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ABSTRACT
When a ship gets into difficulties, one of the main options of an owner or master is to seek to
put into sheltered waters where the difficulties can be remedied or minimised before proceeding
on the voyage. This place is referred to as a ‘Place of Refuge’. Since 1999, there have been
three major incidents involving ships, laden with crude oil and other hazardous cargoes,
requesting and being refused access to places of refuge. In two of these cases, involving the
Erika and the Prestige, the ships subsequently sank and caused severe pollution damage. In the
third, involving the Castor, a disaster was narrowly avoided.
The primary aims of this thesis are to address the issues that arose from the three incidents, to
analyse the two proposals to deal with these issues, namely, voluntary Guidelines issued by the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the proposal by the Comite Maritime
International (CMI) for a discrete convention on places of refuge and assess their adequacy to
deal with future incidents. In doing so, the thesis assesses the manner in which the problem of
places of refuge is treated, first, under international law; second, on the international level, by
international bodies such as IMO, CMI and shipping industry bodies; third, at the national level,
by Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom; and fourth, at the regional level, by the
European Union and regional arrangements for the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.
Any proposal for reform in the area of places of refuge must inevitably encounter and attempt to
balance two firmly entrenched and largely incompatible positions. Shipping interests involved
in the success of the marine adventure have a strong interest in preserving the vessel through
timely intervention in a place of refuge. Coastal States have an equally strong interest in
preserving their national waters and territory from pollution damage and their populations from
danger from hazardous cargoes. To date, the task of trying to balance these varying interests,
either through existing laws and institutions or through the solutions proposed by the IMO and
CMI, has proved to be difficult. Additionally, there are a number of factors which could
influence the way in which coastal States respond to requests for access. These include the age
and condition of the world fleet; the failure of flag State control, port State control and
classification societies to detect substandard shipping; and the failure of current international
conventions to cover all aspects of possible damage to places of refuge.
The conclusion of the thesis is that there is, currently, no complete answer to the problem of
places of refuge since the necessary balance of interests is absent in the current proposed
solutions. This balance must be found and factors influencing the decision of coastal States to
grant access must be addressed. The problem of places of refuge is likely to persist until this
occurs.
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INTRODUCTION
When dealing with ships in distress, the requirement is to find them sheltered water
where the situation can be stabilised, the cargo made safe and the salvors and
authorities can evaluate what further steps are necessary without the pressure of a
crisis over their heads. The concern of port authorities that they should not be exposed
to the risks of pollution, fire or explosion is well understood and is in no way
challenged. But, equally, this is an issue which will not go away and must be addressed.
We cannot continue to permit a situation to unfold in which salvors dealing with a
1
damaged vessel containing a potentially hazardous cargo have nowhere to go.
William O’Neil, Secretary-General, International Maritime Organisation, May 2001.

When a ship gets into difficulties, one of the main options of an owner or master is to
seek to put into sheltered waters where the difficulties can be remedied or minimised
before proceeding on the voyage. This place is known as a ‘place of refuge’ which has
been defined as ‘a place where a ship in need of assistance can take action to stabilise its
condition, reduce the hazard to navigation, protect human life and the environment.’2 A
place of refuge can theoretically be located anywhere in the jurisdiction of a coastal
State including a port or other place in internal waters, an anchorage or roadstead in the
territorial sea or even a location within the exclusive economic zone. The essential
criterion is that the place must be somewhere where a ship can go to ‘take action to
stabilise its condition, reduce the hazard to navigation, protect human life and the
environment.’3 In practical terms, the great majority of suitable places of refuge are
within the internal waters or territorial sea of a coastal State.
‘Places of refuge’ is currently an important issue in maritime circles because of an
apparent change to what had been long accepted as customary international law of the
sea, namely that requests for a place of refuge are rarely, if ever, refused.4 Since the
1970s coastal states have begun to refuse refuge to ships in distress, particularly to ships
carrying oil or other dangerous cargoes. Since 1999, there have been three major
incidents involving ships, laden with crude oil and other hazardous cargoes, requesting
1

Speech given by Mr. W.A. O'Neil, Secretary-General of IMO to the International Association of Ports
and Harbours (IAPH), Montreal (Canada), 19-26 May 2001 <www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.
asp?topic_id=82&doc_id=1016>.
2
IMO Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 949(23) Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of
Assistance adopted on 5 December 2003, Annex Article 1.19 (IMO Guidelines).
3
IMO Guidelines Article 1.19.
4
Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 3-4.
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and being refused access to places of refuge. In two of these cases, the Erika and the
Prestige, the ships subsequently sank and caused severe pollution damage. In the third,
the Castor, a disaster was narrowly avoided.
The words of the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
quoted above sum up the present day conflict between the interests of coastal States and
shipping interests in relation to ships in need of assistance and the significance of
finding an answer to the problem. The words were spoken soon after the successful
conclusion to the odyssey of the Castor which had for forty days sailed the waters of the
Mediterranean Sea seeking a place of refuge having been consistently refused access by
seven separate coastal States on the basis that it would put their ports and their
populations in danger.
Any proposal for reform must inevitably encounter two firmly entrenched and largely
incompatible positions. On the one hand shipowners and the various parties involved in
the success of the marine adventure such as charterers, cargo owners, insurers, masters
and crew and salvors have a strong interest in preserving the ship through timely
intervention in a place of refuge. Allied to these interests are the interests of the flag
State, the port States and the classification societies which play a role in ensuring the
ship is kept in a seaworthy condition. On the other hand, coastal States through their
port authorities and national governments have an equally strong interest in preserving
their waters and territory from pollution damage and their populations from danger from
hazardous cargoes. In this the demands of environmentalists, coastal communities,
politicians and media play a major role.
The fate of the Castor and other similar cases, such as the Erika in 1999 and the
Prestige in 2002, exemplify the inadequacies of existing international law, both under
treaty and customary international law, when faced with a ship needing a place of
refuge but carrying with it the potential to damage or pollute the place in which refuge
is sought. There was at the time and continues to be no obligation under international
law for coastal States to grant access to their ports either to ships in general or, with
very limited exceptions, to ships in distress. Since 1999, and particularly since the
sinking of the Prestige in November 2002, this inadequacy in international law has been
recognised by the IMO and other international organisations as well as by various
coastal States and the European Union. Action has been taken at national, regional and
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international levels to prevent similar disasters by changing the treatment given to
requests for access to places of refuge by ships in distress.
The task of trying to reconcile the varying interests and demands through existing laws
and institutions has proved to be difficult, if not impossible. The attempts to reconcile
the various interests are evident in the main solutions proposed for the problem of
places of refuge. There are currently two main suggested solutions to the problem, one
of which is in operation and one that is a proposal. The first has been put forward by the
IMO in the form of voluntary guidelines which are designed to provide a framework
within which a decision on a request for access to a place of refuge can be assessed
according to various risk factors. As there is no obligation to grant access and use of the
IMO Guidelines is voluntary, they would initially appear to favour coastal States. The
alternate proposal has been put forward by the Comite Maritime International (CMI)5 in
the form of a binding international convention under which coastal States are obliged to
grant access to a place of refuge and contains provisions to deal with any unintended
damage consequent upon such access. In form, the proposal appears to favour shipping
interests. While both approaches attempt to provide a balance between the competing
interests, both have significant defects that could threaten this balance and lead to States
failing to adopt or properly apply either or both solutions.
Both of the solutions presently proposed could potentially provide an appropriate
answer to the places of refuge problem but there is still great scope for either or both
solutions to fail to receive sufficient support from coastal States and the shipping
industry. The reasons for this fall outside the actual wording and intent of the
instruments themselves. Other factors can and do influence the willingness of coastal
States to subject their waters, national territory, environment and populations to the
risks associated with granting access to a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance.
These factors include the age and design of ships carrying oil and other noxious
substances, the lack of confidence of coastal States in the industry regulators due to past
failures in the Erika and Prestige, and, most importantly, the failure of the IMO
Guidelines and the international conventions dealing with liability and compensation to
provide compensation to the coastal States for all the damage that could be caused by
5

The Comite Maritime International (CMI) was founded in 1897, is based in Antwerp and is made up of
national and multinational Associations of Maritime Law. The primary purpose for the establishment of
CMI was to codify the whole body of international maritime law.
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granting access to ships in need of assistance. All these factors need to be addressed at
the same time as implementing either or both of the proposed solutions. Failure to do so
could influence whether or not coastal States apply the IMO Guidelines at all or, if they
do, whether they are applied properly and, in the event of the CMI draft Instrument
becoming a convention, whether or not coastal States will sign it.
The problem of places of refuge is on going and needs to be addressed as it is inevitable
that the catastrophes will continue unless a proper solution is put in place. The
inadequacy of current approaches highlights the need for other solutions to be devised
to resolve the differences between shipowners and coastal States.
HYPOTHESIS
Following on the background provided above, the hypothesis that is proposed in this
thesis is that the current approaches to dealing with the problems associated with places
of refuge for ships in distress are inadequate and that a new approach is required.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
To establish the hypothesis, the primary aims of this thesis are to address the issues that
arose from the Castor, the Erika and the Prestige, and to examine and analyse the two
main proposals to deal with this conflict of interests – use of the set of voluntary
guidelines drawn up by the IMO and the proposal drawn up by CMI for a separate,
discrete convention on places of refuge. Since neither solution is viable unless a number
of other relevant factors influencing the adoption and implementation of either or both
proposed solutions are addressed, the thesis will also examine and assess these factors.
The aims of the thesis will be achieved by way of four objectives.
The first objective is to establish that the problems concerning places of refuge are
significant and current. This will be achieved in two ways. First, the concept of places
of refuge will be defined and placed in its historical, legal and physical contexts.
Second, the problems associated with the application of the concept will be clearly
articulating by reviewing the cases of Erika, Castor and Prestige and detailing the
extent and complexity of the problems by reviewing and analysing the competing roles
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of the parties and the various interests involved. This review will clearly establish that
the problems are ongoing and that they urgently require a solution.
The second objective is to review the places of refuge problem in the context of
international law to ascertain if there exists in international law a general right of access
to ports and, if not, whether there is a specific right of access to ports by ships in
distress. If such a right does exist either generally or specifically for ships in distress,
the answer to the problem of places of refuge lies in the enforcement of these
international obligations.
The third objective is to examine the way in which the problem of places of refuge is
currently addressed internationally, regionally and nationally. On the international level,
this will be achieved by examining and assessing the current approach taken by the
IMO, CMI, the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and international
shipping industry organisations. At the national level, this will entail a consideration of
the present policy towards places of refuge in Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom. At the regional level, the approach to the problem adopted by the European
Union and such arrangements as the Bonn Agreement for the North Sea and HELCOM
Agreement for the Baltic Sea will be reviewed.
The fourth objective involves a detailed analysis of the two current proposals to remedy
the problem and external factors which may influence the way these remedies might be
put into practice. The approach to achieving this objective consists of a critical
evaluation of the IMO Guidelines and the proposed CMI draft Instrument, as well as an
analysis of the external factors that may have an impact on the implementation of both
proposed solutions.
METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS
The thesis, therefore, falls roughly into answering three questions – What is the
problem? What is being done internationally, nationally and regionally to address the
problem? What can be put in place to overcome any inadequacy in the current
approaches?
A thorough assessment of the problem is essential to any proper understanding of the
current and proposed approaches being adopted at the international, national and
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regional levels and putting them in the wider context of minimising damage by oil
pollution. The assessment involves both primary and secondary materials in a number
of fields, especially industry publications and newspapers, scientific literature and legal
literature.
To properly assess the adequacy of current international, national and regional methods
of dealing with the issue of places of refuge, it is necessary to fully review primary
resources such as treaties, national legislation, court decisions and policy documentation
as well as relevant secondary materials.
The assessment of the possible solutions to the problem will rely mainly on a review of
existing secondary resources. However, as the current resources are sparser than for the
other areas of research in the thesis, the assessment of the possible solutions will be
made more by the application of original analysis. This is particularly true of the review
and assessment of the CMI draft Instrument on which, to date, little has been written.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Chapter one of the thesis considers the concept of ‘place of refuge’ in historical terms
and puts it into the context of what could be called the ‘places of refuge problem’, since
it vital to understand what a place of refuge is and what purpose it plays. The chapter
then reviews the various elements of a place of refuge and the rights that historically
have been claimed by ships in distress. A detailed analysis of three of the most recent
major incidents involving places of refuge, the Erika, Castor and Prestige, is then made
to highlight the various interests at play in the problem. These interests are then
examined in detail to show how the complex interplay between the essentially
commercial and public interests makes the current places of refuge problem so difficult
and intractable.
Chapter two assesses the existence or otherwise of a general regime on access to ports
in international law. This assessment must be performed before the question of access
by ships in need of assistance is considered, since, if there is a general right of ships to
access ports this subsumes any question of access to ships in need of assistance. An
understanding of the place and status of ports in international law both under treaty and
customary international law is integral to the examination of any claim to access them.
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This is equally relevant whether such access is sought due to distress or otherwise. The
first part of the chapter examines the powers exercisable by a coastal State over its
internal waters and ports. The second part of the chapter analyses whether or not there
exists in international law a general right for ships to access the ports of a sovereign
coastal State. This involves an examination of treaty obligations and customary
international law.
Chapter three examines whether there exists in international law a right for ships in need
of assistance to access a place of refuge in addition to any general right of access. As
with the question of whether there exists a general right of access to ports, an answer to
this question must be obtained to determine whether there is a need to address the
question of places of refuge any further. As with chapter two, whether any right of
access to a place of refuge for ships in distress exists necessarily involves an
examination of the validity of this argument under treaty and customary international
law.
Chapter four of the thesis analyses the responses to the problem of places of refuge at
the international level by examining and evaluating the approaches taken by
international organisations. This includes the IMO as well as other non-government
organisations such as CMI and IAPH. This chapter will particularly address one of the
two main proposals have been advanced at the international level as an answer to the
places of refuge problem – the set of voluntary guidelines drafted by the IMO. The first
part of chapter four will review the evolution and contents of the IMO Guidelines and
will assess and evaluate their potential to resolve the problem of places of refuge. The
second part of the chapter will review the contributions of CMI, IAPH and other
industry organisations to the development of IMO Guidelines. The alternative proposal
by CMI for a discrete new convention will be examined and assessed in chapter seven.
Chapter five assesses the national approaches taken by Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom and the degree to which these countries import the IMO Guidelines into their
national legislation and policy decisions. Since any proposal by an international body
can only be implemented by national legislation, it is necessary to examine the policy
and legislation of these coastal States to determine what approaches are being taken and
to assess their relative merits. The main objective of this assessment is to see if there is
any consistency of approach to the implementation of the IMO Guidelines.
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Chapter six considers the regional, rather than the international or national level
approach to the problem. This involves a review and evaluation of the actions of the
European Union in addressing the issues pertaining to places of refuge in European
waters as well as two regional arrangements, the Bonn Agreement for the North Sea and
HELCOM Agreement for the Baltic Sea, to assess their suitability for this purpose.
Chapter seven deals with the second of the proposed solutions, namely, the need for a
separate convention to deal with the problem of places of refuge. This will be done both
conceptually and in light of the contents of the draft Instrument developed by CMI. It
will involve an examination of the competing arguments on the necessity for a new
convention to deal exclusively with places of refuge, an analysis of what such a
convention should contain (using the current CMI draft Instrument as a starting point), a
critical examination of the current CMI draft Instrument, an analysis of the inherent
strengths and weaknesses of a convention dealing with places of refuge and conclusions
on whether and to what extent such a new convention would provide a satisfactory
resolution to the problem of places of refuge.
Chapter eight considers a number of external factors which may influence a coastal
State in responding to a request by a ship in need of assistance for access to a place of
refuge, regardless of whether either of the two proposed solutions is implemented. Since
it is the coastal State which ultimately makes the decision on granting access to places
of refuge, the object of this analysis is to assess to what extent a failure to address these
external factors could undermine the adoption of the IMO Guidelines or the proper
application of them or, ultimately, the adoption of any international convention which
may flow from the CMI draft Instrument. This firstly involves an examination of the
roles and varying interests of ship owners, flag States, port States and classification
societies in ensuring that ships are constructed and maintained in such a way as to
minimise the possibility of them requiring a place of refuge and the failures of these
parties to properly perform their roles in light of the experiences of the Erika, Castor
and Prestige. It will also assess proposals put forward both by the parties and by the
IMO and the European Union on how to improve both the condition of ships and the
efficiency of the conduct of the examining parties in the performance of their inspection
roles so that any coastal State can have more confidence that any ship that requests a
place of refuge is seaworthy and properly inspected and certified. Second, this chapter
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will examine and assess the adequacy of the current international conventions that deal
with the issues of liability and compensation for damage done to ports and other places
of refuge by ships in need of assistance, whether such access is granted or not, to
determine to what extent a coastal State granting access to a place of refuge could be
liable for damage caused by the ship to which access has been granted. Finally, the
chapter will consider what influences could be brought to bear on coastal States to
accept and apply the IMO Guidelines.
Chapter nine synthesises the analysis of the earlier chapters to ascertain whether or not
the evidence presented establishes the hypothesis that current methods of dealing with
the problems associated with places of refuge for ships in distress are inadequate and
that a new approach is required. As the conclusion reached in chapter nine is that the
hypothesis is established, the chapter then makes recommendations on ways in which
the current proposals to remedy the problem of places of refuge can be improved and
enhanced.

SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE FIELD
Places of refuge has had a high profile particularly since the Erika sinking in 1999 and
the problems created by the Erika, Castor and Prestige and similar incidents has
prompted successive Secretaries General of the IMO as well as the Comite Maritime
International, the International Association of Ports and Harbors and other shipping
industry organisations to constantly highlight the need for a solution to the ‘places of
refuge problem’ to be found.
The significance of this thesis and its contribution to knowledge of places of refuge is
twofold.
First, it provides needed policy guidance by bringing together the legal issues and
providing a comparative analysis of proposed solutions which has been lacking to date.
While there has been substantial reporting of the problems and identification of
individual issues involved in the ‘places of refuge problem’ as well as some significant
analysis of legal issues, there has been little comparative analysis of the proposed
solutions. By providing this comparative analysis, this thesis will make a significant
contribution to current fragmented literature on the subject.
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Second, the thesis fills the gaps in the literature on the topic of places of refuge. The
existing literature on places of refuge is to a great degree fragmented, scattered and
dated. One major anthology containing essays on a number of aspects of the problem of
places of refuge is contained in a publication edited by Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden
which largely flowed from a research project conducted at the World Maritime
University between 2004 and 2005.6 Other than this publication, only a few articles
have been published recently which directly deal with the topic of places of refuge.
There has been little detailed analysis of the IMO Guidelines or the CMI draft
Instrument and little has been written on more recent changes to the situation in Canada,
Australia and the European Union. Much of the literature on the subject has become
dated and significant changes have been made to the way in which the problem is
treated nationally, regionally and internationally. This thesis contributes to knowledge
in the field by updating analysis of such changes. This is particularly true of recent
changes made by Australia, Canada and the European Union in relation to the
introduction and implementation of guidelines, of the IMO in implementing the IMO
Guidelines and CMI in proposing a significant alternative to the IMO Guidelines. This
thesis brings together these advancements and analyses their significance.

6

Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).

11

CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM OF PLACES OF REFUGE

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the place of refuge in historical terms and puts it into the context
of what could be called the ‘places of refuge problem’. In doing so, a number of issues,
some of which are considered in greater detail in later chapters, are introduced and
discussed.
First, the chapter discusses what a place of refuge is and addresses the rights that
historically have been claimed by ships in distress when they are in need of a place of
refuge.
Second, the chapter reviews the changes that have occurred to the place of refuge
custom, particularly over the last sixty years, and the reasons for the changes. To
illustrate the changes the chapter addresses in detail the circumstances surrounding the
three most recent major incidents involving places of refuge – the Erika, the Castor and
the Prestige.
Third, the chapter identifies the interests that play a role in the place of refuge problem
and assesses how the complex interplay between these essentially commercial and
public interests make the current ‘places of refuge problem’ so difficult and intractable.

1.

What is a Place of Refuge?

The concept of what is now called a place of refuge for ships in distress has existed for
over 2000 years. It has been described as ‘firmly entrenched and time hallowed’.1 It is
only in the last two centuries that, for various reasons, increased notice has been given
to what it is and what it attempts to do.2 These reasons, which are more fully discussed
1

Derry Devine, ‘Ships in Distress – A Judicial Contribution from the South Atlantic’ (1996) 20 Marine
Policy 229, 229; Ben Browne, ‘Places of Refuge – The IUMI Solution’ (Paper presented at IUMI
Conference, Seville, 16 September 2003) 1 <www.iumi.com/index.cfm?id=7200>; Phillip Jessup, The
Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (GA Jennings, 1927) 208.
2
Aldo Chircop, ‘Ships in Distress, Environmental Threats to Coastal State and Places of Refuge: New
Directions for an Ancien Regime?’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 207, 212.
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later in this chapter, include changes to the shipping and salvage industries, the increase
in environmental consciousness and the consequent development of international
environmental law and the concurrent changes to maritime law.
The term ‘place of refuge’ is a relatively new one. In past centuries the basis of the term
has been described in such ways as haven, sanctuary, asylum, harbour, shelter, place of
safety and port of refuge.3 All these terms encapsulate various aspects of the custom but
a common theme running through them all is danger and the need to protect ships and
crew from such danger. The formulation often used to express this danger is events that
arise from force majeure. This term imports the concept of irresistibility of the event
and the involuntariness and lack of choice given to a master and crew when faced with
such dangers. Similarly, in marine insurance terms, the exception of ‘Act of God’
reflects the idea that such events are beyond human control. In the days of sail, such
dangers included events such as severe weather conditions, damage to sails and other
navigational equipment, serious depletion of water and stores, attacks by pirates and
privateers, mutiny by crew or passengers and disease. Such events bring about a state of
‘distress’ to the ship and, consequently, danger to the crew. This humanitarian aspect is
the true basis for the custom and the willingness of coastal States to accept ships in
distress when they would otherwise be entitled to refuse access.4
For many years the term ‘port of refuge’ was commonly used in the shipping industry to
describe a location where a ship in distress could seek shelter.5 This term was not used
in any relevant international convention and the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO), when drafting its Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of
Assistance6 (IMO Guidelines), decided that a better term was ‘place of refuge’ since it
better described geographical areas in which services and facilities for ships in distress

3

Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 6.
4
Alan Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law’ (1976-1977) 14 San
Diego Law Review 597, 610.
5
Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 6-7.
6
IMO Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 949(23) Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of
Assistance adopted on 5 December 2003 (IMO Guidelines).
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could be provided. It was reasoned that the use of the word ‘port’ was too
geographically restrictive, particularly when oil tankers were involved.7
The IMO Guidelines sum up the current view of the elements and purpose of a place of
refuge. In the IMO Guidelines, a ‘place of refuge’ is defined as ‘a place where a ship in
need of assistance can take action to stabilise its condition, reduce the hazard to
navigation, protect human life and the environment.’8 However, this definition does not
apply to all ships as only ‘ships in need of assistance’ are covered. ‘Ships in need of
assistance’ are defined as ‘ships in a situation, apart from one requiring rescue of
persons on board, that could give rise to a loss of the ship or an environmental or
navigational hazard.’9
While the definition in the IMO Guidelines does highlight that there must be an element
of danger, either of the ship sinking or damage being caused to the environment, it is
important to note that the requisite condition is that the ship must only be ‘in need of
assistance’ and not necessarily in a state of ‘distress’.10 This is wider than the traditional
formulation of ‘ship in distress’, which was the requirement in earlier centuries.11 The
traditional ‘distress’ involved an element of involuntariness which gave ships in distress
certain rights and privileges on entering port.12 This element would seem to be lacking
in the IMO Guidelines although, in practical terms, the master of a ship in need of
assistance in most cases would have few options other than to seek shelter in a place of
refuge.13

7

MSC, 74th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-fourth Session MSC 74/24
dated 13 June 2001 20; Rosa Roman, ‘Port Perspectives and Environmental Management Considerations’
in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns
of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 119, 121-122.
8
IMO Guidelines Article 1.19.
9
IMO Guidelines Article 1.18.
10
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
38.
11
Ibid.
12
Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and
the Territorial Sea (Springer, 2006) 65; Eric van Hooydonk, ‘The Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge
to a Ship In Distress’ CMI Yearbook 2003 (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 403, 407-408.
13
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
39 - 40.
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The IMO Guidelines are expressly not intended to deal with situations where human life
is in danger.14 The distinction made between rescue of persons on board the ship and
issues involving the ship itself, highlights one of the reasons for the present problem
with places of refuge.15 This distinction between the preservation of life and of property
has appeared, particularly, in the last sixty years.16 The preservation of life is now
reflected in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS),17
and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR
Convention).18 The obligation of coastal States and ships to take steps to rescue people
from ships in distress is now codified in the SAR Convention and this convention is to
be used in preference to the IMO Guidelines.19
While apparently straight forward, the definition in the IMO Guidelines hides within it
the essence of the conflict between shipping interests and coastal State interests.
Shipping interests would emphasise the first two elements, namely the stabilisation of
the ship and the reduction of the hazard to navigation, while coastal States would look
more at the protection of human life and the environment. However, such a definition
must be put into context and should not be applied to all situations. It is made for the
purpose of introducing IMO Guidelines that are designed to deal with requests for a
place of refuge and clearly reflects this purpose in seeking to address the need to
balance the interests of the shipping industry and coastal States.20 Nevertheless, it is a
convenient starting point for the examination of what a place of refuge is and what it
entails.
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IMO Guidelines Articles 1.1, 1.13-1.17.
Aldo Chircop, ‘Ships in Distress, Environmental Threats to Coastal State and Places of Refuge: New
Directions for an Ancien Regime?’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 207, 215.
16
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
34.
17
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184
UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1996) (SOLAS).
18
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, opened for signature 27 April 1979, 1405
UNTS 97 (entered into force 22 June 1985) (SAR Convention).
19
IMO Guidelines Article 1.1.
20
Preamble to IMO Resolution A 949(23) and IMO Guidelines Article 1.7; it has also been adopted in
guidelines issued in national jurisdictions such as the Australian National Maritime Place of Refuge Risk
Assessment Guidelines Article 1.3.1 <http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/
Place_of_Refuge_Guidelines/Refuge_Risk_Assessment_Guidelines.pdf>.
15
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2.

Customary Rights of Ships in Distress

The essential basis of the custom of places of refuge has always been the protection of
human life.21 Before the modern methods of rescuing crew and passengers from a ship
in distress and international conventions dealing with such rescue were developed in the
20th century, the safety of human life on board a ship was intimately connected with the
safety of the ship itself. In practical terms, this meant that saving or protecting life on a
ship in distress also meant saving or protecting the ship by permitting it to access a
place of refuge.22
The rights that accrued to a ship entering a port in distress have been developed over
many centuries. They include the right to be received and treated hospitably; the right to
repair the ship at domestic prices and in so doing to load and reload cargo as necessary;
the right to revictual and bring on fresh water at reasonable prices; in exceptional cases,
the right to sell part of the cargo to defray repair costs, subject to paying duties on such
cargo; and, ultimately, the right to depart the port, once repaired and resupplied, without
hindrance.23 Ships in distress were exempted from all customs duties which would
normally be levied on cargo carried on board a ship when it entered a port, unless sold
to defray costs.24 They were also exempted from the jurisdiction of the coastal State in
relation to offences that had been committed on board, except offences that had been
committed while within the port or the jurisdiction of the coastal State.25
As will be seen in chapter three, from the late 17th Century on, these rights were
commonly contained in bilateral treaties of ‘Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’,
but even before this there was evidence of these rights being granted under maritime
21

Derry Devine, ‘Ships in Distress – A Judicial Contribution from the South Atlantic’ (1996) 20 Marine
Policy 229, 229; Alan Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law’
(1976-1977) 14 San Diego Law Review 597, 610; Sophie Caggiaguidi-Fahy, ‘The Law of the Sea and
Human Rights’ (2007) 19 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 85, 85.
22
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
33.
23
Andreas Constantinou, ‘Places of Refuge – a Myth or a Reality?’ 2 <www.martrans.org:8093/
symposium/papers/Track%20A/A42%20constantinou.pdf>; Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of
Refuge for Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships –
Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 227.
24
Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and
the Territorial Sea (Springer, 2006) 65-67; Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in
Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental
Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 228.
25
Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and
the Territorial Sea (Springer, 2006) 65-67.
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codes. These rights accrued to all ships including warships, even where the flag State
and the coastal State were at war.26
The rights were of great value to ships in distress, as, without them, the ships and their
cargo, and, in earlier centuries, their crews, would have been liable to seizure and sale
for violation of local laws, particularly for entering port without consent.27 Accordingly,
whether or not a ship was genuinely in distress was an important consideration for port
authorities.28
Entry of a ship in distress into a port gave rights and liberties to the ship but also
imposed responsibilities and obligations on the master and crew of the ship in distress
and seeking shelter. Of primary importance was the obligation placed on the master of a
ship claiming distress, and therefore the rights that flowed from such condition, to
establish clearly that such distress was valid and not simply an attempt to circumvent
local laws.29 This obligation was clearly expounded by Lord Stowell in the case of The
Eleanor30 in 1805 where he held that entry into an otherwise closed port was only
available where the ship was in distress.31 The requisite distress was described:
It must be an urgent distress; it must be something of grave necessity; such as is spoken
of in our books, where a ship is said to be driven in by stress of weather. It is not
sufficient to say it was done to avoid a little bad weather, or in consequence of foul
winds, the danger must be such as to cause apprehension in the mind of an honest and
firm man … Then again, where the party justifies the act upon the plea of distress, it
must not be a distress which he has created himself, by putting on board an insufficient
quantity of water or of provisions for such a voyage, for there the distress is only a part
of the mechanism of the fraud, and cannot be set up in excuse for it; and in the next
place the distress must be proved by the claimant in a clear and satisfactory manner. …

26

Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden
(eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 190-191.
27
Stanley Jados, Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents vii <http:/libro.uca.edu/consulate/
preface.htm>; a good example of the risks of seizure is The Eleanor (1809) Edw. 135, where the ship was
seized because it failed to satisfy Lord Stowell that it had entered the port of Halifax in distress in prima
facie violation of a prohibition against trade between the United States and the British North American
territories.
28
Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden
(eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 192.
29
Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and
the Territorial Sea (Springer, 2006) 68-69.
30
The Eleanor (1809) Edw. 135.
31
Ibid 161.
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Real and irresistible distress must be at all times a sufficient passport for human beings
32
under and such application of human laws.

Provided that distress could be substantiated, ships in distress would be entitled to the
rights that custom had established over centuries, and which had been covered by
bilateral treaties until well into the 20th Century.33
3.

Changes to the Custom of Granting Refuge to Ships in Distress

Little changed with the granting of refuge to ships in distress until about sixty years ago
when coastal States began to question their obligation to provide refuge to ships in
distress particularly where there was no risk to the crew and where the ship and its cargo
had the potential to seriously damage the environment or economy of the coastal
State.34
As will be set out in more detail in chapter three , the right of a ship in distress to access
a port is still customary international law but it appears that this custom is now limited
to situations where preservation of human life is involved.35 The development of search
and rescue methods and capacity meant that passengers and crew could be rescued from
a ship in distress without necessarily having to rescue the ship itself.36
The preservation of property has taken a different turn in recent years. In more recent
times, the development of the law of salvage has had the effect of separating the two
elements of human life and property.37 Salvage and the earning of a salvage reward
have tended to create the notion that the saving of property is a commercial operation
and is no longer part of the general custom of providing assistance to ships in distress.38

32

Ibid 161. This decision is still relevant and has been followed since by the courts in the United States,
Canada and, as recently as 1992, in the English Courts.
33
The use of this type of treaty continued until the 1960s.
34
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
34.
35
Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 16.
36
Notably the SAR Convention.
37
Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden
(eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 222-223.
38
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
Requesting and Granting of Refuge’ (2004) 3 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31,
34; Michael Grey, ‘No Refuge in my back yard!’ (2001) 96/1 BIMCO Bulletin 18, 18.
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In the contemporary context, some coastal States have now prioritised the humanitarian
and environmental protection responsibilities over and above the saving of property. In
such a context, once the crew of a ship is rescued, there is no continuing duty towards
the ship and cargo.39
While it is true to say that many instances of a request for refuge are granted without
incident,40 the fact that it is now requested as a matter of course41 and the fact that
coastal States refuse an increasing number of requests, are indicative of a major shift in
the custom.42 The most spectacular episodes of refusal of refuge which receive great
publicity43 are still the exception rather than the norm but they are becoming more
frequent and the resultant pollution damage is becoming larger, particularly since the
early 1970s.44 A few early examples of refusals of refuge show the increasing trend and
the fact that the problem is not a new one.45
In 1978 the Urquiola was slightly damaged in a grounding and sought refuge in the port
of La Coruna in Spain. Access was refused and the ship was ordered by the port
authorities to go 200 miles offshore. In so doing the ship grounded again and became

39

Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 16; the decision of Barr J in the case in the High Court of
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Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with Ships in Distress – A New IMO Decision-Making Framework for the
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stranded, was abandoned by all but the pilot and master and exploded killing those on
board and causing a spill of approximately 110,000 tons of oil.46
Also in 1978, the Christos Bitas ran aground near Milford Haven in Wales and refloated
itself but rather than ordering it into Milford Haven, the Coastguard requested that it
proceed into the Irish Sea even though it was in a damaged state and leaking oil. It was
intercepted by the Royal Navy and towed into Irish waters off Wexford where the cargo
of oil was offloaded and the ship was towed out to deep water and sunk.47 While this
was not a refusal as such, the failure to order the ship into port had the same effect.
Again in 1978, the Andros Patria while carrying 208,000 tons of oil suffered a crack in
the cargo tanks off Spain and quickly lost 50,000 tons of oil. Requests for refuge were
refused by Spain, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom. The crew was airlifted off
and the salvors were able to unload the cargo off the Azores.48
In 1979, the Atlantic Empress collided with the Aegean Captain off Tobago resulted in
a spill of 287,000 tons, still one of the largest on record. After the collision, the Atlantic
Empress was refused refuge in Tobago and towed out to sea where it exploded and
sank.49
There are many other incidents but these examples show that, if there ever was, there is
no longer a recognition of an automatic right of entry into a place of refuge for ships in

46

Jack Devanney, ‘The Consequences of Providing and refusing Refuge’ Center for Tankship Excellence
1-2 <www.c4tx.org/ctx/public/refuge.pdf>; <http://www.cedre.fr/uk/spill/urquiola/urquiola.htm>.
47
Toby Stone, ‘The Experience of the United Kingdom’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places
of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006)
429, 452-453; Jack Devanney, ‘The Consequences of Providing and refusing Refuge’ Center for
Tankship Excellence 1-2 <www.c4tx.org/ctx/public/refuge.pdf>; George Kasoulides, ‘Vessels in
Distress: Safe Have for Crippled Tankers’ (1987) 11 Marine Policy 184, 185. Interestingly, it appears that
there was some doubt as to whether and when the Irish Government had been informed see Dail Eireann
Debates Volume 308, 17 October 1978 <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0308/D.0308.197810
170062.html>.
48
Jack Devanney, ‘The Consequences of Providing and refusing Refuge’ Center for Tankship Excellence
2 <www.c4tx.org/ctx/public/refuge.pdf>; George Kasoulides, ‘Vessels in Distress: Safe Have for
Crippled Tankers’ (1987) 11 Marine Policy 184, 185; Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for
Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 215; Mark Cohen,
‘Travails of the Flying Dutchmen – Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement and the US Salvage
Industry’ (1982) 6 Marine Policy 265, 270-271.
49
Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge: International Law in the Making’ (2003) 9 Journal of International
Maritime Law 159, 159; Dennis Bryant, ‘U.S. Policy Regarding Places of Refuge’ (October 2007)
Maritime Reporter 18.

20

distress.50 This is not to say access is not granted and, indeed, there is an equally long
list of such cases which, if anything, is underreported because there is no significant
impact on the place of refuge.51 However, it was not until the sinking of the Erika in
1999 and the subsequent incidents of the Castor in 2000 and Prestige in 2002 that
concerted action was taken in relation to places of refuge.52
What caused the change in the custom and the split between the humanitarian and
property aspects of the customary law on refuge is a matter of conjecture, but it would
appear that the change has been brought about by various factors including, at least, the
simultaneous growth of the shipping industry, the growth of environmental
consciousness with consequent changes to international environmental law from 1972
and changes to international maritime law, particularly from 1982, and the combined
effect of all these developments on the law and practice of the salvage industry.53
Changes to the Shipping Industry
The growth of the shipping industry in both the size of ships and the type of cargo since
the end of World War II is closely connected with the change in attitude by coastal
States to any obligations they may have had to grant a place of refuge to ships in
distress. Particularly since the 1950s there has been a massive increase in the size of oil
tankers carrying up to 500,000 tons of cargo with the increased potential of pollution,
particularly oil pollution.54 This coincided with an increasing number of serious
pollution incidents, the growing awareness of the effects of pollution on coastal States
and international efforts to combat such pollution.55 This trend was aptly described by
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Lord Mustill in Semco Salvage and Marine Pte Ltd v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd; The
Nagasaki Spirit56:
Crude oil and its products have been moved around the world by sea in large quantities
for many years, and the risk that cargo or fuel escaping from a distressed vessel would
damage the flora and fauna of the sea and shore, and would impregnate the shoreline
itself, was always present; but so long as the amount carried by a single vessel was
comparatively small, such incidents as did happen were not large enough to attract
widespread attention. This changed with the prodigious increase in the capacity of crude
oil carriers which began some three decades ago, carrying with it the possibility of a
disaster whose consequences might extend far beyond the loss of the imperilled goods
and cargo. Such a disaster duly happened, at a time when public opinion was already
becoming sensitive to assaults on the integrity of the natural environment. Cargo
escaping from the wreck of the Torry[sic]Canyon off the Scillies caused widespread
contamination of sea, foreshore and wild life. The resulting concern and indignation
were sharpened when the Amoco Cadiz laden with 220,000 tons of crude oil stranded on
57
the coast of France, causing pollution on an even larger scale…

As discussed later in this chapter, this growth in the size of ships and the corresponding
increase in cargoes had serious effects on the salvage industry which is central to the
preservation of ships in distress.58
In relation to oil transportation, economies of scale and the cost and increased demand
for crude oil after 1945 resulted in an exponential growth in the size of oil tankers.59 In
1945 the average size of an oil tanker was 16,000 dwt.60 By 1955 this has increased to
55,000 dwt and the first 100,000 dwt tanker was launched in 1959.61 From then to the
early mid 1970s the size rapidly increased to over 500,000 dwt.62 By the end of the
1980s over 60% of oil tankers exceeded 125,000 dwt and 45% exceeded 200,000 dwt.63
Geopolitical events also contributed to the rapid development of tankers. The 1956 Suez
War affected trade through the Suez Canal64 and the closure of the Suez Canal between
1967 and 1975 resulted in the need to transport oil around the Cape of Good Hope. This
factor influenced the development of larger ships to justify the longer journey. Even
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after the Suez Canal was reopened in 1975 many of the larger ships could no longer
navigate it or other shallower channels such as the Straits of Dover, the Malacca Strait
and the Bosporus.65
Other relevant demand factors included the change of policy from transporting refined
oil to transporting crude oil which reduced the need for sophisticated ships,66 the change
in the United States from being an exporter of oil to being an importer,67 the rapid
increase in both the price of crude oil and the freight rates in the early 1970s68 and the
increase in refinery size and storage capacity at destination.69
All the factors noted above increased the demand for crude oil which increased supply
and the need for transportation at a cheaper rate.70 The resultant development of much
larger tankers such as the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) of 200,000-300,000 dwt to
transport oil mainly in the Mediterranean, West Africa and the North Sea, and the Ultra
Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) from 300,000 dwt to in excess of 500,000 dwt to transport
crude from the Arabian Gulf to Europe, North America and the Far East,71 not only
increased the volume of trade but also the risk of significant damage to the environment
in the event of disaster.72
Significant disasters involving oil tankers started to occur in the 1960s, the most
damaging one being the grounding of the Torrey Canyon in the Scilly Isles off Cornwall
in 1967. This was the first major case involving a large oil tanker which caused
significant environmental damage from an estimated spill of 120,000 tons of oil. This
incident resulted in the then Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) (now the IMO) bringing into effect substantial changes to existing conventions
dealing with oil pollution, including the International Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL)73 and subsequent conventions dealing
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with compensation and liability.74As indicated earlier, other major incidents occurred
subsequently and included the sinking of the Urquiola off Spain in 1978 (a spill of
110,000 tons), the grounding of the Amoco Cadiz in the Bay of Biscay in 1978 (230,000
tons), the collision between the Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain off Tobago in
1979 (280,000 tons), the grounding of the Exxon Valdez off Alaska in 1989 (36,000
tons), the grounding of the Braer off the Shetland Islands in 1983 (85,000 tons), the
grounding of the Sea Empress in Milford Haven in 1996 (75,000 tons) and, significantly
for the purposes of places of refuge, the sinking of the Erika off France in 1999 (30,000
tons) and the sinking of the Prestige off Spain in 2002 (70,000 tons).75
A number of these spills resulted in either the IMO initiating new conventions76 or
States unilaterally legislating to address the problem. Examples of this unilateral action
include the Oil Pollution Act of 199077 of the United States, passed after the Exxon
Valdez grounding, and the European Union Directives and other measures promulgated
after the Erika sinking.78
While oil spills attract most publicity, there are other sources of pollution from ships.79
The other main category is hazardous and noxious liquid substances (HNS) which have
the capacity to harm human life and the marine environment and includes chemicals,
liquefied gas, explosives, flammable liquids and solids and corrosive substances80 but
not nuclear material or oil.81 Chemical spills are less frequent than oil spills and smaller
in quantity, however, the potential damage by chemicals, even in small doses, is far
greater than oil.82
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Just as potentially harmful as a chemical spill is the risk of explosion and the
consequent damage to port facilities and local populations. As discussed below, it was
the risk of explosion in the case of the Castor that was one of the reasons given for the
ship being refused a place of refuge in seven jurisdictions. In the case of the
Grandcamp, this risk became a reality when a cargo of over 2,000 tons of ammonium
nitrate exploded killing 581 people and causing over $600 million damage in the port of
Texas City in 1947.83
A place of refuge case involving the carriage of chemicals was the Ever Decent. The
ship, which was carrying a cargo of hazardous materials (primarily potassium and
sodium cyanide), was given refuge in Zeebrugge after a collision in the North Sea in
1999. This was granted after a fire had burned for 6 days releasing serious toxic fumes
and with the cooperation of English, French and Belgian authorities.84
The experience in the Grandcamp and subsequent cases concerning the transportation
of HNS85 resulted in the IMO drafting the Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection With the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by
Sea 1996 (HNS Convention).86 This was designed to complement the various
conventions dealing with oil pollution damage that were introduced after the Torrey
Canyon disaster in 1967.87
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As discussed below, what the major oil and chemical incidents over the last forty years
also brought about was an increased public awareness among politicians, media,
environmental groups and the general population of coastal States of the environment in
general and environmental dangers posed by dangerous cargoes being transported along
their coasts in particular.
Growth of Environmental Consciousness and the Development of International
Environmental law
At the same time as developments in the shipping industry were occurring, international
environmental law and the idea of the need to protect the environment were also
growing.88 Since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and
the ensuing Stockholm Declaration of 1972,89 a greater emphasis has been placed by the
international community and States on the protection of the environment, including the
oceans.90 Emerging, fragmented efforts to protect the oceans by States were reinforced
by the Stockholm Declaration and its resolutions,91 particularly Principles 2 and 7 which
state:
The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and
especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as
appropriate.
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

The Stockholm Declaration was followed by the creation of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and expanded on by subsequent United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 199292 the
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Declaration of which emphasised the need for States to ensure that their activities do not
harm the environment.93
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 which flowed from the Rio de Janeiro Conference sought to
reinforce the need for States to protect the environment, including the protection of
oceans, seas and coastal areas.94 The World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002
held in Johannesburg reviewed and built on Agenda 21.95
While this sequence of Conferences and Declarations covered more areas than the
oceans, it gives a clear indication of the growing expectation that States must do more
to protect the environment and an awareness among politicians and populations of such
States that pollution of the environment was a matter of concern.96
Changes to International Maritime Law
While environmental law was developing and in conjunction with these developments,97
the United Nations also undertook a review of the law of the sea culminating in the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (LOSC).98
There had been conventions drafted by the IMO in the 30 years before LOSC dealing
with specific issues in marine pollution. These included the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London
Dumping Convention),99 MARPOL and its predecessor the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 (OILPOL).100 LOSC sought to
address pollution of the marine environment in a more comprehensive manner.101
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LOSC, which came into effect in November 1994, places substantial emphasis on the
marine environment. In particular, Part XII of LOSC sets out in detail the rights and
obligations States have in protecting and preserving the environment.102 Under Part XII
of LOSC there is a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment103
and, in relation to pollution, a specific obligation to take steps to ‘prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment’.104 This latter obligation extends to taking
‘all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and
control of the marine environment from any source…’105 and to ensure that ‘activities
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution
to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or
activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they
exercise sovereign rights…’.106 In particular, the measures are to include measures to
minimise ‘pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing
intentional and unintentional

discharge, and regulating the design, construction,

equipment, operations and manning of vessels;…’.107
Article 218 of LOSC empowers coastal States to investigate pollution incidents in their
territorial waters and EEZ and to bring proceedings in respect of any discharges in
violation of the obligations under LOSC.108 The obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment and the right of coastal States to enforce such obligations is
balanced by Article 220(2) of LOSC under which coastal States are not to use these
measures so as to affect innocent passage of ships in the territorial sea or EEZ of the
coastal State except to the extent that ‘there are clear grounds for believing that [the]
vessel…has during its passage therein, violated’ the pollution laws of the coastal
State.109 This prohibition represents a compromise between the right of innocent
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passage and the rights of the coastal State to regulate navigation and pollution in its
territorial sea and EEZ.110
Changes made by LOSC to coastal State rights to control pollution in the territorial sea
and EEZ have increased the rights of the coastal State to regulate the activities of ships
in distress, particularly where the ship has polluted the territorial sea. It is this right and
duty of a coastal State to protect its environment from pollution that has been used as
the basis for the decisions of the Spanish authorities in two of the most recent place
refuge incidents, the Castor and the Prestige.111
Changes to Salvage Law and the Salvage Industry

The changes to shipping practice, maritime law and the emergence of international
environmental law combined to create serious problems for the salvage industry on
which shipping companies depend to assist ships in distress.112 These problems
revolved around the inadequacy of the Salvage Convention 1910113 to deal with modern
circumstances, particularly the conflict between the requirement for the ship to be
actually saved to gain a salvage reward and the increasing tendency for coastal States to
thwart such success by refusing access to a place of refuge.114 Several high profile
shipping disasters, such as the Torrey Canyon in 1967, involved oil tankers which could
not be rescued resulting in no reward for the salvors.115 This failure to obtain a salvage
reward was becoming common with the increasing number and size of oil tankers and
their cargoes. The failure to change the salvage rules to address the increasing risk of
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salvors being unable to obtain salvage reward resulted in salvors threatening to refuse to
attend to oil tankers in distress.116
The difficulties experienced by the salvage industry in relation to oil tankers and their
cargoes started to be addressed by the IMO in 1979. The main problem with the Salvage
Convention 1910 was the need for success to found a salvage reward. Where, through
no negligence of the salvor, there is no success or partial success or where the salvor is
prevented from completing the salvage, no salvage reward can be awarded.117 The latter
aspect in particular is an important consideration where a place of refuge is refused and
the ship subsequently sinks.118 Therefore, one major reform that was considered was the
provision of a safety net for salvors in relation to tankers with oil as cargo.119 The
resulting International Convention on Salvage, 1989 (Salvage Convention 1989)120
recognised the importance of protecting the environment121 and provided the safety net
to salvors. This was a significant compromise.122
Articles 12, 13 and 14 form the main operative part of the Salvage Convention 1989.123
Article 12 maintains the traditional rule that for salvage reward to be earned, there must
be ‘a useful result’, that is, there must be some degree of success in salving the ship or
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cargo.124 If there is ‘a useful result’, a salvage reward is payable to the salvor. The
amount of the reward is calculated in accordance with the criteria set out in Article
13(1).125 The overriding factor in calculating the reward is set out in Article 13(3) under
which the salvage reward cannot exceed the salved value of the ship and cargo.126 It
follows that if neither the ship nor the cargo is salved, there can be no salvage reward.127
In cases of threatened damage to the environment, Article 14 of the Salvage Convention
1989 provides for a safety net of special consideration for the salvors where no reward
is earned.128 This compensation covers the salvors expenses which include not only out
of pocket expenses but also the cost of equipment and personnel reasonably used.129 It
does not include an element of profit.130 The compensation can be increased by up to
30% where the salvage operations ‘has prevented or minimised damage to the
environment’ and can in some circumstances be increased by a tribunal to a maximum
of 100% of the expenses.131 Article 14 of the Salvage Convention 1989 was considered
by the House of Lords in The Nagasaki Spirit, where Lord Mustill held that Article 14
did not create a new basis for salvage but merely enhanced the benefits available from
the performance of salvage operations. Lord Mustill concluded:
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of article 14 all make it clear that the right to special
compensation depends on the performance of ‘salvage operations’ which, as already
seen, are defined by article 1(a) as operations to assist a vessel in distress. Thus,
although article 14 is undoubtedly concerned to encourage professional salvors to keep
vessels readily available, this is still for the purposes of salvage, for which the primary
incentive remains a traditional salvage award. The only structural change in the scheme
is that the incentive is now made more attractive by the possibility of obtaining new
financial recognition for conferring a new type of incidental benefit. Important as it is,
the remedy under article 14 is subordinate to the reward under article 13, and its
132
functions should not be confused by giving it a character too closely akin to salvage.

124

International Convention on Salvage Article 12(1).
International Convention on Salvage Article 13(1).
126
International Convention on Salvage Article 13(3).
127
James Wooder, ‘The New Salvage Convention: A Shipowner’s Perspective’ (1990) 21 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 81, 93; Justice Donnell Michael Ryan, ‘Protection of the Environment : a
New Focus in the Convention on Salvage 1989’ (2009) 23 Maritime Law Association of Australia and
New Zealand Journal 1, 4.
128
International Convention on Salvage Article 14(1); Geoffrey Brice, ‘Salvage and the Marine
Environment’ (1995-1996) 70 Tulane Law Review 669, 672.
129
International Convention on Salvage Article 14(3).
130
Justice Donnell Michael Ryan, ‘Protection of the Environment : a New Focus in the Convention on
Salvage 1989’ (2009) 23 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 1, 8.
131
International Convention on Salvage Article 14(2).
132
Semco Salvage and Marine Pte Ltd v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd; The Nagasaki Spirit (1997) AC 455,
468.
125

31

While the success requirement of salvage remained, the provision of special
compensation without reward meant that the salvor could at least recover expenses.
Even though there was no right to salvage reward in the absence of success, recovery of
expenses was an incentive for salvors to continue to provide services where there was a
threat to the environment.133
One other request by the salvage industry and a number of member delegations,
particularly Australia, showed the extent to which concern for the change in the custom
of granting refuge to ships in distress had grown. What was sought was the insertion
into the draft Salvage Convention 1989 of a provision requiring coastal States to provide
a place of refuge to ships in distress when requested. This was opposed by a number of
delegations, particularly the United Kingdom, on the basis that matters of public law
should not be introduced into what was essentially a convention dealing with private
law. The United Kingdom delegation also argued that the introduction of public law
obligations such as the obligation to provide a place of refuge could endanger the
acceptance of the new convention because of political controversy.134 Ultimately, the
request was defeated after a great deal of discussion at both the meeting of delegates in
Montreal in 1981 and subsequently in the Legal Committee of the IMO.135
In the end, the only reference to places of refuge in the Salvage Convention 1989 was in
Article 11 which merely requires States to cooperate ‘whenever regulating or deciding
on matters relating to salvage operations such as admittance to ports of vessels in
distress…’. On the other hand, Article 9 reinforces the rights of coastal States in relation
to the protection of the environment:
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the coastal State concerned to
take measures in accordance with generally recognized principles of international
law to protect its coastline or related interests from pollution or the threat of
pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences,
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including the right of a coastal State to give directions in relation to salvage
operations.

The salvage industry was sceptical of the obligation to cooperate in Article 11 in light
of not only the provisions of Article 9 but also the increasing trend by coastal States to
refuse a place of refuge to ships in distress.136 It has been argued that the combination
of the wording of Article 9 and the failure of the Salvage Convention 1989 to provide
for an obligation to grant refuge to ships in distress created a legal basis under the
Salvage Convention 1989 for coastal States to refuse access.137 While this view is
probably overly pessimistic,138 the events leading up to the incidents concerning the
Erika, Castor and Prestige, to which this thesis now turns, appear to justify the salvors’
scepticism.

4.

Erika, Castor and Prestige

By the end of the 20th century, there was a heightened awareness of the coastal State’s
rights and obligations to protect its coastline from environmental damage, an awareness
of the risk and dangers posed by the transportation of oil and other dangerous
substances in larger and older ships and the potential that such risks posed for the
environment. The customary practice of granting refuge to ships in distress, particularly
where there was no threat to human life, was also in a state of flux to the extent that
there were doubts being expressed as to whether the custom still existed.139 The
treatment given to the Erika in 1999, the Castor in 2000 and the Prestige in 2002,
illustrate this trend.
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The Erika
It was in the circumstances of the growing change of attitude to environmental
protection and the uncertainty surrounding the right of ships in distress to be granted a
place of refuge, that the Erika sank off the French coast.140 Although there had been
many pollution incidents that had arisen from the sinking of tankers, including incidents
in the same area of the Bay of Biscay,141 the sinking of the Erika has had a more
significant effect than most.

142

It has resulted in much legislative activity in both the

European Union and France and a reconsideration of the issue of places of refuge by the
IMO.143 A brief outline of the circumstances of the sinking is necessary to understand
why a different attitude has been taken to the Erika.144
On 11 December 1999, the Erika, a Maltese registered and Liberian owned oil tanker
while in heavy seas and strong winds in the Bay of Biscay, experienced difficulties due
to a structural defect in its deck plating and issued a distress call. The Erika was on a
voyage from Dunkerque to Livorno in Italy with a cargo of over 30,000 tonnes of heavy
fuel oil. Soon afterwards, the master signalled that the situation had improved and that
the ship was continuing on its voyage. Several hours later, a further distress call was
made as the ship was listing heavily, there were cracks in deck plating and that oil was
escaping. The ship changed course towards Donges. Three hours later the Harbour
master at St Nazaire advised the master that he would only allow the ship into Donges if
it was not spilling oil.145 If it was spilling oil, access to Donges would not be allowed, in
order to avoid pollution of the Loire River.146 There is some dispute as to whether or not
refuge was actually requested, but it is agreed that if it had been requested, it would
have been refused.147 In the next eight hours, the master tried to reduce the stresses on
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the ship but by early morning the cracking worsened and water breached the hull such
that the ship could no longer be steered. A further distress signal was sent requesting
that the crew be rescued. Soon after the ship began to break its back and broke up. The
crew was rescued and eventually the two sections of the ship sank about 30 miles south
of Pointe de Penmarc’h in Brittany.148 About 20,000 tonnes of the cargo of heavy fuel
oil escaped and fouled over 500 kilometres of shoreline, including 400 kilometres of
beaches, and affected important coastal fisheries, mariculture, a large number of sea
birds, tourist sites and salt production areas.149
In itself, the Erika was not unusual.150 It was twenty five years old and because of its
age it was used to carry ‘black products’, that is, heavy fuels and tar, since cleaner
‘white product’ cargoes, such as diesel, petrol and kerosene, require greater tank
cleanliness.151 The Commission into the Erika sinking found that more environmentally
dangerous cargoes were carried by older and more vulnerable ships and that it was not
unusual in the industry for charterers to charter older ships for shipping ‘black
products’. The majority of ships transporting such cargoes were between seventeen and
twenty five years old with over 49% being older than twenty years old.152
Furthermore the Erika was a single hulled ship constructed without segregated ballast
tanks, although some ballast tanks were later converted to segregated ballast tanks.
Again this was not unusual in ships of this age since it was built prior to the more
stringent requirements under MARPOL.153 While all new constructions of tankers since
the early 1990s have been double hulled,154 it is still true that most of oil transported is
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still carried in single hulled tankers.155 Single hulled tankers are being phased out and,
since the Erika sinking, at an accelerated rate. 156
What made the Erika sinking significantly different to many other sinkings at the time
such as the Braer off the Shetland Islands in 1993 and the Sea Empress in Milford
Haven in 1996, and what was ultimately to cause such a huge reaction, was that when it
broke up and sank it was fully certificated and surveyed by the classification society and
had been passed by numerous port State and flag State inspections in the years leading
up to the sinking.157
Prior to its sinking the Erika had changed its name eight times, had sailed under three
different flags, had changed its classification society four times, had been subject to
regular classification society inspections, had been inspected eighteen times by port
State and flag State inspectors, had been detained five times by port inspectors and
cleared each time and had been regularly vetted by oil companies that had chartered
it.158 Substantial repairs had been performed between June and August 1998 and passed
by the classification society after a special survey. The final survey was performed in
November 1999 and no defects were found apart from a mention by the classification
society surveyor of ‘thinnings of the deck longitudinally’ at the point where the ship
ultimately broke into two and with a recommendation that it be looked at the next
inspection in January 2000.159 Additionally, of its seven sister ships, half had
experienced corrosion and cracking and significant deck failure within their first fifteen
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years, including two that suffered cracking right across their decks.160 At the time it
sank, all the Erika’s statutory certificates were valid.161
What was alarming was the fact that all the shipping industry’s safety nets of safety
certificates, classification society surveys, and inspections by a number of port States
and flag States had failed.162 Worse still, since all the surveys and inspections had failed
to disclose the true condition of the ship, to any person or organisation, including port
authorities, seeking to rely on these inspections and surveys, the ship was in good
condition.163 The Secretary General of the IMO summed up the concern:
I think that concern over the Erika incident has been increased by the fact that the
system of controls and inspections that was designed to ensure that any defects were
detected quite clearly failed. The Erika was under class and had been inspected by port
State control and industry inspectors several times, yet none of these surveys showed
164
that the ship was about to split in two.

The Commission’s conclusions give some idea why such a situation was unsatisfactory
and why such surveys and certificates are vital:
The ERIKA was certainly an old ship, but she was used above all for transporting black
products at freight rates which were insufficient to cover costs, unless costs, especially
maintenance costs, were drastically reduced.
The ERIKA had always been sensitive to corrosion but she really began to fall into
disrepair when No. 4 tanks and especially No. 2 wing tanks became dedicated ballast
tanks…
The weakening of the structure of section No.2 of the ERIKA was thus due to
insufficient maintenance and the corresponding rapid development of corrosion, leading
165
to a succession of ruptures which caused the whole structure to collapse.

On the second point made by the Commission, concerning the alteration of the tanks,
since the modifications were made in March 1990,166 effectively, the Commission was
160
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saying that for nearly ten years the ship was falling into disrepair, something which all
inspections during that time had failed to detect.
The reaction to the Erika sinking and subsequent oil spill clearly indicates that public
sentiment in relation to maritime casualties, particularly those that involve pollution, is
becoming much less tolerant of substandard ships carrying dangerous cargoes thereby
threatening the environment.167 In this context the change in attitude to the granting of
places of refuge and the rejection of ships in distress that are likely to damage the
environment is not surprising.
Although place of refuge did not figure greatly in the Erika sinking, the Commission
report did deal with the issue in the following terms:
Harbourmasters are responsible for the safety and security of their ports within the
administrative boundaries fixed for them. …[T]hey can refuse access to the installations
under their responsibility to vessels which might endanger their port installations or
access, the goods in transit or the people there.
Bearing in mind the poor quality of some of the vessels that the forwarding agents or
consignees sometimes approve, the word responsibility in this context is not empty of
meaning.
Be that as it may, this in no way relieves harbourmasters of their general obligations to
give assistance to persons in danger. It is perfectly true to say that it is far easier for
ships to seek shelter or repairs in a port – to which they obviously need to gain access.
This being the case, working in conjunction with the services at the maritime prefecture,
the necessary compromises are made between the requirements of port security, the
168
safety of life at sea and the protection of the environment.

These views expressed by the Commission, clearly reflect the views expressed in other
jurisdictions in relation to the change in the custom of places of refuge to one of
humanitarian assistance only.169
The sinking of the Erika resulted in a great deal of activity at both the IMO and the
European Union, which will be examined in detail in chapters four and six of this thesis.
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The Castor
The next major incident involved the Castor and occurred twelve months after the
Erika, in December 2000. Unlike the Erika, the Castor did survive but only after a forty
day battle during which seven separate coastal States refused to grant a place of refuge.
These refusals of refuge clearly showed how far the custom had changed for ships in
distress that are carrying environmentally dangerous cargoes.
In some ways the facts of the Castor were similar to those of the Erika. The Castor was
a twenty three year old single hulled tanker flagged in Cyprus with Greek owners. It
was transporting approximately 30,000 tonnes of unleaded gasoline from Romania to
Nigeria. It encountered severe weather off the coast of Morocco on 31 December 2000
and experienced a crack across two tanks, allowing vapour to escape which was later
used to form the opinion that the cargo had the potential to explode.170
A place of refuge was requested in Nador, Morocco, to allow the cargo to be offloaded
and repairs done to the tanks in a repair facility. This was refused and the ship was
forced to seek refuge in Spain. This was also refused, although the Spanish authorities
did rescue the crew leaving the ship under the control of salvors who continued to seek
a place of refuge. This was in turn refused by Gibraltar, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, and
Greece.171 There were indications that the flag State, Cyprus, might have been prepared
to ultimately grant refuge172 but no offer had been made by the time that the crisis was
resolved by transhipment of the gasoline and in any event it was considered that Cyprus
was too far for the damaged ship to go.173
Only one of these coastal States, Spain, actually investigated the problem before
refusing access, the others refusing the ship without apparent investigation.174 The
Spanish position was that the grinding of the cracked plating could have caused an
170
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explosion and that granting of access would have endangered not only facilities of the
place of access but also the surrounding population.175
Ultimately, after almost forty days, with the assistance of the Tunisian authorities, but
over thirty kilometres from the coast between Tunisia and Malta and in a Force 12 gale
with seas in excess of eight metres, the cargo was discharged into other ships and the
Castor was then towed to Greece, which had granted refuge after the cargo had been
offloaded.176
In more stark terms than the Erika, refusal of a place of refuge to the Castor by so many
coastal States could have contributed to the loss had the ship been less robust. While the
Castor was an old ship, it was fully certificated and surveyed and, unlike the Erika,
these certificates and surveys appeared to be validly given. Despite the accusations by
Spain that the ship was substandard,177 the subsequent investigation found that the ship
was sufficiently seaworthy to withstand forty days of strong winds and seas without
sinking.178
Also notable was the Spanish position that once the crew had been rescued and there
was no longer a human risk on the ship, there was no obligation on the coastal State to
provide any further assistance.179 The fact that only one coastal State actually examined
the risks of taking in the Castor before refusing refuge also indicated quite clearly that
these States took the view that they could refuse refuge with impunity.180
The Castor experience added to the debate that had started with the Erika sinking. In
particular the IMO started to take notice of the problems created by the change in
attitude to places of refuge by a number of coastal States. The Secretary General of the
IMO highlighted the problem shortly after the Castor episode when he made the
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statement quoted at the start of the Introduction to this thesis concerning the urgent need
to address the problem of places of refuge.
In an attempt to avoid the situation where States could refuse a request for refuge
without consideration being given to the individual situation, the IMO proceeded to
formulate the IMO Guidelines for States to follow when a request for refuge is made.181
These IMO Guidelines were issued in 2003 but not before one of the most damaging
tanker spills occurred in November 2002, involving the Prestige.

The Prestige
On 19 November 2002, the Prestige, a twenty six year old oil tanker owned by Greek
interests and registered in the Bahamas, broke in two and sank 133 nautical miles off
the northwest coast of Spain. It was carrying a cargo of 77,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil
on a voyage from St Petersburg and Ventspils in Latvia to Singapore182 having spent
four months as a floating storage at St Petersburg. The subsequent oil spill of
approximately 63,000 tonnes contaminated 1900 kilometres of shoreline of Spain and
France and severely affected the fishing industries of Spain, France and Portugal as well
as tourism.183
The Prestige had started to experience problems with one of its ballast tanks on 13
November in high winds and heavy seas and had developed a thirty degree list. It had
already leaked about 1,000 tonnes of oil and requested assistance from the Spanish
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authorities. The crew was airlifted off leaving the captain, first officer and chief
engineer as well as the salvors on board. A place of refuge was requested at La Coruna
but this request was refused. Instead the master was ordered to take the ship out to sea
and away from the Spanish coast. For six days the master and the salvors attempted to
save the ship repeatedly requesting a place of refuge from both Spain and Portugal. All
requests were refused. Eventually on 19 November the Prestige broke up and sank
causing one of the worst environmental disasters in history.184
The Prestige disaster was highly reminiscent of the Erika in many ways.185 It was
twenty six years old and for the same reasons as the Erika was carrying ‘black product’,
in this case heavy fuel oil. Like the Erika, the Prestige was single hulled and so under
the timetable in regulation 13G of MARPOL was due to be phased out in March
2005.186
While, unlike Erika, the Prestige had been built and maintained to the standard of its
classification society, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), for all its life, and had been
entered with the London Steamship Association P&I Club since 1988, there were
serious questions raised as to its seaworthiness.187 Again there was a long list of flag
State, port State and classification society inspections all of which had disclosed no
major deficiencies and there had been no detentions.188
A special survey had been conducted in Guangzhou (China) in May 2001 when the
Prestige was dry docked and repairs and replacement of steel work were undertaken. In
May 2002, a Classification Annual Survey was conducted in Dubai under the
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) special requirements for
older tankers, the Prestige was found to be in full compliance with ABS requirements.
184
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Its last port State inspection had been performed in Rotterdam in September 1999 where
three minor problems were found and remedied. Earlier clear port State inspections had
been performed in Gibraltar, Greece, Russia and the United States. No port State
inspections had been performed since 1999 when, apparently, the ship operated outside
European waters. Questions were asked as to why the Prestige had not been inspected
while lying off St Petersburg for four months prior to its last voyage since the Paris
MoU, of which Russia is a member, requires such inspection.189
Regardless of any deficiencies in inspections, the Technical Report issued by the ABS
found that the Prestige was structurally sound and that it broke up because of the
additional pressures experienced by being exposed to six days of severe weather and
waves.190 A subsequent Spanish examination of the plating agreed.191

Effects of the Erika, Castor and Prestige on Places of Refuge
The combined effect of the Erika, Castor and Prestige has resulted in significant action
by the IMO and the European Union. While there were clear differences between the
three ships, their common features were such that they were all treated as symptomatic
of the same problem.
First, all three ships were old. The practical effect of this was that two of the ships, the
Erika and Prestige, were used to carry the worst ‘black product’ cargo with the potential
to cause serious environmental damage.192 Their age also meant that they had by
necessity been repaired on a number of occasions with the potential for bad
workmanship. The repairs, together with normal thinning of plating on the cargo and
bunker tanks, meant that the structure of the ships were potentially weakened.193 In the
case of the Erika this was clearly the case, but less so in the Castor and the Prestige.
The fact that the Erika broke up and sank so quickly indicates that the ship was
189
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inherently too weak to withstand severe weather. The fact that the Castor survived forty
days of constant bad weather and high seas194 and the Prestige remained intact for six
days before sinking despite being damaged and subjected to severe storm stresses,
indicated that they were in a better seaworthy condition.195 Nevertheless, the fate of all
three ships has been treated by the European Union, in particular, as examples of the
types of ships that could no longer be tolerated.196
Second, all three ships were single hulled, although they were to varying degrees
reconfigured to comply with the requirements of Regulation 13G of MARPOL.197 When
combined with the age of the ship, their suspected condition and the cargo being carried,
the fate of the ships resulted in an accelerated phase out by the IMO and a total ban by
the European Union of all single hulled tankers.198
Third, all three ships had apparently requested a place of refuge and had been refused.
The basis of refusal was the same, namely, the risk to the population and the
environment was too great to permit the ship to enter internal waters. 199
Fourth, there was a common attitude among those States that gave reasons for refusal
that once the crew had been rescued, which had happened in all cases, there was no
longer an obligation on the coastal State to grant a place of refuge.200
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5.

Interests Involved in the Places of Refuge Problem

The long established practice of granting a place of refuge to a ship in distress has
clearly changed and whether or not a request for a place of refuge is granted in any
particular case now largely depends on the coastal State weighing up the relative merits
of each of the interests involved before reaching a decision. The interests fall roughly
into three categories: First, those interests most concerned with the successful
completion of the marine adventure; second, those interests most concerned with
preserving the marine and coastal environment; finally, those interests most concerned
with the proper functioning of the shipping industry. These interests are analysed briefly
below.

Interests Concerned with Completion of Marine Adventure
This group of interests is concerned with the successful completion of the voyage or, at
least, the preservation of the ship and cargo should difficulties be experienced prior to
completion of the voyage. As such, these interests would have a strong bias towards a
place of refuge being granted when necessary. These interests encompass the charterers
of the ship, the owners of the ship, the owners of the cargo, the insurers of the ship, the
insurers of the cargo, the master and crew and the salvors.
Charterers
The charterer of the ship is interested in the successful completion of the voyage as,
depending on the terms of contracts with shippers and consignees, it is normally only
then that the charterer earns income.201 There are three types of charterparty - time,
voyage and demise each with its own peculiar exposure to the completion of the
voyage.202
The time charterer hires the ship for a particular period of time during which the ship
can be used for as many voyages as is possible.203 The earlier in the charterparty period
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that the ship experiences difficulties increases the economic pressure on the charterer
for the ship to be maintained by accessing places of refuge in an efficient and timely
matter. While the charterer could be protected from payment of hire by the ‘off hire’
clause of the charterparty,204 any delay on one voyage would seriously impact on the
completion of other contracted voyages.205
The voyage charterer hires the ship for a single voyage.206 This was the form of
charterparty in the Erika, Castor and Prestige. In this charterparty, the charterer does
not normally gain its freight until the end of the voyage.207 The voyage charterer is not
under the same pressures as the time charterer as only one voyage is being prosecuted
no matter how long it takes.208 In a voyage charterparty the risk of delay is on the owner
as the charterer only pays the charter hire and the risk flowing from the inability to
employ the ship for subsequent voyages falls on the owner.209
A demise charterparty can be for a single voyage but is most commonly used on a time
basis by oil companies.210 The essential distinction of a demise charterparty is that the
charterer hires and pays for the master and crew.211 This latter point is an additional risk
for a demise charterer which also has the pressures of either the time or voyage
charterer and adds to the economic incentive for a place of refuge for the charter should
it be necessary to prosecute the voyage.
Whatever form the charterparty takes, but particularly demise charterparties where the
charterer exercises more control over the ship and crew, there is potential for the
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charterer to be liable for oil pollution damage.212 It is therefore in the interests of
charterers to minimise the risk of pollution by use of places of refuge when required.
Shipowners
The owner of the ship is, of course, primarily concerned with the preservation of the
ship as the earner of freight or hire.213 Furthermore, the owner is liable for the direct
costs of employing the master and crew, unless the ship is under a demise charter
party.214 Apart from income and costs, the owner would be interested in preserving a
good reputation to attract further business.215
Payment of freight under voyage charterparties is normally only made on the successful
completion of the voyage unless the charterparty states otherwise.216 Any delay in
completion of the voyage would impact on the owner who would therefore be interested
in a timely grant of a place of refuge when the ship experiences difficulties as this
would potentially reduce the damage done to the ship which could result not only in the
cost of actual repairs217 but also loss of revenue when it is out of service.
Under time charterparties, hire is paid for the contract time whether or not the ship is in
service.218 The risk of delay falls on the charterer unless there is a right to go ‘off hire’
due to the ship being unable to perform its functions.219 The effect of the ship going ‘off
hire’ is that the term of the charterparty is extended by the period of the delay thereby
precluding the owner from earning hire for the extended period.220 If the ship is in
distress and in need of repair, it would be likely that it would go ‘off hire’ until the
problem is fixed.221 It would follow that the owner would be interested in the ship being
212
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given a place of refuge where the necessary repairs could be completed so that the
earning of hire can be resumed as quickly as possible.
Under a demise charterparty, the charterer is regarded as the owner for the term of the
charter and unless legislation otherwise states, the risks of ownership pass to the
charterer.222
The owner is responsible under the International Safety Management Code (ISM
Code)223 for the provision of a seaworthy ship and any refusal or delay in granting a
place of refuge could result in damage or the need for repairs that it is no longer
economically viable to return the ship to a seaworthy state.224
From a contractual liability point of view, under most non-demise charterparties the
owner is under an obligation to proceed to the destination without deviation unless there
is a reasonable excuse. Deviations to preserve the safety of the ship and crew have been
held to be justifiable even if the cause of the distress is due to the ship being
unseaworthy.225 It is therefore in the interests of the owner to be able to deviate into a
place of refuge as this would provide justification for any deviation.
The owner would also be interested in avoiding or reducing any damage to the
environment by entering a place of refuge since, ultimately, the owner of the ship would
be liable for both clean up expenses and, potentially, to criminal prosecution.226
Cargo owners
The economic imperative of the cargo owner is to ensure that the cargo is delivered
within the time constraints of the sale contract and is also responsible, subject to the
terms of the sales contract, to arrange for the payment of freight and insurance.
Therefore it is in the cargo owner’s interest not only to preserve the cargo by entering a
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place of refuge but also that any delays be minimised.227 Also, the cargo owner could be
liable both civilly and criminally should the cargo cause damage.228 It is therefore of
vital interest that the ship be granted refuge to avoid either loss of the ship or more
importantly to avoid any pollution damage to the surrounding coastline and industries.
Insurers of the ship
Most ships carrying oil are insured by being entered into a Protection and Indemnity
Club (P&I Club).229 Although coverage can differ, common items include salvage,
wreck and pollution offences.230 The latter includes not only clean up expenses but also
legal expenses231 and even criminal fines.232 It is the salvage expenses that are most
relevant to the P&I Club and so the more quickly a ship is permitted into a place of
refuge and necessary repairs are done, the less expense there is for the insurer.233 In the
Castor, the ship was under the control of the salvors for nearly forty days thereby
greatly increasing the expense for the P&I Club.234 Also in relation to places of refuge,
the P&I Clubs have recently added to its coverage the giving of guarantees to coastal
States for the granting of refuge to its insured ships.235
Hull insurers complement the cover given by P&I Clubs.236 They also have an interest
in preserving the ship since the insurance covers the loss of or damage to the ship
227
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insured.237 Most hull insurance covers limited pollution coverage,238 salvage239 and
general average expenses.240 Hull insurers are therefore interested in ships in distress
being permitted to enter places of refuge to eliminate or minimise damage to the ship
and the risk of total loss, whether actual or constructive, and to minimise any pollution
damage.
Cargo Insurers
Like hull insurers and P&I Clubs, cargo insurers have an interest in the preservation of
the ship as this would mean, in most cases, the preservation and ultimate delivery of the
cargo. The entry of a distressed ship into a place of refuge would aid the preservation of
the cargo and cargo insurance would cover such actions and the discharge of the cargo
at a place of refuge.241 Cargo insurance can cover loss due to actions of government to
prevent or minimise pollution242 and the cargo’s share of salvage reward and expenses
and general average expenses.243 For all these reasons the cargo insurer would be in
favour of a ship in distress being permitted to enter a place of refuge.
Master and Crew
For purely humanitarian reasons the master and crew would prefer to be permitted to
enter a place of refuge rather than be forced to deal with damage to a ship that could
endanger not only their lives but also the safety and ultimate survival of the ship.244
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Another issue that has arisen particularly since the Erika is the criminalisation of the
master and crew for causing or contributing to pollution damage.245 The master of the
Erika was arrested and ultimately acquitted.246 The master of the Prestige was also
arrested and charged with disobeying the directions of the Spanish authorities to take
the ship out to sea instead of accessing a place of refuge.247 The increasing use of
criminal sanctions against the master of a ship in distress adds to the imperative for such
ships to be permitted to enter place of refuge.
Salvors
Finally, salvors are especially interested in the use of places of refuge since their income
by the earning of salvage reward depends on the successful completion of the salvage.
As described earlier, prior to the introduction of special rewards for expenses in
combating pollution in unsuccessful salvage operations in the Salvage Convention
1989, the salvor received no salvage reward where the salvage operation was
unsuccessful. The principle of ‘No cure – No pay’ applied.248 It was therefore vital for
all methods of saving the ship and cargo to be employed, especially the granting of
access to a place of refuge.249 The salvage industry and the maritime industry as a whole
were highly critical of the actions of all seven governments in the Castor saga, although
ultimately the salvage operation was successful.250 The loss of the Prestige and the
circumstances surrounding the refusal of a place of refuge was all the more contentious
as all the evidence was that the ship would probably have been saved and most of the
pollution damage avoided had the Prestige been allowed refuge.
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Interests Concerned with Preservation of the Marine and Coastal Environment
Ranged against and in conflict with what are, essentially, commercial interests
concerned with the successful completion of the voyage, are those interests more
concerned with the preservation of the marine and coastal environment.251 These
interests are particularly the coastal State, including coastal communities, port
authorities, and politicians in regional governments and national governments, as well
as environmentalists, and media.
Coastal States
The imperative of protecting the marine and coastal environment has only been of
importance in the last fifty years.252 This equates roughly to the changes to the shipping
industry noted earlier253 and the consequent effect such changes had on the custom of
granting refuge. Coastal States, such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom which
sit on some of the most dangerous major trade routes have taken an active interest in
minimising adverse effects of oil spills.254 This has occurred from the wreck of the
Torrey Canyon in 1969 onwards.255 The United States has also adopted a stringent
position on pollution since the Exxon Valdez grounding in 1989.256
The economic interests of coastal States including fishing, mariculture and tourism have
assumed a much greater significance and consequently coastal States have taken a much
more hardline attitude to what they see as old, unseaworthy tankers sailing through their
territorial sea and exclusive economic zones. Spain and France especially have been
taking a stricter attitude to old single hulled tankers carrying environmentally dangerous
cargoes such as the Erika, Castor and Prestige and have pressed in the European
Commission for the introduction of legislation to protect the coastal States from the
251
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potential damage from these ships.257 As a result of the Prestige sinking, Spain, France
and Portugal have all issued unilateral decrees prohibiting single hulled tankers from
entering not only their ports but also their EEZs.258 While such moves have been
criticised as being in breach of freedom of navigation under LOSC they nevertheless
reflect the increased intolerance of these States to the environmental and economic risks
posed by substandard shipping.259
With the increased awareness within the general population of environmental risks and
responsibilities, this attitude is only going to harden further against substandard ships
transiting their territorial seas and EEZ seeking to enter a place of refuge. Any elected
official would naturally be quite hesitant to permit damaged ships carrying dangerous
cargoes to enter a place of refuge in waters under national sovereignty or sovereign
rights. Any damage flowing from such a decision would inevitably be reflected in the
attitude of the electorate.260
It is political pressure that often results in refusals of refuge and this will continue if and
until such decisions are removed from the politicians by the introduction of independent
decision makers such as the SOSREP in the United Kingdom and the MERCOM in
Australia.261 A proposal for a single European decision maker in the Erika III package
was proposed and withdrawn because of lack of support from the European Union
member States262 but eventually formed part of the final Directive.263
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Environmental Pressure Groups
A recent phenomenon in the increased awareness of environmental responsibilities has
been the growth of environmental pressure groups.264 Some of these groups are
international265 but often the groups are established at grass roots level in reaction to
individual disasters. For example the ‘Nunca Mais’266 group formed in Galicia after the
Prestige sinking has been very vocal in Spain and within Europe on the dangers of oil
pollution and its effects on wildlife and coastal communities.267 Such advocacy can be
influential on forming public opinion and, more importantly, political opinion.268
Media
The media can either reflect or form public opinion, depending on the contributors and
the likely audience.269 On the one hand specialist shipping media will tend to examine
the issues from the view of the industry,270 while on the other hand, general media, both
print and electronic, can just as easily sway public opinion by the way the issues are
reported.271 Whichever way the media operates and whatever its motives, it can have a
significant effect on the way a crisis is perceived and reacted to by the local
communities and politicians.272
Shipping Industry Regulators
This category comprises those bodies that regulate the shipping industry by way of
survey and certification. Flag States, port States and classification societies fall within
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this heading. Regulators have no direct financial interest in the question of whether or
not a place of refuge is granted or refused, except to the extent that that their
professional reputations are called into question should a ship be found to be in distress
despite being in possession of clear surveys and inspection reports, such as was the case
with the Erika.
Flag States
The role of the flag State is of great importance in the maintenance of shipping safety
standards.273 Under Article 94(1) of LOSC: ‘Every State shall effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag.’ In particular, Article 94(3) of LOSC imposes obligations on flag States to
ensure safety at sea by, inter alia, ensuring the ships are seaworthy and are properly
crewed and trained. Seaworthiness is ensured under Article 94(4)(a) by proper, regular
inspections and surveys in accordance with ‘generally accepted international
regulations, procedures and practices’ (Article 94(5)).274
Despite being the central point of the regulatory regime, flag State control has, in recent
decades, become seriously deficient, resulting in poor control being exercised over their
flagged ships particularly in the area of safety.275 The emergence of ‘flags of
convenience’, where flag States accept ships onto their registers but then fail to properly
regulate them in accordance with their responsibilities under LOSC and other
international conventions,276 is a serious problem gradually being dealt with by the
IMO.277 Furthermore where proper arrangements do exist in flag States, the structure
can be so complex as to make it difficult for instructions and guidance to be given in
times of distress when a place of refuge might be required.278
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Finally, in many instances the crew of the ship is different to that of the flag State which
can result in flag States failing to properly protect them. This can become of great
importance in current times where masters are increasingly being criminalised.279 In the
case of the Erika, the Indian master was imprisoned by the French authorities and his
case was taken up, not by the flag State but by the Indian Government. Similarly in the
Prestige, the Greek master was protected not by the flag State but by representations by
Greece.280
Port States
While on the high seas, a ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.281
Once a ship enters the internal waters of another State, the situation changes. The ship is
then, with some exceptions, subject to the laws of that State.282 This coastal State
control was extended by LOSC to cover some offences, such as marine pollution, to
ships while transiting the territorial sea.283
The powers of the coastal State are exercised by inspections and enforcement of
requirements under international conventions by means of Port State Control.284 The
IMO first established procedures for Port State Control in 1981.285 Memoranda of
Understanding have also been established which cover most areas of the world
establishing inspection and reporting procedures to be followed by member States in
relation to ships within their ports.286
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The ability of a port State to enforce its law flows from the principle of sovereignty.287
In relation to ships in distress, since the case of the Creole288 in the 1840s, it has been
accepted law that offences committed on the high seas are not justiciable by the coastal
State into which the distressed ship sails, but this does not apply to offences committed
while the ship is within the jurisdiction of the coastal State.289
LOSC extends the powers of the coastal State to include the right of the coastal State to
investigate and enforce pollution offences that have occurred outside its jurisdiction if
the ship is voluntarily within its jurisdiction.290 The International Convention Relating
to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil Pollution Damage (Intervention
Convention),291 also permits a coastal State to take steps to prevent pollution on the high
seas where such pollution could seriously affect the coastal State.292
SOLAS gives inspection powers to the coastal State in relation to safety of the ship.
Other conventions such as the International Convention on Load Lines,293 MARPOL
1973/78, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers,294 the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement
of Ships
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and various ILO conventions also give the coastal State the right to inspect

for compliance with the conventions.296
At least up until the 1990s little effort was made by port States to properly perform their
inspection roles.297 Even in cases where inspections are performed by some port States
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they have failed to properly detect ships with serious defects. In the Erika, there was
evidence of eighteen port State inspections performed within eight years of the sinking,
all of which disclosed no defects, and yet the ship broke up and sank within twenty four
hours of encountering difficulties.298
Classification Societies
Classification societies originated in the late 17th Century.299 Their role was initially to
provide technical advice to owners, charterers and insurers as to the seaworthiness of
ships.300 This is still their essential role today but to this has been added the role of
inspecting ships and issuing certificates on behalf of flag States, particularly the open
registers which do not have the capacity to perform them.301
Great reliance is placed on the certificates issued by classification societies302 but the
extent of the liability for failure to provide accurate certificates is unclear under either
contract303 or tort law.304 If, however, a successful action could be launched, the
classification society has unlimited liability unlike other actors in pollution cases.305
For this reason, any action that reduces the exposure to claims, such as access to places
of refuge, would be advantageous to classification societies.
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CONCLUSION
The problem of places of refuge clearly flows from a substantial change being made to
what was considered to be an unwritten custom of the sea that ships in distress were
always granted a place of refuge. The rights that flowed from the granting of a place of
refuge were significant and reflected the needs of distressed ships both of the crew and
the shipowner and cargo owners.
The extent of the custom of granting refuge to ships in distress has been called into
question over the last sixty years for various reasons including changes to shipping and
salvage industry practices, the growing concern over protection and preservation of the
marine environment and the changes in international law both in the environmental and
maritime fields. The result is that the custom of granting access, if it still exists, in
practice only covers humanitarian aspects and any rights the ship and cargo interests
may have had are under serious challenge. The main factor in this change is the growing
awareness of the need and obligation to protect the marine and coastal environment
from pollution by dangerous cargoes carried by substandard shipping.
This change in attitude to the environment and the standard of shipping has resulted in a
conflict between those interests concerned with the successful completion of the voyage
and those interests concerned with the preservation of the marine and coastal
environment. A solution to this conflict has proved elusive particularly since the
shipping industry safety net that should have to a large degree prevented the cause of
the problem has failed.
Generally and historically, the first place in which a ship in distress would want to take
refuge is a port. Therefore, before examining what has been put in place internationally
and nationally to address the problem with places of refuge, it is necessary to begin the
analysis by examining to what extent international law deals with access to ports by
ships in general and ships in distress in particular. If the examination of international
law reveals any obligations on coastal States to accept ships in distress, then the solution
would be to more rigorously enforce those obligations. If such obligations do not exist,
then other solutions must be examined. This examination of international law
obligations is made in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
GENERAL ACCESS TO PORTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
An understanding of the place and status of ports in international law, both under treaty
and customary international law, is integral to the examination of any claim for access
to them. This is equally relevant whether such access is sought due to distress or
otherwise.
This chapter examines the existence or otherwise of a general right of access to ports in
international law. This examination must be performed before the question of access by
vessels in distress is considered. If there is a general right of vessels to access ports then
this subsumes any question of access to vessels in distress.
Since ports, by physical necessity, normally exist within or in close proximity to the
internal waters of a coastal State, the first part of this chapter briefly examines the
sovereignty of a coastal State over its internal waters and ports.
The second part of this chapter examines whether or not the sovereignty of a coastal
State over its ports and internal waters is limited in international law by a general right
for ships to access its ports. This involves an examination of the treaty obligations,
legislation and judicial decisions of a number of coastal States and the opinions of
international jurists such as the Institut de Droit International.

1.

Sovereignty over Internal Waters

The term internal waters refers to ‘waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea’.1 Internal waters form part of the territory of the coastal State and are so
closely linked with the land that they are governed by the same legal regime.2 This
territorial sovereignty is based on the need for territorial integrity, defence and other
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commercial interests.3
It is a well established norm of customary international law that a State has sovereignty
over its territory, and by extension, its internal waters.4 This view was expressed as far
back as 1758:
[p]orts and harbour are manifestly an appendage to and even a part of the country and
consequently are the property of the nation. Whatever is said of the land itself will
equally apply to them, so far as respects the consequences of the domain and the
5
empire.

The principle of State sovereignty was more recently commented on by Judge Huber in
the Island of Palmas Arbitration (United States v The Netherlands)6:
Sovereignty in relation to a portion of the surface of the globe is the legal condition
necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the territory of any particular State.
…Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
7
other state, the functions of a State.

This point was also considered by the International Court of Justice in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v United States of America)8
where it was reaffirmed that
the basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary international law …extends to
the territorial waters and territorial sea of every state. …It is also by virtue of this
9
sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports.

The issue of sovereignty in internal waters is dealt with in LOSC in Article 2(1). This
Article states that ‘the sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory
and internal waters … to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.’10
3
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However, sovereignty over internal waters is not absolute. The sovereignty of a coastal
State can be limited by multilateral treaties and by State practice through bilateral
treaties entered into by that State. Decisions of international tribunals and courts can
also affect the ability of a coastal State to exercise sovereignty over its internal waters.11
The provisions of LOSC do not generally apply to internal waters and so do not affect
the way in which the coastal State deals with matters arising in them. Other than Article
2(1) and the definition of ‘internal waters’ in Article 8(1) of LOSC, there are few direct
references to internal waters or any powers a State can exercise in relation to them.12
One of the major effects of LOSC not covering internal waters is that, with limited
exceptions, there is no requirement for a coastal State to grant access to merchant
ships13 through or to its internal waters or to any port14 which forms part of those
internal waters.15 A limited exception to this is found in Article 8(2) of LOSC which
provides that the right to innocent passage in internal waters does exist where the use of
baselines to delimit internal waters results in incorporating into internal waters water
that had not previously been included.16 Also, where an international strait has been
11
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included in internal waters by means of a straight line boundary, Article 34(1) of LOSC
permits innocent passage through that strait.17
Since ports form part of the internal waters of a State, the State has the right to exercise
sovereignty when considering granting access to its ports and to control the activities in
its ports.18
2.

Access to Ports

Since sovereignty over access to ports can be limited by international convention and
customary international law, a coastal State cannot with impunity19 deny access to its
internal waters for ships if there exists a treaty which obliges the coastal State to grant
access to either ships in general or particular ships, in the case of a bilateral treaty, or an
enforceable principle of customary international law.

Bilateral treaties
The late 18th and early 19th Century was the age of free trade where seaborne trade
between the major European nations, the Americas and Asia expanded many times.20
Trade was seen by some writers to be the obligation of all States.21 It was the age of
Adam Smith and David Ricardo22 whose ideas on free trade became the economic
paradigm of the age.23 This concentration on the development of trade, prompted
writers, such as Christopher Wolff 24 and Samuel Puffendorf, 25 to argue that there is an
obligation to trade and that to effectuate this obligation there must be access granted to
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ports.26 It was on the basis of this right to trade being dependent on obligations under
treaties that resulted in a great number of bilateral treaties being entered into from the
late 18th Century to today. The early versions of these treaties were variously called
‘Treaties of Amity, Commerce and Navigation’ or some other combination of such
aims. The earliest of these treaties appear in the late 18th Century and were increasingly
evident until the early 20th Century with the advent of more multilateral treaties.27 The
trend in trade agreements in the 20th Century has been more on a multilateral basis.28
Today the purposes provided previously under Treaties of Amity, Commerce and
Navigation are more commonly achieved under Free Trade Agreements or the
multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).29
The major method now used in bilateral treaties is ‘national treatment’ and ‘most
favoured nation’ clauses and there is little specific reference made to a right to access
ports.30 Under ‘national treatment’ clauses, foreign registered ships trading in a State are
to be required to be accorded the same treatment that ships registered in that State are
given.31 ‘Most favoured nation’ clauses provide the same benefits for nations declared
to be ‘most favoured’, that is they are given rights and benefits not available to all
States. These clauses do not by themselves create an obligation on the contracting
parties to permit access to ports, but requires that equal treatment be given to
contracting parties.32 An example of such a treaty is the Treaty of Commerce,
Establishment and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Japan under which
ships of each State have ‘liberty of access to all ports, waters and places open to
international commerce and navigation’.33 In relation to national treatment clauses,
under a draft 2006 Trilateral Agreement between South Africa, Brazil and India, each
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Party accords ‘vessels of the other Party in its ports the same treatment as is accorded to its
own vessels in matters of access to ports…’.34

Naturally, the objective of a bilateral treaty on trade would be defeated by non access to
ports,35 but without an express right it would appear that the coastal State could exercise
its sovereignty to refuse or condition such entry.36 In a report in 1896 the English Law
Officers stated: ‘There is no principle of international law imposing on any state (apart
from Treaty) a duty of permitting commercial intercourse. It would, however, be a
violation of international comity and of right conduct as between civilised States to
forbid such intercourse without some adequate reason’.37 Thus refusal of access to ports
may lack comity but this in itself would not impose a legal obligation to grant access.38
Multilateral Conventions
There has only been one multilateral convention that is directly concerned with access
to ports, namely the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime
Ports, Geneva, 1923 (1923 Geneva Convention and Statute).39 LOSC and other
multilateral conventions negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) refer to access indirectly, while a few other non IMO maritime
related conventions also refer to access to ports. These conventions will be examined to
see if there are any bases for a general right of access to ports.
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Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, Geneva, 1923
The 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute was the result of a series of meetings of the
League of Nations Committee on Communications and Transit set up by the First
General Conference of the League of Nations in Barcelona in 1921.40 The setting up of
the Committee flowed from the recommendation in Article 379 of the Versailles Peace
Treaty that a convention dealing with ports and other means of transport be negotiated
within five years.41 After subsequent meetings in Genoa in 1922 and Geneva in 1923
the provisions of the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute were agreed.42 The object of
the Convention was set out in the Preamble:
Desirous of ensuring in the fullest measure possible the freedom of communications
mentioned in Article 23 (e) of the Covenant by guaranteeing in the maritime ports
situated under their sovereignty or authority and for purposes of international trade
equality of treatment between the ships of all the contracting states, their cargoes and
passengers

The 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute continued the bilateral treaty format of
reciprocity and equality of treatment, but it also gave an explicit right to the signatory
States to access the ports of other signatory States. The wording in the Preamble clearly
identified equality of treatment as the main objective. It was subject to this equality of
treatment that access to ports was granted.
In Article 1 of the Statute, the definition of ‘port’ is quite wide: ‘All ports which are
normally frequented by sea-going ships and used for foreign trade shall be deemed to be
maritime ports within the meaning of the present Statute.’
The main operative Article is Article 2 of the Statute:
Subject to the principle of reciprocity and to the reservation set out in the first paragraph
of Article 8, every Contracting States undertakes to grant the vessels of every other
Contracting State equality of treatment with its own vessel, or those of any other State
whatsoever, in the maritime ports situated under its sovereignty or authority, as regards
freedom of access to the port, the use of the port, and the full enjoyment of the benefits
as regards navigation and commercial operations which it affords to vessels, their
cargoes and passengers.
40
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Article 8 of the Statute provides for suspension of these benefits in certain
circumstances:
Each of the contracting states reserves the power, after giving notice through
diplomatic-channels, of suspending the benefit of equality of treatment from any vessel
of a state which does not effectively apply, in any maritime port situated under its
sovereignty or authority, the provisions of this statute to the vessels of the said
contracting state, their cargoes and passengers.

The granting of access could also be denied under the provisions of Article 16 of the
Statute:
Measures of a general or particular character which a Contracting State is obliged to
take in case of any emergency affecting the safety of the State or the vital interests of
the country may, in exceptional cases, and for as short a period as possible, involve a
deviation from the provisions of Article 2 to 7 inclusive; it being understood that the
principles of the present statute must be observed to the utmost possible extent.

The extent to which the provisions of the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute
constitute an absolute right for the contracting parties to access the ports of another
contracting party has been the subject of dispute.43 One commentator has argued that the
provisions of the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute could form the basis of a general
right to access maritime ports.44 In this regard 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute was
cited as one of the bases in the decision of the Tribunal in the Arbitration between Saudi
Arabia and ARAMCO in 1958.45 The Arbitrator used the 1923 Geneva Convention and
Statute and other older authorities to hold that:
According to a great principle of public international law, the ports of every state must
be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of
46
the state so require.
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The argument was based on the opinions of three jurists and the provisions of Article 16
of the Statute which gives states the right to deny access in certain limited
circumstances. It was argued that it would follow logically that in all other
circumstances, ports should be open.47
It has also been argued that there is an obligation on States to remain open to the rest of
the world for trade purposes and that therefore there is an obligation on all States to
keep at least some ports open for trade.48 This argument is expressed as follows:
[A]s no State appears to be regarded as having the right to isolate itself wholly from the
outside world, or to remain aloof from all commercial or economic intercourse with it,
there would seem to be a corresponding obligation imposed upon maritime powers not
49
to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to all its ports.

The majority of commentators reject these views.50 The general view is that the effect
and intent of the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute was not to grant general access to
ports but to grant access on the basis of reciprocity which could be suspended where
reciprocity is not given by another party or where national interests demanded it.51 Not
only is 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute limited to reciprocity but it is only binding
on its signatories.52
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The view that the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute does not to grant general access
to ports, has been supported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) which, in a report in 1975,53 stated:
it would appear that the 1923 Ports Convention does not state unequivocally (i) that a
right of access exists for all merchant vessels that come to a port with a lawful purpose,
regardless of their nationality or ownership and prior or subsequent port of call; (ii) the
type of ports for which access is granted; (ii) the type of vessels for which access is
granted; (iv) the circumstances in which access can be denied; and (v) the procedures
54
governing access.

To date there has been limited acceptance of the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute55
with only forty three current signatories, the majority of which are European States
which ratified or acceded to it within the first ten years. Significantly, there are few
major flag States as parties56 and there are a number of major maritime States such as
China, the United States and the Russian Federation that have not acceded to the
Convention.57 The fact that there has been little support for the 1923 Geneva
Convention and Statute would indicate that not only are few States directly bound but
that there are insufficient indicia of State practice to argue that the 1923 Geneva
Convention and Statute represents customary international law.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
As noted earlier in this chapter, LOSC does not generally regulate the use of internal
waters, including ports, although there are specific references to ports in certain
situations.58 Article 211(3) of LOSC mentions access to ports in the context of pollution
prevention. It states:
States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels
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into their ports or internal waters…shall give due publicity to such requirements and
shall communicate them to the competent international organisation.

Article 211(3) does not grant a right of access but simply requires communication of
any conditions for entry. It in no way affects the sovereignty of the coastal State.59 It has
been argued that the wording of the Article must imply a right to access60 but this
stretches the clear meaning of the words which are directed to communicating
conditions of entry, if such entry is to be granted.61
Similarly Article 255 of LOSC makes mention of access to ports for research purposes
but only requires States to
endeavour to adopt reasonable rules, regulations and procedures to promote and
facilitate marine scientific research …and, as appropriate, to facilitate, subject to their
laws and regulations …access to their harbours …for marine scientific research vessels.

Finally, Part X of LOSC grants rights of access of landlocked States to and from the sea.
Again there is no absolute right to access ports. While Article 125(1) states that
landlocked States have the right to transit coastal States in order to take advantage of the
benefits granted under LOSC, Article 125(2) requires that such arrangements be made
by way of treaties entered into by the affected States. Most crucially, Article 125(3)
states:
Transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the
right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for
62
in this Part for landlocked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests.

This clearly acknowledges that the coastal State can lay down conditions for access to
its ports.63 It is also clear that Part X is set up to compensate landlocked States and not
to provide a general access regime.64
Other Multilateral Conventions
Other than LOSC, there are a number of other multilateral conventions the provisions of
59
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which may affect access of ships into ports. Some of these conventions, rather than
granting a specific right to access a port, give the coastal State a specific right to deny
entry to ships in certain circumstances.
In recent years, particularly since 2001, international security concerns have resulted in
the rapid creation of a number of conventions dealing with maritime security.65 This has
had a significant impact on access to ports. Of major importance are the amendments to
International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS)66 in 2004 which
inserted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) as Part XI2.67 All ships must comply with the Code68 and failure to do so will result in the ship
being denied entry into a port.69
Under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL),70 Regulation 8(2) requires ships to have the required certification denies
port entry to ships which do not have the proper certification.71 Article 5(3) of MARPOL
states:
If a Party denies a foreign ship entry to the ports or off-shore terminals under its
jurisdiction or takes any action against such a ship for the reason that the ship does not
comply with the provisions of the present Convention, the Party shall immediately
inform the consul or diplomatic representative of the Party whose flag the ship is
entitled to fly, or if this is not possible, the Administration of the ship concerned. Before
denying entry or taking such action the Party may request consultation with the
Administration of the ship concerned. Information shall also be given to the
Administration when a ship does not carry a valid certificate in accordance with the
provisions of the Regulations.
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Finally, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) of 198572
states in Article 5(2):
Each party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself
whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of
its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or
archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage,
archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

On the basis of this Article, some States have enacted legislation to deny or condition
entry of nuclear powered ships into their ports. For example, in Australia, under s192C
of the Navigation Act,73 nuclear ships are permitted to enter Australian waters subject to
compliance with the Regulations under the Act. Under s 11 of the New Zealand Nuclear
Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987,74 entry of nuclear powered ships
into the internal waters of New Zealand is prohibited
3.

Evidence of Custom from Judicial Decisions and National Legislation

Decisions of International Tribunals
In relation to access to ports, at the international level there have been few decisions of
the International Court of Justice or other tribunals which discuss whether or not a
general right of access to ports exists. The Nicaragua case which unequivocally
affirmed the sovereignty of a coastal State and its right to regulate entry into its ports
was reaffirmed in the Land Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute.75 However, neither
case discusses a general right to enter a port nor indeed any general right for a coastal
State to refuse entry.
Earlier decisions have been made by other tribunals in relation to the closure of ports. In
the Portendick case of 1843 the Arbitrator found that a State could ‘arbitrarily close its
ports to foreign vessels’.76 Subsequent arbitrations of the 19th and early 20th centuries
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confirm that there was little scope for applying the concept of abus de droit to closure
of ports or rivers within sovereign territory even where this affected the rights of other
States. So in the Poggioli case77 where damages were claimed for the closure of a port
for insufficient reasons, the Umpire stated:
This may be the case, but the umpire has nothing whatever to do with the reasons
inducing the government to close the port. The umpire assumes that it was within its
police powers to close it, and no contract existing between the Poggilis and the
Government …by virtue of which damages could be claimed for the closing of the port,
the power of the government must be regarded as plenary and the reasons for its
78
exercise beyond question.

This view was upheld in the Orinoco Steamship Company Case of 191079 where it was
stated that ‘…the right to open and close, as a sovereign on its own territory, certain
harbors, ports and rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws is not and
could not be denied to the Venezuelan Government…’.80 Even where there were
contracts affected by the closure as in the Martini case,81 the sovereign right to close a
port was upheld subject only to the obligation to pay compensation.82
A norm that does seem to have emerged is that of giving appropriate notice of port
closures. Failure to give appropriate notice could render the coastal State liable in
damages.83 However, this does not prohibit the closure of a port but merely provides for
compensation.84
The alternate argument that general access to ports is a norm of customary international
law is to be found in the ARAMCO Arbitration between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO in
1958 where Professor Sauser-Hall stated that access to ports was a ‘great principle of
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international law’.85 This view has been debated ever since. Reflecting the views of the
19th century trade advocates, it is still argued that there is an obligation on nation States
to remain open to the rest of the world for trade purposes and that therefore there is an
obligation on all States to keep at least some ports open for trade.86
In coming to this conclusion the Arbitrator relied on three legal authors and the 1923
Geneva Convention and Statute. On analysis, none of the authorities support the
conclusion nor does the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute.87 The majority view
seems to be that this statement is incorrect.88
National Legislation and Decisions of National Courts
Evidence of national legislation and national judicial decisions in relation to general
access to ports is fairly sparse and not decisive89 and almost all indicate that the coastal
State has the right to deny entry at will.90 A brief examination of the legislation and case
law of a number of coastal States provide that there is no basis for a norm of customary
international law concerning access to ports.
Australia
There is little legislation at either state or Federal levels dealing with access to ports.
What little there is, deals with conditions of entry or with denial of access. In common
with many coastal States, entry into ports in Australia is subject to the control of the
harbour master of the port. The powers of the harbour master are the subject of state
legislation and are extensive. In New South Wales, among other powers, s 88(1) (a) of
the Marine Safety Act 1998 gives the harbour master the power to control ‘the time and
manner in which any vessel may enter or leave the port’. More significantly, s 89 (1)
85
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permits the harbour master to ‘…give directions …prohibiting the entry into, or
movement out of, the port or any part of the port, …of any vessel that the harbour
master has reasonable cause to believe is in imminent danger of sinking in the port and
causing an obstruction to navigation or is in imminent danger of causing serious damage
to the marine environment or property in the port’. Similar provisions exist in the other
states and the Northern Territory.
A recent instance of the use of the harbour master’s powers concerned the Eurydice
which in 2004 was refused entry into Sydney Harbour because there appeared to be oil
escaping from it.91 This was an exercise of s 89 (1) of the then Ports Corporatisation
and Waterways Management Act 198992 on the basis that there was a serious danger of
harm being done to the marine environment. After repairs were done, it was allowed
into port but presumably if repairs had not been successful, the harbour master could
have continued to refuse entry.93 Similar reasons were given by the Port of Launceston
Authority when it refused entry to the Iron Baron in 1995.94
At the federal level, the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act
2003,95 inter alia, is intended to apply Part 11-2 of SOLAS and the ISPS Code to all
Australian waters, including ports.96 Under s 99(4)(a), the Secretary can give a control
direction requiring the ship operator or master to remove the ship from Australian
Waters. ‘Australian Waters’ is defined as including ‘the waters of the sea on the
landward side of the territorial sea of Australia’ and ‘inland waters’ which would
include ports. The directions that can be issued are limited by s 99(3)(b) to ‘a direction
of a kind that can be given, under Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS or the ISPS Code, by a port
state to a foreign flagged ship.’ As Article 2.5.4 of Regulation 9 of Part 11-2 of SOLAS
permits port authorities to deny entry into port of ships which are non compliant with
the ISPS Code, a Direction under s 99(4) (a) of the Maritime Transport and Offshore
Facilities Security Act 2003 could be a denial of entry for ships that do not comply with
the provisions of the Act.
91
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Under the Navigation Act 1912, foreign ships can also be denied entry into a port if they
are not constructed in accordance with MARPOL.97 This power is only to be used where
necessary or expedient to protect the environment.
United States
The attitude in the United States to access to ports has changed over the last two
centuries. In the 19th Century, in line with the pro-trade view, the prevailing attitude was
that, unless there was a strong reason to deny access to ports, ports should be open.98 In
the case involving the Crescent City in 1852, where an American ship was denied entry
into Cuba because of the previous actions of the purser, the American representative
was told to protest in the following way:
You will state that the government does not question the right of every nation to
prescribe the conditions on which the vessels of other nations may be admitted into her
ports. That, nevertheless, those conditions ought not to conflict with the received usages
which regulate the commercial intercourse between civilised nations. That those usages
are well known and well established, and no nation can disregard them without giving
just cause of complaint to all other nations whose interests would be affected by their
99
violation.

By the start of the 20th Century this attitude was changing in relation to entry into
American ports. So in 1912, Executive Order 1613 prohibited any foreign ships entering
certain American ports.100 In 1923 in the case of Cunard SS Co v Mellon,101 the
Supreme Court refused to allow the case of the Crescent City to be used as a precedent
for permitting foreign ships to enter United States ports.102 In Khedivial Line SAE v
Seafarers International Union103 the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit found
against the applicant in an action for an injunction to stop the defendant unions from
picketing a ship owned by the applicant. In so doing the Court commented:
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Plaintiff concedes that there is no treaty between the United States and the United Arab
Republic granting the latter’s vessels free access to United States ports. Plaintiff has
presented no precedents or arguments to show that either the law of nations accords an
unrestricted right of access to harbours by vessels of all nations or that, if it does, this is
a right of the foreign national rather than solely of the nation….In any event the law of
104
nations would not require more than comity to the ships of a foreign nation….

In a footnote the Court report states that ‘the access of foreign vessels to ports is usually
provided for in a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.’ It also refers to the
1923 Geneva Convention and Statute but notes that the United States is not a party.105
Legislation in the latter part of the 20th and early 21st Centuries discloses a gradual
tightening of the earlier view that ports should remain open. This legislation relates
particularly to environmental, safety and security issues.106 While much of the early
legislation concerned conditioning of entry, later legislation also gave a wide scope to
deny entry.107
In relation to the environment, s 4115 of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 requires that all
tanker ships over 5000 tons operating in US waters constructed after 1990 be built with
double hulls and a phase out of single hull tankers built before that date.108 As a result
any single hull tankers in contravention of this requirement are precluded from entering
US ports.109 This phase out of single hull tankers is also reflected in Regulation 20 in
Annex 1 to MARPOL.
Security concerns, particularly since September 2001, also have the effect of denying
entry into US ports of ships that do not comply with the relevant legislation. In the Port
and Waterways Safety Act 1972, s 1228 denies entry to United States waters to ships
that do not comply with a number of conditions including compliance with any relevant
act or treaty and adequate and proper manning.110 Also there is a right under s 19(c) of
the Deepwater Ports Act 1974 to deny entry to foreign ships to deepwater ports without
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prior agreement.111 The US Coast Guard also operates a Special Interest Vessel Program
under the 1976 Magnuson Act112 under which any ship can be excluded from United
States waters. This has been used to exclude a Soviet cruise ship in 1975, Nicaraguan
ships in 1984 and a Polish crewed ship in 1980. The rules of this program are
unpublished and can be issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.113 The flag States to
which this program applies varies but it has in the past excluded ships from Iran, North
Korea and Syria.114 Finally, the Maritime Transportation Security Act,115 which enacts
SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code, allows the Coast Guard to refuse entry to US waters of
ships that do not comply with the Code.116
Clearly the last twenty or thirty years has resulted in a significant curtailment of the
right of access to US ports, or more correctly increased the bases for refusal of entry.
The end result is that current US State practice could not be the granting of free access
to ports but quite the opposite.
Canada
There have been a number of decisions by Canadian Courts in relation to access to ports
by ships in distress117 but in relation to a general right of access to ports, the Canadian
position has been summed up by the Exchequer Court in Canada (Attorney General) v
Natalie S.(The)118:
the Parliament of Canada has an absolute right to exclude foreign vessels from any of
its ports….There is however a general practice to admit foreign seagoing vessels to
ports and to give them, on admission, equal treatment. This general practice is based in
part, on treaties, and in part upon a general and tacit permission of access by countries
119
concerned.

This position that access is a privilege and not a right can be displaced by legislation.120
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Under s 126 of the Canada Shipping Act 2001121 ships can only enter a VTS zone if
clearance has been obtained. Section 227 of the Canada Shipping Act 2001 also permits
the Minister to refuse entry to a ship if it is in contravention of an international
convention listed in Schedule 1 to the Act. The Schedule includes an extensive range of
Conventions including pollution, navigation and safety Conventions. In a similar way,
under s16 of the Marine Transportation Security Act 1994, the Minister can deny entry
to a ship where the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe a ship is a security threat.

In relation to pollution, under s 12 of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1985,
the regulations can be passed prohibiting any ship of that class from navigating within
any shipping safety control zone specified therein unless the ship complies with
standards prescribed by the regulations.122

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a long maritime history and has enacted national laws
concerning access to its ports. The origin of the practice of the United Kingdom is often
cited as going back to 1236 when King Henry III stated ‘Let no foreigner…go to
England without license from the King….If any such person lands…other than with our
license or our mandate , then he should be immediately turned back.’123
In common with many coastal States, legislation especially over the last twenty to thirty
years has increased the conditions of entry into United Kingdom ports and also provided
the right to deny access to certain ships. This legislation has its origins both from
national jurisdiction as well as resulting from the need to comply with European Union
Directions. An example of the first category is the traditional powers of the harbour
master of a port to regulate the manner in which a ship could enter a port under s 52 of
the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act of 1847.124
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More recently the harbour master has been given explicit power to prohibit the entry
into a harbour under s 1 of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985125 where he is of the opinion
that because of the condition of the ship there was a ‘(a) grave and imminent danger to
the safety of any person or property or (b) grave and imminent risk that the may, by
sinking or foundering in the harbour, prevent or seriously prejudice the use of the
harbour by other vessels’.

In relation to pollution, the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution)
(Amendment) Regulations 2004,126 the phase out of single hulled tankers was
accelerated and Regulation 31 provides that ships in breach of the double hull
requirement after the relevant date are to be prohibited from entering United Kingdom
ports.

European Union
Maritime industry is important to the European Union and steps have been taken since
the 1990s to implement community wide requirements for ports.127 Prior to the
introduction of majority voting little was done but after the Braer grounding in January
1993 a common policy on marine safety was developed.128 The result was the Council
Directive 95/21/EC on Port State Control issued on 19 June 1995.129 This Directive is
designed to improve conditions of ships in European waters and to prevent substandard
ships from operating in those waters.130 It requires all member States to introduce
common requirements for port State control in ship safety, pollution prevention and
shipboard living and working conditions.131 On 19 December 2001, as a result of the
Erika sinking, an amendment was made to Directive 95/21132 by the insertion of Article
7b under which a black list of ships which had been repeatedly detained was to be
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drawn up. Entry on the black list meant that the ships were banned from entry into
European waters until they could show that they could be operated safely.133 On 14
December 2003, after the Prestige sinking, the European Commission published the
first black list of ships that were refused entry into European waters, together with a list
of ships that would be added to the list if they were detained one more time.134

On 31 March 2004, by Regulation (EC) No 725/2004,135 the European Parliament
enacted the ISPS Code and directed all member States to legislate for its
implementation136 with whatever sanctions are considered ‘effective proportionate and
dissuasive’.137

4.

Opinions of International Jurists

At the international jurisprudential level, the right of access to ports has been examined
by the L’Institut de Droit International on three occasions. In 1898 it stated that access
to ports is presumed but ports can be closed for exceptional reasons of which the State
is the sole judge.138 This was strengthened slightly in its meeting in Stockholm in 1928
in that the presumption was removed and it was stated that ports were open to foreign
ships but could be closed in emergencies but only for a limited time.139 This was later
reversed in 1957 when the Institut stated in its Amsterdam meeting at Article II that
‘subject to the rights of passage sanctioned either by usage or by treaty, a coastal State
may deny access to its internal waters to foreign ships except where they are in
distress.’140 This is despite following two desiderata in the Preamble:
Desiring to see States facilitate international communications through the regime of
their maritime waters, notably by abstaining from denying access to their internal
133
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waters to foreign commercial vessels save where in exceptional circumstances this
denial of access is imposed by imperative reasons;
Declaring that it is consistent with the general practice of States to permit free access to
141
ports and harbours by such vessels;

The fact that, in spite of these desiderata, the Institut still resolved to allow States to
close their ports indicates strongly that in the view of the Institut there is no general
right to access ports.142

CONCLUSION
At an international level, there is little support for the concept of a general right to
access ports. While the concept of a general right of access to ports has yet to be
established, certain usages in relation to ports have been accepted as customary
international law. So, it has generally been accepted that: States have sovereignty over
their ports and can accordingly regulate access and conduct of ship within ports unless
obliged to do so by treaty or international law; States can nominate places on its coast as
ports;143 States can close ports in emergencies;144 States should give advance notice of
port closures to avoid liability. None of these norms can be used to found a general right
of access to ports.
Clearly from a practical economic viewpoint, most ports of the world are open to
international trade, which otherwise could not function. Nevertheless, this practice of
cannot be seen as a right to enter. It is a convenience for coastal States to enable trade
and can be conditioned and at times prohibited.145
From an examination of multilateral conventions, there is no evidence of a general right
to access ports.146 The 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute does not go this far but
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merely permits ships from signatory States to enter its ports on the basis of
reciprocity.147 It can be withdrawn and conditioned. LOSC and other multilateral
conventions, while they mention access to ports specifically or by implication, deal
more with the conditions of entry to ports and the conduct of the ships while in port. In
fact some, such as SOLAS, specifically deny the right to access in certain circumstances.
While some bilateral treaties do specifically grant access to the ships of the other party,
such access is specific to those ships and the right is not a general one. In any event
these too can be conditioned. In the 19th and early 20th centuries there was some
evidence of State practice founding a general right of access to ports but particularly
since the advent of larger and larger oil tankers since the late 1950s environmental
concerns have taken on a significance that overshadows any nascent right of access.
Security and safety concerns brought about in the early 21st Century have increased the
bases of refusal of entry of ships into port to the extent that it can no longer be argued
that there is a general right of access.
Whatever basis there may be in bilateral treaties, there is no general obligation to grant
access to ports and the position is that States can refuse entry to ships on a number of
grounds thereby refuting any presumption that ports are open to all ships. In Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Application)148 the
International Court of Justice observed that customary international law is dynamic and
undergoes ‘continuous evolution’.149 In relation to access to ports any previous
conceived right of general access has now evolved into a position that, even if it existed
previously, it no longer does.
The next question is whether there is any basis in international law for specific
exceptions to the sovereignty of a State over access to its ports, particularly the right of
a ship to access a port when it is in distress. This will be examined in the next chapter
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CHAPTER 3
ACCESS TO PORTS BY SHIPS IN DISTRESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
While it is quite clear that a ship cannot access ports as of right and that any request for
entry can be permitted, conditioned or refused by the coastal State, it is widely argued
that, exceptionally, such access must be granted where a ship is in distress.
As with the question of whether there exists a general right of access to ports, an
examination of this exception argument must be performed to determine whether there
is a need to address the question of places of refuge. If access to ports for ships in
distress is required under international law, then any further solutions would be
unnecessary. All that would be required would be enforcement of existing international
obligations.
This chapter addresses the argument that there exists in international law an obligation
on coastal States to grant access to ships in distress. This necessarily involves an
examination of the validity of this argument under customary international law and
treaty. In the same way as a coastal State cannot with impunity deny general access to
its internal waters for ships if there is an enforceable principle of customary
international law or there exists a treaty which obliges the coastal State to do so, so it
follows that ships in distress must be granted access if such access is required
customary international law or under treaty.

In addressing the argument of the existence of a right for ships in distress to access a
place of refuge, this chapter will first determine what is meant by the term ‘distress’.
Second, early trade relations between maritime States will be reviewed to determine the
existence, origins and development of such a right. Third, the formal system of bilateral
treaties which evolved from maritime practices from 1648 onwards will be examined
and assessed for evidence of the existence and extent of the custom. Fourth, the chapter
will analyse relevant 20th century multilateral treaties which gradually replaced the
system of bilateral treaties in dealing with aspects of international maritime relations
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and maritime law for any relevant treatment of the custom. Finally, the chapter will
examine any evidence for the existence or otherwise of any right of access for ships in
distress, through international and national judicial decisions and other State practice of
coastal States.
1

What is meant by ‘distress’?

Any right of access to a place of refuge to a ship when it is in distress raises the question
of what ‘distress’ means and what must be proven to establish that a ship is in distress.
The idea of ships in distress requesting a place of refuge prior to entering a port is a
relatively recent one. Prior to even 50 years ago,1 it was more common for ships to enter
a port or place of refuge and to then notify the port authorities of their presence and the
reasons therefore.2 This was even more so in the 17th and 18th centuries when
communication was virtually non existent. Therefore State practice as exemplified in
treaties and judicial decisions, does not normally deal specifically with any right of
access to a port for ships in distress but rather with the consequences of such entry.3 In
this regard, exemption from local customs duties4 and other laws, such as trade
restrictions,5 prohibition against the slave trade6 and illegal fishing,7 as well as fair
treatment of crew and cargo featured far more prominently in State practice.
From an analysis of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, little mention is made of
ships in distress being granted a right to access a place of refuge and none of them gives
any definition for the term ‘distress’.
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What constitutes ‘distress’ has been examined in the national case law of various coastal
States including the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. What can be
extracted from these decisions, which will be examined in more detail in this chapter, is
that distress must primarily involve an element of danger to the ship, its cargo and crew,
to the extent that a reasonable master is put in fear of losing the ship, cargo or crew.8
This danger can come not only from physical elements such as severe weather and
heavy seas,9 but also from lack of fuel, stores and water.10 Damage to the ship need not
be such that destruction or sinking is inevitable, provided that it is deemed reasonably
necessary to put into a place of refuge to repair or revictual to enable the voyage to
continue.11 It is also clear that the danger must be unavoidable and urgent and not selfinduced by the failure to properly navigate the ship,12 to victual the ship or load
sufficient fuel.13 Many of these dangers were peculiar to sailing ships and no longer
relevant to modern ships. However, the concept of distress, and the necessity for it when
requesting a place of refuge, is still valid today.
2.

Evidence of Custom from Early Trade Relations between Maritime States

Varying degrees of evidence of the custom can be found in the literature and legal
Codes from the times of Greece, Rome and Carthage, in the Codes of mediaeval
maritime States of Europe in the Middle Ages and the writings of jurists such as Hugo
Grotius. In literature the custom of hospitality to ships and sailors in distress is
mentioned by both Homer in the Odyssey 14 and Vergil in the Aeneid. In the latter book
Vergil makes a plea for hospitality for ships in distress:
What men, what monsters, what inhuman race, what laws, what barbarous customs of
the place, shut up a desert shore to drowning men, and drive us to the cruel seas again.15
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That this need for assistance for ships in distress was of concern to mariners in earlier
centuries is exemplified by the fact that this quote from the Aeneid was cited by Hugo
Grotius in The Freedom of the Sea, a seminal work in the law of the sea.16
Codes of maritime practice evolved from the earliest times of maritime trade. The best
known of the early maritime Codes, the Rhodian law, as incorporated into the Code of
Justinian, attempted to codify existing maritime custom at the time17 particularly in
relation to an early form of General Average but did not mention places of refuge.18 The
Rhodian Law, at least that version which was promulgated in the 8th century,19 does deal
with dangers and difficulties of navigation but there is no mention of ships in distress.20
In fact, there was some evidence that where ships were wrecked on a foreign shore, the
local inhabitants were permitted to seize the property from the ship and the crew and
passengers could be either ransomed or enslaved.21
There is more evidence of the growth of the custom of granting places of refuge in the
later mediaeval Codes of the maritime European States. These Codes developed because
of the need for consistency of treatment of merchants, ships and cargoes among all the
trading ports. As trade was essentially an international concern it was necessary for
there to be a common legal basis for trade and ships that carried trade.22 Gradually these
Codes gained widespread acceptance such that they were enforced by the courts of most
trading centres of Europe.23 In some countries special courts were established, like the
courts of pied-poudre in England and other maritime centres, elsewhere merchant’s
16
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courts were set up to deal with disputes in such a way as to not unduly interfere with the
carrying on of trade.24 While these Codes also contained many provisions concerning
General Average obligations, there is the genesis of the idea of assisting ships in
distress.
Lo Libre de Consolat de Mar which appeared in writing in Barcelona in 1435 but which
had been in existence since before the First Crusade in 1096,25 consolidated the customs
then existing in Catalonia and made extensive reference to an obligation to aid another
ship in distress.26 While no reference is made to access to ports, it does recognise the
need to assist ships in distress, which was a great advance on the uncontrolled anarchy
of earlier centuries.
Codes of other maritime States had also alluded to the duty to protect and assist ships
and sailors in distress. The Maritime Ordinances of Trani (1063) which is considered to
be the first maritime Code for the Mediterranean27 alluded to ships being permitted to
enter prohibited ports because of bad weather but does not oblige access to be given.28
The only consequence of so doing exempted the master from customs duties, which is
an aspect of the custom which has developed around places of refuge and which,
arguably, still exists today.29
In France, the Navigation Code of the Port of Arles (1150) provides in clause 105 that
fishermen living near the river must go to the assistance of any ship owned by another
resident of Arles if it is in danger.30 Later the Rules of Oleron (circa 1266 but arguably
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before this)31 provided in Article XXIX that protection and assistance was to be given to
sailors of ships wrecked on the shore.32 A further refinement occurred in the Ordinance
of Louis XIV in 1681 which codified the Rules of Oleron into French law.33
Gradually trade moved north to the Baltic and other north European ports and the
maritime customs established by the Codes in Italy, Catalonia and France formed the
practice in these ports. In Germany and the Baltic, the Laws of Visby were promulgated
to deal with trade with and between the towns of the Haseatic League in 1407. These
were based on the Ordinances of Trani but more especially on the Rules of Oleron.34
Subsequently the Laws of the Hanse Towns were issued around 1597 and were based
largely on the earlier Codes. Article IX of the Laws of the Hanse Towns provided that
masters of ships were to provide necessary provisions to ships in distress at no cost.35
In England the laws were codified into the Black Book of the Admiralty36 and were
based largely on the Rules of Oleron, which were reputedly brought to England by
Queen Eleanor in the 11th Century.37 Similarly, in Scotland, the Rules of Oleron and the
Laws of Visby formed the basis of maritime law.38 By the 14th century the admiralty
courts had been established and by the 16th century they were dealing with commercial
disputes.39 In the case of Luke v Lyde 40 in 1759, Lord Mansfield decided the case on the
Rhodian Laws and justified this use of maritime Codes as by stating that ‘maritime law
is not the law of any particular country, but the general law of nations….’.41 The
judgement then surveys the origins of maritime law as commencing with the Rhodian
Code and followed by the ‘Consolato del Mere’, the ‘laws of Oleron’, the ‘Hansetown
31
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Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, Handbook on the New Law of the Sea Volume I (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1991) 63; Bridget Murphy, ‘Luke v Lyde – an Analysis’ (2003) 9 Auckland University Law
Review 1140, 1147; Martin Norris, ‘The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty’ (1954) 52 Michigan Law
Review 479, 481 and <www.historyoflaw.info/maritime-law-history.html>.
35
< http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/documents/hanse.html>.
36
Royal Connell and William Mack, Naval Ceremonies, Customs and Traditions (US Naval Institute
Press, 6th ed , 2004) 25.
37
Martin Norris, ‘The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty’ (1954) 52 Michigan Law Review 479, 481.
38
Aldo Forte, ‘‘Kenning be Kenning and Course be Course’: Maritime Jurimetrics in Scotland and
Northern Europe 1400-1600’ (1998) 2 Edinburgh Law Review 56, 57; as to the laws of Visby see
<http://www.1911encyclopaedia.org/Sea_Law>.
39
Maritime Legal Resources, ‘History of Admiralty Law’ <http://www.marlegal.com/mlhist.html>.
40
Luke v Lyde (1759) 2 Burr 882; 97 ER 614.
41
Luke v Lyde (1759) 97 ER 614, 617.

89

laws’, the ‘laws of Wisbuy’ and ‘the Ordinance of Lewis the 14th’.42 This decision
conveniently sets out the growth and development of the Codes from which it can be
established that by 18th century that there existed a common set of rules and practices
among the major maritime States of Europe that could form the basis of customary
law.43
There were clearly accepted rules on general average and protection of ships and crew
in distress. From these points, it can be argued that the Codes form the genesis of the
custom of protecting ships in distress by permitting access to ports by such ships.
However, there is insufficient evidence to firmly establish any duty on coastal States to
grant access. This would have to await the development of the bilateral treaty system
which flowed from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.44
3.

Evidence of Custom from Bilateral Treaties

Although the Rules of Oleron and the Laws of Visby appear to have formed a set of
customary Rules among maritime States by the end of the 16th century, it was still
considered prudent for bilateral treaties to be concluded between States to ensure the
safety of ships and crew.45 While this trend is generally ascribed to have commenced
after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, there were earlier indications of such diplomatic
initiatives. One example arose from the preparations for the Spanish Armada in 1588.46
The King of Spain wrote to the King of France in which
The King of France… had been informed of the object of this great naval expedition -which was not by any means… an enterprise against France or England, but only a
determined attempt to clear the sea, once for all, of these English pirates who had
done so much damage for years past on the high seas--and had been requested, in
case any Spanish ship should be driven by stress of weather into French ports, to
afford them that comfort and protection to which the vessels of so close and friendly
47
an ally were entitled….
42
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Also the Peace Treaty between Spain and the United Provinces of the Low Countries in
January 1648, provided for an exception to a general prohibition of entry of warships
into ports ‘where they are forced in by storm or obliged thereto through necessity, or to
avoid the dangers of the sea’.48
While the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck of 164849 have been credited with the
birth of the system of State sovereignty,50 other important features were the
denunciation of war51 and the freeing up of trade.52 The latter point was necessitated by
the destruction that the Thirty Years War had caused to commerce in Europe. Both
points formed the basis of subsequent bilateral treaties of either ‘Friendship, Navigation
and Commerce’ or simply of ‘Commerce and Navigation’ which were entered into by
not only the signatories to the Peace of Westphalia but also by other existing and
emerging nations over the next three centuries.53 These treaties had common features
and most included provisions for ships in distress and the treatment to be afforded to the
crew and cargoes of such ships.54
Bilateral Treaties of Great Britain and the United States of America
State practice in the form of bilateral treaties has been evident in Great Britain from the
mid 17th century and the United States from soon after the Declaration of Independence
Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 174.
48
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in 1776. The geographical scope of the parties to these treaties is such that most of the
commercial world of the 18th and 19th centuries was covered by these treaties. An
examination of the terms of the treaties of these two countries gives a clear reflection of
the State practice of most of the major commercial powers.
Early examples of English bilateral treaties are the various Treaties of Commerce and
Navigation entered into with Sweden and Denmark between 1654 and 1670.55 While
Great Britain was not a party to the Peace of Westphalia, the tenor of these Treaties
reflected its intent. In this regard all the Treaties commence with an exhortation that
there be a ‘sincere, true and perfect friendship, peace and alliance…’.56 All Treaties also
include reference to ships in distress and how they are to be dealt with in each other
State’s jurisdiction. An example is Article VI of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce
between Great Britain and Sweden Uppsala 11 April 1654 which states:
In case any of the ships of either Confederate, whether of war or merchants, belonging
to the subjects and people of either, be by occasion of tempests, pursuit of pirates and
enemies, or any other urgent necessity constrained to put into each other's havens, roads
or shores, they shall be received there with all kindness and humanity, and enjoy all
friendly protection, and be permitted to refresh themselves and procure, at a reasonable
price, all things needful for their sustenance, reparation or use; neither shall they be
hindered from going out of the said ports or roads, at their pleasure, without paying any
customs or duties; provided they do nothing contrary to the laws, ordinances and
57
customs of the place, which the said ships shall enter into or abide in.

This formulation is similar in most other such Treaties at that time and contains the
recognised liberties granted to ships of the other State. Although this formulation does
not specifically state that ships in distress can have access, the implication is that they
do since once in port they are to be welcomed and treated properly.58 Similar Treaties
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were entered into between Great Britain and Portugal and Spain during the same period
using a similar formulation.59
Great Britain entered into many more bilateral treaties of Commerce and Navigation in
the 18th and 19 centuries both in Europe, North Africa60 and with emerging countries of
Central and South America.61 The general formulation was expanded in such Treaties
particularly those of the 19th century to deal not only with taking refuge but also with
salvage and wreck. The liberties relating to refuge are reasonably consistent with the
earlier Treaties and followed the following formulation:
Any ship of war or merchant vessel of either of the High Contracting Parties which may
be compelled by stress of weather, or by reason of any other distress, to take shelter in a
port of the other, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to procure all necessary supplies, and
to put to sea again, without paying any dues other than such as would be payable by
national vessels. In case, however, the master of a merchant vessel should be under the
necessity of disposing of a part of his cargo in order to defray the expenses, he shall be
bound to conform to the regulations and tariffs of the place to which he may have
come.62

This wording and the liberties granted in Treaties during the 1850s and after concerning
ships in distress use the same wording which appears to be the standard wording at the
time and as such could be said to be accepted State practice. Again it should be noted
that the wording does not give a specific right for ships in distress to access a port but
does not deny them facilities and exemptions from local customs laws.
59
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Another State that was negotiating bilateral treaties of ‘Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation’ during the 18th and 19th Centuries was the United States of America.
The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and France of 1778 was
the first such treaty entered into by the newly self declared United States.63 France, by
entering the Treaty, recognised the independence of the United States and so made
provision for commerce between the States including the rights of ships and crew in
distress. Article 21 recited the formulation that had been common since the Treaties
between Great Britain and Sweden 120 years earlier –
In Case the Subjects and Inhabitants of either Party with their shipping whether publick
and of War or private and of Merchants, be forced, through Stress of Weather, pursuit
of Pirates or Enemies, or any other urgent necessity for seeking of Shelter and Harbour,
to retreat and enter into any of the Rivers, Bays, Roads or Ports belonging to the other
Party, they shall be received and treated with all humanity and Kindness and enjoy all
friendly Protection & Help; and they shall be permitted to refresh and provide
themselves at reasonable Rates with victuals and all things needful for the sustenance of
their Persons or reparation of their Ships and conveniency of their Voyage; and they
shall no Ways be detained or hindered from returning out of the said Ports or Roads but
64
may remove and depart when and whither they please without any let or hindrance.

Although similar rights are granted to those under earlier Treaties, the refuge destination
is wider than just ports and is the first example of the places other than ports being
included in the refuge concept. Similar provisions for ships in distress were made in
Treaties with Prussia in 178565 and Spain in 1795.66
The provisions in the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His
Britannick Majesty and the United States of America, otherwise known as Jay’s Treaty,
were more elaborate and at the same time restrictive. Paragraph 2 of Article 23 states:
And His Majesty consents, that in case an American Vessel should by stress of weather,
Danger from Enemies, or other misfortune be reduced to the necessity of seeking
63
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Shelter in any of His Majesty's Ports, into which such Vessel could not in ordinary
cases claim to be admitted; She shall on manifesting that necessity to the satisfaction of
the Government of the place, be hospitably received, and be permitted to refit, and to
purchase at the market price, such necessaries as she may stand in need of, conformably
to such Orders and regulations as the Government of the place, having respect to the
circumstances of each case shall prescribe. She shall not be allowed to break bulk or
unload her Cargo, unless the same shall be bona fide necessary to her being refitted.
Nor shall be permitted to sell any part of her Cargo, unless so much only as may be
necessary to defray her expences, and then not without the express permission of the
Government of the place. Nor shall she be obliged to pay any Duties whatever, except
67
only on such Arts, as she may be permitted to sell for the purpose aforesaid.

This provision related only to American ships in English (and more relevantly, British
North American) ports and was silent on English ships in American ports, although the
first paragraph of Article 23 gives mutual access to warships of the Contracting States.68
Furthermore, it only applies to ports to which American ships would not otherwise have
been granted access and required that the master of the ship in distress satisfy the port
authorities of the fact of distress.69 Finally it has no provision allowing for the ships to
leave without let or hindrance as was contained in the Treaties with France and Spain.70
While mention is also made to refuge in Article 25 concerning ships of the Contracting
parties captured as prize by warships or privateers of a third country, this provision is
much less welcoming, requiring them to leave as quickly as possible after the weather
or dangers of the sea had abated.71 Nevertheless the main liberties granted to ships in
distress in Treaties since the 1650s were present.
Similar to Great Britain, the United States entered into a number of Treaties with the
Barbary States of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in North Africa between 1786
and 1836.72 While most of these treaties resulted from wars between the United States
67
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and the various Barbary States in the early 1800s73 provisions were made for both ships
that were wrecked on the coast of North Africa and for ships in distress. While
providing for the safety and protection to be granted to American subjects, in relation to
ships, these Treaties only deal with the disposition of wreck and the provision of stores
and the liberty to repair and deal with cargo without payment of duties. The common
tenor of the wording of these Treaties concerning place of refuge is exemplified by
Article 6 of the Treaty with Tripoli of 1796:
Vessels of either party putting into the ports of the other and having need of provisions
or other supplies, they shall be furnished at the market price. And if any such vessel
shall so put in from a disaster at sea and have occasion to repair, she shall be at liberty
to land and reembark her cargo without paying any duties. But in no case shall she be
74
compelled to land her cargo.

The Treaties entered into with the emerging countries of Central and South America75
were slightly more extensive. An indicative example is Article 9 of the Treaty with
Venezuela of 1836:
Whenever the citizens of either of the contracting parties, shall be forced to seek refuge
or asylum in the rivers, bays, ports or dominions of the other with their vessels, whether
merchant, or of war, public or private, through stress of weather, pursuit of pirates or
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed at Tripoli 4 November 1796, <http://avalon. yale.edu/
18th_century/ bar1796t.asp> (entered into force 10 June 1797); Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed at
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enemies, they shall be received and treated with humanity, giving to them all favour and
protection for repairing their ships, procuring provisions, and placing themselves in a
76
situation to continue their voyage, without obstacle or hindrance of any Kind.

This contains another example of the extension of the refuge destination to include
places other than ports.77 The wording also reinforces the standard rights and liberties
that were granted to ships in distress in earlier Treaties, such as the right to be received,
the right for the crew to be treated with humanity, the right to repair, the right to procure
provisions and the right to continue on their voyage without hindrance. While this
formulation does not mention the freedom from paying customs, this right had been
firmly established in earlier Treaties and is evident in later Treaties. The wording was
also similar to the Treaties that were being entered into by Great Britain at the same
period of time.
Treaties entered into by the United States with European nations in the mid 19th century
followed a similar pattern, although the exact wording was not necessarily the same. For
example the Treaty between the United States and Belgium in 185878 was short and
invoked principles of national treatment:
In cases of shipwreck, damages at, sea or forced putting-in, each party shall afford to
the vessels of the other, whether belonging to the State or to individuals, the same
assistance and protection, and the same immunities, which would have been granted to
its own vessels in similar cases.79

On the other hand, the Treaty with the Two Sicilies in 184580 was more detailed and
onerous:
The merchant vessels of each of the two high contracting parties, which may be forced
by stress of weather or other cause into one of the ports of the other, shall be exempt
from all duty of port or navigation paid for the benefit of the state, if the motives which
led to take refuge be real and evident, and if no operation of commerce be done by
loading or unloading merchandises; [it being] well understood, however, that the
loading or unloading, which may regard the subsistence of the crew, or necessary for
the reparation of the vessel, shall not be considered operations of commerce, which lead
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to the payment of duties, and that the said vessels do not stay in port beyond the time
necessary, keeping in view the cause which led [to] taking refuge.81

By the end of the 19th century, there was a clear pattern emerging in the bilateral treaties
entered into by Great Britain and the United States. This included such rights and
liberties as the right to be received, to seek refuge in places other than ports, the right
for the crew to be treated with humanity, the right to repair, the right to procure
provisions, freedom from paying customs and port duties and the right to continue on
their voyage without hindrance. Some Treaties required that the ship claiming distress
had to prove it but this was in no way universal.82
While the 19th century was the heyday of bilateral treaties and the 20th century saw the
advent of multilateral treaties after the Hague Peace Conference in 1899,83 bilateral
treaties that dealt with port access for ships in distress were by no means absent. As will
be seen later in this chapter, the only attempt to formulate a multilateral approach to
ports in the Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports,
Geneva, 1923 was not a success84 and it was therefore necessary for States to continue
to negotiate bilateral treaties that included rights of ships in distress.85
By the beginning of the 20th Century, the basic elements of access to places of refuge
for ships in distress had developed and converged to such an extent that it could be
strongly argued that state practice was such that a custom had developed that ships in
distress had a right to access places of refuge, although this was more implicit than
explicit, and had various liberties and rights while in that place of refuge.86
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The trend in wording of bilateral treaties in the 20th century continued to converge and
in essence reflect the 19th century wording particularly concerning the treatment of ships
that had entered port in distress.87
In the years before World War I, Great Britain continued to use the wording similar to
that which it used in the 19th century treaties which encapsulated the rights and liberties
that were common to all these treaties.88 Between the two World Wars, the trend
continued.89
After World War II there was less use made of ‘Friendship Commerce and Navigation
Treaties’90 and an increased use of ‘national treatment’ and ‘most favoured nation’
clauses91 in line with the gradual introduction after 1947 of multilateral trade
agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).92 In common
with earlier wording, there was little specific reference to a right to access ports,93 but
the use of the ‘national treatment’ and ‘most favoured nation’ clauses in treaties had the
effective result of permitting ships of each signatory State access to each other’s ports.
An example of a specific granting of access is in the Treaty of Commerce,
Establishment and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Japan 1962 under
which ships of each State have ‘liberty of access to all ports, waters and places open to
international commerce and navigation’.94 Another example is the Treaty of Friendship
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Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Greece 1951
where it is stated the ‘Vessels of either party that are in distress shall be permitted to
take refuge in the nearest port or haven of the other party…’95
During the same period, the United States continued to negotiate bilateral agreements in
the same manner as it had in the 19th century. By the 1960s the United States was
finding it increasingly difficult to negotiate this type of treaty, particularly with
developing nations and the last treaties of this kind were negotiated with Togo96 and
Thailand in 1966.97 Both of these treaties grant access to ships in distress in the same
wording as in the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United
States of America and Greece 1951 and some, but not all, other such treaties entered
into since 1945.98
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Although the United States is still party to 32 such treaties,99 the trend now is for
bilateral agreements to target specific objectives such as the great number of Bilateral
Investment Treaties entered into since 1959.100
Bilateral Treaties of the former British Empire
One of the major political developments of the early 20th Century was the gradual
devolution of independence to the self governing members of the British Empire. This
raised the question of the continued application of the ‘Friendship Commerce and
Navigation’ Treaties entered into by Great Britain on behalf of the Empire to these
States. In view of the geographical size and the trade generated by these States and the
shipping needed to carry this trade, this was not an unimportant question.
Dominions and colonies of the former British Empire such as Australia,101 New
Zealand, South Africa,102 the Irish Free State and Canada were not competent to enter
into Treaties until authority to do so was granted under the Statute of Westminster of
1926/31.103 That is not to say that attempts had not been made by the colonies and
Dominions to enter into treaties with foreign countries particularly on commercial
matters. Canada successfully negotiated tariff agreements with the United States and
France in 1878-1879.104
At the Colonial Conference of 1887 and the subsequent Colonial Conference in 1894,
Canada, New Zealand, and the self governing Australian colonies of Victoria and New
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South Wales pressed for greater freedom to enter into commercial treaties.105 The
compromise reached was that the Imperial Crown in the form of Great Britain would
continue to enter into commercial treaties with foreign States but would do so only after
consultation with the Dominions and colonies.106 It was not until the Halibut Fisheries
Treaty of 1923107 that a Dominion entered into a treaty with a foreign State, albeit with
the prior approval of the British Government.108
After the Statute of Westminster, the Dominions109 were permitted to enter into treaties
with foreign States in their own right.110 The Statute applied automatically and in its
entirety to Canada, the Irish Free State and the Union of South Africa but not to
Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland,111 where it was required to be approved by
their Parliaments. Australia adopted the Statute in 1942112 and New Zealand in 1947.113
Newfoundland did not adopt it prior to being absorbed into Canada in 1949.
Another method of including the Dominions and colonies began in 1878 by the
inclusion in commercial agreements a provision which precluded automatic application
of the treaty to the colonies and Dominions.114 Under this method each of the colonies
or Dominions, which were usually enumerated in the text, were able to accede to the
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treaties within a defined period of time. Up to that time, treaties entered into by Great
Britain automatically included the Empire.115
In Australia, there was an added complication. At Federation in 1901 there were 18
treaties to which one or more of the six colonies had acceded under the 1878
arrangement.116 The question was whether these were automatically terminated, were
transferred to the Commonwealth or remained with the relevant State.117 In the result,
by 1914 it was decided that the treaties were not terminated and the responsibility under
them had passed to the Commonwealth.118
There are still over 200 treaties entered into by Great Britain that bind Australia by
‘inheritance’.119 These include 20 of the Treaties of Friendship Commerce and
Navigation entered into by Great Britain and which prior to 1878 applied automatically
to the Empire.120 Australia, as an independent State, has never favoured Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, preferring to rely on multilateral trade
agreements and to negotiate bilateral treaties only for specific purposes.121 After World
War II, the multilateral treaties such as the GATT, reduced the need for bilateral treaties
and the emphasis of the Australian government turned increasingly to Treaties of
Commerce122 and Free Trade Agreements and targeted bilateral agreements.123 These
agreements do not make separate reference to ports and shipping but rely on ‘most
favoured nations’ and ‘national treatment’ clauses to achieve uniformity of treatment. In
the only quasi treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the Basic Treaty of
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Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan,124 there is no reference to
navigation and shipping with the emphasis being on the development and granting of
most favoured nation status rather than specific obligations such as access to ports.125
In the other former Dominions, 23 of the Treaties of Friendship Commerce and
Navigation entered into by Great Britain are still in force in Canada.126 In New Zealand,
the Irish Free State prior to 1949 and the Union of South Africa prior to 1960,127 there
are none.
In Ireland prior to 1949, the Irish Free State entered into two Treaties of Commerce and
Navigation in its own right.128 In 1950, the Republic of Ireland entered into a Treaty of
Friendship Commerce and Navigation with the United States of America. Article
XVIII.5 of that Treaty refers to ships in distress in simple terms: ‘Vessels of each Party
that are in distress shall be permitted to take refuge in the nearest port or haven of the
other Party, and shall receive friendly treatment and assistance’.129 This wording is the
same as that in the Treaties between the United States and Greece, Togo and Thailand
noted earlier.
In South Africa prior to 1960, specific action was taken to keep in force the Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Italy signed at Rome on June
15th, 1883.130 In the Republic of South Africa, particularly since 1994, the trend appears
to also be for bilateral treaties to be entered into for specific purposes, particularly,
Bilateral Investment Treaties, moving away from the broader Friendship Commerce and
Navigation type of treaty.131 For example, in 1998, the Republic of South Africa entered
into a Shipping Agreement with Germany which included in Article 5 national
124
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treatment between the ships of each State including rights of access to ports on a
reciprocal basis.132
Bilateral Treaties of Other States
The extensive nature of the bilateral treaties entered into by Great Britain and the United
States encompassed most areas of the world and with most of the major trading nations.
State practice by these States between themselves in dealing with ships in distress by
way of bilateral treaties reveals the same general trend.
Treaties of Friendship Commerce and Navigation entered into by other Asian and
European countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Japan, Denmark, France, Greece,
Siam(Thailand), Latvia, and Finland were worded in either identical terms as those of
Great Britain and the United States or in terms that incorporated most of the elements of
these Treaties.133
In the case of Siam, for example, it entered into its first Treaty of Amity and Commerce
with the United States in 1833134 and subsequently entered into similar treaties with
most of the European colonial powers, particularly between the two world wars.135 The
provisions in these treaties relating to ships in distress reflect the wording in treaties
entered into by other States at the time.136
Effect of Bilateral Treaties on Customary International Law
Although later treaties, particularly after 1945, would disclose a divergence of actual
wording, the fact remains that the core elements of the rights of ships in distress both to
enter a port and within the port have been consistently part of bilateral treaties in the
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20th century.137 These elements include the obligation on the port state to give all
possible assistance to persons and property on board a distressed ship; the right to
undertake repairs; the right to procure stores; the right to be free of customs or other
duties unless cargo is unloaded and traded; the ability to put to sea again without
hindrance; the right to consular assistance. While the right of access itself is not always
specified, as described earlier, the fact that other rights are accorded to ships that have
put into a port because of distress must make it implicit that such ships are permitted to
enter or, at least, are not prevented from entering a port or place of refuge.
The number of bilateral treaties and the similarity of their contents has led to an
argument that there is now a rule of customary international law obliging all States to
grant access to ports to ships in distress regardless of whether or not there is a treaty
obligation.138 While this general consistency in tenor and wording of bilateral treaties is
indicative of a custom of permitting ships in distress to enter a port, and therefore an
exception to the traditional rule that there is no automatic right for a ship to enter a port,
by itself it would be insufficient to establish that such a rule of customary international
law exists.139
The first problem is that the treaties are between individual States and not multilateral,
which approach failed in 1923. As such they bind only the parties to the treaties. As was
seen earlier, a common practice in bilateral treaties, if sufficiently broad, can become
customary international law.140 However, such an approach should be treated with
caution.141 Simply because certain rights are contained in numerous treaties does not
automatically create a custom without evidence of some ‘fundamental norm-making
character’.142
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A further concern in relation to any argument that a right of access per se exists for
ships in distress through the multitude of bilateral treaties is that there is no uniformity
or consistency of such a right being expressly given rather than implicitly given.143
While it could be argued that the existence of a substantial body of State practice by
way of bilateral treaties necessarily means that there is an right for access for ships in
distress under customary international law even where such a right is not expressly
given in a bilateral treaty, such a right cannot be assumed and would require
adjudication before if could be acted on. A requirement for substantial uniformity of
State practice has been laid down by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
Case (United Kingdom v Norway) 144 and the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru).145
The fact that some treaties include an express right of access and others are silent on it
shows an inconsistency of practice that would make it difficult to establish an automatic
right of access to ports by ships in distress, even though they are similar in many other
details.146 This is even more so in view of changing State practice in the second half of
the 20th century where there is a safety or environmental threat to the coastal State from
the ship needing refuge.147
There would appear to be more certainty on other aspects of the ‘refuge custom’
namely, the treatment given to the crew, ship and cargo once the ship is in port. As will
be seen below, case law in a number of countries have shown that these aspects are
considered binding.
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4.

Ships in Distress under Multilateral Conventions

Since early in the 20th century, multilateral Conventions have sought to codify maritime
law, culminating in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)148 in
1982. There is little direct reference to ships in distress or to places of refuge in any
multilateral Convention. As was seen in chapter two, there is no provision in any
multilateral Treaty that provides for access to ports as of right, so the question that must
then be raised is whether the fact that a ship is in distress creates an exception to that
conclusion. This part of the chapter will review a number of multilateral Conventions
which were examined in chapter two, to ascertain if an exception does exist.
Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, Geneva, 1923
In chapter two, it was concluded that the effect and intent of the Convention and Statute
on the International Regime of Maritime Ports (Ports Convention)149 was not to grant
general access to ports but to grant access on the basis of reciprocity which could be
suspended where reciprocity is not given by another party or where national interests
demanded it.150 Not only is it limited to reciprocity but it is only granted to the
signatories to the Convention.151
While there are some limitations as to which ships are covered by the Ports Convention,
such as fishing vessels,152 ships involved in the maritime coasting trade153 and
warships,154 there is no provision which excludes ships in distress. This conclusion is
reinforced by paragraph 1 of the Protocol of Signature to the Ports Convention which
states that ‘it is understood that the provisions of the present Statute shall apply to ports
of refuge specially constructed for that purpose’. If ships in distress seeking a port of
refuge were to be excluded from the provisions of the Ports Convention then such an
addition would not have been required. Equally, there is no specific provision in the
148
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Ports Convention permitting access to ships in distress.155 It follows that where a ship in
distress that belongs to a Contracting State requests access to a port covered by the
Ports Convention, access would be required to be given under Article 2 in the same
manner as any other ship which is not in distress. This would be subject to all other
conditions required by the Ports Convention being met, such as equality of treatment
under Article 2 and such rights not having been suspended under either Article 8 or
Article 16.
The reference to a ‘port of refuge’ in paragraph 1 of the Protocol of Signature to the
Ports Convention does create a possible limitation for ships in distress. Indeed the
whole Ports Convention is limited to maritime ports, which would include such ports of
refuge. Article 1 of the Statute in the Ports Convention describes maritime ports as
including ‘All ports which are normally frequented by sea-going ships and used for
foreign trade…’. This limits the rights provided under the Statute in the Ports
Convention to ships, including ships in distress, to such ports or to ‘ports of refuge
specially created for the purpose’ and would exclude other places of refuge, such as
bays and anchorages not within a port, that may be more appropriate to the
circumstances of the case.156
In practice, the question of whether places of refuge must be limited to maritime ports
may be more apparent than real. In the few countries which have designated places of
refuge, many are ports. For example, in Denmark, 22 places of refuge have been
designated for ships of either high pollution potential or low pollution potential.157 Of
the 14 places of refuge for ships of high pollution potential, nine are ports and five are
anchorages. The eight places for low pollution potential ships are all anchorages.158 In
the United Kingdom, while it is not the policy to predetermine places of refuge, it is
estimated that 761 potential places of refuge in the UK Pollution Control Zone are ports
and harbours.159
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While it is possible that the apparent limitation of places of refuge to maritime ports
might be argued in any challenge to the granting of refuge, in practice, the potential loss
of reciprocity under Article 8 of the Ports Convention would probably prevent such a
literal interpretation. Furthermore, under Article 26 of the Convention on the Law of
Treaties,160 parties to treaties must perform obligations in good faith and it could be
argued that taking a strictly literal distinction between a port and a place of refuge
would not be acting in good faith.
A further possible restriction on the access of ships in distress under the Statute in the
Ports Convention flows from Article 16 of the Ports Convention which permits the
Contracting State to opt out of the provisions of the Statute to the Ports Convention ‘in
the case of an emergency affecting the State or the vital interests of the country’. As was
stated earlier, this article was used, perversely, by the Arbitral Tribunal in the ARAMCO
Arbitration161 as a basis for establishing that there was a general right for ships to access
ports, when it clearly authorised the opposite.
There is no guidance as to what grounds would constitute the requisite emergency or
vital interests and there does not appear to have been any judicial guidance. It is
therefore arguable that the threat of major pollution could constitute an emergency that
would entitle a Contracting State to temporarily suspend the rights under the Statute in
the Ports Convention, including the right of the ship in distress to access a port.162
However, adopting the rules of interpretation in Article 31 of the Convention on the
Law of Treaties a stronger counter argument would be that such an emergency would
need to be measured against the objects and intent of the Convention as a whole.163
In such a context, it is important to remember that the Ports Convention flowed from
the Versailles Peace Treaty and was designed to:
ensure in the fullest measure possible the freedom of communications… by
guaranteeing in the maritime ports situated under their sovereignty or authority and for
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purposes of international trade equality of treatment between the ships of all the
164
contracting states, their cargoes and passengers.

From the breadth of the intent of the Ports Convention and flowing as it did from the
Versailles Peace Treaty, it would logically follow that for ‘the emergency affecting the
safety of the State’ to be sufficiently important to warrant the suspension of the Ports
Convention, it would need to be of a serious nature and be read eiusdem generis with
the words ‘vital interests of the country’.165 Under such an interpretation, a threat of oil
pollution would be unlikely to be sufficiently serious to affect the vital interests of the
country and as such negate the intent of the Ports Convention. Arguably, the threat of a
nuclear explosion or nuclear pollution from a ship in distress under nuclear power or
carrying nuclear cargo or a ship carrying less volatile but still dangerous cargo166 would
be more likely to warrant such a suspension. Unless it could be clearly and reasonably
shown that the threat of oil pollution constitutes an emergency so great as to affect the
vital interests of a country, Article 16 of the Ports Convention could not be used to
prevent a ship in distress from accessing a port where it would otherwise be permitted to
do so. 167
One further argument for the right of ships in distress to access ports under the Statute
in the Ports Convention comes not from what the it says but what it doesn’t say and the
reasons for this. There is evidence in the Travaux Preparatoires that the reason why
there is no mention of the rights of ships in distress to access ports flows from the fact
that such a right was considered so well established and absolute that there was no need
to mention it.168 The representatives of Belgium and the Netherlands at the Conference
on the Ports Convention, at least, are reported to have expressed this view.169 While this
idea is more a matter for discussion under customary intentional law, it is necessary to
consider the import of such an argument in the interpretation of this Statute in the Ports
Convention. While a Treaty must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the ordinary
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meaning to be given to the terms of the Treaty…’,170 it is permissible to use the Travaux
Preparatoires as a supplementary means of interpretation to either confirm the ordinary
meaning or to provide guidance where there is any ambiguity.171 In relation to the
central article (Article 2), while no separate mention is made the right of access of ships
in distress, there is also no mention of denial of entry. Accordingly it must logically
follow that the use of the general word, ‘vessels’, must include the subset of ‘vessels in
distress’. As the provision can be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, it is not
necessary to make use of the views expressed in the Travaux Preparatoires in
interpreting the Statute in the Ports Convention.
In summary, the Ports Convention permits access to ports by ships in distress in the
same manner and on the same terms as any other ship covered by the Ports Convention.
Whether this extends to places of refuge other than ports is questionable but, arguably,
it does. Furthermore, any suspension of the rights granted under the Statute in the Ports
Convention would only apply to ships in distress if such ships threaten the vital interests
of the coastal State and in normal circumstances threats of pollution would be unlikely
to do so.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
While it is quite relatively straightforward to establish that LOSC does not grant a
general right of access to ports, establishing the position of a right of ships in distress to
access ports is more problematic.
There have been two major propositions posited under which it is argued that the LOSC
does deal with ships in distress: first it is argued that a ship in distress seeking a place of
refuge is not engaging in innocent passage in the territorial sea and therefore can be
refused entry into the internal waters and ports of a coastal State; second, it is argued
that the pollution rights and responsibilities in Section 5 of Part XII of the LOSC can be
used to refuse access to places of refuge to ships in distress where such ships and their
cargoes constitute a pollution threat. These propositions will now be evaluated.
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In common with its predecessors, LOSC is not directly concerned with the internal
waters of the coastal State.172 It has no specific provisions relating to access to ports in
general or for ships in distress.173 In common with all ships, ships in distress would only
be permitted to access places of refuge in territorial waters or to proceed through
territorial waters to a place of refuge in internal waters if its voyage through the
territorial sea constituted ‘passage’ under LOSC and, if so, if the ‘passage’ was
‘continuous and expeditious’ and ‘innocent’.
What is meant by ‘passage’ is set out in Article 18 of LOSC. It must be for the purpose
of either ‘traversing that [territorial] sea without entering internal waters’ or to ‘proceed
to or from internal waters’. Clearly the objective of passage through the territorial sea is
of a temporary nature as a medium for transit and not as a destination in itself.174
Therefore the entry of a ship in distress into the territorial sea for the purpose of seeking
a place of refuge would not be ‘passage’ within the definition in Article 18. However, if
the entry into the territorial sea was for the purpose of transit and the ship then develops
difficulties requiring a place of refuge, the passage would not cease to be a passage
within the meaning of Article 18. This would mean that it would then be subject to the
requirements in Articles 18 and 19 that it be ‘continuous and expeditious’ and, if that is
so, that it be ‘innocent’.175
The requirement for passage to be ‘continuous’ emphasises that the basis of the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea is that passage is merely a conduit for trade
and that the territorial sea itself cannot be the destination of the passage.176 What is
meant by ‘expeditious’ is not as clear. A general definition is acting with ‘speed and
efficiency’.177 It has been stated that ‘expeditious’ does not imply that ships must
‘proceed with full speed ahead’, but merely that the ship must proceed quickly.178
Contrary to this, it has been argued that this cannot be the interpretation since a fortiori
the right to stop and anchor, granted to ships in distress in Article 18(2) must also imply
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a right to proceed slowly without actually stopping.179 However, this misconstrues the
exception accorded ships in distress. The benefit of innocent passage in Article 18 is
accorded to ships transiting the territorial sea as part of a larger voyage or a voyage into
internal waters.180 As such, hovering, unnecessary manoeuvring and anchoring should
play no part in passage unless distress or force majeure result in it being necessary to
stop or anchor the ship.181 Unless it is necessary to stop or anchor then the ship must
continue on its journey as quickly and efficiently as possible.182
If the passage can be classified as being ‘continuous and expeditious’, it must then be
shown to be ‘innocent’ within the definition in Article 19 which specifies that passage is
‘innocent’ provided that it is ‘not prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the
coastal State’. Article 19(2) specifies what is meant by ‘prejudicial to the peace, good
order and security of the coastal State’. While most of the activities listed are specific,
the final activity, specified in Article 19(2)(l), appears to be a ‘catch all’ provision when
it specifies ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’.183 This activity is
not to be interpreted eiusdem generis with the other activities and is wide enough to
cover any such matter regardless of whether or not it is prejudicial.184 A ship in distress
no longer proceeding on a direct passage through the territorial sea to a place of refuge
could be viewed as being involved in an activity ‘not having a direct bearing on
passage’ as the basis of the granting of the right under Article 17 is that of a conduit
through the territorial sea.
179
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If the passage of a ship in distress is viewed as not being passage within the meaning of
Article 18 or, if it is, it is not ‘continuous and expeditious’ or such passage is not
‘innocent’, Article 25(1) authorises the coastal State to ‘take the necessary steps in its
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent’. Such steps could include
refusal of entry into territorial waters; an order to the ship’s owner and master that it be
removed from the territorial sea; the ship being arrested for offences committed within
the territorial sea; or that any permitted entry into internal waters be the subject of
conditions.185 The imposition of conditions is addressed in Article 24. Under this article,
the coastal State ‘shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the
territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention’, and in particular, cannot
‘impose requirements of foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or
impairing the right of innocent passage’. This presupposes that navigation is ‘passage’
and that it is ‘innocent’. It follows that where a ship does not fall within these
parameters, the coastal State can impose conditions that could have such a practical
effect. This right to impose conditions of entry is particularly relevant to ships in
distress attempting to access a place of refuge.
The combined effect of Articles 18 and 19 could have the effect of preventing a ship in
distress from accessing a place of refuge in the internal waters of a coastal State. This is
so even if can be argued as a general proposition that a ship in distress has a right to
access places of refuge in that State.
The second argument deals with the rights and obligations of the coastal State to take
steps to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment under Section
5 of Part XII of LOSC.186
It has been argued that the duties imposed on States under Part XII of LOSC to control
or prevent pollution can form the basis of a duty to grant a place of refuge to ships in
distress. This argument is based on the general obligation on all States to take steps to
prevent harm to the marine environment contained in Article 192 of LOSC187 and the
obligations in Articles 194 and 195 of LOSC on States to take all measures to prevent
185
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such damage and to ensure that the hazard is not transferred from one area to another.188
The argument in favour of the granting of access to ships in distress based on these
provisions of LOSC is not assisted by the rest of Part XII. In fact the more specific
obligations set out in Part XII apply in a positive sense to flag States and only in a
discretionary sense to coastal States.189
One of the major aims of LOSC was to confirm the existing rights of flag states and to
redefine and expand the rights of coastal States particularly in the territorial sea and the
EEZ. The wording of Part XII is no different.190 The duties placed on States to preserve
the marine environment reaffirmed the existing role of the flag States but also granted
coastal States rights to enforce compliance with national laws in the internal waters and
to regulate activities of shipping in the territorial sea and EEZ subject to the overriding
obligation not to interfere with innocent navigation. LOSC does not seek to change the
primary role of the flag State.191 So in Article 211(2) of LOSC the flag State ‘shall adopt
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine
environment from ships flying their flag or of their registry….’ In contrast Articles
211(4) and (5) coastal States ‘may… adopt laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from foreign vessels…’ in
the territorial sea and EEZ. The distinction is that it is only the flag State that is obliged
to adopt laws in relation to its flagged ships while coastal States have a discretion to
adopt laws.
Far from creating a duty on coastal States to grant access to ships in distress, Part XII of
LOSC arguably does the opposite. It continues and codifies the existing law in relation
to the responsibilities of flag States and imposes positive duties on them. However, it
merely grants coastal States a discretion to pass laws in relation to the territorial sea and
the EEZ and to enforce them but imposes no positive obligation on them to do so.
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Therefore a coastal State may take steps to protect the environment by granting access
to a port to a ship in distress in the territorial sea or the EEZ but is under no obligation
to do so. If a ship in distress is actually in port but such entry is classified as not being
voluntary, the powers of the coastal State are even more circumscribed and it can in fact
prevent an unseaworthy ship from leaving port.
Under neither of the arguments posited can there be an obligation under LOSC on
coastal State to grant access to a ship in distress. Accordingly there is no provision in
the LOSC which would oblige a coastal State to grant access to ships in distress.192 Such
access could be granted at the discretion of the coastal State and could be the subject of
any condition the coastal State cares to impose.193 If LOSC is to be used to force coastal
States to grant a place of refuge, specific and unequivocal provision would need to be
inserted.194
International Convention on Salvage 1989
Article 11 of the International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention)195 is the
only direct reference in an international convention to ships in distress. However,
Article 11 only relates to cooperation during salvage operations. It states:
A State Party shall, whenever regulating or deciding upon matters relating to salvage
operations such as admittance to ports of vessels in distress or the provision of facilities
to salvors, take into account the need for co-operation between salvors, other interested
parties and public authorities in order to ensure the efficient and successful performance
of salvage operations for the purpose of saving life or property in danger as well as
preventing damage to the environment in general.196

This requirement to take the needs of salvors into account is, however, ‘an empty
exhortation’197 that imposes no duty on a coastal State to actually grant access to a ship
in distress. All it does is to ensure that there is cooperation with all interested parties
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when making decisions, including whether or not to grant access to a ship in distress,
during the performance of the salvage operation.198
During the negotiations for the Salvage Convention, it was proposed that it deal more
specifically with the provision of places of refuge for ships in distress.199 There was an
unusual alliance between environmental groups and the shipping industry that pressed
for there to be included in the Convention an obligation for States to grant places of
refuge.200 However, this proposal was unsuccessful. The main reason for the failure was
that most delegates took the view that the Convention essentially dealt with private
commercial interests and that there was no place for public rights and responsibilities.
The end result therefore was a ‘half hearted arrangement’201 under which the public law
aspects of salvage were ignored.
It has been argued that despite its general wording, Article 11 could form the basis of a
duty to grant access to ships in distress but only through coastal States putting Article
11 into their legislation.202 The same author admits that practically this appears to be
difficult not only from the point of view that there has been a relatively few number of
States which have ratified the Salvage Convention and put it into legislation203 but also
from the fact that even among the States that have done so, all have excluded Article 11
from the legislation.204
Therefore it can be concluded that the Salvage Convention does not create an obligation
on coastal States to grant a place of refuge to ships in distress but merely requires that
States cooperate with salvors in relation to the salvage operation in which the granting
of a place of refuge could be a part.
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International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation
1990
Under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC),205 all signatories are obliged to put in place oil pollution
emergency plans for ships under their jurisdiction206 and masters of such ships are
obliged to report any discharge or possible discharge from the ship to the nearest coastal
State.207 On receipt of such report the coastal State is to assess the likelihood of damage
from the spill and propose actions to deal with such spills.208 It is argued that, while
there is no specific obligation on coastal States to grant access to ships in distress, the
requirements of Article 5 of OPRC could include consideration of the granting of a
place of refuge as a possible action. However it is conceded that there is no evidence of
such action being taken.209
The critical factor in this argument is that the granting of a place of refuge could be but
one of the actions considered where a report is received. This does not create a specific
obligation and it as such it leaves the decision on whether to adopt this as a possible
action to the coastal State. As such it does no more than Article 11 of the Salvage
Convention.
International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties 1973
In a similar manner as OPRC, Article 1(1) of the International Convention relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1973 (Intervention
Convention)210 permits coastal States to:
take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or
eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from
205
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pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or
acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major
harmful consequences.

This could include either permitting or even ordering a ship in distress to access a place
of refuge.211 It still suffers from the weakness of the argument in relation to the Salvage
Convention and OPRC, that there is no specific obligation to do so. It remains
discretionary on the part of the coastal State.212
5.

Evidence of Custom from Judicial Decisions

To ascertain what, if any, customary international law exists in relation to right of
access to ports and the liberties and rights once in port, it is necessary to examine other
evidence of State practice such as judicial decisions and established policies.
In looking at judicial decisions it is important to be clear on the basis of the decision. In
relation to ships in distress, most of the decisions of national courts deal with particular
aspects of the custom and use of such decisions should be limited to that one aspect. It
would be inappropriate to apply such decisions to all aspects of the custom. This is
important in considering to what extent national decisions have on establishing the
existence or otherwise of a right of a ship in distress to access a place of refuge.213 As
with bilateral treaties, most cases have dealt with such aspects of the distress custom as
exemption from local customs duties and other laws, such as trade restrictions,
prohibition against the slave trade and illegal fishing, as well as fair treatment of crew
and cargo.
To date there has been no decision of the International Court of Justice on the refuge
custom, although there have been international arbitrations under the terms of various
bilateral treaties. Ultimately a decision of the International Court of Justice will be
necessary if an authoritative decision is required.214
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Decisions of international arbitral bodies and national courts can provide some guidance
on State practice. Decisions of international arbitral bodies and of the national courts of
the United States, England, Canada, the Netherlands and Ireland will now be examined
to see what guidance they can give on the question of the existence of a binding custom
on access to ports for ships in distress.
Decisions of International Arbitral Bodies
During the late 18th century and the 19th century, prior to the establishment of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International Justice,
bilateral commercial treaties often included provisions to establish arbitral tribunals to
decide differences between the parties and the commercial interests of their subjects,215
while some treaties were concluded solely to deal with such issues.216
Some of the earliest treaties included Jay’s Treaty of 1795217 and the Treaty of Ghent of
1814 between Great Britain and the United States.218
By 1853, a number of claims between British and United States interests remained
outstanding since the Treaty of Ghent.219 To resolve these issues and issues that had
arisen subsequently, a Convention between Great Britain and the United States set up an
arbitral tribunal to decide these issues.220 A number of cases came before this tribunal
that involved the treatment of ships entering port because of force majeure. The claims
concerned the right of the State in which the port was situated to enforce its laws on the
ships that entered the port because of force majeure.
Three cases on issues that arose between 1835 and 1841 and which dealt with the
question of slaves being legally carried on ships forced into a port where slavery was
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illegal, came before the tribunal. These cases involved the ships Enterprise, Hermosa
and Creole.221
In The Enterprise, the ship was carrying slaves between American ports and was forced
to seek refuge in Nassau in Bermuda, which was a British possession.222 In the case of
The Hermosa, the ship was wrecked on a reef off the Bahamas and slavery was still
legal in the United States but had been made illegal in Great Britain and its possessions.
In the case of The Creole, the situation was more complicated in that the slaves on
board mutinied while the ship was on the high seas and captured and murdered some of
the crew. The ship was then forced to go to Nassau. Although some of the slaves who
committed the murders were held, the rest of the slaves were liberated by the port
authorities.223
In all three cases, although in different circumstances, most or all of the slaves were
liberated by the British authorities on the basis that slavery was now illegal in British
possessions.
The owners of the slaves sought compensation arguing that the law that applied to ships
which were forced to seek refuge solely because of force majeure was the law of the
flag and that the British authorities could not impose British law on the cargo. In two
earlier cases dealing with slave cargo, The Comet and The Encomium,224 the British
Government had compensated slave owners for the liberation of slaves in the Bahamas
where the ships had been rescued after stranding, on the basis that the law that applied
to the ship and its cargo was the law that applied on the high seas i.e. the law of the flag
State.225 The significance of these cases was that at the time compensation was paid,
slavery was still legal in British possessions. The American representatives argued that
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the decisions in these cases were still relevant and that in the absence of any other
factors, a ship which entered a port in distress was not subject to the laws of the port.226
In all three cases, the Umpire found for the owners and awarded compensation of
$49,000, $16,000 and $110,330 respectively.227 The reasoning given in The Enterprise,
which was confirmed in The Hermosa,228 was that
It is undoubtedly true, as a general proposition, that a vessel driven by stress of weather
into a foreign port is not subject to the application of the local laws, so as to render the
vessel liable to penalties which would be incurred by having voluntarily come within
the local jurisdiction. The reason of this rule is obvious. It would be a manifest injustice
to punish foreigners for a breach of certain local laws unintentionally committed by the,
229
and by reason of circumstances over which they have no control. …

And further:
The conduct of the authorities at Bermuda was a violation of the laws of nations, and of
those laws of hospitality which should prompt every nation to afford protection and
230
succor to the vessels of a friendly neighbor that may enter their ports in distress. …

This exemption is not absolute231 –
While the vessel is to extent alluded to free from the operation of local laws, it by no
means follows that it is entitled to absolute exemption from the local jurisdiction, as, for
example, it can scarcely be contended that persons on board the vessel would not be
subject to the local jurisdiction for crimes committed within it….It appears to me
therefore that it can not with correctness be said that a vessel forced by stress of weather
into a friendly port is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state to which she belongs
in the same way as if she were at sea…she brings with her (by the law of nations)
immunity from the operation of the local laws for some purposes, but not for all. …232

While the circumstances of The Creole were different, the result was the same and for
the same reasons.233 The Umpire stated:
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The Creole was on a voyage, sanctioned and protected by the laws of the United States,
and by the law of nations. Her right to navigate the ocean could not be questioned, and
as growing out of that right, the right to seek shelter or enter the ports of a friendly
power in the case of distress or any unavoidable necessity.
A vessel navigating the oceans carries with her the laws of her own country so far as
relates to the persons and property on board, and to a certain extent retains those rights
even in the ports of the foreign nations she may visit….
These rights, sanctioned by the law of nations – viz, the right to navigate the ocean and
to seek shelter in case of distress or other unavoidable circumstances, and to retain over
the ship, her cargo, and passengers the laws of her own country- must be respected by
all nations, for no independent nation would submit to their violation. ...234

Other Commissions also looked at the issue of the rights of ships entering ports in
distress. A Convention between the United States and Mexico of 11 April 1839235 set up
a Commission dealt with a case of The Brig Ann in 1839. In this case the ship was
forced into the port of Vera Cruz to replenish supplies which had been depleted through
rough weather. The cargo of brandy was impounded by the port authorities on suspicion
of it being contraband. The Mexican courts ordered that the ship be permitted to
replenish, repair and leave with the cargo since the only reason it entered Vera Cruz was
because of distress. In spite of this the cargo was only released on payment of duty. The
Tribunal ordered damages for this duty and demurrage.
In the case of The Susannah, on a voyage from New Orleans to Corpus Christi, Texas,
the ship was forced to enter the Rio Grande because it had lost its anchors, was leaking
badly and was without provisions. The Mexican authorities claimed the entry was for
the purposes of smuggling and the ship was seized and the master imprisoned.
Subsequently by Act of Congress of 3 March 1849236 it was declared that pursuant to
Article 10 of the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation of April 5 1831237 the
seizure of the ship was illegal since ‘her entry into a Mexican port was not for the
purpose of commerce, but from necessity and to escape destruction….The duty of the
Mexican authorities was to render assistance to the master…’238
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Pursuant to a Convention of September 8 1923 between the United States and
Mexico,239 an Arbitration Commission heard the case of Kate A Hoff v the United
Mexican States concerning The Rebecca.240 In February 1884, The Rebecca was
disabled and damaged by adverse weather and was forced to enter the port of Tampico
in Mexico. As with The Susannah, the master was arrested on suspicion of smuggling
and the cargo was seized and subsequently sold by the Mexican authorities. The
American Consul subsequently argued that the seizure was illegal as, among other
reasons, the ship entered the port in distress and was therefore immune from customs
duties. In the Arbitration, the arbitrator stated that:
there appears to be general recognition among the nations of the world of what may
doubtless be an exception…to this fundamental rule of subjection to local jurisdiction
over vessels in foreign ports…. Recognition has…been given …to the immunity of a
ship whose presence in territorial waters is due to superior force. The principles with
respect to the status of vessels in ‘distress’ find recognition in domestic laws and
international law.
The enlightened principle of comity which exempts a merchant vessel, at least to a
certain extent, from the operation of local laws has been generally stated to apply to
vessels forced into port by storm, or compelled to seek refuge for vital repairs or for
241
provisioning, or carried into port by mutineers.

The Umpire also made reference to the requirements for ‘distress’:
While recognising the general principle of immunity for vessels in distress domestic
courts and international courts frequently give consideration to the question as to the
degree of necessity prompting vessels to seek refuge. It has been said that the necessity
must be urgent.242…Assuredly a ship foundering in distress, resulting either from the
weather or from other causes affecting management of the vessel, need not be in such a
condition that it is dashed helplessly on the shore or against rocks before a claim of
distress can properly be invoke do n its behalf. The fact that it may be able to come into
port under its own power can obviously not be cited as conclusive evidence that the
plea is unjustifiable….It can probably be correctly said that a mere matter of
convenience in making repairs or in avoiding a measure of difficulty in navigation
243
cannot justify a disregard of local laws. …
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Other Commissions adopted the same views.244 Although such Commissions are no
longer used, the experience over nearly a century shows clearly that the views are
reasonably consistent and there seems to be an established position on how ships in
distress are to be treated in port,245 namely, that they are permitted to repair and
replenish supplies and also to be immune from local laws including customs duties and
other revenue laws provided that the cargo is not commercially dealt with in the port.
The immunity is not absolute since crimes committed when in port are subject to
national jurisdiction.
While there is no explicit right to access a port, except arguably where human life is
threatened,246 the implication is very clear, particularly from the decision in The
Rebecca, that such a right must exist if only on the basis of comity. However, as will be
seen in some national decisions, particularly in the late 20th century, it is dangerous to
take any right of entry into ports for ships in distress as axiomatic where there is no risk
to life.247
Decisions of United States Courts
Evidence is also available in support of the existence of rights of ships in distress in the
decisions of the national courts of the United States.
The early decisions of the US Supreme Court on the matter of refuge tended to deal
with it as a question of immunity from local laws.248 The earliest case which recognised
rights of ships in distress is that of Hallet & Bowne v Jenks249 which involved the
American sloop Nancy. On 5 January 1799, the ship was forced by weather to enter
Cape Francois in Hispaniola, then a French possession, and was forced to sell part of the
cargo to make repairs. Entering a French port and trading there was in violation of the
244
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non-intercourse law of June 1798. A new cargo of local produce was loaded and the
ship sailed 7 weeks later. It was subsequently seized by American authorities for breach
of the law and the charterers were charged.250 In a subsequent claim on insurance,
Marshall CJ found for the plaintiff charterers and stated that:
But the Court is of the opinion that the act of Congress did not impose such terms upon
a person who was forced by stress of weather to enter a French port, and land his cargo,
and was prevented by the public officers of that port to relade and carry it away. Even if
an actual or general war had existed between this country and France, and the plaintiff
had been driven into a French port, a part of his cargo seized, and he had been permitted
by the officers of the port to sell the residue, and purchase a new cargo, I am of the
opinion that it would not have been deemed such a traffic with the enemy as would
vitiate the policy upon such new cargo.251

Similarly, exemption from import duties for goods on board distressed ships or was
reached by the Supreme Court in The Brig Concord.252 In this case a cargo of wine
owned by Spanish merchants was brought in to New York aboard an American
privateer as prize and sold under court order. A claim by the owners for the proceeds
without payment of import duty was refused because the goods had been sold by order
of the court and became retroactively liable for import duties. However this did not
detract from the fact that the goods had been brought into the country by superior force
and, but for the sale, would have been exempt:
Where goods are brought by superior force, or by inevitable necessity, into the United
States, they are not deemed to be so imported, in the sense of the law, as necessarily to
attach the right to duties….In the present case if the goods had been specifically
restored, and afterwards withdrawn from the United States by the Claimants, they
253
would have been exempt from duty.

Not all such seizures received the same outcome. In the case of The Experiment,254 a
British ship at a time of war between the United States and Great Britain was brought
into Boston as a prize by a privateer, who then claimed a commission. There was strong
evidence that there had been collusion between the ship and the privateer such that the
entry into port was not under the necessary distress.255
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The question of what constitutes distress sufficient to permit ships in distress from
exemption from local laws and, more importantly, from seizure and confiscation was
the subject of a number of decisions of the Supreme Court.256
In The New York,257 it was alleged that the ship had entered the port of New York in
October 1811 because of a lost rudder and stress of weather. It was carrying produce
from Jamaica, a British possession, importation of which was prohibited by the nonintercourse law of March 1809. The goods were seized and it was claimed that, similar
to the earlier case of The Nancy, the ships and its cargo should not be seized because the
ship entered port due to distress. Livingston J giving the opinion of the court, held that:
The necessity must be urgent, and proceed from such a state of things as may be
supposed to produce on the mind of a skilful mariner, a well grounded apprehension of
the loss of vessel and cargo, or of the lives of the crew.258

In the event the majority found there was sufficient evidence of distress but did not
disagree with the definition.259 This was so even though there was sufficient evidence to
prove that it was the intent of the master to illegally import the cargo into the United
States.260
The New York was confirmed soon after in The Aeolus,261 but in this case the court
found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that there was an intent to
illegally bring the cargo into the United States. Livingston J held that to set up distress
to avoid the seizure of the ship and cargo ‘ a court would require the most satisfactory
proof of the necessity which is urged in her defence’.262
During the American Civil War, the excuse of putting into port due to distress was
employed to avoid seizure on charges of blockade running. In The Diana,263 the ship
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was arrested before it could enter a blockaded port and the owners argued that it was
only doing so because of damage through stress of weather.264 Field J stated:
It is undoubtedly true that a vessel may be in such distress as to justify her in attempting
to enter a blockaded port. She may be out of provisions of water, or she may be in a
leaking condition, and no other port be of easy access. The case, however, must be one
of absolute and uncontrollable necessity; and this must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. ...265

On the evidence the court found that the claim of distress was fraudulent and
condemned the ship.266
Similarly in November 1861, The Nuesta Senora de Regla, a Spanish ship sailing to
Havana put into Port Royal near Charleston, South Carolina due to lack of coal. The
port was at that time blockaded by Union forces during the Civil War. The ship was
seized as prize and sold. The Court found that the seizure was illegal and ordered it be
restored. It was not restored and the owners were eventually given compensation.267
While these cases tend to reflect the circumstances of their time, they do indicate that
the concept of granting access to ships in distress, or at least not excluding them, is one
of long standing and unquestioned application. The decisions did not question the right
of ships in distress to access ports, which seemed to be assumed, but sought to ensure
that the circumstances that formed the basis of the claim of distress were met. What
these circumstances were (and still are), reflected the urgency of the situation and
standard of concern that must be present in the mind of those making the decision to
seek refuge. The decisions clearly emphasise that not all situations of danger are
sufficient to form the basis of a claim of distress and that the person making the
decision must be sufficiently apprehensive about the situation that he or she is willing to
risk the application of local laws, including seizure and confiscation of the ship and its
cargo, to seek refuge.
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Decisions of the English Courts
Perhaps surprisingly, there is a scarcity of English decisions on the rights of ships in
distress. A survey of decisions reveals that most cases which involve ships in distress
are concerned more with salvage and the existence or otherwise of a right to a salvage
reward.268 This flows from the fact that for a claim for salvage reward to be successful,
the ship salved must have been in danger.269
The one notable exception is the case of The Eleanor270 which has also been quoted
with approval by the Supreme Courts of the United States271 and Canada.272
In The Eleanor, the case arose out of an alleged breach of legislation passed in 1788,273
which stated that only ships owned and crewed by English nationals could enter the
British ports in North America with produce from the United States. Any ship entering
port in violation of this prohibition could be seized. The Eleanor was owned by an
American national who entered the Port of Halifax in Nova Scotia in breach of this Act
but claiming distress. If distress was not well founded the ship could be seized by the
port authorities. Therefore it had to be established whether or not distress existed. Lord
Stowell gave the following definition:
It must be an urgent distress; it must be something of grave necessity; such as is spoken
of in our books, where a ship is said to be driven in by stress of weather. It is not
sufficient to say it was done to avoid a little bad weather, or in consequence of foul
winds, the danger must be such as to cause apprehension in the mind of an honest and
firm man … Then again, where the party justifies the act upon the plea of distress, it
must not be a distress which he has created himself, by putting on board an insufficient
quantity of water or of provisions for such a voyage, for there the distress is only a part
of the mechanism of the fraud, and cannot be set up in excuse for it; and in the next
274
place the distress must be proved by the claimant in a clear and satisfactory manner.

He also stated that:
It has been said, that even upon the supposition that this is to be taken as an alien ship,
yet whatever may have been the imprudencies of conduct on the part of the owner, she
would be entitled to the rights of hospitality if driven into a British port in distress; and
certainly if the distress were real, whether Hall is a British subject or not, and whatever
268
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may be the character attaching to the ship, she would be entitled to that benefit. Real
and irresistible distress must be at all times a sufficient passport for human beings under
275
and such application of human laws.

In the event, Lord Stowell found that the claim for distress was fraudulent and made
with the intent of evading the restrictions under the legislation and selling his cargo. As
distress did not exist within the definition he had set out, the ship was seized.276
The 1992 case of Merk and Djakimah v the Queen,277 a decision of the Court of Appeal
for St Helena, examined the continuing influence of The Eleanor decision. This case
involved the prosecution of the master and crew of a ship carrying drugs which
allegedly was forced into St Helena due to lack of fuel. If distress was established it was
argued that the arrests and seizure of the ship breached the right of the owner, master
and crew to immunity from the application of local laws.278 The Court dealt with the
case by applying Lord Stowell’s definition of distress in The Eleanor and found that, on
the facts, the distress was self induced and therefore according to Lord Stowell, not
sufficient to establish the requisite distress. This, the Court found, did not deny the ship
the right to access St Helena because it was in fact short of fuel and therefore in distress,
but the fact that the lack of fuel was self induced denied the owner, master and crew the
immunities they would have otherwise enjoyed. As a result there was no immunity from
local laws, including the charge of importing drugs into St Helena.279 The Court
speculated, without deciding, that the case would have been different had the ship been
‘driven out of control on to the shore of St Helena’ since then the distress would not
have been self induced and the immunity from local laws would have applied.280 In light
of the line of cases from The Creole onwards, such a conclusion would probably have
been correct.281
The decision in Merk and Djakimah v the Queen is important in that it reconfirmed that
the presumption of access to a port by ships in distress still existed in 1992 and that it
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was for the claimant to prove the distress. If proven under the test laid down in The
Eleanor, the claimant would be immune from local laws. If not proven, all immunities
would be lost although this would not affect the continuing right to access a port.282
Decisions of the Canadian Courts
The Canadian courts have been active in making decisions on the rights of ships
particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These cases, particularly in the
1930s, dealt with distress in the relation to contraband and fisheries.283
An early case of The Nabby was decided by the Court of Vice Admiralty held at
Halifax, Nova Scotia in August 1818.284 This case involved alleged violation of the
sovereignty and laws of Great Britain which prohibited foreign fishing ships from
entering the waters of Nova Scotia and taking and curing of fish and also for entering a
prohibited port in Nova Scotia. In relation to entering a port, the master claimed it was
necessary to do so to replenish supplies and that therefore it came with no intention to
trade. The Judge, in florid terms, extolled the right of ships in distress to access a port if
it in is distress:
And most assuredly if a case of real distress is made out, there is an end for ever of this
question….Real distress is a passport even through the savage land, it appeals at once to
sentiments universally felt, at its approach, the rigour of law is softened, and the
violence of war becomes composed by the sacred influence of humanity. And where
can unaffected calamity seek refuge if it is denied it on a British shore?...While I am
ready to acknowledge the interesting features of distress, I am vigilant to detect the
subtle contrivances of art.285

On the evidence he found that the distress was not real and condemned the ship.
In Canada (Attorney General) v McDonell,286 alleged breach of customs laws resulted
in the seizure of a cargo of alcohol from the schooner M.L. White. The ship, en route
from St Pierre et Miquelon to Boston, was forced to seek shelter, due to stress of
weather, in the port of Barrington, Nova Scotia, with the intention of proceeding on to
282
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Boston as soon as it was able. The master failed to report to the Collector of Customs
and to produce his records and was charged with smuggling and the cargo and ship were
seized.287 The Exchequer Court found that as the ship had entered port in distress, it was
not an ‘arrived’ ship for the purposes of the Customs legislation and so could not be
seized for not reporting to the Customs authorities.288
The subsequent case of Cashin v the King289 also involved the customs laws but the
Exchequer Court reached a different conclusion. The decision questioned the doctrine
that ships entering a port in distress were exempted from local laws and local
jurisdiction.290Angers J stated:
It is a well recognised principle, supported by the jurisprudence as well as by the
opinions of authors on international law, that a ship compelled through stress of
weather, duress or other unavoidable cause to put into a foreign port, is, on the grounds
of comity, exempt from liability to the penalties or forfeitures which, had she entered
port voluntarily, she would have incurred. This principle however must not be too
widely interpreted. It does not carry any right of exemption from local law, especially
revenue laws. Such exemption would require express legislation.291

The offence in this case was the submission of a false report to the Customs
Commission, which was an offence committed within the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia
for which the general exemption for ships in distress did not apply.292
The decision was consistent with the earlier case of Rex v Flahaut293 where the Supreme
Court of New Brunswick did not challenge the right of a ship in distress to enter a port
provided the distress was consistent with the principle laid down in The Eleanor that the
distress must be ‘real and irresistible’.294 In this case the master was charged with
possession of alcohol while in port which was contrary to the laws of New Brunswick.
The plea of distress was dismissed on the facts but the Court did not deny that, had the
facts been otherwise, the master would have been exempted from prosecution.295 These
cases were decided on the narrow grounds but did not challenge the concept of ships in
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distress having a right to enter a port. This was consistent with both earlier and later
cases heard in the Canadian Courts.296
In R v Valiant,297 the owners of a fishing ship unsuccessfully sought to claim the benefit
of a right of entering bays for the purpose of shelter, repairs and water under a 1818
Treaty between Great Britain and the United States.298 The Exchequer Court, while
denying the application of this Convention to the waters off British Columbia,299 did
accept that stress of weather or other unavoidable cause could have provided a defence
under the Customs Act.300
In SS May v The King,301 the Supreme Court of Canada, with facts similar to R v
Valiant,302 again found that under s 183 of the Customs Act,303 entry into a place other
than a port by ships in distress was a defence to a prosecution for so doing. Lamont J
stated:
It is common ground that this section, although primarily enacted as a customs
provision for the protection of the revenue, does, by the exception contained in the
words ‘unless form stress of weather or other unavoidable cause’ give effect to a
principle of international law recognised by both countries, namely, that vessels of one
nation will be excused from entering the territory of another if there is an actual
necessity for their so doing.304

The Court then addressed the question of what was meant by the distress exception.
After reviewing the cases of The Eleanor, The Diana and The New York, Lamont J
stated:
A perusal of the above authorities leads to the conclusion that an entry by a foreign
vessel into Canadian waters cannot be justified on the ground of ‘stress of weather’
unless the weather is such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably competent and
skilful master, possessing courage and firmness, a well grounded bona fide
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apprehension that if he remains outside the territorial waters he will put in jeopardy his
vessel and cargo.
In every case the questions whether the master fairly and honestly on reasonable ground
believed it necessary to take shelter, and where he exercised reasonable skill,
competence and courage in the circumstance, are questions of fact for the tribunal
whose duty it is to find the facts.305

On the facts the Court found that the entry was not due to distress and the appeal was
dismissed.306
SS May v The King was quickly followed and affirmed by the Supreme Court in SS
Queen City v The King, SS Tillie M v The King and SS Sunrise v The King,307 all heard
together on the same day as the SS May and all dealing with similar facts. One
additional argument in these cases was the fact that the ships in question were
constructed such that they could not operate safely outside territorial waters and that this
should be taken into account when assessing the claim for stress of weather. The Court
rejected the argument on the basis that such a weakness was self induced and according
to The Eleanor could not justify the plea of distress.308
The Canadian decisions follow the general tenor of the United States and English
decisions. They affirm the existence of a right of ships in distress to access ports and
that they are exempted from the laws of the host State unless the offences are committed
in port or under laws which specifically require compliance. In relation to compliance
with local laws the Canadian decisions appear to be more strictly applied than in the
United States,309 as was evident in Cashin v The King.310
Decisions of the Netherlands Courts
Two decisions of the Netherlands courts have highlighted the growing trend for refuge
to be refused to ships in distress that are in a dangerous condition or are carrying
environmentally dangerous cargos.
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In the case of The Attican Unity,311 the ship caught fire and sought refuge in Antwerp.
However it was refused entry into Dutch territorial waters to enable it to do so, on the
basis that it was not in innocent passage under Article 14 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958. The ship subsequently entered Dutch waters
and beached itself.312 The refusal was upheld by the Supreme Court. While the decision
turned on the interpretation of ‘innocent passage’ it is important because the Court
effectively upheld the right of a port to refuse refuge to a ship in distress because of the
dangerous condition of the ship.313
In the case of The Long Lin,314 the Council of State refined the decision in The Attican
Unity. In this case the ship was carrying a cargo of resin and had been heavily damaged
in a collision off Ramsgate. The collision had resulted in some of the cargo being lost
overboard and the fuel tanks of the ship being hit allowing oil to escape. The ship was
permitted access to Dutch territorial waters but only on the payment of security to cover
potential damage caused by the entry of the ship.315 While it confirmed the right to
request a guarantee in favour of the State, the Court overturned the decision requiring
the security on administrative law grounds.316 It stated that any guarantee must reflect
the anticipated costs of the State in the event of an unfavourable ending, and in this case
the amount was excessive.317 It confirmed the earlier decision of The Attican Unity, in
part, finding that a refusal of access was permitted on the grounds of State sovereignty
and that because of the damage it had suffered it was not in ‘passage’,318 but added that:
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under international law the respondent may not go so far as to prevent a ship which is in
distress and requires repairs from entering territorial and coastal waters and seeking
safety in port or elsewhere along the coast. In such a case, the seriousness of the
situation in which the ship finds itself should be weighed against the threat which the
ship poses to the coastal State.319

The decision has been criticised on the finding that the ship was not in ‘passage’,320 but
it is conceded by the same author that it is permissible for the authorities of a coastal
State to refuse access to damaged ships that pose a threat.321
The Long Lin, while it continues to assert that States cannot refuse to grant access to
ships in distress, also introduces a concept of balancing interests which was taken up
later by the International Maritime Organisation in its IMO Guidelines.
Decisions of the Irish Courts
The decision of the High Court of Ireland in ACT Shipping (Pte) Ltd v The Minister for
the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney General,322 involving the ship Toledo, was
consistent with the growing trend that was appearing in State practice in a number of
States and which was evident from the contemporaneous decision of the Netherlands
Courts in The Long Lin. This practice was to refuse access to a place of refuge for ships
in distress not only where the ship was in danger of damaging the coastline of the
coastal State but also where there was no danger to human life on the ship. In such
situations, there was no obligation owed to the ship under customary international law
for it to be granted automatic right of access to a place of refuge.
In the case of The Toledo, the ship developed a major leak in the hull during adverse
weather conditions such that the hold was flooded and it was in danger of sinking.
Salvors were employed and access to Bantry Bay in south west Ireland. The crew were
airlifted off the ship which was then abandoned to the salvors. Access to Irish ports was
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requested and refused for the reasons that there was no risk to life and there was risk the
ship might be wrecked and bunker fuel might pollute the south Irish coast, as well as the
practical reasons that Bantry Bay and the only other alternative, Cork, were unsuitable.
The ship was towed to Falmouth in England where it was also refused access, was
beached, was subsequently declared a constructive total loss and scuttled. The
defendants were sued for breach of its obligation under customary international law for
failing to grant a place of refuge to a ship in distress.323
Barr J reviewed in detail the current position of ships in distress under customary
international law and found:
In summary, therefore, I am satisfied that the right of a foreign vessel in serious distress
to the benefit of a safe haven in the waters of an adjacent state is primarily humanitarian
rather than economic. It is not an absolute right. If safety of life is not a factor, then
there is a widely recognised practice among maritime states to have proper regard to
their own interests and those of their citizens in deciding whether or not to accede to
any such request. Where in a particular case, such as the ‘Toledo’, there was no risk to
life as the crew had abandoned the casualty before a request for refuge had been made,
it seems to me that there can be no doubt that the coastal state, in the interest of
defending its own interests and those of its citizens, may lawfully refuse refuge to such
a casualty if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of
substantial harm to the state or its citizens if the casualty is given refuge and that such
harm is potentially greater than that which would result if the vessel in distress and/or
her cargo were lost through refusal or shelter in the waters of the coastal state. The
abandonment of a ship in distress before refuge is sought is an important ingredient in
assessing whether or not the casualty should be granted refuge by the coastal state.
There are two reasons why that is so; first, the absence of any risk to human life
excludes the most compelling reason in support of an application for refuge. Secondly,
abandonment of a ship carrying a substantial valuable cargo is patently an act which
would be resorted to by an experienced master only in circumstances of major distress,
and this in itself is cogent evidence that the casualty is seriously damaged and,
therefore, may cause significant harm to the coastal state and/or its citizens.324

The distinction between permitting access where life is in danger325 and where it is not
have come about because of what Barr J called a ‘fundamental metamorphosis’ of
modern shipping including the increase of risk of damage to the host State due to the
increase in size of ships and the type of cargo carried.
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6.

State Practice

Ireland is not the only coastal State to come to this conclusion on the change to the
practice to places of refuge. In recent years, the State practice of other coastal States,
separate from but reflected in the Courts, has also taken this view.
Barr J in The Toledo conveniently summarised this trend and the reasons for it:
‘The right of refuge which traditionally has been available to foreign ships in serious
distress is one which has evolved in customary international law in the course of several
centuries. The custom grew up when ships were sail-driven and were far smaller than
the average modern commercial vessel. In the age of sail and in the early years of steam
driven vessels allowing ships in distress the benefit of safe refuge very rarely presented
any significant risk to the receiving state. The question of refusing sanctuary to a
peaceful foreign merchant vessel in distress very seldom arose, and, accordingly, there
was no need to devise rules regulating the right of maritime states to exclude foreign
vessels in distress from their waters. However, in modern times there has been a
fundamental metamorphosis in the development of shipping and in the growth of
maritime commerce. In the past several decades commercial vessels in serious distress
may present a major risk of damage to the receiving state….In short…risk of damage to
the receiving state, has developed a far greater degree of importance in modern times
and, in practice, has significantly modified the customary right of entry to a foreign port
or safe haven enjoyed by ships in serious distress…In the modern era there appears to
be a clearly discernable change in emphasis in the attitude of maritime states towards
casualties seeking shelter in their waters, in that greater importance is given to the
distinction between ships in distress where a humanitarian consideration of life is
involved and those, such as the MV Toledo, where the risk to vessel and cargo is purely
economic in nature. It is now commonplace for foreign ships in distress which are in the
latter category to be refused entry to the territorial waters of states from which access is
sought….’326

That this view is also the view of the Irish Government is reflected in the debate in the
Dail Eireann in February 1990 on the situation concerning The Toledo at the time. The
Minister for the Marine clearly differentiated between the duty to preserve life and the
preservation of property.327 Reference was also made to the experience of The Kowloon
Bridge and The Tribulus which has just before The Toledo incident been given refuge in
Bantry Bay. The Kowloon Bridge, while proceeding to sea after successful repairs sank
in Bantry Bay causing serious pollution.328 While the Minister denied any connection329
it is reasonable for this to have been a consideration in the treatment of The Toledo and
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indeed, Barr J made reference to it in his decision.330 What the treatment granted to The
Kowloon Bridge and The Toledo shows is that the Irish state practice was not to grant
automatic entry to ships in distress nor to always refuse, but was to deal with each case
on its merits.
This approach is common with other State practice, particularly since the 1960s since
when there has been an increase in ships being refused access.331A list of such refusals
and the States involved includes The Cristos Bitas (United Kingdom), The Andros
Patria (Spain, France, United Kingdom and Portugal), The Aeolian Sky (United
Kingdom), The Terpenbeck (United Kingdom), The Prinsendam (United States), The
Eastern Mariner I (Bermuda), The Attican Unity and The Long Lin (Netherlands and
Belgium), The Briz and The Sormovsky 7 (Netherlands), The Iron Baron, (Australia),
The Aida (Brazil), The Belofin (South Africa). There are also examples of ships in
distress being granted refuge including The Sea Empress (United Kingdom), The
Kowloon Bridge and The Tribulus (Ireland), The Eastern Power (Canada).332
Clearly, State practice is not consistent. What is clear is that coastal States are
increasingly refusing access to ships in distress seemingly on an ad hoc basis with no
apparent consistency of reasoning.333 The sinking of The Erika was a pivotal moment in
the development of State practice and the subsequent incidents involving The Castor
and The Prestige brought about a more consistent approach to the granting or refusal of
places of refuge to ships in distress.334
As will be seen in later chapters of this thesis, the approaches taken by the European
Union and coastal States such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom are
increasingly moving towards a more consistent approach based on the IMO Guidelines

330

ACT Shipping (Pte) Ltd v The Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney General [1995] 2
ILRM 30, 46.
331
George Kasoulides, ‘Vessels in Distress: Safe Havens for Crippled Tankers’ 11 Marine Policy (1987)
184, 185-186; Mark Cohen, ‘Travails of the Flying Dutchmen, Lloyds Standard Form of Salvage
Agreement and the US Salvage Industry’ (1982) 6 Marine Policy 265, 278-279.
332
George Kasoulides, ‘Vessels in Distress: Safe Havens for Crippled Tankers’ 11 Marine Policy (1987)
184, 185-186; Comite Maritime International, ‘Places of Refuge – CMI Report to the IMO’ CMI
Yearbook 2002 (Comite Maritime International, 2002) 117, 139-142.
333
Aldo Chircop, ‘The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden
(eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2006) 163, 215.
334
Ibid.

140

issued in 2003.335
For current purposes, the development of State practice from at least the 1960s has been
a clear movement away from the earlier custom of international law that ships in
distress were able to access places of refuge. By the 1990s it was clear that this custom,
while it still existed, became rooted more in humanitarian interests and less in
commercial interests.336 The two elements, safety of life and safety of property which
had for centuries been bound together were being treated separately.337
The increasing awareness of environmental issues and the need to protect coastlines and
in some cases the population have prompted coastal States to refuse access to ships
where there is no danger to human life from accessing places of refuge where there is
danger to the environment or populations.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reached in this chapter are that there is no specific right under any
multilateral treaty compelling a coastal State to grant access to ships in distress but that
there has existed and there continues to exist under customary international law an
obligation on a coastal State to grant access to ships in distress, although the extent of
the custom has changed over time. The examination shows that, today, the extent of the
obligation under customary international law has been greatly circumscribed to be one
of humanitarian assistance only and that, outside the requirement to protect human life,
a request by a ship in distress for access to a port or a place of refuge is now to be
treated in the same way as any general request for access. It therefore follows that
further steps must be taken to find a solution to the non humanitarian problems
associated with places of refuge. In this regard the next three chapters will examine the
steps taken at the international, national and regional levels to address these problems.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO PLACES OF REFUGE
PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have identified the problem of places of refuge to be one of a
conflict between two firmly entrenched and largely incompatible positions, namely, the
long held claim by ship owners and their related interests to access a place of refuge
should the ship find itself in distress and the competing claim by coastal states and their
related interests to refuse access to ships in distress to protect their environment and
population from damage by pollution. That this is still a problem is clearly exemplified
by refusals of access and subsequent environmental disasters in the cases of the Erika
and the Prestige. Also clear is that a satisfactory solution to the problem will not be
found by leaving the matter with individual coastal States and that the intervention of an
international body is necessary.
Furthermore an examination of international law both under treaty level and customary
international law gives a mixed view as to the current state of places of refuge in
international law. This examination shows that existing international law does not
provide a solution to the problem and that further action is needed. In the absence of any
clear solution in existing international law, action has been taken by various
international bodies and organisations to attempt to find a solution.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has recognised the problem and has
acted on it. It has also been examined and commented on by other international non –
government organisations such as the Comite Maritime International (CMI) and the
International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and other shipping industry
groups all of whom have contributed to the activities and actions of the IMO.
The first part of this chapter will look briefly at the arguments presented by the IMO
that the places of refuge problem is an international one and must be dealt with at an
international level through the IMO. Having established the international character of
the problem and the central role of the IMO in providing a solution to the problem, the
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chapter will then examine and assess the actions of the IMO in relation to places of
refuge. The main response has been the issue in 2003 of Guidelines on Places of Refuge
for Ships in Need of Assistance (IMO Guidelines) to be used by all parties when the
need for a place of refuge arises. The development and contents of the IMO Guidelines
will be examined to assess their potential to provide a solution.
The introduction of non-binding IMO Guidelines as the response to the problem is in
contrast to the suggestions of other international bodies that there be a more binding
formal response. The second part of this chapter will examine the views and actions of
CMI, IAPH and other shipping industry associations and assess their contribution to the
debate. In particular, the development of a draft Instrument on places of refuge by CMI
will be examined together with the reactions of the IMO, the IAPH and shipping
industry associations to such a development. The actual terms of the CMI draft
Instrument will be examined and assessed in chapter seven of this thesis.
1.

Places of Refuge as an International Problem

Successive Secretaries-General of the IMO have stated clearly that not only is the
problem of places of refuge an international one that requires an international response
but also that the IMO is the appropriate body to provide the response. Many of these
statements have been in response to moves by individual States and the European Union
to address the problem of places of refuge outside the IMO.
In May 2001, after the Castor incident, the then Secretary General of the IMO, William
O’Neill, commented:
I intervened … to insist that the issue [of places of refuge] should be tackled as a matter
of international concern by IMO. It is simply not acceptable that a damaged ship should
be left at the mercy of the weather for as long as 35 days with the distinct risk that cargo
would be spilled and cause environmental damage. Governments, the shipping industry
and salvors all need formal guidelines on how to proceed in these circumstances and
1
IMO is the obvious place to address the problem.

In more general terms, Mr O’Neill also commented on need for an international
approach and hinted at the reason why in recent times States or groups of States have
acted independently of the IMO:
1

Speech given by Mr. W.A. O'Neil, Secretary-General of IMO to the International Association of Ports
and Harbours (IAPH), Montreal (Canada), 19-26 May 2001 <http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/
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I know that there are some countries and groups of countries that would often like to see
the pace of change accelerated. They would prefer to see standards imposed that are
more stringent and more demanding than those that are agreed to in IMO. I can
understand that. But they must never overlook that an industry as international as
shipping can only be effectively regulated by international standards that can be applied
globally, and the only way to achieve that is through consensus-based decisions such as
2
those that are made at IMO.

In February 2004, the current Secretary General, Efthimios Mitropoulos, reaffirmed this
international approach to problems involving shipping and succinctly summed up why
they must be treated in an international manner:
There is no doubt in my mind that an international industry like shipping, in which the
prime physical assets – the ships themselves – actually move between countries and
continents and therefore between different legal jurisdictions, simply has to be
regulated internationally…. To expect ship operators to navigate through an archipelago
of different standards and contrasting requirements would be completely impractical
and would, I am sure, be detrimental to safety and environmental protection overall
because of the resulting confusion and misunderstanding.
That is why I have resisted, and will continue to resist passionately, any attempt at
unilateralism or regionalism in the regulation of shipping….
I firmly believe that when State individually or groups of States collectively act
unilaterally, the industry suffers and the Organisation is weakened….IMO’s success is
grounded on unity and consensus; decisions made by consensus are far stronger that
those made by majority vote, and it is in the best interests of all the parties of the
equation that we continue to strive to find consensus solutions in all the issues that
3
come before IMO.

The latter quote is significant as it was made soon after the Secretary General had met
with the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Transport and
Energy.4 The European Union had shortly before then issued its Directive concerning
the accelerated timetable for the withdrawal of single hulled tankers in advance of an
IMO response on the same matter. While this meeting was acknowledged to have had a
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positive outcome,5 the European Union has continued to pursue an agenda in matters of
shipping safety, including places of refuge, which has appeared to be moving towards a
regional regime independent of the IMO.6 Additionally, Spain, France and Portugal
have taken unilateral action to ban single hulled tankers from their Exclusive Economic
Zone and the United States has instituted its own regime under the Oil Pollution Act
1990.7
It was also acknowledged by Mr Mitropoulos in the same speech that, to counter
regional approaches to shipping safety, the IMO needs to adapt better to rapidly
changing developments in shipping and to streamline its activities and regulatory
functions and is attempting to do so, particularly through such initiatives as the
voluntary audit scheme to examine member State compliance with international
conventions.8
In the current IMO Strategic Plan, the need to be proactive and to counter action
independent of the IMO has been highlighted as two of the major challenges:
The challenge for IMO is to:
.1 be proactive in identifying trends and developments affecting shipping;
…
.3 provide an effective and efficient response to shipping trends, developments
and incidents, and in so doing, stave off regional or unilateral tendencies which
9
conflict with the Organization’s regulatory framework; …

The actions taken by the IMO to places or refuge reflect this international approach to
the problem.
2.

Actions on Places of Refuge by the International Maritime Organisation

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO)10 was established
by the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation,
5

Ibid 4.
Veronica Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection in the International
Law of the Sea – Implementing Global Obligations at the Regional Level (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 282.
7
Oil Pollution Act 1990 33 USC 2701 (2009).
8
Efthimios Mitropoulos, ‘Challenges for the International Maritime Organisation in the 21st Century’
(Paper presented at NATSHIP 2004, Melbourne, 19 February 2004) 4 <www.imo.org/Newsroom/
mainframe.asp?topic_id847&doc_id=3741>.
9
IMO Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 989(25) Strategic Plan for the Organisation (for the six-year
period 2008-2013) adopted on 20 November 2007.
10
Ademune-Odeke, Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984)
252.
6
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194811 to, inter alia, regulate and improve shipping safety and navigation.12 In 1975,13
the name was changed to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)14 and its
purposes were expanded to include the following the prevention and control of pollution
from ships.15 These two objectives of navigation safety and pollution from ships
continue to be the main focuses of the IMO.16 Since its founding, the IMO has become
more proactive in dealing with problems of shipping safety and pollution to ensure that
these problems are identified and addressed as quickly as possible.17 However, in
addressing these problems, there has always been a reluctance to introduce new
conventions unless there was a clear necessity.18 From the early 1980s this aversion was
made clear by successive resolutions of the Assembly. Assembly Resolution A 500
(XII), adopted on 20 November 1981, recommended ‘proposals for new conventions or
amendments to existing conventions [be made] only on the basis of clear and welldocumented demonstration of compelling need’.19 Later Resolutions in 1993,20 199921
and 200722 reaffirmed this requirement and also the need to avoid excessive
regulation.23 As discussed later in this chapter, this aversion to new conventions and
excessive regulation account, in part, to the reluctance of the IMO to consider the draft
Instrument on places of refuge proposed by CMI.
11

Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, opened for signature 6
March 1948, 289 UNTS 48 (entered into force March 17, 1958).
12
Ademuni-Odeke, Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 253;
Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation Article 1; Alan Khee-Jin Tan,
Vessel-Source Marine Pollution (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 75.
13
IMO Assembly, 9th Session, Resolution A 358(IX) Title and Substantive Provisions adopted on 14
November 1975.
14
Ibid Annex.
15
Ibid; the inclusion of pollution was a result of the grounding and sinking of the Torrey Canyon in 1967
and the subsequent pollution disaster see Edgar Gold, ‘Learning from Disaster: Lessons in Regulatory
Enforcement in the Maritime Sector’ (1999) 8 Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law 16, 16.
16
Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 75; Louise de
la Fayette, ‘The Marine Environment Protection Committee: The Conjunction of the Law of the Sea and
International Environmental Law’ (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 155, 160.
17
IMO Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 900(21) Objectives of the Organisation in the 2000’s
adopted on 16 November 1999.
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Michael Julian, ‘Challenges in the Prevention of Marine Pollution’ (Paper presented at SPILLCON
2000, Darwin, 15-17 August 2000) 7-8 <www.aip.com.au/amosc/papers/julian_m.doc>.
19
IMO Assembly, 12th Session, Resolution A 500 (XII) Objectives of the Organisation in the 1980s
adopted on 20 November 1981, Article 3.
20
IMO Assembly, 18th Session, Resolution A 777(18) Work Methods and Organisation of Work in
Committees and their Subsidiary Bodies adopted on 4 November 1993, Article 4.
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IMO Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 900(21) Objectives of the Organisation in the 2000s
adopted on 16 November 1999, Article 2.4.
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IMO Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 990(25) High-Level Action Plan of the Organisation and
Priorities for the 2008-2009 Biennium adopted on 29 November 2007, Article 6.
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IMO Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 900(21) Objectives of the Organisation in the 2000s adopted
on 16 November 1999, Article 2.2.
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The IMO was asked to address the problem of places of refuge initially after the Erika
sinking in 1999 but more especially after the Castor incident in 2000/2001.24

In

analysing the actions taken by the IMO in relation to places of refuge, three periods can
be identified: pre Castor up to 2001; post Castor from 2001 to the approval of the IMO
Guidelines in November 2003; and the period from 2003 to date. This chapter will now
examine the IMO’s actions during these periods and will then examine the IMO
Guidelines and IMO’s actions since their adoption.
Earlier attempts at introducing places of refuge obligations into the Salvage Convention
198925 failed largely because of fears that the introduction of public law obligations into
what was essentially a commercial arrangement would prevent the Salvage Convention
from being readily accepted. As was seen in chapter three of this thesis26, ultimately, the
only reference to places of refuge was Article 11, which merely required consultation
between salvors and other interested parties and public authorities.27 Until 2003, this
was the only reference to places of refuge in any international instrument.28
Similar fears of acceptability by coastal States of a convention on places of refuge were
voiced in discussions at the IMO29 and in CMI.30 Furthermore, prior to the Castor
incident, it would have been difficult to argue that there was a compelling need for such
a new convention, as required by the IMO Assembly resolutions.
24
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the Australian Position’ (2003) 17 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 101,
106; International Maritime Organisation, ‘“Places of Refuge” – addressing the problem of providing
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International Convention on Salvage, opened for signature 28 April 1989, 93 UKTS 8; Cm 3458
(entered into force 14 July 1996) (Salvage Convention).
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Organisation’ (2003) 18 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 155, 163-164; Legal
Committee, 83rd Session, Matters arising from the seventy-fourth session of the Maritime Safety
Committee: Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 83/13/3 dated 28 August 2001, paragraphs 57; Christopher Young, ‘The International Maritime Organisation and the Development of an International
Legal Framework for Places of Refuge’ (Paper presented at International Workshop : Places of RefugeResponsibilities and Rights of Port Authorities University of Antwerp 11 December 2003) 3
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Rosalie Balkin, ‘The IMO Position with Respect to Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2005-2006 (Comite
Maritime International, 2006) 154, 154; Legal Committee, 83rd Session, Matters arising from the seventyfourth session of the Maritime Safety Committee: Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 83/13/3
dated 28 August 2001, paragraph 7.
29
Legal Committee, 95th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its Ninety-fifth Session
LEG 95/10 dated 22 April 2009.
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Patrick Griggs, ‘Places of Refuge’ (Paper presented at International Workshop on Places of RefugeResponsibilities and Rights of Port Authorities, University of Antwerp, 11 December 2003) 5-6 <http://
espo.vandenbroele.be/downloads/miscellaneous/12424/news/2003/events>.
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The forty day saga of the Castor and the attendant criticism of the actions of coastal
States prompted the IMO to act to prevent any repetition.31 The Secretary General made
finding a global solution to problems such as those experienced by the Castor a priority
for the IMO.32 Although the problem of places of refuge has been on the agenda of the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) since the Erika,33 the Secretary General charged it
with the task of devising a solution. At the 74th Session of the MSC in May 2001, he
stated:
the time had come for IMO to consider globally, as a matter of priority, and to adopt
any measures required to ensure that, in the interests of safety of life at sea and
environmental protection, coastal States reviewed their contingency arrangements so
that disabled ships were provided with assistance and facilities as might be required in
34
the circumstances.

The matter of ‘ports of refuge’ (as it was then referred to)35 was referred to other IMO
Committees and subcommittees for consideration and advice including the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),36 the Fire Protection Sub-committee

31
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Annex 4.
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(FP)37 and the Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue Sub-committee
(COMSARS),38 for consideration and comment.
The question of places of refuge was thoroughly discussed by the MSC at its 74th
Session in May 2001 and it was ultimately decided that it was an operational safety
matter and should be referred to the Safety of Navigation Sub-committee (NAV) to
devise a solution with a timeline of 2003.39 Input from the Legal Committee was also
recommended and sought.40 The MSC members, in discussion, indicated a preference
for non mandatory guidelines41 with priority being given to human safety and protection
of the environment.42 From the start it was realised that the solution lay in finding the
right balance between the interests of the shipping industry and those of the coastal

37
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(Comite Maritime International, 2006) 154, 156.
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States.43 This was clearly reflected in the Draft Terms of Reference drafted by NAV
and approved by MSC44 :
1 Placing the highest priority to the safety of all involved in any operation concerning
the provision of places of refuge in order to provide a safe haven for ships in need and,
with due attention to all environmental aspects associated with these operations, to
develop a practical way for IMO to address the issue of places of refuge, from the
operational safety point of view, by preparing guidelines for:
.1 actions a master of a ship should take when in need of a place of refuge
(including actions on board and actions required in seeking assistance from
other ships in the vicinity, salvage operators, flag State and coastal States).
.2 the evaluation of risks associated with the provision of places of refuge and
relevant operations in both a general and a case by case basis; and
.3 actions expected of coastal States for the identification, designation and
45
provision of such suitable places together with any relevant facilities; ….

At the same time a Draft General Framework was drawn up by NAV,46 and
subsequently approved by MSC.47 This framework consisted of three sets of guidelines
for use when seeking a place of refuge – guidelines for action by the master, guidelines
for actions expected by the coastal State and guidelines for the evaluation of risks.48
Other Committees, particularly the Legal Committee, were requested to provide input
and also member States and intergovernmental and non governmental organisations
were asked to contribute, noting that the framework was not exhaustive.49
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The Legal Committee was first involved with places of refuge in debate over the
Salvage Convention 1989 where the suggestion that the Convention contain a
requirement for coastal States to provide refuge to ships in distress was not carried.50
The next involvement occurred in 2001 when MSC requested that the Legal Committee
‘consider it [places of refuge], if it so decides, from the international law, jurisdiction,
rights of coastal States, liability, insurance , bonds, etc. point of view.’51
The Legal Committee put the matter on its work programme52 and on the agenda for its
84th session in April 2002.53 It also mandated the Secretariat to investigate the legal
issues, both public and private, and to provide a report to the Committee.54 In doing so,
the assistance of CMI was offered and accepted.55
The Secretariat provided a ‘Preliminary Advice on Legal Issues Relating to Places of
Refuge’ for the 84th session of the Legal Committee.56 This essentially dealt with the
position of places of refuge in international treaty law and covered issues of
sovereignty, force majeure, the duty to render assistance to ships in distress at sea,
compensation and the right of coastal states to protect the marine environment. It
concluded generally that there was no general right of access to ports and that the force
majeure/distress provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC)57 and other conventions ‘do not of themselves give a right of entry to a place of
refuge but on the other hand neither do they preclude the development of such a
50
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51
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principle.’58 As to any duty to render assistance to ships in distress, the advice was that
Article 98 of LOSC, which provides for a general duty to provide assistance, does not
oblige coastal States to establish places of refuge but ‘this does not mean that
complementary guidelines[or rules] could not be developed for places of refuge’.59
Finally, it advised that principles of compensation in existing conventions would apply
equally to places of refuge,60 the right of a coastal State to protect its coastal
environment was undisputed and that these rights do not ‘necessarily conflict with nor
preclude the development of the concept of places of refuge’.61
The final advice provides the guiding principle for any method of dealing with places of
refuge:
it would seem quite possible for IMO to develop the concept of places of refuge in a
manner which retains the proper and equitable balance between the rights and interests
of coastal States and the need to render assistance to vessels which are damaged or
62
disabled or otherwise in distress at sea.

This advice was interpreted by the Legal Committee as providing no barrier for the
development of guidelines on places of refuge.63
In support of the need for balance, IAPH submitted a paper to the 84th session of the
Legal Committee.64 It supported the conclusion that there was no general right to access
ports in international law and that for ships in distress the right existed for humanitarian
reasons only.65 The IAPH position was that ports owed some responsibility to ships in
distress, particularly to safety of life, but that any response should be weighed against
damage to the environment and coastal populations and the commercial operations of
the port.66 This was summed up in a resolution annexed to its paper:
58
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contingency arrangements [to provide adequate assistance and facilities to disabled
ships] are directed at the safety of life at sea without however compromising the safety
of the on-shore population, the need to mitigate environmental damage to the port as
well as to coastal areas and as well as certain operational and commercial needs of the
67
port.

With this background, the 84th session of the Legal Committee extensively discussed
places of refuge.68 The Committee agreed with the advice received from the Secretariat
and IAPH that there was no right in international law for ships in distress to be granted
access to ports but, also, that there was nothing to prevent it either.69 There was
substantial support for the use of non binding guidelines having accepted that there was
nothing in LOSC to preclude such an approach. These guidelines would need to be
balanced and flexible so that they could be applied on a case-by-case basis and that predesignation of places of refuge would not be appropriate.70
It was recognised that coastal States would have serious reservations and concerns
particularly in relation to damage to the environment and other coastal interests. Issues
of liability and compensation would therefore need to be considered in the guidelines.71
The issue of financial security and insurance for ships entering ports in distress was
raised.72 CMI was requested to address and report on these issues on behalf of the Legal
Committee and also to investigate whether there was any gap in the liability and
compensation provisions of current pollution conventions.73 The decision making
process was also addressed with varying opinions being given as to who should be able
to make decisions on the granting or refusal of access and that the decision making
process would need to be discussed when formulating the guidelines.74
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Finally, the Legal Committee recommended that the draft guidelines be referred back to
the Legal Committee for final review of legal aspects.75
The discussions of the Legal Committee were considered by the 48th session of NAV on
5 August 2002, together with comments from other IMO Committees.76 NAV
established a working party.77 A submission by France with a draft set of guidelines78
formed the basis of the draft prepared by the working party.79 As well as ‘reviewing and
streamlining’ the draft French proposal and submissions by other IMO bodies80 and the
International Salvage Union (ISU),81 the brief given to the working party required it to
address various issues including sovereignty, consistency with other IMO instruments,
decision

making
82

compensation.

and

procedures,

financial

implications

and

liability

and

It was also required to formulate questions to be considered by other

IMO committees specifically on legal and financial aspects.83
Since the matter was one of priority, NAV requested that the process of approval of the
guidelines be streamlined by MSC authorising NAV to report directly to the 23rd session
of the IMO Assembly in July 2003. This was to be subject the final text being reviewed
and approved by MEPC, MSC, COMSAR and the Legal Committee.84 This approach
was approved by MSC at its 76th session in December 2002.85

75

Ibid paragraph 92; Christopher Young, ‘The International Maritime Organisation and the Development
of an International Legal Framework for Places of Refuge’ (Paper presented at International Workshop:
Places of Refuge-Responsibilities and Rights of Port Authorities University of Antwerp 11 December
2003) 8 <http://espo.vandenbroele.be/downloads/miscellaneous/12424/news/2003/events/Young%20text.
pdf>.
76
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 48th Session, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee NAV
48/19 dated 5 August 2002, paragraph 5.5.
77
Ibid paragraph 5.7.
78
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 48th Session, Places of Refuge – Proposed guidelines on
places of refuge and proposal for a resolution establishing MERCs – Submitted by France NAV 48/5
dated 19 March 2002.
79
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 48th Session, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee NAV
48/19 dated 5 August 2002, paragraph 5.6.
80
Ibid paragraph 5.7.1.
81
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 48th Session, Places of Refuge – Proposed guidelines on
places of refuge – Submitted by ISU NAV 48/5/1 dated 12 May 2002.
82
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 48th Session, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee NAV
48/19 dated 5 August 2002, paragraph 5.7.2.
83
Ibid paragraph 5.7.5.
84
Ibid paragraph 5.1.13.
85
MSC, 76th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-sixth Session MSC 76/23
dated 16 December 2002, paragraph 11.25; Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge International Law in the
Making’ CMI Yearbook 2003 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 329, 336.

154

The Working Group clearly recognised the major problem areas that needed to be
addressed – liability and compensation.86 As well as identifying any gaps in IMO
instruments concerning liability and compensation, the Legal Committee was also
requested to particularly consider ‘the provision of financial security to cover either
expenses which the coastal State may have incurred or to provide adequate
compensation to meet any liabilities of the shipowner which may arise.’87
Draft guidelines with a covering draft Assembly resolution88 and a draft Assembly
resolution dealing with the related issue of Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)89 were
distributed for comment as annexures to the Report of NAV on its 48th session on 5
August 2002.90
The draft guidelines and the questions specifically posed by NAV for examination by
the Legal Committee were presented to the Legal Committee at its 85th session in
October 2002.91 The Secretariat indicated that MSC at its meeting in December 2002
might request the Legal Committee to examine the guidelines and resolutions from a
legal perspective.92 At the meeting CMI reported on an investigation it had conducted at
the request of the Legal Committee into the extent to which national laws of its member
States deal with place of refuge.93 The Report was based on the replies received to a
survey sent to member States seeking advice on national application of Article 11 of the
Salvage Convention 1989; Articles 17, 18, 21, 192-199 and 221 of LOSC; and Articles
3, 4, 5 and 6 of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response

86
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and Co-Operation 1990 (OPRC Convention).94 It also sought advice on national
experience with ships in distress.95
The CMI report concluded that there is little national legislation pursuant to these
conventions. In some instances the reason for this is that member States are not parties
to some of the conventions but even where they are signatories many member States
have failed to put the conventions into effect in national legislation. This is particularly
true of Article 11 of the Salvage Convention 1989.96 It was pointed out in the debate in
the Legal Committee on this report, these conclusions could be deceptive in that only
dualist systems require national legislation for conventions to be enforceable and other
States implement conventions by executive action.97
The reasons for this failure are not clear from the CMI survey but may include member
States not fully understanding their responsibilities under international law towards
ships in distress particularly where the member States are federal States with divided
responsibilities between the various national components.98
The CMI report concluded that there needed to be a more consistent approach between
member States concerning places of refuge. While the approach needed to be flexible, it
suggested that places of refuge and the conditions attached to their use should be clearly
identified.99 While none of these conclusions was inconsistent with the preference of the
Legal Committee for non binding guidelines, as will be seen later in this chapter, CMI
subsequently advocated the formulation of a new convention to deal with the
problem.100 In pursuance of the specific questions posed by NAV on liability and
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compensation, CMI was further requested to investigate and report to the Legal
Committee the current compensation and liability regimes and to advise on any gaps.101
MSC at its 76th session in December 2002 requested the Legal Committee to consider
the draft guidelines and provide advice on any legal issues including the provision of
financial security for damage caused by ships in distress from the perspectives of both
the coastal State and the shipowner.102
The Legal Committee at its 86th session in April/May 2002 considered the draft
guidelines and resolutions and submissions by the Secretariat, CMI and the Spanish
delegation.103 Overall, the Legal Committee did not make any comment on the terms of
the draft guidelines mainly because they were of a non binding nature.104
The submission of the Secretariat contained suggested amendments to the draft
guidelines and resolutions.105 The Legal Committee agreed that these were valid and
should be considered by MSC and NAV in finalising the draft.106
The CMI submission was a report on survey done of national members on the questions
of liability and compensation. Insufficient responses had been received and a further
report would be submitted prior to the next Legal Committee meeting and submission of
the draft guidelines to the Assembly in November 2003.107 It was widely agreed that the
issues of liability and compensation were adequately covered by existing and pending
conventions but that any further discussion would await the results of the survey.108
101
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Pending further investigation of the issues of liability and compensation the Legal
Committee recommended that a caveat be placed in the guidelines – ‘These guidelines
do not address the issue of Liability and Compensation for damage resulting from a
decision to grant or deny a ship a place of refuge.’109
On the question of liability and compensation, three submissions from the Spanish
delegation sought to substantially amend the draft guidelines and tilt the balance greatly
in favour of the coastal State.110 One amendment sought to reverse the onus contained in
the draft guidelines under which a ship in distress was entitled to refuge where possible
to read that a coastal State should only grant access where all technical criteria in the
guidelines had been met.111 The second submission sought to change the balance
between the master and the coastal State by requiring that before granting access,
liability and insurance considerations be taken into account and that all ships must have
unlimited insurance.112 It also proposed to alter the response responsibility by
introducing the requirement that the owner, master and salvor should comply with the
directions of the coastal State113 in clear conflict with the requirements of International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).114 The third submission proposed that
‘prevention at source’ be the primary principle, that is, ‘vessels should be built,
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maintained, managed and crewed in such a way that the provision of outside assistance
during their operation is not necessary’.115 This meant that the definition of ‘ship in
distress’ would be deleted and access to a place of refuge would only be granted to what
was described as a ‘safe ship’.116 Accordingly only ships that complied with all
international safety standards and which were insured for unlimited liability for all
damage caused by pollution would be permitted access.117
The substance of these submissions was interpreted as making issues of liability and
compensation more decisive issues than maritime safety.118 By only allowing access to
ships that by definition are compliant with all safety standards and, even then, only if
they have unlimited insurance, would defeat the whole objective of providing access to
those ships that are most in need of refuge, namely, allegedly substandard ships such as
the Castor and the Prestige.119 There was little support for the Spanish proposals in the
Legal Committee.120 As they were deemed to be matters of a technical nature they were
referred to MSC and NAV for consideration along with the other comments made by
the Legal Committee.121
As the next meeting of the Legal Committee was to be held prior to the 23rd Assembly,
MSC and NAV were invited to refer the amended guidelines back to the Legal
Committee if required.122
The 77th session of MSC reviewed the report of the Legal Committee and a number of
submissions from member States, including the submissions previously made by Spain
to the Legal Committee and now remade to MSC.123 The Spanish submissions were not
agreed to, except in minor instances, as they affected the balance necessary for the
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guidelines,

124

but they did raise the issue of the viability of the guidelines without any

reference to liability and compensation.125 Ultimately, it was agreed that the caveat
recommended by the Legal Committee be inserted and that the Legal Committee be
requested as a matter of priority to follow up the issue of financial security for liability
and compensation.126 NAV was then given specific drafting instructions for the final
form of the guidelines.127
At the 49th session of NAV, Spain again made the same submissions128 which were
again rejected by the Sub committee except to the extent previously approved by
MSC.129 Additionally, Australia made a submission requesting that the guidelines
reflect a better balance between the competing interests and suggested a number of
minor amendments.130 This submission was also considered within the confines of the
instructions of MSC 77.131
The drafting of the final guidelines were assigned to a working group and NAV
approved the resultant final wording.132 It referred the final draft to the Legal
Committee for consideration and also to give guidance on the list of conventions which,
according to the guidelines, was the international basis for places of refuge.133
The Legal Committee approved the draft guidelines at its 87th session in October
2003.134 In relation to liability and compensation the only reference in the guidelines
was made by the insertion into the list of conventions135 of international conventions
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dealing with liability and compensation. Other than this list, the Legal Committee
agreed to continue to discuss the issues of liability and compensation but that this
should not prevent the adoption of the guidelines by the Assembly, which it considered
to be of great importance.136 Accordingly, NAV referred the guidelines to the 23rd
session of the IMO Assembly and they were adopted as Resolution A 949 (23) on 5
December 2003.137
3.

IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance

In view of the diametrically opposed interests of the ship and the coastal State, the IMO
Guidelines adopted by the IMO in December 2003 had to be a delicate balance between
these two sets of interests.138 This is clearly set out in one of the Recitals in the
Preamble to Resolution A 949 (23):
RECOGNIZING ALSO the need to balance both the prerogative of a ship in need of
assistance to seek a place of refuge and the prerogative of a coastal State to protect its
139
coastline…

In seeking to achieve this balance, the Resolution also recognises that masters and
salvors often need guidance on what they must do when a ship is in distress just as the
actions of the coastal State would be assisted by an established procedure. The actions
of both ship and coastal State are vital to ‘enhance maritime safety and the protection of
the marine environment’.140 In achieving a common beneficial outcome each incident
was to be treated as an exercise of risk management weighing up the interests of all
parties according to the risks relevant to the specific incident.141
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To achieve these aims NAV originally envisioned two sets of guidelines, one each for
the master/salvor and for the coastal State authorities, and a document outlining the risk
factors to be taken into account. The final draft combined all three elements.142
The whole tone of both the IMO Guidelines and the Resolution is conciliatory and nonperemptory.143 For example, paragraph 2 of the Resolution merely ‘invites
Governments to take these Guidelines into account when determining and responding to
requests for places of refuge from ships in need of assistance’. When coupled with the
wording of Article 3.12 of the IMO Guidelines, that when a request for access is made
‘there is no obligation for the coastal State to grant it’, it is clear that the IMO
Guidelines go to great lengths to avoid imposing any binding obligations on coastal
States. However, to provide balance, Article 3.12 continues ‘the coastal State
should…give shelter whenever reasonably possible’.144
In similar fashion, except for the determined actions of some member States,
particularly Spain, in MSC, NAV and the Legal Committee proceedings, the debates in
all committees and subcommittees were careful to avoid as far as possible sensitive
political and legal issues.145
By not dealing with the issues of liability and compensation, the Legal Committee and
NAV sought to achieve a workable document while reserving the right to readdress the
issues once all the current conventions that dealt with liability and compensation were
ratified and in operation.146 The fact that the IMO Guidelines were not viewed by the
Assembly as being immutable is reflected by the terms of paragraph 4 of the Resolution
where the Assembly
REQUESTS the Legal Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the said
Guidelines from its own perspective, including the provision of financial security to
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cover coastal State expenses and/or compensation issues, and to take action as it may
147
deem appropriate.

In response, the Legal Committee has retained the issue of places of refuge as a high
priority item in its work programme and has adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude in relation
to issues of liability and compensation.148
Structure of the IMO Guidelines
The IMO Guidelines are written in a clear, ‘user friendly’ way and provide guidance on
the reasons for the IMO Guidelines and their importance, what is expected of all parties
where a place of refuge is requested, as well as a risk matrix to enable objective
decisions to be made on such a request.149 The IMO Guidelines are structured as
follows: general provisions including objectives, background and purpose of the IMO
Guidelines together with definitions; guidelines for action required of masters and/or
salvors of ships in need of refuge (Part 2); guidelines for actions expected of coastal
States (Part 3); applicable international conventions (Appendix 1); and guidelines for
the evaluation of risks associated with the provision of places of refuge (Appendix 2).
General provisions
The first part of the IMO Guidelines contains, in narrative form, an outline of their
objectives and purpose. While the provisions do not seek to direct member States as to
what to do, they do provide information on the views of the IMO on places of refuge to
encourage member States to use the risk management procedure set out in the later parts
of the IMO Guidelines.150
Although placed later in the IMO Guidelines, for a clearer understanding of the other
general provisions, the definitions should be considered first. For the first time in an
international instrument, a definition of ‘place of refuge’ is provided by the Guidelines:
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Place of refuge means a place where a ship in need of assistance can take action to
enable it to stabilize its condition and reduce the hazards to navigation, and to protect
151
human life and the environment.

From this definition, the Guidelines apply only to ‘a ship in need of assistance’. This is
defined as
Ship in need of assistance means a ship in a situation, apart from one requiring rescue of
persons on board, that could give rise to loss of the vessel or an environmental or
152
navigational hazard.

As noted in chapter one of this thesis,153 this terminology is wider than the conventional
wording of ‘ships in distress’. The definition extends the concept of ‘need’ to include
issues of environmental and navigational risks in addition to saving the ship itself.154
The change of wording from ‘ship in distress’ to ‘ship in need of assistance’ occurred
during the negotiations on the draft guidelines. At the first substantive meeting of NAV
on the topic in July 2001, the point was made by a number of delegations that a
different term to ‘ships in distress’ should be found as that term had a specific meaning
in a number of conventions155 and could be confusing.156 The draft terms of reference
for NAV used the words ‘ships in need’157 and the French draft that formed the template
for the draft guidelines used the term ‘situation of difficulty’.158 When the draft
guidelines were produced at the next meeting of NAV the term had been changed to
‘ship in need of assistance’.159
The circumstances cited in the definition are instructive. In relation to the need for the
ship to be in danger of being lost, this clearly takes into account the statement of Lord
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Stowell in the case of the Eleanor,160 that the ‘distress’ must be serious. The
circumstances also reflect the dual role of the IMO in shipping safety and pollution
prevention.161 The inclusion of navigation hazard is self explanatory and the inclusion
of environmental hazard reflects the current emphasis now being placed by the IMO on
avoiding or reducing environmental impacts from shipping activities.162 It is to reduce
the navigational hazard and to protect the environment that a place of refuge should be
sought.163
The extent of the hazard is not stated, so, in theory, the risk of pollution or danger to
navigation necessary to warrant the provision of a place of refuge need not be
substantial. However, in the risk assessment process, since there is no obligation on a
coastal State to grant access, the size of the potential oil spill or the navigational risk
would be a factor that would need to be considered by the coastal State in making its
decision on access.164 In practice, unless there are other factors involved, it is likely that
for a ship to be ‘in need of assistance’ and therefore able to request a place of refuge,
the risk to the environment or navigation would need to be much more than minor.165
This would be different should other factors militate against even small risks, such as an
oil spill in a particularly sensitive area or with the potential to seriously affect local
mariculture, such as oyster beds, or a risk of the ship sinking in a narrow access
channel.166
In the introduction and background sections (paragraphs 1.1 – 1-11), the IMO
Guidelines seek to provide a rationale for their use and to highlight the importance of
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taking a balanced view on the provision of a place of refuge.167 It presents the
overriding question in paragraph 1.2:
1.2
What to do when a ship finds itself in serious difficulty or in need of assistance
without, however, presenting a risk to the safety of persons involved. Should the ship be
brought into shelter near the coast or into a port or, conversely, should it be taken out to
sea?

The competing arguments of shipping interests and coastal State interests are briefly
expounded with the following quite telling, if not obvious, conclusion in paragraph 1.7:
1.7
Therefore, granting access to a place of refuge could involve a political decision
which can only be taken on a case by case with due consideration given to the balance
between the advantage for the affected ship and the environment resulting from
bringing the ship into a place of refuge and the risk to the environment resulting from
that ship being near the coast.

This effectively ends any argument that ships in distress have an automatic right of
access to a place of refuge.168 While chapter three of this thesis has shown that state
practice has been moving in this direction over the last few decades and states such as
Spain and France have been refusing access where there is a threat to the environment,
this statement in the IMO Guidelines is the first specific declaration in an international
instrument that the coastal State can refuse access on environmental grounds.169
The admission that a decision on the granting of access to places of refuge can be a
political one is used in paragraph 1.10 as a basis for the need for the IMO Guidelines
and the value in using them to justify any decision on access:
1.10
The use of places of refuge could encounter local opposition and involve
political decisions. The coastal States should recognize that a properly argued technical
case, based on a clear description of the state of the casualty, could be of great value in
any negotiations which may take place.
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The use of the risk management process in the IMO Guidelines would provide a rational
and objective basis for the purposes of supporting a decision to either grant or refuse
access both to the shipping interests and to satisfy local opposition.170 It could also
provide a defence to the coastal State in any claim that may be made against its decision
in legal proceedings.171
Taking into account the introductory points and background, the IMO Guidelines then
provide a succinct statement of their purpose:
The purpose of the Guidelines is to provide Member Governments, shipmasters,
companies…and salvors with a framework enabling them to respond effectively and in
such a way that, in any given situation, the efforts of the shipmaster and shipping
company concerned and the efforts of the government authorities involved are
complementary. In particular, an attempt has been made to arrive at a common
172
framework for assessing the situation of ships in need of assistance.

The IMO Guidelines then consider the position of safety of human life at sea. However,
the way they deal with it is convoluted. Paragraph 1.1 of the IMO Guidelines makes an
apparently clear statement:
1.1
Where the safety of life is involved, the provisions of the SAR Convention
should be followed. Where a ship is in need of assistance but safety of life is not
involved, these guidelines should be followed.

While not stating so explicitly, the juxtaposition of ‘safety of life’ and ‘SAR
Convention’ naturally leads to the conclusion that the IMO Guidelines do not apply
where there is an issue of life at sea since the objective of the International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) is to ‘rescue persons in distress at
sea’.173 Furthermore, the SAR Convention is primarily an operational document
detailing the steps to be taken by signatory States to establish search and rescue
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capability and use of those capabilities in various situations at sea.174 This conclusion is
confirmed in part in paragraph 1.13 of the IMO Guidelines where the short statement
made in paragraph 1.1 is qualified by the wordsThese Guidelines do not address the issue of operations for the rescue of persons at sea,
inasmuch as the practical difficulties that have given rise to the examination of the issue
of places of refuge relate to problems other than those of rescue.

The IMO Guidelines then identify two exceptions to this general statement
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namely,

where the ship needs assistance but has not entered the ‘distress phase’ as set out in the
SAR Convention i.e. ‘the ship or person is in imminent danger and in need of immediate
assistance’,176 or where the crew has been evacuated even if some personnel remain on
board. In these instances the IMO Guidelines are to be used until such time as the
situation for those on board enters the ‘distress phase’ of the SAR Convention,
whereupon the SAR Convention takes precedence over the IMO Guidelines.177
Regardless of whether or not the SAR Convention applies, when evaluating a specific
case in accordance with the IMO Guidelines, the decision makers must still take the risk
to human life into account where the condition of the ship could potentially put at risk
the lives of people in the vicinity, such as port and other local inhabitants, and those
crewmembers, salvage crew or other volunteers who stay on or go on board the ship to
deal with the problems being experienced by the ship.178
In short, despite the wording of paragraph 1.1, the IMO Guidelines do apply to human
life, whether of persons on board the ship or in the coastal locality. The risk to human
life must still be taken into account when assessing the risks involved with granting or
denying access to a place of refuge. The exception to this is where the ship has entered
the ‘distress phase’ under the SAR Convention, at which time the SAR Convention takes
precedence. To this extent the two instruments are complementary.179
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The treatment accorded to safety of life at sea under the IMO Guidelines also calls into
question the continued validity of the norm of customary international law that a ship
has a right to access a place of refuge where there is a risk to human life. This was
identified in chapter three as still being in existence. Risk to human life, except where
covered by the SAR Convention, is now covered by the IMO Guidelines. It is submitted
that danger to human life, where the SAR Convention does not apply, has now been
substantially diminished and transformed from a situation where customary
international law requires access to a place of refuge be given into a risk factor to be
taken into account by a coastal State under the IMO Guidelines when a request for
access to a place of refuge is made.180
Just as the IMO Guidelines have now put an end to any argument for an automatic right
of a ship in distress to access a place of refuge, there is an argument that the method of
treatment accorded to safety of life under the IMO Guidelines has effectively removed
the remaining element of the norm of customary international law that granted a right of
access where human life is at risk.
Actions required by the master and/or salvors
The next part of the IMO Guidelines deals with the actions that masters and salvors
should take when the ship gets into difficulties and needs assistance and before a
request is made for a place of refuge.
The primary aim of these requirements is for the master or salvor to clearly establish the
problems being experienced and report them to the coastal State to enable the coastal
State to assess the risk and to establish whether or not the ship is a ‘ship in need of
assistance’ within the meaning of the IMO Guidelines and, if so, what action, if any,
may be required of the coastal State.181 The events that may cause problems to a ship
include those listed in paragraph 1 of Appendix 2 to the IMO Guidelines, which include
fire, explosion, grounding, collision and pollution among others.
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In addition to identifying the actual problems being experienced, the master or salvor
must then assess the likely consequences of such problems in the context of four
hypothetical situations – if the ship remains where it is, if it continues on, if it enters a
place of refuge or if it is taken out to sea.182
Finally, the master or salvor must identify what assistance is required from the coastal
State.183 This assistance can include, but is not limited to, the emergency response
actions set out in paragraph 3 of Appendix 2 to the IMO Guidelines – lightering,
pollution combating, towage, stowage, salvage and storage.
Once all this information is ascertained, it is then transmitted to the coastal State
through that State’s Maritime Assistance Service (MAS),184 together with advice as to
what actions the master or salvor intends to take within a stated period of time.185
While it is waiting for the response from the coastal State, the master or salvor should
take all necessary action to deal with the situation including signing a towage or salvage
agreement or for other services.186 However, in relation to such actions, paragraph 2.7
requires that such action be ‘subject, where necessary, to the coastal State’s prior
consent’. No guidance is given as to when this necessity would arise or, in such
instances, who would give the consent.187 It creates another level of consultation and
potentially could impact on the master’s right and obligation under international law to
take any action to preserve the ship and crew.188 The difficulties created by excessive
consultation were clearly shown in the Amoco Cadiz grounding and sinking in 1978
when no action was taken to limit the damage until the master was able to contact the
owner for permission to accept a salvage contract.189 Another risk with this dependence
on coastal State consent was exhibited in the Prestige when the master was ordered by
the Spanish authorities to take the ship to sea and later charged the master for failing to
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obey the order and trying, with the assistance of salvors, to save the ship.190 Not
surprisingly, the Spanish delegation had proposed an amendment to this paragraph,
which was ultimately unsuccessful, by the insertion of the following new subparagraph:
2.6.1 The Master, the owner and, where applicable, the salvor of the ship should
comply with any instructions and safety measures that the coastal State considers
191
appropriate in the event of a threat of danger to the ship or coastal interests.

This requirement for consent is indicative of the bias of the IMO Guidelines towards the
coastal State and has the potential to cause serious problems for a master or salvor in a
distress situation.192
Actions expected of coastal States
Starting with an unsubstantiated admonition that under international law the coastal
State can require the ship’s master to act in accordance with the coastal State’s
directions to halt a threat of danger, with a further statement that the coastal State can
override the authority of the master should the master fail to act as directed,193 the IMO
Guidelines then deal with the method of assessment to be employed by a coastal State
when a ship requests a place of refuge.
First, coastal States are encouraged to develop a contingency plan for each possible
places of refuge and to assess the appropriateness of each potential places of refuge by
use of the factors listed in paragraph 2 of Appendix 2 to the IMO Guidelines. The
analysis of potential places of refuge should be done so that in the event of a request for
a place of refuge being granted, the coastal State is in a position to direct the ship to the
most appropriate place of refuge.194
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The factors which can be taken into account include environmental and social factors as
well as the natural conditions of the potential place of refuge.195 The environmental and
social factors address the safety of the crew and public safety on land as well as the
possible effects of pollution on designated environmental areas, fisheries, mariculture
and tourism and the availability of facilities such as reception facilities and pollution
combating equipment.196 The natural conditions include the prevailing weather and
tides, the bathymetry, navigational characteristics and operational conditions,
particularly where the potential place of refuge is a port.197
In addition, an assessment should be made of the availability of suitable equipment, the
availability of evacuation facilities and international cooperation and, above all, a
competent MAS.198 In relation to the MAS, difficulties could occur in States where
there are multiple jurisdictions and it is necessary for a central MAS be established in
such instances to avoid any confusion or failure of communication.199
Finally, the possible consequences of various possible actions on the safety of personnel
and local populations and risks associated with pollution, fire and explosion on the
potential place of refuge should be taken into account.200
There is no requirement either under international law201 or under the IMO Guidelines
for the identified places of refuge to be published.202 In the initial discussions on the
IMO Guidelines in the Legal Committee, the question was raised as to whether or not
places of refuge should be pre-designated. The prevailing view and the one which
continues today is that as each request for a place of refuge involves different
considerations, a case-by-case treatment was preferable to a system of pre-
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designation.203 As will be seen in the chapter six of this thesis, the European Union204
does require that places of refuge be designated and published by its member States.
When a request for a place of refuge is received by a coastal State, consideration must
be given as to whether or not to grant the request. Paragraph 3.9 of the IMO Guidelines
sets out case specific factors that should be taken into account when assessing the
request. The factors used in relation to specific places of refuge, which should have
been carried out by the coastal State beforehand, should also be used in the
assessment.205 While not designed to be exhaustive, the factors listed in paragraph 3.9
indicate the types of factors that would apply to most situations.206 These include the
condition of the ship at the time of the request and its potential to change; the type and
condition of cargo carried; whether or not the master and crew or salvors are still on
board and, if so, their condition; whether a salvage agreement has been entered into; the
distance to a potential place of refuge; whether the ship is insured and if so, the details
of the insurance; the details of any financial security required; the requirements, if any,
of the flag State.207 While many cases will be similar, no two cases will be identical and
the assessment factors for each case will vary.208
Where possible, to assist in assessing the risks, paragraph 3.10 recommends that an
inspection team be put on board.209 The analysis of the risks is to include an assessment
of the competing risks of leaving the ship at sea or bringing it into a place of refuge by
reference to the risks to the crew and salvors on board, the risks to the persons at or near
the place of refuge, the risks of pollution, the risks of disruption should the place of
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refuge be a port and the consequences of refusing a place of refuge. Finally due
consideration should be given to the preservation of the ship and cargo.210
Once all the assessments and analyses have been performed, the coastal State must then
make a decision on whether or not to grant a request for access. Paragraph 3.13 gives
the options available to coastal States: allow or refuse access, subject to any
conditions.211
In making its decision, guidance is given to the coastal State in paragraph 3.12 which
provides clearly that there is no obligation to grant refuge but that after that the various
factors be assessed in a balanced manner the coastal State should ‘give shelter whenever
reasonably possible’.212 This yet another indication that the former norm of customary
international law of permitting automatic access to a place of refuge for ships in distress
is no longer considered valid.213
As to conditions of access, paragraph 3.14 provides that where the place of refuge is a
port, a security guarantee for all expenses incurred by the port in permitting the ship
into port must214 be given. An indicative list of such expenses is given and includes
pilotage, towage, mooring operations and safety measures, as well as port dues and
‘miscellaneous expenses, etc’.215 The inclusion of port dues is another significant
deviation from customary international law. As was shown in chapter three of this
thesis, dating from at least the late 18th century, one of the benefits accorded ships in
distress entering places of refuge was that they were not obliged to pay port dues or
customs duties on cargo.216 The requirement for ships entering a port in distress for a
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guarantee to include ‘port dues’ effectively removes this benefit which was held to be
still in existence as recently as 1992.217
The inclusion of ‘miscellaneous expenses, etc’ at the end of the list clearly indicates that
the list is not exhaustive and raises the question of what, if any, limit there is to the
coastal State’s ability to apply financial obligations on shipowners before permitting a
ship in distress to enter a port.218 This question is contentious as some coastal States,
such as Spain, have insisted that only guarantees that cover unlimited liability will be
acceptable.219 The problem with not specifying the charges is that it not only potentially
contravenes Article 26 of LOSC220 but could also result in some coastal States
effectively refusing all requests for refuge by requiring the giving of guarantees that are
punitive and often unable to be covered by insurance.221 This is where the failure of the
IMO Guidelines to fully address the issue of liability and compensation could create
difficulties for their proper application.222
As will be seen more fully in chapter eight of this thesis, while the current regime of
compensation, as set out in Appendix 1 of the IMO Guidelines, does cover liabilities for
damage by ships in need of assistance and does provide compensation for such damage,
it also permits shipowners (and hence their insurers) to limit their liability in most
instances.223 In major oil spills, such as the Prestige, there is a clear risk that the
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expenses involved in cleaning up the spill could exceed the limitation fund.224 In this
case, the coastal State would be liable to cover the remaining expenses.225 This
argument was forcefully put by Spain during the negotiations on the IMO Guidelines in
MSC226 and NAV.227
Spain’s approach was that the emphasis of the IMO Guidelines should be effectively
reversed by the placing of criteria concerning the compliance of the shipowner with all
international safety standards ahead of the overriding need for the ship in need of
assistance to be granted a place of refuge.228 This effectively meant that only ships that
were ‘safe’ should be permitted access.229 Coupled with this was the requirement that
the owners provide security for unlimited civil liability.230 For this reason Spain, with
limited support from other delegations,231 also urged that the IMO Guidelines deal with
the issues of liability and compensation.232 Ultimately the Spanish proposals were found
by a significant majority to be too radical and were not accepted.233
This failure of the Spanish proposals does not, however, detract from the potential
problem for a coastal State of insufficient funds being made available by the owners of
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ships granted refuge because of the right of the owners to limit liability.234 This problem
is compounded by the fact that guarantees covering unlimited liability could not be
given by shipowners because they may be unable to obtain insurance cover to back
these guarantees.235
The International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI), in its submission to MSC during
the negotiations, commented that such guarantees would not be provided by the London
market.236 Subsequently the International Group of P and I Clubs did provide a draft
Standard Letter of Guarantee as part of the ongoing work of the Legal Committee into
liability and compensation, but this too is limited to a specified amount.237
Unless the issue of unlimited guarantees is dealt with within the overall question of
liability and compensation, the risk is that coastal States will refuse access to ships in
need of assistance until an unlimited guarantee is given.238 As this currently is not
available in the insurance markets, this may impact on the effectiveness of the IMO
Guidelines as a tool for dealing with the problem.239
The final point on the decision making process under the IMO Guidelines is who makes
the actual decisions to grant or refuse access.240 The IMO Guidelines make no reference
to this point stating only that it is for the coastal State to make the decision. The IMO
Guidelines concede that such decisions can be political decisions. Since there is no
obligation for a coastal State to grant access there is a risk that the decision could
ultimately be based on factors other than those in the IMO Guidelines and a ship could
still be refused access even if it satisfied all the risk factors.241
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As will be seen in chapters five and six of this thesis, to address this risk, some coastal
States have established a body independent of Government with the mandate to make
decisions on access to places of refuge.242 In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of
State’s Representative (SOSREP) has been established to perform this role243 and in
Australia the Maritime Emergency Response Commander (MERCOM) plays a similar
role.244 In the European Union, one of the original policies outlined in the Erika III
package was that the SOSREP system be replicated within every Member State of the
European Union. This proposal was not supported by the majority of member States and
was initially deleted from the package.245 However when the package was finally
presented to the European Parliament in March 2009 the proposal was reinserted and
approved.246
4.

Actions of IMO on Places of Refuge after Adoption of IMO Guidelines

After the adoption of the IMO Guidelines, MSC247 deleted any further action on places
of refuge from their work programme as did the NAV.248 At the request of the
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Assembly, MSC, MEPC and the Legal Committee continued to keep the IMO
Guidelines under review.249
Additionally, the Legal Committee was requested by the Assembly ‘to consider, as a
matter of priority, the said Guidelines from its own perspective, including the provision
of financial security to cover coastal State expenses and/or compensation issues, and to
take action as it may deem appropriate.’250
At its 87th session, as well as approving the draft IMO Guidelines, the Legal Committee
also considered the current situation concerning liability and compensation.251 While the
CMI survey on the issues of liability and compensation had not yet been completed,252
the Spanish delegation made a lengthy submission indicating that it did not consider that
current international instruments dealing with liability and compensation adequately
dealt with all eventualities.253
The general consensus of the Committee discussions was that, while the concerns raised
by Spain merited consideration, the Committee should wait for the outcome of the CMI
survey and in the interim encourage member States to ratify outstanding conventions,
which may close any gaps in coverage.254
From at least the 90th session of the Legal Committee in May 2005 to date, the Legal
Committee has stated that it will take a ‘wait and see’ attitude to the question of liability
and compensation for damage caused by ships in distress and it does not support
another separate convention.255 This attitude has been summed up as follows:
In a nutshell, the Committee has preferred to adopt a wait and see approach and to
encourage a greater participation in the existing conventional regime rather than
recommend the adoption of a new legal regime specifically on the subject of places of
249
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refuge. Consequently, while the Committee is certainly keeping a watching brief on the
subject of places of refuge, it is fair to say that at the present time no further action is
256
planned.

The Legal Committee retains as one of its high level actions, keeping the IMO
Guidelines under review particularly in light of the work of CMI.257 In this regard, the
most recent consideration of the matter by the Legal Committee was in its 95th session
in February 2009, where it discussed a draft Instrument prepared by CMI258 at which
meeting the Committee reiterated that it did not wish to develop a binding instrument on
places of refuge ‘at this stage’.259
5.

Assessment of the IMO Guidelines

One assessment of the IMO Guidelines sums up the current situation:
The IMO Guidelines have satisfied the urgent need for a practical and cooperative
approach in dealing with places of refuge for ships in distress, but they do not provide
answers to several legal questions that have been raised in debates in the IMO and state
practice. Thus, having addressed an urgent management response need, the IMO
260
is expected to address the legal ramifications.

In effect the IMO Guidelines are a first step to finding a solution to the problem but
other questions remain.261
An assessment of whether or not the IMO Guidelines provide a long term solution or
simply a temporary short term one can be made by an examination of their benefits and
disadvantages.
Benefits
The benefits provided by the IMO Guidelines are evident not only in their practical
operation in a place of refuge incident but also from their inherent benefits as a non
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binding instrument distinct from a formal and binding international instrument.

First, the major practical benefit of the IMO Guidelines is that they provide a set of risk
factors that should be used by all parties in reaching a decision when a request for a
place of refuge is made.262 When used by sufficient number of coastal States and ship
masters and salvors, they provide a consistency of approach that has been lacking to
date.263 All parties know what is expected of them and can prepare for them. Coastal
States in particular can employ the IMO Guidelines to make contingency plans for the
reception of ships in need of assistance if this is the decision that is made.264
Furthermore, coastal States can make objective assessments of potential places of refuge
so that in the event of consent being granted, the ship can be immediately directed to the
appropriate place whether it be a port or other place.265
Second, the IMO Guidelines provide the coastal State with the ability to make a
decision on an objective basis. This enables the decision maker to provide clear
justification for the decision whether it be in the domestic political and economic
context or in a court should the decision be challenged.266 Conversely, the IMO
Guidelines put a burden on the coastal State to ensure that their decisions are justifiable
in terms of the IMO Guidelines to counter any claims by third States of mala fides.267
Third, salvors are in a better, though not entirely satisfactory, position under the IMO
Guidelines as they have clearer procedures to follow. Although not addressed in the
Salvage Convention, a refusal of access that is objectively based on the IMO Guidelines
could arguably also assist salvors in claiming that as a result of the refusal they are able
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to claim ‘deemed performance’ under the contract of salvage and be thereby
discharged.268
Fourth, while the IMO Guidelines clearly state that there is no obligation on a coastal
State to grant access, shipping interests are benefitted under the IMO Guidelines by the
fact that an assessment should be made and that this assessment should include expert
analysis by an inspection team. As was seen in the Castor, one of the major failings of
six out of seven coastal States which refused access was that they failed to even inspect
the ship before refusing access.269 Under the IMO Guidelines this should not be
repeated.
Fifth, if properly used, the IMO Guidelines should prevent automatic refusals of access
without proper consideration of the relevant factors that have occurred in the past.270
This will not prevent extraneous factors, such as political pressures, being used to refuse
access where the objective analysis indicates otherwise, but it would make the
justification of such actions more difficult.271
Sixth, a benefit which flows from the use of non binding instrument such as the IMO
Guidelines as opposed to a formal treaty, is that States are freer to refuse to apply the
IMO Guidelines without fear of significant legal repercussions.272 The IMO Guidelines
are designed to allow such flexibility and would not function properly without it.
Seventh, the use of non binding instruments such as the IMO Guidelines also permits
easier acceptance of them both politically and administratively by States adopting them.
Negotiation of treaties and their subsequent adoption into domestic law, if it happens at
268
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all, can be lengthy and controversial.273 In contrast the use of non binding instruments
has fewer attendant difficulties and can be put in place quickly.274 It also allows time for
the States to devise a more binding and comprehensive solution if this is ultimately
deemed to be appropriate.275
Eighth, the use of the approach taken by the IMO Guidelines allows States to deal
collectively with problems without necessarily committing to definitive binding
action.276 It enables States to coordinate their behaviour in such a way as to achieve
desired objectives without the necessity to build in enforcement provisions. The various
Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control are good examples of this.277 As
outlined in this chapter, in the IMO discussions to devise a solution to the place of
refuge problem after the Prestige it was clear that there would be no consensus on any
obligation on coastal States to admit ships in need of assistance and more time was
needed to evaluate the need for this and for the insertion of obligations concerning
liability, compensation and financial undertakings. The IMO position on places of
refuge was then, and still is, that there is no need at this stage for a binding treaty as
proposed by CMI or for any other changes to the IMO Guidelines to accommodate
questions of compensation and financial obligations. As such the use of the IMO
Guidelines enabled the IMO to devise a temporary solution quickly without the need to
reconcile national differences.
Disadvantages
As with the benefits, the disadvantages in the use of the IMO Guidelines are reflected in
their practical operation and from their status as a non binding, as opposed to a formal,
instrument.
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First, the main drawback of the IMO Guidelines is that they are non binding and so not
legally enforceable.278 This point and its risks have been summed up:
The problem with such guidelines is that they are unenforceable, and will probably be
ignored by the very ship owners and flag states at which the exercise was initially
aimed. Guidelines are certainly the poor relation of conventions, but they may be better
279
than nothing.

They are an example of the type of non binding instrument which is commonly used in
international environmental law to provide a framework in which decisions are made
with the long term view of them becoming accepted practice.280
Second, there is no obligation on the coastal State to grant access to a place of refuge. In
this, the IMO Guidelines finally clarify the position that where there is no risk to life, a
ship in distress has no right of access to a place of refuge.281 Even where risk to life is
involved and despite statements in the IMO Guidelines to the contrary, where the SAR
Convention does not apply, human life is considered but only as a risk factor. Arguably
this also eliminates the remaining aspect of the maritime custom that access is granted
to a ship in distress where there is a risk to human life.
Third, it follows from the voluntary nature of the IMO Guidelines that proper
implementation of them will depend entirely on the goodwill of the coastal State. To the
extent that the shipmaster or salvor must follow the procedures, the failure to do so
properly could contribute to a decision to refuse access. However, there is no sanction
available against coastal States which improperly apply the IMO Guidelines whether by
failing to properly follow them or by the introduction of other extraneous factors.282 As
indicated above, there is nothing to prevent coastal States refusing access even where
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the analysis under the IMO Guidelines indicates access should be granted.283 While the
presence of the IMO Guidelines might impose a ‘moral’ obligation to use them
properly, should the coastal State for any reason chose not to do so, then they are free to
ignore any decision that would objectively flow from their use.284
Fourth, the IMO Guidelines do nothing to prevent political and other extraneous
influences being brought to bear on the decision maker.285 No direction is given as to
who should make the decision. Unless the decision is made by an independent person or
body, there is a risk of political pressure being applied.286 This can be summed up with
the statement: ‘I do not believe that it is wise to leave these decisions to local maritime
authorities - local authorities are subject to local pressures.’287
Fifth, the IMO Guidelines make no reference to the obligations of the flag State. There
are a number of the responsibilities imposed on flag States by LOSC including the
investigative role, the obligations to protect the crew and, potentially a liability for
damage by the ship. The IMO Guidelines are silent on any role the flag State can or
should play when one of its ships is refused refuge.288
Sixth, there is a need for the IMO Guidelines to deal with issues of liability and
compensation, despite the assertion of the Legal Committee and most of the delegations
which discussed the IMO Guidelines in the MSC that the existing legal conventions and
those yet to be put into force adequately cover the issues.289 While there is little doubt
that any adverse consequences of a ship in distress whether in a place of refuge or not,
would be covered by the various conventions listed in Annex 1 to the IMO Guidelines,
the fact that shipowners can limit their liability under these conventions except in rare
283
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cases raises the possibility that coastal States could be financially liable for any amount
in excess of the limitation fund.290 Failure to address the issues of liability and
compensation could have the effect of some coastal States refusing to adopt and apply
the IMO Guidelines.291
6.

Action on Places of Refuge by other International Organisations

CMI, IAPH and other industry organisations such as the International Salvage Union
(ISU), the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Associations (P&I Clubs)
and the International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI) have varied opinions. Some,
such as CMI, ISU and IUMI adopt a different view to the IMO and advocate a separate
convention,292 a draft of which has been drawn up by CMI.293 This is on the basis that
there is no current convention that deals with all aspects of the rights and obligations of
States and there are serious deficiencies in the current convention regime that are not
cured by the current IMO Guidelines.294 On the other hand, IAPH and the P&I Clubs
favour the IMO position to the extent that existing conventions should be implemented
before a new convention is considered but that if there are gaps then a new convention
should be considered but not necessarily in the form promoted by CMI. These varying
views will now be examined.
Comite Maritime International (CMI)
The Comite Maritime International (CMI) was founded in 1897,295 is based in
Antwerp296 and is made up of national and multinational Associations of Maritime
Law.297 The primary purpose for the establishment of CMI was to codify the whole
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body of international maritime law.298 In doing so it was bound to seek the input of all
relevant interests including shipowners, bankers and others interested in international
maritime trade. When IMCO was founded in 1948, there was no Legal Committee
established to assist it. The main reason for this was that CMI was already performing
the role of drafting international treaties and IMCO (and later the IMO) continued to use
the services of CMI for this purpose.299 After the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, the
IMO decided to establish the Legal Committee to which it would refer appropriate legal
matters.300 While the role of CMI was accordingly reduced after the formation of the
Legal Committee, there has been an increased level of cooperation between the two
organisations since the 1990s.301 As a result, CMI still performs its primary role but
does so, on behalf of the IMO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) to which it sends draft texts and provides assistance.302
In the context of places of refuge, the earlier discussion of the evolution of the IMO
Guidelines included various references to the work CMI was performing for the IMO.303
This was done mainly by way of two surveys of its members. The first survey in 2002
dealt with the experiences of member States with ships in distress and the second survey
in 2003 concerned the issues of liability and compensation where a ship in distress is
given or refused access to a place of refuge.
The results of the first survey were presented to the 85th session of the Legal Committee
in October 2002.304 CMI members had been requested to comment on the position in
national law of and experience with specific articles of the Salvage Convention 1989
(Article 11), LOSC (Articles 17, 18, 21, 192-199 and 221), and OPRC Convention
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(Articles 3-6). Members were also requested to provide information on any experience
with the admission or refusal of access to ships in distress.305
The overall result was mixed. Most respondents stated that their nations had adopted all
three conventions but had put only some of the provisions dealing with the position of
ships in distress into legislation. For example, most nations that had adopted the Salvage
Convention 1989 had excluded Article 11 so that there is no reference to places of
refuge in their legislation. Similarly contingency plans to respond to oil pollution under
LOSC and OPRC do not provide for ships in distress.306 The CMI recommendations
from the survey were that there needs to be consistent processes followed by
Governments where a place of refuge is requested with such places and conditions of
entry to them being identified publicly.307
At the request of the Legal Committee, CMI conducted a second survey specifically
addressing issues of liability and compensation that arise out of the admission or refusal
of admission of ships in distress.308 Pending the results and consideration by the Legal
Committee of issues of liability and compensation and with the aim of producing the
guidelines as soon as possible, the caveat was placed into the IMO Guidelines that they
did not deal with liability and compensation. The results were presented to the 87th
session of the Legal Committee in October 2003.309 In summary, most Governments
considered that they would have no liability for damage that ensues from the granting of
access to a ship in distress but there could be where the decision to refuse access was
reached negligently. Further, where damage does occur, most Governments considered
that this damage would be covered by the International Convention on Civil Liability

305

Ibid paragraph 1; Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge International Law in the Making’ CMI Yearbook
2003 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 329, 337.
306
Stuart Hetherington, ‘International Sub-Committee Discussion Paper’ CMI Yearbook 2003 Part II
(Comite Maritime International, 2003) 380, 380; Legal Committee, 85th Session, Places of Refuge –
Submitted by the Comite Maritime International LEG 85/10/3 dated 17 September 2002, paragraph 23.
307
Legal Committee, 85th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Comite Maritime International
LEG 85/10/3 dated 17 September 2002, paragraph 24; Legal Committee, 85th Session, Report of the
Legal Committee on the Work of its Eighty-Fifth Session LEG 85/11 dated 5 November 2002, paragraph
159.
308
Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge : Recent developments update as at August 2003’ in CMI Yearbook
2003 : Vancouver I : Documents for the Conference (Comite Maritime International, 2004) 358, 358;
Legal Committee, 85th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its Eighty-Fifth Session
LEG 85/11 dated 5 November 2002, paragraph 159.
309
Legal Committee, 87th Session, Places of Refuge – Summary of responses to the CMI’s second
questionnaire – Submitted by the Comite Maritime International LEG 87/7/2 dated 16 September 2003.

188

for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (CLC 92)310 and in most circumstances no liability
would attach to a person other than the shipowner and that compensation would be paid
by the ship’s P&I insurers and the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund.311
In assessing what further contribution CMI could make to the debate, CMI also
canvassed in its discussions what possible options there were to address the problem of
places of refuge in light of the survey findings, particularly in the areas of liability. At
its 2004 Conference, CMI concluded that the international conventions that dealt with
liability and compensation, even if fully ratified, could ultimately leave coastal States
exposed to liability.312 CMI concluded that either the IMO Guidelines or the
international conventions dealing with liability and compensation, or both, needed to be
amended to deal with issues of liability and compensation or a new convention was
required dealing solely with places of refuge.
The results of the meeting were presented to the Legal Committee.313 The Legal
Committee maintained its position that a new convention was not warranted and that
member States should be encouraged to ratify existing conventions.314 Despite this
attitude, CMI decided to continue work on issue and to draft an instrument dealing
exclusively with places of refuge for consideration by the IMO.315 This culminated in a
draft Instrument in 2008 which CMI presented to the Legal Committee together with the
results of a third survey which disclosed significant gaps in take up of conventions.316
This draft will be examined and assessed in chapter seven as an alternative to the IMO
Guidelines as a solution to the places of refuge problem.
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International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH)
The International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) is a Tokyo based worldwide organisation of port authorities and government agencies founded in 1955. It
currently has membership of 230 ports in 90 countries which account for approximately
60% of world sea trade and 90% of container traffic. It has consultative status a NonGovernment Organisation on a number of UN specialised agencies including the IMO
and UNCTAD where it represents the interests of ports and the port industry.317
IAPH has had an interest in places of refuge from the since the problem first arose and
has made regular contributions to the debates in the IMO Legal Committee and other
committees and in CMI from the ports perspective.318
IAPH first highlighted the need for a solution to places of refuge soon after the Castor
incident and recommended to MEPC, by a Resolution of the Board of Directors, that
contingency plans be reviewed by coastal States so that assistance can be provided to
ships in distress. These plans should take into account not only safety of life at sea and
environmental concerns, but also the operational and commercial interests of the port.319
A subsequent paper to the Legal Committee of the IMO320 stressed the need for a
balanced approach to dealing with requests for access to a place of refuge. It suggested
that, in addition to its earlier comments to MEPC, consideration be given to a
geographical regional approach of designation of places of refuge and a supranational
approach to the methodology of assessing requests. Some delegations were attracted by
the regional approach321 which presages the subsequent activities of the European
Union that will be more fully examined in chapter six of this thesis. With respect to
liability, it suggested immunity be given to those responding to requests for access and a
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system of liability that falls primarily on the ship and not the port. As for compensation
it suggested a special fund for any damaged caused by the granting of access.322 All of
these suggestions have been taken up either wholly or in part by the IMO Guidelines,
the European Union initiatives and the CMI draft Instrument.
At the 2004 Conference of CMI, where the decision was made to proceed with a
specific draft instrument for places of refuge, IAPH provided a paper dealing with the
issues raised by CMI and subsequently provided to the Legal Committee323 of IMO.
Issues central to the interest of IAPH mainly concerned liability and compensation.324 It
was pointed out that, while IMO members should be encouraged to expeditiously ratify
the outstanding international conventions, even with such ratifications, there will exist
gaps in the coverage. Significantly these include pure economic loss which is non
compensable by the laws of a number of common-law countries.325 They also include a
number of cargoes such as on general cargo ships, coal, steel, timber, vehicles and
livestock which are not covered by specific compensation conventions and which will
therefore be cover only by the significantly lower limits of the Convention on Limitation
of Liability for Maritime Claims.326
IAPH supported the initiatives of CMI and recommended that either a new convention
be developed or the existing compensation conventions be amended to ensure
compensation for all losses a port may suffer.327 Guidelines were not supported due to
their non mandatory nature.328
The position of IAPH with regard, specifically, to the CMI draft Instrument is that it
does not provide the coastal States with sufficient incentives to balance the increased
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benefits accorded shipping interests.329 To properly balance the interests, shipowners
must be prepared to waive any limitation of liability and provide unlimited guarantees
to cover all potential damages.330 The final IAPH view is that the current CMI draft
Instrument does not grant coastal States sufficient incentive to waive their sovereign
rights to determine who enters its internal waters and under what conditions.331
At this stage, the position of IAPH is similar to that of the IMO to the extent of
encouraging ratification of existing conventions with a review of liability and
compensation, including the need for a new convention, should there be gaps, but still is
not in favour of guidelines as the solution.332
Shipping Industry Associations
As well as CMI and IAPH, a number of shipping industry associations that have an
interest in places of refuge, have consultative status with the IMO as Non-Government
Organisations and have contributed to the debate in IMO. This includes organisations
that represent various shipping and port interests such as the International Salvage
Union (ISU), the International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI), the International
Group of P&I Associations (P&I Clubs), the International Gas and Tanker and Terminal
Operators (SIGTTO), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), and the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS).333 The three most active participants in the
debate have been ISU and the insurance interests represented by IUMI and P&I Clubs.
ISU has been particularly interested in finding a solution to the problem.334 This is
unsurprising as it is the salvors that are most often affected by a refusal of a coastal
State to grant access.335 As was seen in chapter one, the case of the Castor clearly
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showed the effect on a salvor of such a refusal. In this case what should have been a
relatively straight forward salvage became a much lengthier exercise which placed the
salvage crew at significantly more risk and substantially increased the cost.336 In the
Prestige, the salvors were prevented from saving the ship by the conduct of the Spanish
authorities which again placed the salvage crew in danger and had an economic effect
on the salvor’s operations.
Although changes to compensation provisions of the Salvage Convention have to an
extent ameliorated the economic consequences of a failure to grant access, the
possibility remains that a salvage reward for a successful salvage would in the case of a
valuable ship and cargo be more beneficial than a recovery of costs.337
ISU’s attitude to the IMO Guidelines is that they are a useful in directing decision
makers to risk factors but that they do not go far enough.338 ISU supports the CMI draft
Instrument for the following reasons:
A formal instrument is necessary to compel relevant authorities with little or no
knowledge of the sea, to make a proper informed decision in the light of all
circumstances. To make a genuine choice between what may be two evils. Not to
simply reject a solution which they perceive will affect them, without considering the
consequences to others. Guidelines are simply guidelines which can fairly easily be
avoided by a determined politician or administrator with little or no knowledge of ships
and the sea or the real dangers posed by them. Teeth are needed to ensure a balanced
judgement is made by those who have to make the decisions at times of crises. The draft
339
instrument before us, give[s] those teeth.

While supporting the CMI draft Instrument, ISU acknowledges that such an instrument
gives little incentive for coastal States to sign up to it. It suggests that environmental
salvage be developed which would include in any payment or reward an amount to
cover actions taken to avoid environmental damage.340
As it is the insurers that not only cover salvage costs but also pollution expenses and
losses to the ship and cargo, the views of IUMI and P&I Clubs are highly relevant. As
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early as February 2003, IUMI, which represents hull and cargo insurers, had advocated
an international convention to deal with the problem and recommended to the IMO the
development of such an instrument341:
This association believes that there is a need for a Port of Refuge Convention which
applies world-wide: the maritime leprosy problem needs international co-ordination –
at the moment it is easy for a country simply to turn away a vessel in distress in the
hope that it will just go away and become someone else’s problem. An obligation to
provide places of refuge…needs to be imposed on as many countries as possible world342
wide.

This obligation would not need to be absolute. The State should retain the power to send
away a ship in distress if there was a greater risk to the coastal State but this decision
would need to be based on reasonable grounds.343 In this the IUMI view is reflected in
the CMI draft Instrument which it supports.344
The P&I Clubs cover all the potential liabilities relevant to places of refuge, including
pollution. As such the P&I Clubs have a vital interest in finding a solution to the places
of refuge problem.345 In this regard they have provided to IMO a draft letter of
guarantee that could be used by the parties.346
However, contrary to the IUMI position, the view of the P&I Clubs is that there is
insufficient compelling need for a new convention for the time being. Furthermore, it is
their view that the IMO Guidelines have been effective in achieving a workable balance
between the interests of the coastal State and the shipping interests.347 The P&I Clubs
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are in favour of encouraging implementation of existing conventions before examining
any need for a new convention.348
CONCLUSION
In the last decade since the Castor and Prestige, the issue of places of refuge has
assumed a major profile in the international sphere. In view of the uncertain nature of
customary international law and treaty law concerning any right of ships in distress to
access ports of refuge, the IMO and other international bodies have attempted to address
the issue.
In producing the IMO Guidelines, the IMO hopes it will be a document that will form
the basis of risk management decisions when a place of refuge is requested. The IMO
Guidelines are acknowledged as a good first step to dealing with the problem and at the
very least are better than nothing.349 While they were introduced to satisfy an urgent
need and are thereby deficient,350 the fact that they at least provide a framework is a
great advance on the ad hoc decision making so obvious in cases like the Castor.
However the perceived need for a non-binding instrument could result in less than
satisfactory use being made of them due to the inherent weaknesses in voluntary
undertakings. The need for the goodwill of coastal States for the proper implementation
of the IMO Guidelines could undermine acceptance of the IMO Guidelines should those
States fail to live up to the expectations of the international community. To a degree,
this acceptance will be predicated on the issues of liability and compensation being
addressed. Nevertheless, as will be seen in chapters five and six of this thesis, there has
been a significant degree of acceptance of the IMO Guidelines by the European Union
and States such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, to indicate that the IMO
Guidelines or similar national guidelines could eventually form the basis of a norm of
customary international law. This end would certainly not be achieved by the
uncoordinated and ad hoc approach to the problem of places of refuge evident to date.
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However, in the short term, the IMO Guidelines suffer from significant weaknesses.
These weaknesses flow essentially from the perceived need to produce a document to
satisfy an urgent need. The end product is what has been described as the lowest
common denominator sufficient to attract support from its member States. It steers clear
of offending the sovereignty of coastal States at the expense of providing certainty of
access to a place of refuge to ship masters and salvors in a distress situation. The end
product is a document that is arguably biased towards the interests of the coastal States
while seeking to deal with the rights of shipowners and shipping interests in an advisory
and non binding way.
While the IMO Guidelines are acknowledged by most interests as a good first step, there
is divergence of opinion within the shipping industry as to their adequacy as final
document. The failure to deal with issues of liability and compensation runs the risk of
severely hampering acceptance of the IMO Guidelines by coastal States and increases
the likelihood that incidents like the Castor and Prestige will reoccur due to risk based
decisions being overruled on political or other extraneous grounds.
The IMO has now effectively stopped work on the problem, preferring to adopt a ‘wait
and see’ attitude while encouraging member States to ratify existing conventions. In this
the IMO is supported in part by IAPH and the P&I Clubs. However, as has been pointed
out by IAPH, even if all the existing conventions are ratified, there will still be major
gaps particularly in relation to liability for cargoes not covered by the conventions and
limitation of liability both of which could lead to shortfalls in compensation to coastal
States affected by the result of decisions on places of refuge.
CMI, supported by IUMI and ISU, has taken the matter one step further by drafting an
instrument under which attempts to redress the balance by removing the possibility of
objectively made decisions being overruled on other grounds. To make the draft
instrument palatable to coastal States, the CMI draft Instrument attempts to address
issues of liability and compensation. CMI candidly accepts that such an instrument may
be unacceptable to coastal States as being a major infringement on sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the draft instrument does provide a model in the event that a convention is
needed should another Prestige incident occur.

196

Regardless of what, if any, international initiative proves to be of use, ultimately, it will
be necessary for international solutions to be implemented in the legislation of nation
States. The problem of places of refuge has been addressed by a number of countries
both before the international initiatives and subsequent to them. The next chapter will
examine the ways in which Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom deal with the
problem.
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CHAPTER 5
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO PLACES OF REFUGE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Earlier chapters of this thesis have shown the growing trend in State practice and
decisions of national courts to restrict the application of the custom of permitting a ship
in distress to access a place of refuge. The IMO has no practical way of requiring the
international community to accept the IMO Guidelines nor has it any way of enforcing
their application. This can only be done through national legislation or other state
practice.
This chapter examines the extent to which the IMO Guidelines have been accepted and
applied by three States either simpliciter or with modifications and additions. The States
examined are Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom for the following reasons: all
three States apply their Place of Refuge Guidelines in different ways; Australia and
Canada, as federations, provide their own difficulties in the application of guidelines
partly as a result of different federal models; in Australia and Canada major changes to
places of refuge policy and legislation have occurred in the last 3 years; Australia and
the United Kingdom have created independent officers to decide whether or not to
admit a ship in distress into a place of refuge after the application of guidelines.

While the primary objective of the analysis in this chapter of the actions of these three
States is to assess the acceptance and implementation of the IMO Guidelines model, it
will also seek to identify any factors which might detract from the consistency of
approach envisaged by the IMO Guidelines. What is required is certainty for all parties
when a place of refuge is requested and any inconsistency of approach and
implementation of place of refuge guidelines would not be appropriate for what is
essentially an international problem. If certainty cannot be achieved through national
implementation of the IMO Guidelines, then either they will need to be strengthened or
alternative solutions, such as a discrete convention dealing solely with places of refuge,
must be found to supplement or replace them.
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1.

AUSTRALIA

Due to its relative geographical isolation, there have been few major pollution incidents
involving places of refuge.1 However, Australia, or more particularly some of the
Australian states, has been at the forefront of developing guidelines for places of
refuge.2 Various forms of guidelines for places of refuge have existed in some
Australian states since 1994 and in 2003 the Commonwealth introduced National
Guidelines, based on the IMO model. The guidelines of the states and the
Commonwealth will be examined and assessed in this section. To fully appreciate the
way guidelines for places of refuge are formulated and applied in Australia, this section
will initially examine the complicated division of jurisdiction over the internal waters
and territorial sea of Australia and the implications of such arrangements for the
formation and implementation of pollution preparedness and response and guidelines
for places of refuge which form part of such arrangements. The section will then
examine a number of cases involving places of refuge and the way in which guidelines
influenced the way in which the incidents were handled.

Maritime Jurisdiction in Australia
Australia is a federal State with six constituent states and two self governing territories3
with a Westminster form of government. It has an extensive coastline bordering three
oceans.4 As well it has a large EEZ surrounding not only the continental land mass but
also around a number of island territories and the Australian Antarctic Territory which
amounts in total to over twice the size of the land mass of the Australian mainland.5

1
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At federation in 1901, the then six self governing colonies ceded certain powers to the
new federal Government but retained all other powers to themselves.6 It was not until
the 1970s that the High Court of Australia was asked to look specifically at the division
of jurisdiction over the territorial sea.7 In 1973, the Commonwealth Government
enacted the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 19738 which proclaimed Commonwealth
sovereignty over the territorial sea and the continental shelf. The effect was that
Commonwealth sovereignty commenced at the low water mark.9 This undercut the
assumption that had commonly been made about the position of the states in relation to
offshore areas, namely, that the states could legislate out to the 3 mile limit which was
generally understood to have been the jurisdiction the states at federation.10
After an unsuccessful challenge to the validity of Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973,
the six state, Northern Territory and Commonwealth Governments entered into the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement in June 1979 by which they agreed to share
jurisdiction over the offshore waters and their resources.11 Pursuant to the Offshore
Constitutional Settlement the Commonwealth passed the Coastal Waters (State Powers)
Act 1980,12 under which legislative jurisdiction was granted to the states and Northern
Territory over all activities within three nautical miles of the coast and over some
activities beyond three nautical miles. Where the states or Northern Territory chose to
legislate, then the Commonwealth powers rolled back to the extent of the state law. If
they did not legislate then Commonwealth law operated from the low water mark.13
As the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 has not been repealed, the Commonwealth
has sovereignty over offshore areas beyond the low water mark.14 However under the
6
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Offshore Constitutional Settlement, in practical terms, the states and Northern Territory
can pass laws within the territorial sea adjacent to the respective state or Territory as if
they form part of the state or Territory.15 Since the proclamation of the twelve nautical
mile territorial sea, the territorial sea lying between three and twelve nautical miles and
other maritime zones lying beyond the territorial sea falls under Commonwealth
control.16
Legislation Affecting Places of Refuge
The division of jurisdiction brought about by the Offshore Constitutional Settlement is
reflected in the approach taken to places of refuge in Australia. The Commonwealth, the
states and the Northern Territory have all passed legislation concerning marine pollution
within their jurisdictions. This legislation, while not dealing with places of refuge per
se, does give wide powers to the relevant minister in a situation where a ship has
discharged oil or there is a likelihood of such a discharge taking place, including a
power to direct ships to proceed to a specified place.
Commonwealth Legislation
In view of the division of jurisdictions brought about by the Offshore Constitutional
Settlement, where the states or Northern Territory have legislated, the Commonwealth
has no practical jurisdiction within 3 nautical miles of the coastline of Australia except
for waters around external territories.17 Accordingly, the main piece of Commonwealth
legislation dealing with marine pollution, the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of
Pollution from Ships) Act 1983,18 makes no reference to powers to direct movement of a
ship to a place of refuge.
The Commonwealth does, however, have some residual jurisdiction within three
nautical miles by virtue of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
15
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High Seas in cases of Oil Pollution Damage (Intervention Convention).19 The
Intervention Convention is enacted into Australian law by the Protection of the Sea
(Powers of Intervention) Act 1981 (Intervention Act).20
The essential provision of the Intervention Convention is contained in Article 1:
Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline
or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon
a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.

It follows that the Commonwealth’s powers under the Intervention Act, which derive
from the Intervention Convention, are limited by the wording of Article 1. Article 1 is
enacted in s 8(1) of the Intervention Act–
Where the Authority is satisfied that, following upon a maritime casualty on the high
seas or acts related to such a casualty, there is grave and imminent danger to the
coastline of Australia, or to the related interests of Australia, from pollution or threat of
pollution of the sea by oil which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful
consequences, the Authority may take such measures, whether on the high seas or
elsewhere, as it considers necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate the danger.

Four preconditions must be satisfied before the Commonwealth can take action under
s 8. There must be a maritime casualty or act related to such a casualty, it must occur on
the high seas, there must a ‘grave and imminent danger’ to the coastline or related
interests of Australia and the consequences of pollution or threat of pollution must
reasonably be expected to be harmful.
‘Maritime casualty’ is not defined in the Intervention Act but is defined in the
Intervention Convention21 asa collision of ships stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on
board a ship or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of
material damage to a ship or cargo.
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Act has the same meaning as in the Intervention Convention.
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This definition is very wide and would cover most cases of ships in distress and in need
of a place of refuge.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Intervention Act apply only to casualties on the high seas. The
granting of rights to take measure against ships while on the high seas is an exception to
the right of freedom of navigation on the high seas.22 Actions taken following casualties
in waters other than the high seas would, of course, be within the judicial competence of
the coastal State.23
No guidance is given in the Intervention Act (or in the Intervention Convention) or as to
what constitutes ‘grave and imminent danger’ or how the expectation of major harmful
consequences can reasonably be made. While the Intervention Act now gives the power
to reach these conclusions to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)

24

it

does not indicate what factors need to be taken into account in so doing.
The Intervention Act, in ss 8 and 9, provides a list of measures that may be employed.
These measures include the power to take action on the high seas to ‘move the ship or
part of the ship to another place’ or to issue directions that this be done.25
Care must be exercised in applying the powers under s 8 of the Intervention Act because
of the potential effect of Article 6 of the Intervention Convention –
Any Party which has taken measures in contravention of the provisions of the present
Convention causing damage to others, shall be obliged to pay compensation to the
extent of the damage caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to
achieve the end mentioned in Article I.
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The Intervention Act in s 10 also includes a power, in situations not covered by the
Intervention Convention (i.e. for casualties that occur other than on the high seas), to
move or direct the movement of any ship in internal waters26 or in the Australian coastal
sea27 and any Australian ship on the high seas.28 There are fewer restrictions than under
s 8 and all that is required under s 10 (2) is that there be an escape or likely escapee of
oil or a noxious substance. The need for proportionality continues in s 10 (4), although
the compensation payable under Article 6 of the Intervention Convention for failure to
comply with this requirement, is absent.
These provisions, in effect, give the Commonwealth powers to direct certain ships not
only in the territorial sea but also the internal waters of a state of Territory to a place of
refuge even where the state or Territory may object. Since all land based places of
refuge would be within the jurisdiction of the states or Northern Territory, this would
seem to conflict with the spirit of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement. It could also,
in relation to the provision covering internal waters, conflict with s 14 of the Seas and
Submerged Lands Act, where a place of refuge is in waters of the sea that are waters of
or within any bay, gulf, estuary, river, creek, inlet, port or harbour that were, on 1st
January, 1901, within the limits of a state and remain within the limits of the state. The
constitutionality of s 10 and the powers of the Commonwealth claimed under it have
been raised by a number of commentators.29 The better view is that it is constitutional
but, from a practical point of view, the situation causes confusion because of the
presence of multiple jurisdictions.30
As will be seen below, the distribution of powers and responsibilities between multiple
jurisdictions was addressed in the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil
26

Other than those on intra-state voyages, Australian fishing ships not proceeding on an overseas voyage
and pleasure craft (s10(1)).
27
This includes the territorial sea of Australia and the sea on the landward side of the territorial sea of
Australia and not within the limits of a State or Territory (The Protection of the Sea (Powers of
Intervention) Act 1981 s 10(8)).
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Sam Bateman and Angela Shairp, ‘Places of Refuge in a Federal Jurisdiction – The Australian
Experience’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 375, 386; Dionne Maddern and
Stephen Knight, ‘Refuge for Ships in Distress: International Developments and the Australian Position’
(2003) 17 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 101, 109-110; Thomson
Clarke Shipping, Report of AMSA/AAPMA Conference on Safe Havens and Salvage 19-20 February 2002
Port Melbourne (Thomson Clarke Shipping 2002) 30.
30
Dionne Maddern and Stephen Knight, ‘Refuge for Ships in Distress: International Developments and
the Australian Position’ (2003) 17 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 101,
110.
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and Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances 1973 (National Plan).31 Places of refuge
and the jurisdictional arrangement for emergency salvage were discussed at the 199332
and 200033 reviews of the National Plan. At the AMSA/AAPMA Conference on Safe
Havens and Salvage, held in February 2002, the need for clarification of the powers of
intervention was noted as was the need for national guidelines for places of refuge to be
developed.34 The creation of an equivalent to the United Kingdom Secretary of State’s
Representative (SOSREP) was also mooted.35
The concerns of the salvage industry were addressed in the House of Representatives
Inquiry into Maritime Salvage in Australian Waters set up in 2002 following a report by
the Productivity Commission into the Economic Regulation of Harbour Towage and
Related Services.36 Although it was outside the terms of reference of the committee, the
question of places of refuge was raised as an issue of concern.37 Specifically, the
Committee looked at the priority of saving of life over potential damage to the
environment and at the question of who should make any decision on the granting of
refuge. On the first question, the Committee emphasised that saving of life must always
take priority over all other considerations. On the latter point, the Committee
recommended thatin determining the site to be used as a place of refuge, the person making the final
decision must have an adequate level of maritime experience, understanding of
38
maritime safety issues and appropriate maritime transport ministerial authority.

This recommendation was adopted by the Commonwealth following in-principle
agreement with the states and the Northern Territory in November 2005 on an
integrated approach to maritime emergency response in the National Maritime
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February 2002, 2-3.
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Zealand Journal 101, 110.
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Ibid 43.
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Emergency Response Arrangements.39 The result was an amendment to the Protection
of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Amendment Act 200640(Intervention Amendment
Act) which came into force on 23 May 2006.41
The provisions of the Intervention Amendment Act sought to clarify and rationalise the
jurisdictional arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states and Northern
Territory where a ship in distress requires assistance.42 This included not only salvage
services per se but also the need for a place of refuge, either as part of the salvage
service or not.43
As described earlier,44 under the Intervention Act, the Offshore Constitutional
Settlement and the Australian Constitution, these responsibilities had been divided
between the Commonwealth and the states and Northern Territory according to size of
ship, type of ship, location of the ship and/or purpose of voyage. There was also a
dispute concerning the power of the Commonwealth to direct a ship into a place of
refuge against the wishes of the relevant state or Territory.
As a result of agreement between the states, Northern Territory and the Commonwealth,
the Intervention Amendment Act changed the basis of the distribution between the
Commonwealth, states and Northern Territory.45 The Commonwealth powers were
increased to cover all ships in the inland waters of each state and Northern Territory that
are engaged in trade and commerce or are owned, operated, managed or controlled by a
constitutional corporation, all ships in territorial sea adjacent to each state or Territory
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Australian Maritime Safety Authority, National Maritime Emergency Response Arrangements
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or waters on the landward side of the territorial sea not constituting internal waters, all
ships in the EEZ and all Australian ships on the high seas.46
Additionally, the Intervention Amendment Act makes clear that the Commonwealth’s
jurisdiction for the purposes of the Act extends to ships in internal waters of the states
and Northern Territory where there is a constitutional basis for the Commonwealth to
do so.47 Therefore ships covered by international treaty,48 ships engaged in interstate or
overseas trade49 or ships owned by constitutional corporations50 are also subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, even when they are in internal waters.51
The breadth of the amended s 10(2)52 seems to limit the jurisdiction of the states and the
Northern Territory to ships such as pleasure craft not owned by constitutional
corporations and other commercial ships such as ferries operating exclusively within
internal waters. However, the reality is different.
The Intervention Act only applies under ss 8(1) and 9(1) to casualties on the high seas
which present a grave and imminent danger of major harm being caused to the coastline
of or interest of Australia or under ss 10(1) and 11(1) where there has been an escape of
oil or a noxious liquid substance or there is a threat of such escape. It does not apply in
situations where there has been no escape or threat.
Furthermore, under s 5(1) of the Intervention Act, the powers of the Commonwealth are
concurrent powers with the state where this is possible. The exception to this is in
s 5(1A)53 to the extent that a direction given by the Commonwealth prevails over the
laws of a state or Territory. If the Commonwealth does not wish to take control of a
particular situation then the relevant state or Territory law will apply. However, if the
46

Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Amendment Act 2006 ss 49, 50.
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Commonwealth does assume control and issues directions, the states and Northern
Territory have no rights at all.54
This ability of the Commonwealth to issue directions that prevail over the laws of a
state or the Northern Territory is particularly relevant in a direction to a master or salvor
to go to a place of refuge and clarifies the situation under the unamended Intervention
Act where there was some doubt as to whether the Commonwealth could direct a ship to
a place of refuge against the wishes of the state or Territory. This doubt has been
removed by the Intervention Amendment Act. Under s 11(1)(a), the Commonwealth may
now issue a direction requiring that the ship be moved to a specific place or area.
Further, under s 11(1)(s) the Commonwealth can issue a direction requiring ‘a specific
place to be treated as a place of refuge’ for ships referred to in ss 8(1), 9(1) and 10(2). If
the Commonwealth gives such directions, the ship must move to such place as it is
directed and the state or Territory in which the place of refuge is situated cannot refuse
to accept the ship.
The effect of the issue of a direction to for a ship to proceed to a place of refuge in a
state or Territory over the wishes of such state or Territory, is ameliorated to a degree
by the Inter-Governmental Agreement on the National Maritime Emergency Response
Arrangement

(Inter-Governmental

Agreement)

entered

into

by

between

the

Commonwealth and all states and the Northern Territory on 29 February 2008.55 This
agreement, amongst other things, divides the roles and responsibilities of the
Commonwealth and the states and Northern Territory in relation to the granting of a
place of refuge to a ship covered by the provisions of the Act.56 It also provides for the
establishment of the role of the Marine Emergency Response Commander (MERCOM)
as the person responsible for coordinating and making decisions on behalf of the
Commonwealth in marine emergencies.57
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While the Inter-Governmental Agreement, in Article 5.1.3, confirms the intervention
powers of the Commonwealth as including ships in the EEZ, coastal seas and internal
waters, it does provide a role for the states and Northern Territory.58 Notwithstanding
the legal rights of the Commonwealth, Article 5.1.4 of the Inter-Governmental
Agreement sets out the intent of the Commonwealth to respond only to casualties
outside the ports of a state or the Northern Territory and only to ships over SOLAS size
limits (i.e. over 400gt).
The MERCOM however reserves the right to take control of a situation where the
MERCOM reasonably assesses that there is actual significant pollution or a threat of
such pollution and the states or Northern Territory authorities are not taking adequate
measures to address it.59 The MERCOM will also intervene where there is agreement
with the state or Northern Territory to do so.60 In relation to casualties over which the
MERCOM does assume control, Article 5.1.5 of the Inter-Governmental Agreement
provides that the MERCOM will make every endeavour to consult with the relevant
state or Northern Territory and take into account the their guidelines, policies and
views, but retains the ultimate right to make the final decision.61
The role of the states and the Northern Territory are set out in Part 5.2, Articles 5.2.1
and 5.2.2, of the Inter-Governmental Agreement which provide the corollary to the
Commonwealth powers. The states retain the right to deal with casualties in ports,
internal waters and in the adjacent coastal sea but only in relation to casualties within
ports and to ships in internal waters62 and in the adjacent coastal sea that are below
SOLAS size.63 Action can also be taken in relation to ships greater than SOLAS size
where the MERCOM assesses that there no actual or threatened pollution and the states
or Northern Territory conclude there is a need to deal with the situation in accordance
with its own legislation.64
One other important amendment made by the Intervention Amendment Act was the
introduction of responder immunity into the Intervention Act as s17A, together with
58
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concomitant provisions in s17B on expenses of compliance.65 These provisions were
considered important as incentives for relevant parties to cooperate fully in addressing
the actual or potential consequences of a casualty.66 The powers of the MERCOM to
issue directions, with significant penalties for non compliance,67 which might conflict
with the wishes of another entity or might involve others in actual or potential liability
in complying with the direction, needed some incentive to avoid argument in time of
crisis. The responder immunity and expense payment provisions were intended to
provide this incentive.68
In the context of places of refuge, bringing a ship in distress into a port or permitting
such entry as a result of a direction by the MERCOM and which causes some pollution
would not result in criminal or civil proceedings for such pollution provided it was done
in good faith and with reasonable care.69 The exception to this is where action is
brought pursuant to the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 198170 or the
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 to
recover intervention and clean up costs.71
As to expenses of compliance with a MERCOM direction, s 17B provides that where a
person incurs expenses that person can recover them from the owner of the ship
reasonably incurred in complying with the direction.72 In a place of refuge situation this
would cover such expenses as towage expenses and port dues.73
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State and Northern Territory Legislation
State and Northern Territory legislation, while consistent in granting the power to direct
movements of ships, is slightly different in form. New South Wales, Victoria and South
Australia provide a general power to the relevant Minister or official to direct ships.
Queensland and the Northern Territory, provide for a specific power for the relevant
Minister or officer to direct ships to a specified place under more limited circumstances.
In Tasmania and Western Australia, there is no specific power but a power can be
inferred from the wording of the legislation.
In New South Wales, s 47 of the Marine Pollution Act 198774 provides that where there
has been an oil spill or there is an imminent risk of one occurring, the Minister may
require that certain actions be taken to avoid, minimise or remove the pollution. These
powers include a power to direct a ship to a specified place. Similar wording to the New
South Wales legislation occurs in Victoria under s 45(1) (a) (iii) of the Marine Act
198875and in South Australia under s 28(2) (b) of the Protection of Marine Waters
(Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1987.76 All three Acts grant the power of
removal in situations where a discharge has taken place or there is a possibility of such
a discharge taking place and for various purposes including the prevention, limitation,
dispersal, containment, minimisation or removal of the consequent or potential
pollution. There is no requirement that the pollution or threat of pollution pose a
serious danger to the environment.
In Western Australia, s 27 of the Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act
198777 does not specify what actions the appropriate authority can take. In similar terms
to the New South Wales legislation, there is no requirement that there be any danger to
the environment. If there has been a discharge or the appropriate authority is of the
opinion that such a discharge may occur, the appropriate authority can ‘take such action
as it thinks fit’ to prevent, limit, disperse, contain, remove the pollution or minimise the
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damage.78 As such there is nothing to prevent the appropriate authority from ordering a
ship to a place of refuge if that is considered to be an appropriate action.
In Queensland, the Northern Territory, and Tasmania, the power is more limited and
generally reflects the requirements contained in the Intervention Convention relating to
the seriousness of the pollution or threat of pollution. The requirements include the
necessity for there to be a serious danger of harmful consequences before there arises
any powers of intervention, including the power to direct a ship to a place of refuge.
This would result in there being no power to direct ships to a place of refuge in smaller,
non serious discharges. This limitation is not present in the legislation of New South
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia.
In Queensland, s 98 of the Transport Operations (Marine Pollution) Act 199579
provides that where a ship that has been damaged or where there is an imminent threat
of damage to the ship or cargo the Minister may direct that ship to ‘another place’. This
would encompass situations where a ship is damaged and is in need of a place of refuge.
Similar provisions to the Queensland legislation are provided for in the Northern
Territory under s 82(1) and s 82(3) of the Marine Pollution Act 1999,80 including the
power to direct that a ship be moved. In addition, and uniquely in the Australian
legislation in this area, this section also provides requirements as to how the choice of
measures is to be reached and what considerations are to be taken into account. Under
s 82(2), the Chief Executive must ensure the exercise of the power will not involve a
threat to human life and consult with AMSA and the ship’s owner, unless the
intervention has to be exercised urgently. Further, under s 82(8) the Chief Executive
must consider the probability of imminent danger, the likelihood of success of the
intervention and the likely extent of any damage which may be caused by the
intervention.81
In Tasmania, under s 26A of the Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act
1987,82 the power is in the same terms as in the Queensland and Northern Territory
legislation in that it only applies to a marine casualty that constitutes ‘grave and
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imminent danger to state waters, the coastline or another part of the state’s physical
environment’. However, the remedy is different in that there is no specific power to
direct that a ship go to a particular place. The remedy provided in s 26A (1) is that an
authorised officer may assume control of the ship and take ‘critical action’. ‘Critical
action’ is defined in s 26A (9) as including ‘moving a ship’.83 By inference, this would
include power to move the ship to a place of refuge.

Administrative Arrangements Relating to Places of Refuge
The size of the area of sea around Australia and the complicated jurisdictional
arrangements that exist to deal with oil and chemical pollution mean that there needs to
be a coordinated plan between the agencies of the Commonwealth, the states and
Northern Territory and the oil and shipping industries to combat spills that occur in the
inland waters and territorial sea of Australia.84 Not only does this require coordination
of roles and a clear chain of command, it also requires the ready availability of supplies
such as booms, dispersants and other prevention and cleaning equipment and also the
availability of emergency towage ships.85 This necessity was highlighted in the 1970
grounding and subsequent oil spill from the Oceanic Grandeur which, on 3 March
1970, ran aground in the Torres Strait, carrying 55,000 tonnes of crude oil and which
resulted in a spill of over 1,000 tonnes.86 The response to the spill by Commonwealth
and Queensland agencies highlighted the lack of coordination and preparedness that was
needed to combat major spills.87
As a result of the experiences in the Oceanic Grandeur grounding, negotiations that had
been ongoing since 1969 were accelerated and in October 1973, the states, Northern
Territory and the Commonwealth Governments entered into an agreement known as the
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National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil (National Plan).88 Initially this did
not include consideration of places of refuge but this was subsequently discussed and
acted on in later reviews of the National Plan.
National Plan
The National Plan provides a framework under which spills of oil or other noxious
liquid substances can be responded to as quickly and efficiently as possible. As with
many other maritime arrangements, responsibility for delivery of the plan is divided
under an Inter-Governmental Agreement89 between the Commonwealth, the states and
the Northern Territory in their respective areas of jurisdiction.90
Although the National Plan has existed since 1973, it also is designed to satisfy
Australia’s obligations under the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 199091 which Australia has ratified and
which came into force on 13 May 1995.92
There is no reference in the National Plan to places of refuge but it was discussed
during the 1993 Review of the National Plan.93 The question raised in the review was
whether or not places of refuge should be pre-designated or determined on a case by
case basis. Industry wanted them to be pre-designated to minimise delay in a salvage
operation. This was opposed by some states which maintained that such a move would
be politically provocative and pointless since the designated places might never be
needed and that a case by case basis would be preferable.94 The case by case basis was
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ultimately preferred.95
Guidelines on Places of Refuge
National Maritime Places of Refuge Risk Assessment Guidelines(National Guidelines)96
were introduced in May 2003 and are designed to be used by all Australian maritime
administrations.97 However, the National Guidelines also specifically state that where
there are existing state or Northern Territory guidelines these should be used for
assessing any request but that where these do not exist, the National Guidelines should
be used.98 Guidelines on places of refuge have existed in Queensland, New South Wales
and Western Australia since the early 1990s and in light of the precedence they take
over the National Guidelines, they need to be examined first.
Queensland
The first Queensland Guidelines were issued in Queensland in 1994 and were updated
in 1999.99 The waters surrounding Queensland are particularly sensitive as they include
the Great Barrier Reef, which was designated by the IMO as the first Particularly
Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) in 1991.100 The Queensland Guidelines cover not only the
coastal waters of Queensland but also the territorial sea of Australia, the waters of the
Great Barrier Reef, the EEZ of Australia and the high seas where there is potential to
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damage Australian interests.101 They form part of the protective measures for
preservation of the Great Barrier Reef.102
The aims of the Queensland Guidelines are to assess a request for a safe haven103 in the
relevant areas, to protect human life, protect the environment and preserve the ship and
cargo.104 With these objectives in mind, the Queensland Guidelines list assessment
criteria to be used once a request for a safe haven is made. These include details of the
ship, its position and weather and sea conditions, details of the damage and its cause,
whether or not there are casualties, details of actual or potential pollution and the type of
safe haven needed. Once received, an assessment is made of the risks to the ship and its
crew and what assistance may be necessary. If access is to be granted, an assessment is
made of the most appropriate safe haven and whether there are any alternatives, such as
repairing at sea. This assessment of an appropriate safe haven includes assessing the
environmental risk to the safe haven and to the ecological and socioeconomic resources
of the surrounding area.105
Not all requests for safe haven will be granted as they are determined on a case by case
basis and the safety and environmental factors have to be weighed against each other.106
Nevertheless, the 2000 review of pollution measures in the Great Barrier Reef appears
to conclude that provision of a safe haven is to be encouraged since:
It is rarely possible to deal satisfactorily or effectively with a marine casualty in open
seas conditions. The longer a damaged ship is forced to remain at the mercy of the
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elements, the greater the risk of deterioration and of a greater hazard to the environment
107
and loss of life and property.

The National Guidelines are now in place but they do not override arrangements in
operation in the states or Northern Territory.108 Accordingly, even though the National
Guidelines cover most of the criteria listed in the Queensland Guidelines, in theory, any
request for a place of refuge in the waters covered by the Queensland Guidelines should
be first assessed under the Queensland Guidelines.
New South Wales
In November 1997, the New South Wales Department of Transport issued Guidelines to
Assess a Request for a Place of Refuge (NSW Guidelines).109 The NSW Guidelines were
updated in April 2001,110 April 2002111 and June 2004.112
The NSW Guidelines were drawn up according to the model of the Queensland
Guidelines.113 Their priorities were to save life, protect the environment, the economic
infrastructure of the state and the ship and its cargo.114
Under the NSW Guidelines a place of refuge could be requested where a ship at sea had
been involved in an emergency such as explosion, fire, flooding, collision, grounding or
power failure particularly when accompanied by pollution of the sea.115 For each
situation different criteria are listed in Appendices 2-7 which includes the criteria set out
in the Queensland Guidelines model but in more detail.116 The operational criteria and
the weather criteria at the place of refuge are listed in Appendices 8 and 9
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respectively.117 Again these criteria match those in the Queensland Guidelines model. In
addition, criteria peculiar to the ship or place of refuge are listed in the body of the NSW
Guidelines.118 Reference is also made to places of refuge and the role of the MERCOM
in the NSW State Waters Marine Oil and Chemical Spill Contingency Plan, which is a
sub-plan of the National Plan.119 As with the Queensland Guidelines, the NSW
Guidelines are extant and in the event of a request for a place of refuge in New South
Wales jurisdiction the NSW Guidelines should be used.
Western Australia
The Western Australia Maritime Place of Refuge Risk Assessment Guidelines (WA
Guidelines) form an appendix to the WestPlan Marine Transport Emergency
Management Plan.120 They are designed to assess request for a place of refuge in
Western Australian waters.121 They were originally issued in December 2004 and
rewritten in January 2007.
The WA Guidelines are in virtually identical terms to the National Guidelines with only
slight contextual changes. Accordingly any comments on the national guidelines apply
equally to the WA Guidelines.
National Guidelines
The National Maritime Place of Refuge Risk Assessment Guidelines (National
Guidelines) were drawn up by the National Plan Management Committee in 2002122
and endorsed by the Australian Transport Council (ATC)123 on 23 May 2003.
Formulation of the National Guidelines arose from a recommendation at the
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AMSA/AAPMA Conference on Safe Havens and Salvage held in February 2002.124 They
were amended on 22 May 2009 to take into account the need for consistency with the
IMO Guidelines and to reflect the changes to the intervention arrangements.125 In form
and content the National Guidelines are an amalgam of the state guidelines and the IMO
Guidelines.
The National Guidelines are split into four parts - an introduction; the process of
dealing with a request for a place of refuge; the process of dealing with such a request;
and management issues between the Commonwealth and the states and Northern
Territory. Appendices then deal with contact details, the information to be supplied with
the request, issues for dealing with the ship while at sea and criteria for the selection of
a place of refuge, a pro forma for transfer between administrations, and a pro forma for
directions under intervention legislation.126
Introductory Provisions and Definitions
In a similar way to the IMO Guidelines, the first part of the National Guidelines deals
with preliminary matters including definitions, the purpose of the guidelines, the
application of the guidelines and why a place of refuge should be granted, including a
short expose of the international law on the topic. It also includes the practical aspects
of when a ship should seek a place of refuge and the way the National Guidelines
should be applied within a federal state and internationally.127
Part 1.3 contains two definitions – ‘place of refuge’ and ‘maritime casualty’. The
definition of ‘place of refuge’ replaces the earlier use of ‘safe haven’ and ‘port of
refuge’ and is identical with the IMO Guidelines.128 Unlike the IMO Guidelines no
definition is given of ‘ship in need of assistance’. The other definition given is
‘maritime casualty’. This is virtually identical with the definition in the Intervention
Convention except that rather than a non specific reference to ship and cargo, the
definition in the National Guidelines relates specifically to the ship involved in a
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maritime casualty and its cargo.129 The inclusion of this definition reflects one of the
primary purposes of the National Guidelines, namely, as part of the powers of
intervention under the Intervention Convention.130
Although no definition is given of ‘ship in need of assistance’, Part 1.4 in effect defines
the term by describing when a ship should seek a place of refuge.131 Paragraph 1.4.1
sets out the general circumstances when a ship may seek a place of refuge:
Generally, access to a place of refuge may be sought in circumstances involving a
132
maritime casualty, force majeure or distress, or some other operational situation.

Additionally, paragraph 1.4.2 sets out other situations. When a ship is in a position
where its safety or the safety of its crew or passengers are at risk or it poses a threat to
the marine environment or other property, a ship should consider seeking a place of
refuge.133
Two points can be made on paragraphs 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 of the National Guidelines. First,
the concessive nature of the words ‘may’ and ‘should’ is consistent with the voluntary
nature of the IMO Guidelines which is also reflected in the statement in paragraph 1.2.3
that the National Guidelines are voluntary.134 The voluntary nature of paragraph 1.4.2 is
also evident from the use of the words ‘should consider seeking a place of refuge’ as
compared to the wording in the 2003 version which uses the words ‘should seek a place
of refuge’.135 Second, the inclusion in paragraph 1.4.2 of safety of crew and passengers
indicates that the National Guidelines are designed to cover safety of life at sea.136 In
this they are different from the IMO Guidelines which specifically leave most instances
of safety of life at sea to be dealt with according to the International Convention on
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).137
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Paragraph 1.1 of the National Guidelines succinctly sets out the purposes of the
National Guidelines as being intended to protect assist maritime safety and protect the
environment. This is achieved by providing assistance in identifying places of refuge
where the emergency cannot be dealt with at sea and the process needed to access the
places of refuge.138 It also specifically links the National Guidelines to the IMO
Guidelines by stating that they ‘complement’ the IMO Guidelines.139 This is similar to
the statement in paragraph 1.2.2 that the National Guidelines are ‘complementary and
should

be

read

in

conjunction

with,

any

existing

applicable

state/NT

guidelines’.140Although this does not specifically import the IMO Guidelines into the
National Guidelines the use of the word ‘complement’ would indicate that the two
documents are to be read together. The same argument would apply to state guidelines.
Therefore it can be argued that anything in the IMO Guidelines or state guidelines that
are not in the National Guidelines, such as a definition for ‘ships in need of assistance’
in the IMO Guidelines, could be used in addressing an emergency covered by the
National Guidelines.
A more difficult situation could arise if there is a conflict between any two or more sets
of guidelines, as to which would take precedence. While the National Guidelines were
amended in May 2009 to ensure consistency with the IMO Guidelines141 and to a great
degree this has been achieved, there is still the possibility of a conflict and the use of the
word ‘complement’ tends to exacerbate the problem. The possibility of conflict is
addressed in relation to state or Northern Territory intervention legislation in paragraph
4.2.9 of the National Guidelines where it is stated that state and Northern Territory
legislation is to be ‘used wherever possible’, together with a default position in
situations where this is not possible.142
The National Guidelines apply in all Australian maritime jurisdictions where a place of
refuge is considered necessary by either the Commonwealth or state or Northern
Territory maritime agencies.143
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Paragraph 1.2.3 of the National Guidelines makes it clear that, consistently with the
IMO Guidelines, the application of the National Guidelines is voluntary, flexible and on
a case by case basis.144 This application is to be made consistently with international
law principles particularly ‘those relating to the balance of interests between a ship in
distress and Australia’s national interest’.145 The balance required to be applied under
international law principles is further explained in paragraph 1.5.5 of the National
Guidelines. It is acknowledged that there is no obligation for a State to provide a place
of refuge and in trying to reach a decision as to whether or not to grant access, four
principles are listed as factors to be balanced– the long standing humanitarian right to
seek access a place of refuge (but not a right to access per se); the obligation on
Australia to render assistance to a ship in distress; the right to refuse or grant access
subject to conditions; the right to protect the environment.146 These constitute the classic
formulation as to why the place of refuge problem exists and why a solution is
needed.147 As such they are well established principles.
Paragraph 1.2.3 also states that the National Guidelines ‘seek to enhance a cooperative
and consensus approach between parties’.148 This is clearly the case between the various
maritime authorities within Australia.149 What is less explicit is cooperation with other
parties such as salvors and other parties involved in salvage operations.
Paragraph 1.5.4 of the National Guidelines makes the statement that under Article 11 of
the International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention),150
‘Australia is obliged…when considering a request for a place of refuge, to take into
account the need for cooperation between salvors, other interested parties and public
151
authorities to ensure the efficient and successful performance of salvage operations’.

The position in Australia is not quite as clear cut as the statement would appear to be.
While Australia has ratified the Salvage Convention, the enabling legislation, the
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Navigation Act 1912,152 sets out in s 315 that certain articles of the Salvage Convention
have the force of law. Article 11 is not included.153 It follows therefore that Australia is
obligated at the international level to do nothing that would derogate from the operation
of Article 11 but domestically no individual is competent to bring action to force
compliance with international obligations that are not in some way the subject of
domestic law.154 However, under s 7 of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act
1990,155 AMSA is obliged to ‘perform its functions in a manner consistent with the
obligations of Australia under any agreement between Australia and another country’.156
The Salvage Convention would fall within this requirement as being an agreement
between Australia and another country. Accordingly, while Article 11 does not have the
force of law in Australia under the Navigation Act 1912, the effect of s 7 of the
Australian Maritime Safety Act 1990 means that in relation to an emergency for which
AMSA is responsible and where the National Guidelines are applied, AMSA is obliged
to apply Article 11.157
In practical terms, the wording of Article 11 is quite loose and the obligations imposed
under it are limited.158 In effect it makes the need for consultation with salvors, other
interested parties and public authorities part of the decision making process and does
not oblige the decision maker to consult or cooperate if it is considered that there is no
need to do so.159 As one of the solutions to a salvage operation is the provision of a
place of refuge, Article 11 does not oblige the decision maker to cooperate in or agree to
such an action if it is not deemed to be necessary.
Part 1.5 of the National Guidelines sets out the rationale for providing a place of refuge.
In noting the fact that there would be a reluctance for coastal States to accept damaged
or disabled ships and that any decision could involve political factors,160 the National
152
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Guidelines reflect the introductory provisions of the IMO Guidelines. So, too, is the
admonition that at times it would be more counter productive to leave a damaged ship at
sea than the grant access to a place of refuge.161 The National Guidelines then go further
than the IMO Guidelines by identifying five instances where a place of refuge should be
requested.162 These are to protect human life on the ship; to protect human life and
safety in the surrounding area; to protect the environment and coastal resources; to
protect economic and socio-economic infrastructure; and lastly to protect the ship and
cargo.163 While the list is not expressed to be in order of priority, it is indicative of the
various levels of concern implicit in the decision making process outlined in Article
3.11 of the IMO Guidelines.
Requests for Place of Refuge
Requests for a place of refuge can only be granted by either the state or Northern
Territory Government or the Commonwealth Government depending on where the
emergency has occurred.164 If within three nautical miles of the coast, the relevant state
or Territory government has authority to grant the request. Outside 3 nautical miles up
to and including the EEZ of Australia, the Commonwealth Government through AMSA
has the power to grant the request. If the place of refuge is within the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park, AMSA should consult with the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Authority.165 The relevant authority is identified in Appendix A to the Guidelines.166 At
any time, should the MERCOM consider that intervention is required in any maritime
zone, the MERCOM has the power to grant the request.167
Decision Making Process
The decision making process is generally consistent with the process in the IMO
Guidelines and the state Guidelines. Appendix B sets out the information which should
be provided with the request for place of refuge. This information is similar to that
listed in the state Guidelines.168 The IMO Guidelines do not provide a similar list but
161
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many of the items of information required by the National Guidelines would be needed
for assessment of the risks presented by the request for a place of refuge.169
Prior to making a decision on whether or not to grant a place of refuge, the National
Guidelines provide in paragraph 3.1.3 that an analysis should be made of the possibility
of dealing with the emergency at sea.170 The risk factors for such an analysis are set out
in Appendix C.171 If as a result of such analysis it is decided that the emergency cannot
be adequately dealt with at sea then the possibility of a place of refuge would need to be
examined using the same criteria and the criteria set out in Appendix D dealing with the
selection of a place of refuge.172
The identity of the decision maker is determined by the jurisdictional division set out
earlier.173 In reaching a decision, the decision maker should consult with other relevant
stakeholders including port authorities or other agencies likely to be affected by the
decision.174 Also in reaching a decision, the decision maker must take into account the
implications of refusing a place of refuge.175 Once the decision is made it is relayed to
the party requesting it and to the MERCOM if not the lead agency.176
While the process in the National Guidelines is more complicated than the IMO
Guidelines because of the federal nature of Australia, the criteria used and the ultimate
objectives of the risk analysis process are essentially the same.177
Management Issues
As a result of the federal nature of Australia and the potential for multiple jurisdictions,
the first part of Part 4 of the National Guidelines deals with the process where it is
necessary to transfer casualty coordination between jurisdictions.178 This may happen
for a number of reasons including lack of staff, skills or knowledge or other operational

169

Appendix 2 to the IMO Guidelines lists guidelines for the evaluation of risks. This would require
information on those risks to be provided beforehand.
170
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 3.1.3.
171
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 3.1.4.
172
National Guidelines 2009 paragraphs 3.1.5-3.1.6.
173
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 3.2.3.
174
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 3.2.5.
175
National Guidelines 2009 part 3.3.
176
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 3.2.8.
177
IMO Guidelines Annex paragraphs 3.12 -3.14.
178
National Guidelines 2009 paragraph 4.1.2.

225

pressures. This transfer may cover full accountability and responsibility or something
less such as delegation of particular responsibilities.179
The second part of Part 4 attempts to deal with issues of liability and compensation.
These issues are absent from the IMO Guidelines and their absence forms one of the
major problems with their effectiveness.180 However, the way the National Guidelines
deal with the issues fails to advance the issue in any meaningful way.
The major thrust of the provisions on liability and compensation concerns the
advisability of obtaining letters of indemnity and the way they should be negotiated.181
Paragraph 4.3.2 of the National Guidelines advises that such indemnities should address
costs, liability and compensation for all types of damage that could be caused by
permitting a ship in need of assistance to enter a place of refuge.182 Also paragraph 4.3.3
of the National Guidelines advises that in assessing an amount for any letter of
indemnity should take into account the fact that most of the international conventions
dealing with marine pollution have limitation provisions.183 No guidance is given as to
what to do should the potential damage, particularly environmental damage, exceed the
limitation amounts in the various Conventions. This leaves open the possibility that the
decision maker could require a guarantee covering unlimited costs, liability and
compensation before permitting the ship to enter.184 As indicated in the chapter four of
this thesis, this would be difficult if not impossible to obtain and the result would be that
the ships most in need of a place of refuge could be denied entry.185
As such, the liability and compensation provisions in the National Guidelines are
unhelpful at best and, in the same way as the IMO Guidelines, would need to be
clarified to avoid the possibility that failure to provide adequate security could result in
refusal of access.
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Incidents involving Places of Refuge
In spite of the length of the Australian coastline and the high dependence on shipping,
there have been few major oil spills in Australian waters.186 Of these only a few have
involved the question of places of refuge. Nevertheless, what incidents there have been
give some indication of how the various Australian jurisdictions deal with requests for
places of refuge, whether under guidelines or otherwise.
‘Daishowa Maru’
An early case involved the 59,296 tonne wood-chip carrier Daishowa Maru.

In

February 2002, it grounded during a severe storm in the anchorage off the port of Two
Fold Bay in southern New South Wales. After being salvaged, it was found that the hull
plating had been severely damaged and that repairs needed to be done in Japan.187
While being towed up the New South Wales coast it sought refuge in Jervis Bay to
effect some towing repairs. Initially access was granted by the Royal Australian Navy
but this was later withdrawn due to protests by local conservation groups. The next port,
Port Kembla, was unsuitable physically and ultimately towage repairs were effected in
Gladstone.188
The incident highlighted the effect of outside influence on decision making, an issue
that would occur again in later incidents. It also highlighted that not all ports are
suitable as places of refuge and that the appropriate place of refuge may be some
distance away from the incident.
‘Iron Baron’
The Iron Baron was a 37,557 dwt ore carrier built in 1985 and demise chartered to BHP
Transport Pty Limited. On 10 July 1995, it ran aground on a reef in the approaches to
the Tamar River in northern Tasmania. The ship had approximately 600 tonnes of oil in
186
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its tanks and after the grounding and ensuing salvage operations most of it had escaped
form the tanks.189 The ship was refloated but inspections disclosed major structural
damage to the hull. A request was made to the Launceston Port Authority for a place of
refuge. The request was refused for three main reasons – the fear that the ship would
sink in the Tamar River, the possibility of environmental damage190 and the inability to
obtain insurance.191 Prior to the discovery of the extent of the hull damage, access was
being considered subject to an indemnity in favour of Tasmania and the Launceston
Port Authority.192 An alternate place of refuge off Flinders Island was also refused.193
The ship was ordered by the Harbour Master to be removed from the port area and it
was removed and scuttled.194
Although there were no applicable guidelines, the subsequent enquiry into the incident
found that national guidelines based on the Queensland model should be drawn up.195 It
also suggested found that in some instances it could be more environmentally dangerous
to refuse a safe haven.196
The decision making process that ultimately resulted in a refusal of a safe haven
included consideration of environmental and operational issues as well as the possibility
of entry under an indemnity. In this the assessment was conducted in a manner not
dissimilar to the process later outlined in the National Guidelines and gives a good
indication of how such incidents would be dealt with now.
‘Eurydice’
In February 2004, an incident arose involving the Cypriot flagged oil tanker Eurydice
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carrying 85,000 tonnes of light crude oil which might have given an opportunity to test
the National Guidelines. While the ship did experience difficulties off Sydney Harbour
due to a 150 millimetre hairline crack in a cargo tank, it did not request a place of
refuge.197 Nevertheless, the Sydney Ports Corporation did make contingency plans in
the event that it did.198
Entry into Sydney Harbour was refused on the basis that the Harbour Master was not
certain whether or not the ship could transit Sydney Harbour without causing an
environmental or navigational hazard.199 In line with the spirit of the National
Guidelines, repairs were attempted at sea which ultimately proved successful and the
ship was permitted to enter port.200
One aspect of the conduct of the incident which extended over 6 days was the initial
requirement that the ship provide an indemnity far in excess of the limitation amount.201
Although this amount was reduced to a manageable amount,202 had refuge been
requested, the amount of the indemnity could have become a serious issue that might
have precluded access being granted.
Another aspect was that of political interference. Three days into the incident, it was
decided that the Minister for the Environment would assume control of the issue,
including the decision as to whether or not the ship would be permitted to enter Sydney
Harbour. This decision would be based on the fact that the ship had to be inspected at
sea and there must be no visible oil leaks.203
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The Eurydice incident highlighted a number of issues that give an indication of the
manner in which requests for place of refuge would be treated. The issue of indemnities
and more particularly the amount of the indemnities is an issue not peculiar to Australia.
As will be seen the requirement for an unlimited guarantee before access is granted is a
significant problem in other jurisdictions.
The issue of political interference is also a major issue. The Eurydice incident occurred
before the creation of the MERCOM position and the situation may have been different
had the MERCOM existed and taken a role in the matter. If this had taken place the
Minister for the Environment would have been unable to interfere in the salvage
operations.
Wunma
The interrelationship between State responsibility, the National Guidelines and the
MERCOM was examined in the incident concerning the ship Wunma in the Gulf of
Carpentaria on 6 and 7 February 2007.204
The Wunma was a fully laden ore carrying ship found itself in distress in a cyclone off
the coast of Queensland in the Gulf of Carpentaria. As a result of the cyclone the ship
was badly affected by water which caused power to be lost and communications to be
impaired. The crew was evacuated and the ship was abandoned. Salvage operations
began soon after.205 Since there was a risk of pollution, AMSA assumed the role of lead
combat agency under the National Plan.206 However, as there was a significant risk of
pollution and the ship was a Queensland registered ship, the Queensland authorities
continued to be consulted.207 A decision was made in consultation with the Queensland
authorities and the MERCOM to tow the ship to Weipa to effect repairs.208 As the storm
had abated and the ship was secure, it was considered that the ship was no longer in
distress and that accordingly the National Guidelines did not need to be used not the
powers of intervention under Queensland legislation.209 It was acknowledged that had
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there been continued risk to life, property or to the environment, the National
Guidelines would have been used and intervention powers invoked. In such
circumstances the MERCOM could also have intervened under Commonwealth
intervention legislation.210
The actions taken in the Wunma provide an illustration of when and how the National
Guidelines should be used, the role of the state authorities and ultimately, the right of
the MERCOM to intervene. It also clearly shows that before an analysis is done of the
need for a place of refuge and where the place of refuge is to be, the threshold question
of whether the ship is in fact in distress needs to be answered.
Assessment of the Australian Position on Places of Refuge
The Australian Government and the states and Northern Territory have laws which
explicitly or implicitly authorise the relevant authority to direct a ship to a place of
refuge in particular circumstances.
In relation to requests by ship masters for a place of refuge, Australia has, to a large
degree, followed the lead of the IMO in promulgating National Guidelines. The
National Guidelines reflect the IMO Guidelines in spirit and application. They are
voluntary and flexible and provide for a case by case analysis of both for the need for a
place of refuge and where the appropriate place of refuge should be. Any major
differences are necessary to take into account the constitutional arrangements within a
federal state.
In form the National Guidelines are significantly longer and more detailed than the IMO
Guidelines and the document tends to read like a policy paper rather than an operational
document. The main operational parts of the document are in the appendices where the
assessment criteria are listed. To be of optimum use by a master of a ship in distress or
by a port authority or maritime administration in a crisis, the document needs to be split
between the policy elements and the operational elements. In practical terms, while
there has been little application of the National Guidelines to date, recent incidents have
tended to show a consistency of approach between all jurisdictions.
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However, the recent incidents have also confirmed weaknesses in the National
Guidelines that are also present in the IMO Guidelines. This is particularly true of the
problems that flow from the voluntary nature of the National Guidelines, the potential
for outside interference and the difficulties that can flow from the absence of definitive
provisions on liability and compensation. This latter point can easily lead to ports
seeking unrealistic amounts of security before a ship will be allowed into a place of
refuge, as initially happened in the Eurydice.
The creation of the role of the MERCOM is a positive step to eliminate outside
interference in the decision making process. However, because of the federal nature of
Australia, the rights of the states and the Northern Territory had to be accommodated
with the result that it is not clear when the MERCOM can or will intervene to deal with
a specific incident.
The states and the Northern Territory can still play a major role in the question of places
of refuge and are still potentially subject to outside influence. In instances where the
MERCOM is involved, the powers of the MERCOM would exclude political
interference in the same was as the SOSREP does in the United Kingdom. However, the
MERCOM does not become involved in all pollution incidents and in practice much of
the responsibility remains with the states and Northern Territory. In these cases there is
still no protection from political interference. Ideally, to resolve this, the state decision
makers must be freed from political or other outside interference in the same way as the
MERCOM or the MERCOM’s responsibilities must be increased to include more
incidents now handled by the states and Northern Territory.
The nature of federal states can impose jurisdictional difficulties which require a high
degree of cooperation between the constituent parts.211 However, not all federations are
the same as Australia. This thesis will now turn to examine another federation, Canada,
to see how it deals with the same issues.
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2.

CANADA

Canada has a federal Westminster parliamentary system of government212 and consists
of a Federal Government, ten Provinces and three self governing Territories. It has an
extensive coastline bordering three oceans.213 It also has a long border with the United
States the eastern part of which includes the shores of major inland lakes and rivers,
particularly the St Lawrence.
Maritime Jurisdiction
The maritime boundary of the Provinces is the low water mark and any waterline on the
landward side of the low water mark. All waters on the seaward side of the boundary
together with its subsoil and minerals form part of Canada.214 The only exceptions are
that waters that formed part of the Province when it joined the Confederation continue
to be part of the Province,215 and waters control of which is granted to a province by
regulation under s 9 of the Oceans Act 1996.216 The Provinces have no jurisdiction to
deal with the granting of places of refuge, at least in relation to the ship while it is at
sea. As will be discussed below, the Provinces and municipalities may have some minor
part to play should the decision to grant or refuse a place of refuge affect their
environmental interests.
The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Limited217 held that the
control of marine pollution, including provincial waters, was found to be a matter of
concern for Canada as a whole particularly because of its extra provincial and
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international character and implications.218 On the basis of this decision, control of
marine pollution is a matter on which the Canadian Government has constitutional
power to legislate.219 As places of refuge is an aspect of such control this case is also a
ground for arguing that the Canadian Government has exclusive jurisdiction to issue
guidelines to deal with them.
Treatment of Places of Refuge - National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan
(PORCP)
A major review of Canada’s transportation system was conducted in 2003.220 Its
report221 highlighted, among other matters, the need for Canada to closely monitor and
contribute to the activities of international maritime bodies including the IMO

222

and

223

also to take steps to reduce or eliminate marine pollution.

As part of this process and after lengthy discussion, Canada introduced the National
Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP) on 3 July 2007.224 In form and substance
they closely follow the IMO Guidelines, which are expressly to be taken into account
and implemented.225
Introductory Provisions
The PORCP is designed to provide guidance on how a request for a place of refuge is to
be dealt with and to devise a risk management process to ensure a timely and efficient
outcome to such requests. It is also designed to provide a consistent manner of dealing
with such request in all Canadian waters.226 The PORCP is expressed to apply to
requests for a place of refuge in all Canadian waters whether in internal waters,
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territorial sea or EEZ. Additionally it applies to any ship with a destination within
Canadian waters.227 In line with the IMO Guidelines, the PORCP does not apply to
cases involving the safety of life at sea. It only applies once the safety of life has been
dealt with.228
Authority for Directing Ships
The PORCP sets out the effect of the legislation which grants powers to various
Ministers and other bodies to direct ships into a place of refuge.
The Canada Shipping Act 2001229 gives powers to direct ships to a place of refuge in
Parts 8 and 9230 which concern pollution prevention and response by the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans and Transport Canada respectively. One of the main enforcement
bodies, the Canadian Coast Guard, forms part of the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans.231 Both parts give powers to direct ships in situations of actual or potential
pollution. Under s 175(1) of the Canada Shipping Act 2001, a pollution prevention
officer may issue directions to any ship which he or she may reasonably believe to have
discharged or be about to discharge a pollutant into Canadian waters to go to a specified
place by a specified route and remain there for a reasonable period; to leave specified
waters; or to not enter Canadian waters. Similar powers are granted to the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans under s 180(1) of the Canada Shipping Act 2001 and to the
Minister for Transport under s 189(d) of the Canada Shipping Act 2001. The Canada
Shipping Act 2001, gives clear authority for either the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans
or the Minister for Transport (or their appointees) to direct ships to a place of refuge and
give statutory authority for the issue of guidelines to assist the decision making
processes.
Within port areas, the Canada Marine Act 1998232 gives powers to persons designated
by the appropriate port authority to direct ships which are polluting or in danger of
polluting the waters of the port. Under s 58(1)(d) these direction making powers include
227
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directions to leave a dock, berth or other port facility; to leave or refrain from entering
any area, or to proceed to or remain at a specified location. This includes powers to
direct ships to a place of refuge.
There is a potential conflict in authority in making decisions on directing ships under
the Canada Marine Act 1998 and the Canada Shipping Act 2001 between the Minister
of Transport, the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans, and designated officers. This is
recognized in PORCP which requires that all responsible authorities ‘make every effort
… to agree on a required course of action’.233
Responsibility for Decisions and Decision Making
The risk of conflict between various jurisdictions and interests is potentially greater in
the area of decision making under the PORCP. Under the PORCP, the responsibility for
making decision on granting a request for a place of refuge, the actual place of refuge
and any operational decisions falls to the Regional Director TC Marine Services.234 This
seemingly clear power is immediately undermined by the succeeding paragraphs.
The first requires the obtaining of approval in high risk situations of any Transport
Canada Crisis Management Structure and Crisis Management Team.235 More of a
potential problem is the next paragraph under which ‘decisions involving other
authorities with jurisdiction (i.e. port authority, local municipal authority) will be
subject to approval by the relevant authority’.236 ‘Other authorities with jurisdiction’
would include the Canadian Coast Guard and relevant port authorities which have
jurisdiction under the Canada Shipping Act 2001 and the Canada Marine Act 1998
respectively. Although not mentioned in the PORCP, in those small areas of waters that
form part of Provinces, such as the Georgia Strait, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Johnstone
Strait and Queen Charlotte Strait in British Columbia237 and the waters around the
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Confederation Bridge in Prince Edward Island,238 the Provincial authorities would also
have jurisdiction.239
The mandatory wording of the paragraph makes any decision by the Regional Manager
subject to the approval of other bodies including the Canadian Coast Guard, port
authorities and, in some instances, Provincial authorities. This inevitably means a high
level of cooperation and consultation must be undertaken before a decision can be
made. This need for cooperation in decision making not only between Transport Canada
and the Canadian Coast Guard but also other interested stakeholders is highlighted in
the statement that
every effort should be made by all involved to cooperate, work closely together, allow
for an open exchange of information and build consensus in the decision making
240
process.

In Annex 2 Part 1 of the PORCP there is a list of 33 potential risk assessment team
members and stakeholders. While not all of the listed parties would necessarily be
relevant to every request for refuge, when combined with Transport Canada and the
Canadian Coast Guard, the potential for conflicting positions and consequent delay in
making decisions is magnified.
To an extent, this risk is addressed in the statement ‘where consensus cannot be reached,
the best decision will be made by TC as the lead agency’.241 However, it is not clear
whether the ‘best decision’ is the final decision in the way the MERCOM in Australia
or the SOSREP in the United Kingdom has the ultimate power to direct a ship into a
place of refuge where there a lack of consensus. It would appear not to be since the
decision of Transport Canada must still be made ‘in conjunction with other authorities
with jurisdiction’.242
To encourage cooperation, the Regional managers of Transport Canada are required to
bring to the attention of all stakeholders including provincial authorities, port
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authorities, municipal authorities, coastal communities and First Nations, the
importance of places of refuge and the implications for all the interests of the provisions
of the PORCP and regional arrangements made under it.243 The objective is to ensure
that there is a high degree of local acceptance of the measures that may have to be taken
in the event of a place of refuge being sought within their jurisdiction or community.244
This is particularly important in instances where there is little time to consult before a
decision is made.245
The possibility of a request being made as a matter of emergency is addressed in a
number of places in the PORCP. In one place it states that ‘in urgent situations, the
PORCP will be followed to the extent possible given the time available for decision
making’.246 Further, under ‘Decision Making’, there is a requirement that ‘the decisions
making process should be followed to the extent possible under the circumstances’.247 It
then states:
Recognising that the situation at sea could deteriorate rapidly with time, a decision
should be made as quickly as possible and the situation closely monitored until it is
adequately resolved. However, a place of refuge incident will not transpire at such a rate
248
that a collaborative decision making process of some kind cannot be followed.

Whether or not this hope of sufficient time can be realised has yet to be tested but it has
been clearly recognised that there will inevitably be cases where the luxury of time is
not available. This point is emphasised by the observation that:
A fundamental matter to understand is that there may not be sufficient time to garner
‘multi-stakeholder’ input and consensus on a place of refuge decision. A vessel may
find its own natural place of refuge or require immediate assistance in a number of
hours. Pre-planning and pre-consultations are largely to facilitate a practicable and
249
equitable solution where and when there is time.

As part of the pre-planning part for a place of refuge situation, each Regional Manager
is to collect information on the coastal areas in the region with a view of using this
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information to identify possible places of refuge in a particular incident. Pre-designation
of places of refuge is not recommended as each incident is different.250 In not predesignating places of refuge, the PORCP is in line with the views of the IMO251 and a
number of maritime jurisdictions including Australia, the United States and the United
Kingdom, but not the European Union.
The value of the pre-consultation is that, in incidents where time is not available for full
consultation before a place of refuge decision is made, the relevant stakeholders are
aware of the process and the necessity for granting a place of refuge and so are more
likely to accept the decision and its potential consequences.252
Decision Making Process
The actual decision making process set out in the PORCP is similar to Part 3 of the IMO
Guidelines in that it sets out the factors that need to be taken into account when dealing
with a request for a place of refuge. However, the PORCP goes further in its decision
making process than the IMO Guidelines by introducing a risk matrix. The PORCP is
essentially a step-by-step process which results in a risk matrix for the specific ship and
incident being produced. This matrix is based on information collected about the reason
for the request, data about the ship seeking refuge, current status of the ship and
physical conditions.253 The various options are then identified and assessed and
evaluated. The information thereby obtained is assessed according to the possible
consequences and risks associated with the grant or refusal of refuge. On the basis of
this assessment and evaluation a decision is made to grant or refuse access. Various
Annexes outline the information required for each of the steps.
At the same time as the information is being assessed, potential places of refuge are
identified based on the information previously obtained by the Regional Manager and

250

PORCP 9.
MSC, 77th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-seventh Session MSC
77/26 dated 10 June 2003 paragraph 8.10.4.
252
EnviroEmerg Consulting Services, Major Marine Vessel Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in
British Columbia July 2008, 135 <http:.//www.georgiastrait.org/files/LOS_marine_vessels_ report.pdf>.
253
PORCP 10.
251

239

the specific requirements of the particular ship in question.254 Annex 3 lists the criteria
to be used to select a suitable place of refuge.255
The actual decision on granting a place of refuge is based essentially on where the risk
falls in the nine levels of the matrix taking into account all the information received.256
The basic rule is that wherever possible access should be granted but this is dependent
on the risk of damage to the population, property and environment of the place of refuge
as well as, in catastrophic cases, long term impact and damage to the national
economy.257 If the risk falls within levels 1-3, the risk is low and in such cases access
should be granted. Also where the risk is higher than 3 but action can be taken to taken
to reduce the risk or where the risk is lower than it would be if the ship was left at sea,
access should also be granted.258 Where the risk is too high, access must be refused
together with directions on actions that are required to be taken and reasons for the
refusal are to be given to the ship.259 All assistance is then to be given at sea to avoid
any damage to the environment which may ensue.260
International Arrangements With the United States
Although marine pollution and places of refuge policy is a federal concern with little
scope for the Provinces to intervene, Canada does have extensive maritime borders with
the United States along the Pacific Ocean, the Great Lakes, the Atlantic Ocean and the
Arctic Ocean. In situations where pollution and places of refuge requirements cross
national borders, it is necessary for arrangements for pollution control and dealing with
cross border requests for places of refuge to be put in place.
The 2003 Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP)261 is
designed to provide a coordinated response to existing national oil spill plans where the
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waters are contiguous to both countries.262 The JCP once activated provides for joint
responsibility of the Canadian Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard when
there is a cross boundary spill, and for each organisation to support the other where the
spill is in contiguous waters but still within one jurisdiction.263 In national waters, the
relevant national plan applies.264
The JCP divides the contiguous marine border into five zones- CANUSLANT for the
Atlantic coast; CANUSLAK for the Great Lakes; CANUSPAC for the Pacific Coast;
CANUSDIX for the Dixon Entrance between British Columbia and Alaska; and
CANUSNORTH for the Beaufort Sea.265 Under the JCP the Canadian Coast Guard
Regional Directors and the United States Coast Guard District Commanders for the
relevant zone are to develop response plans for the contiguous waters in their zones.266
There are currently plans promulgated for all zones.267
Although all plans are operational documents, the revised draft of the CANUSLANT
plan contains an annex dealing with places of refuge.268 It details that where either
country considers the granting of a request for a place of refuge to be an appropriate
response for both countries, that the Coast Guards of both countries will jointly decide
where the most appropriate place of refuge is and that this place could be in either
jurisdiction. Once the selection is made the places of refuge policy of that jurisdiction
will apply.269
Places of refuge in joint waters have been considered in other zones by other joint
governmental bodies.270 On the Pacific seaboard, the Pacific States/British Columbia
262
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Oil Spill Task Force regularly reviews oil spill response in the States of Alaska,
Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii and the Province of British Columbia.271 This
includes the areas of joint waters in by the CANUSPAC and CANUSDIX zones.272 This
Task force was set up in 1989 after the Nestucca and Exxon Valdez oil spills.273 In 2003
it established a Places of Refuge Project Workgroup as a result of the Prestige sinking
in 2002. It recognised that a similar event could occur on the Pacific coast and that a
place of refuge plan would be necessary.274 In light of the IMO Guidelines published in
2003, the Group produced an Area Plan Annex for Places of Refuge in December
2004.275 These were closely based on the IMO Guidelines and were expressed to
‘operationalize’ them.276 The document addresses two points: the collection and
collation of information on potential places of refuge and procedures to expedite a
decision on a request for a place of refuge.277 As with the IMO Guidelines the issues of
liability and compensation were not addressed.278 The Annex subsequently formed the
basis for the British Columbia Department of Environment Guideline and was taken
into account in the formulation of the PORCP.279
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Assessment of the Canadian Position on Places of Refuge
The Canadian position on places of refuge is to adopt, as far as possible, the IMO
Guidelines.280 The PORCP also goes much further than the IMO Guidelines by
introducing the principles of risk management and decisions based on a risk matrix into
the process. However, the strict application of risk management principles and
processes may not be the most appropriate way to deal with a situation where the
decision to grant or refuse refuge can often be a matter of urgency. While the PORCP
does accept this possibility, there is often little time to apply the principles and to
consult with all interested parties and as such the imposition of risk management
requirements and a risk matrix could be counterproductive to the rapid, informed
decision that must be made. With the luxury of time, application of the risk
management principles set out in the PORCP would likely result in an unimpeachable
decision but, more likely, the decision will be an ‘agony of the moment’ choice.281
While planning and consultation with local authorities and bodies would be of benefit in
making this decision, the inflexible, prescriptive application of risk management
requirements would likely hinder this process.
Furthermore, any clinical application of the matrix and the directions that flow from it
could have the effect of removing flexibility from the decision making process. For
example, a minor, highly probable accident would result in a risk factor of 5/9,282
putting it in the middle of the medium range. This scenario is quite possible for a
situation where pollution has occurred or is likely to occur with inevitable risk of at
least minor property or environmental damage. By putting this scenario into the medium
category, there is an increased likelihood that the risk of minor damage to the
environment could result in a ship being refused access even if such damage could be
contained and minimised in the place of refuge and a much larger risk of environmental
damage flowing from the refusal being avoided. Should the risk be deemed significant,
i.e. the potential damage being more significant but still only short term, the risk factor
rises to 7/9 which is in the high risk category.283 In view of the fact that a request for
refuge must be denied (i.e. no discretion) where the risk to the place of refuge is too
280
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great,284 such a scenario could potentially result in refuge being denied. The Prestige
could arguably have fallen within this the significant category and had it requested a
place of refuge in Canada, under the PORCP the decision may well have been the same
as that made by Spain.
The PORCP is written as a risk management tool to provide decision makers with
assistance in reaching a balanced assessment of risks to the ship in need of refuge and
the risks to the place of refuge.285 The result however is a document which, wittingly or
unwittingly, is biased more towards the protection of Canadian interests than the
surrounding environment as a whole. The decision makers are to take into account all
relevant factors, including risks relating to the ship in various scenarios, but the ultimate
decision is made with the use of a matrix which links the probability of an accident, i.e.
oil spill or ship sinking, with the severity of the consequences to the place of refuge and
the regional and national economy.286 This approach fails to appreciate that the
objective of a place of refuge policy should be not solely to protect the place of refuge
itself but to provide a process whereby the risk to the regional and international
environment is minimised. This point can be summed up:
The ports that could serve as PORs probably favor the vessel leaving the area, and are
willing to risk regional pollution to avoid the problems raised if a POR request is
granted. This is exactly what happened in the Castor and Prestige cases. The essence of
this problem is that coastal states are willing to risk large disasters for everyone to avoid
287
a smaller but certain problem for themselves.

The inflexible, place of refuge-centric risk assessment present in the PORCP could
result in a failure to appreciate the wider ramifications of a refusal of refuge. The
PORCP gives no guidance as to what the ship which is assessed as being too great a risk
can do once it has been compulsorily refused a place of refuge. All that it states is that
‘all possible assistance must be offered to the ship offshore so as to prevent and control
any environmental damage that may or will occur’.288 A more balanced and less
inflexible approach between Canadian interests and the interests of the ship and the
wider environment could reduce the risk of a repeat of the Prestige in Canadian waters.
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The decision making process is itself unwieldy with the consequent potential for delay.
While the actual decision maker is identified as the Regional Director of Transport
Canada Marine Safety,289 the consultation process set out in the PORCP and the number
of authorities with legal jurisdiction to direct ships is extensive. Additionally, Canada’s
international boundaries could also mean that consultation with its neighbours could be
necessary in the event of cross boundary incidents. While Canada does not have
constitutional problems in relation to the powers of the Provinces, the decision maker
does have to deal with and consult with potentially dozens of parties each with its own
policies and objectives. The PORCP acknowledges this possibility but provides no
solution save that ‘every effort must be made for the responsible authorities to agree on
a required course of action’.290
The need for a single decision maker along the lines of the SOSREP may be appropriate
even at the risk of offending local interests. It has been commented that:
There is also a need to recognize that there should be a ‘balance’ between having a
unilateral decision by a federal representative or by a group of government
‘bureaucrats’ that do not have a vested interest in the coastal communities potentially
291
affected.

It has nevertheless been recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada that the control of
marine pollution is a matter of national concern.292 The multiplicity of stakeholders and
bodies with jurisdictional competence to direct ships can create a situation where a
failure to address an emergency urgently can result in the creation of a significantly
worse situation. The PORCP accepts that ‘it is unlikely that one single option will be
acceptable to everyone’293 and in light of this ‘involved stakeholders are to work
towards the best operational decision possible’.294 The recognition of this situation, even
after the application of the risk management and consultative processes in the PORCP,
would undermine any argument that a decision made by a ‘federal representative or
group of bureaucrats’ is unacceptable to local communities. Provided local communities
are properly involved with contingency planning and are kept advised by the Regional
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Manager of TC Marine Safety, as is required by the PORCP,295 the implementation of a
SOSREP system in Canada should not result in local communities or other stakeholders
from being disenfranchised in the process and would ensure that an urgent decision can
be made when the circumstances require.
In summary, the PORCP represents an attempt to provide a risk management based
decision making model using the factors outlined in the IMO Guidelines. However, in
doing so it has created the potential to make the process inflexible. It then overloads the
system by introducing significant requirements for consultation before decisions can be
made. A less complex and prescriptive decision making process with the possibility of
the creation of a SOSREP type of role could make the Canadian Guidelines more
appropriate for situations where urgent decisions are required. This operation of the
SOSREP role in the United Kingdom will now be examined.

3.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

As a unitary State296 the United Kingdom has the constitutional power to legislate for
protection of the environment for the whole country, although as a member state of the
European Union, the United Kingdom is also subject to directives and legislation of the
European Commission and Parliament.
The waters around the United Kingdom, particularly around the southern part of the
North Sea and the English Channel are some of the busiest areas of shipping activity in
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world.297 The United Kingdom has been subjected to some of the world’s most
damaging pollution incidents including the Torrey Canyon in 1967, the Braer in 1993
and the Sea Empress in 1996.298 The latter two cases were instrumental in bringing
about the Inquiries by Lord Donaldson and subsequent changes to the way in which
major marine pollution incidents are dealt with.299
The United Kingdom directly applies the IMO Guidelines.300 The most important
feature of the United Kingdom position is the command and control provisions under
which Secretary of State’s Representative for Marine Salvage and Intervention
(SOSREP) is the sole decision maker for requests for a place of refuge by a ship in need
of assistance and for the choice of a place of refuge if access to such a place is the
appropriate course of action.301 The incident in January 2007 involving the MSC Napoli,
which will be examined later in this chapter, is an example of the SOSREP’s actions in
such a situation.
The United Kingdom is also a party to regional arrangements designed to address cross
border aspects of places of refuge and the requirements of the International Convention
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990 (OPRC)302 to which
the United Kingdom is a party. These arrangements include the Bonn Agreement303
dealing with pollution incidents in the North Sea under which lies the Mancheplan304
between the United Kingdom and France which covers incidents in the English Channel
and which was invoked in the MSC Napoli incident, and the NORBRIT Agreement with
Norway.305
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Legislation
In ports, powers of direction are granted to harbour masters under the Harbours, Docks
and Piers Clauses Act, 1847306 and the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985.307 The legislative
basis for dealing with places of refuge lies in the intervention powers in the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995,308 as amended by the Maritime Security Act 1997309 and the Marine
Safety Act 2003.310
Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847
Section 52 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847311 sets out the powers
of a harbour master in relation to ships generally. The section provides that a harbour
master may issue directions concerning the time and manner of entry into, departure
from and activities within a port. Under s 57312 the harbour master may also direct that
an unserviceable ship be removed from the port to another place and, under s 58,313 can
remove the ship should the owner fail to do so. These sections give a harbour master the
unfettered power, by the issue of directions, to refuse or permit access, with or without
conditions, to a ship in distress or in need of assistance or to direct its removal from the
port. However, as discussed below, where the Secretary of State issues a direction under
Schedule 3A of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995,314 to grant access to a ship in distress,
such direction overrules the powers of the harbour master to refuse access.315
Dangerous Vessels Act 1985
In addition to the powers contained in the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act,
1847,316 the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985317 gives further powers in relation to
dangerous ships.
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Under s 1 of the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985, the harbour master may give directions to
refuse entry into port or the removal of a ship from the port if the ship presents a ‘grave
and imminent danger to the safety of any person or property’318 or a ‘grave and
imminent risk that the vessel may, by sinking or foundering in the harbour, prevent or
seriously prejudice the use of the harbour by other vessels’.319 In assessing whether or
not to issue the direction the harbour master must have regard to the safety of persons or
ships.320 A ship in distress or in need of assistance could fall within the definition of a
‘dangerous vessel’ and could be refused entry into a port by the harbour master under
this section.321
The issue of directions under s 1 of the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985 can be overruled by
the SOSREP under s 3(1) of the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985. The SOSREP can direct
that a ship can enter a port or remain in the port despite a harbour master’s direction,
which then ceases to have effect.322 Under s 3 (2), the harbour master is bound to
comply with and give effect to the direction of the SOSREP.323
The powers of the SOSREP under s 3 could include the power to direct that a ship in
distress be given a place of refuge in a particular port even against the wishes of the
harbour master.324
As under the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847, these powers of the
SOSREP to overrule directions and decisions on places of refuge are greatly augmented
by the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (as amended), particularly by Schedule 3A inserted
by the Marine Safety Act 2003. Schedule 2 of the Marine Safety Act inserts a new s 6A
into the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985 under which any direction given by a harbour
master under s 1 of the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985 will be of no effect if it is
inconsistent with the powers of the SOSREP under Schedule 3A of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995.325
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Merchant Shipping Act 1995
As a result of two major reviews conducted by Lord Donaldson in 1993326 and 1996327
which flowed from the groundings of the Braer in the Shetland Islands and the Sea
Empress in Milford Haven respectively, substantial changes were made to the laws
relating to oil pollution in United Kingdom waters.328 It was the second report that made
substantial critical comments concerning deficiencies in the command and control
structures in shipping and pollution emergencies.329
Prior to the second report, the existing legislation on shipping casualties was ss 137 141 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.330 Section 137 provided that in the event of an
accident occurring on or to the ship which in the opinion of the Secretary of State for
Transport will or may cause substantial pollution to United Kingdom or its waters, the
Secretary of State could issue directions to the master, owner or salvor of the ship
requiring:
(a) that the ship is to be, or is not to be, moved, or is to be moved to a specified place, or
is to be removed from a specified area or locality; or
(b) that the ship is not to be moved to a specified place or area, or over a specified route;
or
(c) that any oil or other cargo is to be, or is not to be, unloaded or discharged; or
331

(d) that specified salvage measures are to be, or are not to be, taken.

Directions under s 137 applied to all ships while in United Kingdom waters and to all
United Kingdom ships332 wherever situated. However, s 141(1) did make provision for
directions to apply to non-United Kingdom ships while outside United Kingdom
waters.333
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The Maritime Security Act, 1997334 introduced a further power to deal with ships in
distress by inserting ss 100A-100G into the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.335
Section 100A granted the Secretary of State the power to issue a direction to establish
temporary exclusion zones where a ship in United Kingdom waters is wrecked,
damaged or in distress and threatens significant pollution or damage to persons or
property.336 The Secretary of State is empowered to establish these temporary zones
where doing so would prevent or reduce the pollution or damage. On the issue of such a
direction it is an offence under s 100B for a ship to enter or remain in the temporary
exclusion zone except with the consent of the Secretary of State.337
Section 100C granted the Secretary of State the power to issue directions to an owner or
master of a ship to move that ship from or to a place specified in the direction. These
directions may be given to prevent or reduce the risk to the safety of the ship or its crew
or other ships, crew or property or to prevent or reduce the risk of pollution in the
United Kingdom or in United Kingdom waters.338
A further amendment was made to s 137 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 by
including pilots, harbour masters and harbour authorities in the class of persons to
whom a direction under the section can be given.339
The Marine Safety Act 2003340 consolidated and enlarged the direction making powers
in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 by repealing ss 137-141 (dealing with pollution
directions) and ss 100C-100E (dealing with movement of ships)341 and inserting a new
Schedule 3A.342
Under Schedule 3A, directions can be given to persons in control of a ship and to
persons in control of land where in the opinion of the Secretary of State an accident has
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occurred to or in the ship which has created a risk to safety of the ship or a risk of
pollution and a direction is needed to remove or reduce the risk.343
In relation to ships, directions can be given to the owner, person in possession, master,
pilot, salvor (and agent) and harbour master or harbour authority.344 As was the case
under the repealed s 137, directions may be given to United Kingdom ships and ships in
United Kingdom waters345 but can only be given to non-United Kingdom ships outside
United Kingdom waters by authority of an Order in Council.346 The directions include
requiring a person to move a ship to a specified place or over a specified route.347 The
last category of persons to whom a direction can be given is important where the
Secretary of State directs a ship in distress to move to waters controlled by the harbour
master or harbour authority and that party objects.348 The effect of the direction is to
overrule the authority of the harbour master or authority.349
The power to give directions to persons on land includes requiring the owners of such
facilities as wharves and dry docks to make their facilities available to ships covered by
the directions.350 This again overcomes any objections the facility owner may have to
accepting a ship in distress and in need of repair which has been directed to go to the
facility by the Secretary of State.351
Other directions can be made by the Secretary of State under paragraph 3 of Schedule
3A of the Marine Safety Act 2003 where such a direction is required to secure the safety
of a ship, other ships, persons or property or to prevent or minimise pollution.352 Such
directions can include requiring the movement of a ship to or from a place in United
Kingdom waters, movement by a specific route or removal of the ship from United
Kingdom waters.
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Command and Control
The legislative basis for dealing with ships in distress is well established in the
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (as amended) and vests in the Secretary of State for
Transport wide powers to issue directions compelling the various parties involved in the
implementation of a place of refuge decision to take action.353
One of the main recommendations of Lord Donaldson’s second report was that ‘the
involvement of Ministers in operational decisions is not a practicable option’ and that a
single person independent of the Minister be appointed to make such decisions.354 As a
result of that recommendation the post of SOSREP was established in October 1999.355
The powers of the Secretary of State for Transport under the legislation were delegated
to the SOSREP. Additionally, the powers of the Department for Energy and Climate
Change356 in relation to fixed platforms were delegated to the SOSREP in July 2002.357
The role of the SOSREP has been described as:
On behalf of the Secretary of State for the Department of Transport (DfT) he is tasked
to oversee, control and if necessary to intervene and exercise ‘ultimate control and
command’ acting in the overriding interest of the United Kingdom in salvage operations
within UK waters involving vessels or fixed platforms where there is a significant risk
358
of pollution.

All incidents will necessarily involve the intervention of the SOSREP. Under Schedule
3A of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, the SOSREP can issue directions only where
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an accident has occurred to or in the ship which has created a risk to safety of the ship
or a risk of pollution and a direction is needed to remove or reduce the risk.359 Also,
under s 100A of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, the SOSREP can only set up a
temporary exclusion zone where a ship in United Kingdom waters is wrecked, damaged
or in distress and threatens significant pollution or damage to persons or property.360
While the SOSREP exercises ultimate control and command in any situation where
there is a risk of pollution, there is no obligation to intervene unless the risk is
significant.361
The first line of control in a pollution incident in a port, including the issue of directions
on access to a ship in distress, is either the relevant harbour master or harbour
authority.362 Where the incident occurs outside the limits of a port the Maritime and
Coastguard Authority (MCA) is the relevant authority.363 In the first instance, control of
a pollution incident including any request for a place of refuge is exercised by the
relevant authority.364 The ‘trigger point’ for the SOSREP is where the threat of pollution
to UK waters and coastline becomes ‘significant’.365 In such a case, the SOSREP can
intervene, and, if this occurs, can issue directions which overrule any directions
previously issued.366 Once control is assumed, all powers to deal with the incident vest
in the SOSREP who has the sole authority to make decisions on all aspects of the
incident, including access to places of refuge for ships in distress.367
In relation to places of refuge, the SOSREP has wide ranging powers under the
legislation including the authority to direct ships to proceed to a specified place by a
particular route, even if this against the decision of the harbour master or port
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authority;368 to refuse access to a place of refuge; to require a ship (other than a UK
ship) to leave United Kingdom waters;369 to direct owners of land based facilities to
grant access to a ship in distress and in need of repair;370 and to set up a temporary
exclusion zone.371 Also, in some rare circumstances, the SOSREP can even take
command of the operation and take any actions considered necessary if it is considered
that the party undertaking the operation is not achieving the desired result or refuses to
comply with directions.372 While any appropriate advice can be sought, the ultimate
control of all matters concerning the incident is with the SOSREP.373
The decision making process is not specified, each request is treated on a case-by-case
basis and in practice both the MCA and the SOSREP apply the IMO Guidelines.374 In
paragraph G.11 of the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping
and Offshore Installations, reference is made to the IMO Guidelines as providing
further information and guidance.375
In common with most jurisdictions that apply the IMO Guidelines, the SOSREP and
MCA do not preselect potential places of refuge.376 In a similar way to the IMO
Guidelines on selection of places of refuge, each request is treated separately and the
most appropriate place of refuge is selected on the basis of, among other considerations,
the degree of shelter provided, absence of navigational hazards, availability of
appropriate infrastructure and facilities to deal with the specific case, the type of cargo
and any threat posed by it, and, in the event of the need to beach the ship, the presence
of gently sloping, soft sand beaches.377 Any place may be an appropriate place of refuge
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and the MCA/SOSREP maintains a list of approximately 800 potential places which
includes not only ports, harbours and anchorages but also bays, inlets, rivers and even
environmentally sensitive areas which can be used if the risk is minimal.378
One matter that is omitted from the IMO Guidelines and has formed the basis of
criticism of the IMO Guidelines is addressed in the United Kingdom legislation. This is
the issue of expenses. Since the SOSREP has the unquestioned ability to issue wideranging directions which must be complied with, it is appropriate that expenses incurred
by parties in complying with such directions be repaid. Under paragraph 15 of Schedule
3A to the Marine Safety Act 2003, any expense incurred by any person in complying
with the SOSREP’s directions can recover those expenses from the owner of the ship
benefitted.379 The SOSREP can also recover expenses and can also reimburse other
parties and recover that amount from the ship owner.380 If however, the action the
subject of the direction was unreasonable and caused unjustified loss or damage, those
parties suffering the damage are entitled, under paragraph 14 of Schedule 3A to the
Marine Safety Act 2003, to recover damages from the Secretary of State.381
One aspect that is missing from the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 is a provision
providing responder immunity for parties complying with directions.382 This immunity
would be particularly relevant in the United Kingdom context where private land
owners, facility owners, such as dry dock operators, or authorities of privatised ports are
obligated to assume risks in relation to ships in distress that they would normally not
accept. That this is a potential problem is the shown by the fact that, according to the
SOSREP, harbour masters are ‘pleased when the SOSREP intervenes: the decisions are
taken out of their hands.’383
It is also not entirely clear what is encompassed by ‘expenses’. A concern of some
private port operators and facility operators could be loss of profit in having to refuse
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other contracts to comply with the directions of the SOSREP to accommodate a ship in
distress. In the case of the Dole America, this was the basis of the refusal of the dry
dock owner to permit use of the dock since it would have interfered with a major ship
refurbishment.384 Schedule 3A of the Marine Safety Act 2003 now overcomes this right
of refusal if a direction is given by the SOSREP,385 but it remains a question as to
whether in such a case, the dry dock owner would receive compensation for the loss of
the ship refurbishment contract or merely the actual expenses of complying with the
direction.
International Arrangements
Although the United Kingdom has no physical boundaries with other States, except for
the boundary between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, it is adjacent to a
number of areas of water the jurisdiction for which is divided between the United
Kingdom and other States. For these areas, the United Kingdom has entered into
bilateral and multilateral agreements to deal with pollution incidents including requests
for places of refuge. These agreements include the Bonn Agreement386 covering the
North Sea, and two agreements on joint responsibility within the Bonn Agreement - the
Mancheplan387 with France388 covering incidents in the English Channel and the
NORBRIT Agreement with Norway.
The Mancheplan concentrates mainly on search and rescue responsibilities and
countering pollution.389 No specific mention is made of places of refuge. However, as
will be seen later, in the case of the MSC Napoli, the Mancheplan was invoked and
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responsibility for dealing with the incident, including the provision of a place of refuge,
was assumed by the SOSREP.390
In the Bonn Agreement Counter Pollution Manual, Chapter 27 specifically deals with
places of refuge.391 This was written in 1983 and so predates the IMO Guidelines. It was
used as one of the bases for the formulation of the IMO Guidelines.392 As a signatory to
the Bonn Agreement, the United Kingdom, through the MCA and the SOSREP, is
obligated to apply the risk assessment approach set out in Chapter 27.393 The approach
taken in the Bonn Agreement to assessing whether or not to grant a request for a place of
refuge is consistent with the IMO Guidelines and the same system of risk analysis is set
out in Chapter 27.394 While not totally identical in terms, the main criteria to be used are
consistent with those laid down in the IMO Guidelines.395 In some respects, such as the
information required to be given by the ship,396 it is more detailed than the IMO
Guidelines.
Incidents involving Places of Refuge
The United Kingdom has a strong record of permitting access to ships in distress.397 It is
government policy that the provision of a place of refuge is an obligation and is to be
granted wherever possible.398 Even where there is a grave risk of pollution damage
access has been granted since this was considered to be the best course.399 One such
case in November 2002 involved the M/T Magnitude which was carrying 90,000 tonnes
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of heavy fuel oil and while waiting entry into port began to lose oil through a crack in
the side of the ship.400 A request for refuge in Milford Haven was made to enable
transhipment which was granted despite the risk of pollution damage, as this was
deemed by the SOSREP to be the best environmental solution.401 The M/T Magnitude
case was all the more remarkable as it occurred only 6 days after the sinking of the
Prestige in November 2002 and the port involved was Milford Haven which in 1996
had been subjected to a 72,000 tonne oil spill from the Sea Empress.402
The most recent major places of refuge case in which the SOSREP was involved, was
that of the MSC Napoli. As indicated earlier this also involved the activation of the
Mancheplan. This case involved a fully laden container ship which on 18 January 2007
encountered a catastrophic hull failure in the English Channel and requested a place of
refuge. Under the Mancheplan, the French and UK authorities concluded that although
the ship was in the French zone of responsibility, Portland in the south of England was
the better place of refuge and the SOSREP took over control. En route to Portland the
ship encountered more difficulties and was in danger of breaking up and polluting the
English Channel. The SOSREP made the decision to beach the ship in Lyme Bay in
Dorset to minimise the threat of pollution and this occurred on 20 January. Over the
next six months the bunker fuel and cargo were removed and the ship was subsequently
broken up and removed.403 One point of importance is that, although the SOSREP
consulted with local interest groups in the Lyme Bay area404 and despite environmental
and media opposition, the conclusion was nevertheless that the best way of avoiding
400
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major pollution was to beach the ship and the SOSREP was able to make this happen
immediately.405
Assessment of the United Kingdom Position on Places of Refuge.
The position of the United Kingdom in relation to places of refuge is fairly unique. This
flows from the presence of an independent officer able to make swift unchallengeable
decisions without undue interference from external sources has been described as ‘a
system that works’.406 The ability of the SOSREP to make swift decisions and to make
changes with minimal delay was described in the report on the MSC Napoli as ‘a
complete vindication of the SOSREP’s role. The SOSREP function was created with
precisely this type of emergency in mind.’407 The International Chamber of Shipping
also supported the SOSREP’s independent authority,408 a view agreed with by the
European Commission which stated that it
welcomes the effectiveness of the action taken by the UK authorities to assist the MSC
Napoli, which was based on the independent decisions taken following an objective
409
analysis of the situation, making it possible to avoid a major disaster.

The view of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) is just as clear:
…the ship is at the mercy of the tides and weather, swift decisions are needed and the
last thing that is required is a huge committee of all those interests arguing for hours
over the right strategy as the situation aboard the ship deteriorates…But he [SOSREP]
is the one who is in charge of an emergency response to a serious marine incident, and it
is his decision that will count…Instead of doubts about who is in charge, there is now a
clear line of responsibility. And in a large number of incidents of all kinds since the
SOSREP was first appointed in 1999, it has proved a highly successful system…The
important thing is that there is somebody actually in charge and that there will be no
jurisdictional disputes as to whether somebody has authority to require something to be
done…410
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While the SOSREP does as a matter of course consult with interested persons and
organisations, the ultimate decision cannot be determined by those external bodies. The
independent decision making role of the SOSREP also overcomes one of the identified
weaknesses of the IMO Guidelines, namely, the risk of political and other influence on
decisions. To a degree, political views can play a part in that overall government policy
in the United Kingdom may change from that of viewing the granting of refuge as an
obligation to be granted whenever possible. However, even in this case, the SOSREP, as
an independent decision maker, cannot be directed to take a particular decision and
decisions made by the SOSREP can only be make subject to ex post facto review by the
Secretary of State for Transport and, ultimately, Parliament.411
The role of the SOSREP as an independent decision maker means that in theory the
SOSREP is not to apply the IMO Guidelines, although the fact that the United Kingdom
is a signatory to the Bonn Agreement would require at least compliance with the
provisions of Chapter 27. Nevertheless, in practice the SOSREP and the MCA do apply
the IMO Guidelines if only for the practical reason that under paragraph14 of Schedule
3A to the Marine Safety Act 2003, compensation is payable where directions given
under the Schedule are not reasonably necessary and cause unjustifiable damage. Use of
the IMO Guidelines would provide some basis of defence against such allegations.
One drawback of the United Kingdom approach comes as a direct result of the
independence of the SOSREP. The fact that any place can be a place of refuge,
including places of environmental importance, could lead to significant damage to the
environment if the wrong place is chosen or a greater degree of pollution than
anticipated occurs. Other than trying to prove that the direction was unreasonable under
paragraph14 of Schedule 3A to the Marine Safety Act 2003 there is no way to question
the decision of the SOSREP. Compensation may be available under relevant
compensation conventions or under the common law but there appears to be no way to
prevent the issue of directions in the first place.
Furthermore the absence of responder immunity and the lack of clarity on what is
encompassed by costs and expenses leaves a respondent to a directive open to the risk
of action by a third party and the inability to recoup lost profits.
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CONCLUSION
The three States examined in this chapter all, to varying degrees, apply the IMO
Guidelines directly or through their own versions with various modifications. The
essential risk based assessment of requests for places of refuge is applied in all three
countries varying from the formal, prescriptive method of the PORCP in Canada to the
flexible independent method used by the SOSREP in the United Kingdom, with the
Australian position adopting elements of both approaches. In theory and given sufficient
time, the end results achieved under all three methods should achieve the same results.
However, it is the control and command elements of the various methods that
essentially differentiates them. The SOSREP model has been seen as the most effective
way of dealing with places of refuge problems particularly where the time available to
make decisions is limited. The Canadian model of requiring extensive consultation
before a decision is made and the fact that there are a number of possible decision
makers detracts form the efficient and effective making of decisions. The MERCOM
model in Australia, while it tries to replicate the SOSREP model must still contend with
powerful state instrumentalities which, politically at least, must be kept satisfied.
Furthermore the fact that the MERCOM fits within the government bureaucracy and is
not totally independent also detracts from the independence of the position.
All three models, in common with the IMO Guidelines, fail to address the questions of
liability and compensation, which has been identified by the CMI as a significant failing
of the IMO Guidelines. The Australian and United Kingdom legislation mention
repayment of costs and expenses arising from compliance with directions but do not
appear to be wide enough to cover such items as lost profits. Additionally the absence
of responder immunity in all but the Australian model is a clear disadvantage to the
recipients of directions. These issues need to be addressed in any consideration of
further solutions to the place of refuge problem.
Examination of these three States is sufficient to show that there is a general lack of
consistency of approach in the application of the IMO Guidelines even in these three
countries. Although not specifically examined in this thesis, other countries including
the United States, South Africa and a number of the member states of the European
Union also apply versions of the IMO Guidelines creating even greater scope for
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differences of approach. Despite the fact that the United States views the role of the
SOSREP favourably and the recent hard won success of the European Commission to
include in the ERIKA III package the requirement for a SOSREP equivalent, not all
countries view such an innovation to be acceptable. This doesn’t even take into account
countries that do not apply the IMO Guidelines.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, lack of consistency of approach is not
appropriate for what is essentially an international problem. What is required is
certainty for all parties when a place of refuge is requested. If this certainty cannot be
achieved through national implementation of the IMO Guidelines, then it may be
possible to achieve better results from a regional approach. If not, then either the IMO
Guidelines will need to be strengthened or alternative solutions, such as a new discrete
convention dealing solely with places of refuge may be needed to supplement or replace
them. These options will be examined in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO PLACES OF REFUGE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
The way in which the problem of places of refuge has been dealt with has to a degree
been the result of having to deal with the demand for immediate action that inevitably
follows serious oil spills. As a consequence, the response has not always been either
quick or coordinated and actions have been taken unilaterally by some States, such as
the United States, and regionally through the European Union.
This chapter will examine and assess the regional approach, as opposed to the national
and international approaches, to prevention of oil pollution and provision of places of
refuge. The chapter will examine the role of regional arrangements in the international
law context as well as the possible effectiveness of such arrangements in assisting the
implementation of any solution to the places of refuge problem. In doing so, the chapter
will examine the actions of the European Union in relation to pollution control and
places of refuge and the approach taken to the same issues under two agreements
covering regional seas around Europe - the Bonn Agreement 1983 for the Protection of
the North Sea (Bonn Agreement) and the Helsinki Convention 1992 for the Protection of
the Baltic Sea (HELCOM Agreement)
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Regional arrangements for shipping and protection of the environment are not new.1 In
relation to the system of port State control, regional arrangements under various
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have been established since 1978 and have
resulted in a significant improvement in the quality of shipping visiting ports within the
regions. In 1974, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) instituted its
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Regional Seas Programme2 as a result of the United Nations Conference on the
Environment held in Stockholm in 1972.3
As for places of refuge, as was seen in chapter five of this thesis, bilateral arrangements
are in place between the United States and Canada and other neighbouring States, which
effectively cover much of North America and, as will be seen in this chapter of the
thesis, regional arrangements in the European Union attempt to create a common
approach to places of refuge within the member States.4
1.

The Regional Approach Concept

The IMO has always taken the view that the problem of places of refuge is an
international one that requires an international response. In this it is at odds with the
United States, which introduced the Oil Pollution Act 1990 in response to the grounding
of and subsequent pollution by the Exxon Valdez in 1989, and to a lesser degree by the
European Union which has also taken unilateral action, initially in response to the
sinking of the Erika, and more recently to the sinking of the Prestige.
There have been competing arguments about unilateral and regional actions in dealing
with international problems.5 While there is little argument that the problem of places of
refuge is an international one, the issue seems to be the way in which the problem is to
be resolved.
As was seen in chapter four of this thesis, an international solution to the problem is the
ideal and is being attempted through the IMO Guidelines. However, in practice, as well
as national approaches, regional arrangements have arisen along side the IMO
initiatives. The reason for the rise of regional arrangements was alluded to by the then
Secretary General of the IMO, William O’Neill, soon after the Castor incident when he
stated:
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I know that there are some countries and groups of countries that would often like to see
the pace of change accelerated. They would prefer to see standards imposed that are
more stringent and more demanding than those that are agreed to in IMO. I can
understand that. But they must never overlook that an industry as international as
shipping can only be effectively regulated by international standards that can be applied
globally, and the only way to achieve that is through consensus-based decisions such as
6
those that are made at IMO.

Two major questions arise from the regional approach – is the regional approach legally
valid within the context of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)7
and could it be effective in providing assistance in finding a solution to the place of
refuge problem?
As pointed out earlier, the protection of the environment has commonly been the subject
of national and regional instruments. In some cases this is because international
cooperation is impossible to achieve or is illusory and the only way to achieve the aims
of the environmental policy is by unilateral action.8 More commonly, regional
initiatives have the effect of encouraging international bodies to adopt a particular
course of action.9
The essential question is whether these actions can be part of what has been described
as the ‘Russian Doll Effect’,10 that is, whether or not the regional approach can coexist
with and fit within the international approach.11 If so, then there should be little concern
with allowing regional actions. Tensions could arise should there be no such
congruity.12
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While LOSC contains references to regional arrangements for, inter alia, the protection
of the marine environment13 and clearly does not prohibit them,14 this is on the basis
that such arrangements will help to implement the objectives of LOSC.15 Under Article
311 of LOSC such arrangements are permitted only if they do not derogate from the
objectives of LOSC. If they do, then such arrangements would be illegal and
unenforceable.16
Most of the national and regional approaches to protection of the marine environment
would appear to operate within the parameters of LOSC.17 While the European Union
has, at times, such as the accelerated phase out of single hulled tankers in 2002, moved
ahead of the IMO it has always expressly acknowledged that its actions are intended to
operate within the international arena. In any event, in such instances, the IMO has
quickly acted to restore its pre-eminent position. Even more clearly, national and
regional approaches to places of refuge operate within the parameters of the IMO
Guidelines, even in the United States which is not a signatory to LOSC. From the
perspective of Article 311 of LOSC, it is clear that the actions of the regional groupings
examined are not inconsistent with the objectives of LOSC and accordingly are valid.
Although legal, the more practical question is whether or not the use of regional
arrangements are appropriate and effective and provide benefits that the international
solution through the sole use of the IMO Guidelines could not.
In simple terms, it could be argued that regional actions simply result in the reduction of
the number of jurisdictions that a shipowner or master must deal with. Before an
assessment can be made of the role that regional arrangements can take in finding a
solution to the places of refuge problem, the actions of the European Union and the
Bonn Agreement and HELCOM Agreement must be examined.
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LOSC Articles 197, 200, 207-208, 210-212; E Franckx, ‘Regional Marine Environment Protection
Regimes in the Context of UNCLOS’ (1998) 13 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 307,
313.
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Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2nd
ed, 2002) 354.
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Vessel-Source Pollution with Special Reference to the Baltic Sea’ (2005) 33 International Journal of
Legal Information 256, 260.
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2.

European Union

Protection of the environment is a cornerstone of European Union policy and, in
particular, the European Union has been very active in protection of the marine
environment in waters surrounding its member States.18
The active role of the European Union has been variously viewed. It has been described
by one commentator as ‘a regional challenge’ that ‘has grown to a point of crisis’,
largely because the European Union has been pressuring the IMO to amend its rules
according to wishes of the European Union.19 On the other hand another commentator
has taken a more positive view and notes that
from the progress made by both the EU and the IMO in legislation, it is very
encouraging that these bodies are now willing to co-operate and, in fact, have worked in
parallel with regard to some projects. There is hope, therefore, that achieving
harmonised international legislation is possible, in order to meet common objectives for
20
marine safety and liability in the future.

The European Commission does not consider its actions to be ‘unilateral’ because it is
working within the international system.21 In its Communication to the European
Parliament and Council on improving safety at sea after the Prestige sinking, the
European Commission stated its objective in maritime safety as acting as a leading

18

Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law’ (2005) 20
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 5; while the Treaty of Rome 1957 (Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature March 25, 1957, 298 UNTS
11(entered into force 1 January 1958)), made no specific mention of the environment it did not prevent
the then European Economic Community from enacting environmental legislation. It was not until the
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 (Single European Act opened for signature 28 February 1986 25 ILM
506 (entered into force 1July 1987)) that specific mention was made of environmental protection, a trend
which was extended by the Maastricht Treaty of European Unity 1992 (Treaty on European Unity,
Maastricht opened for signature 7 February 1992, 31 ILM 247 (entered into force 1 November 1993))
which made protection of the environment a major objective of the European Economic Community;
Philippe Sands, ‘European Community Environmental Law : The Evolution of a Regional Regime of
International Environmental Protection’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2511; Philippe Sands, Principles of
International Environment Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 741-746.
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20
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12 Journal of International Maritime Law 262, 278.
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player in the development of international rules within the IMO and not acting
unilaterally.22
The view of the European Parliament itself is succinctly stated as:
The European Parliament…
36.Understands the concern of the Secretary General of the IMO regarding unilateral
and regional actions by countries outside the framework of the IMO, considers,
however, that EU action, such as, for instance, the banning of flags of convenience from
European territorial waters, may sometimes be necessary in the interests of safety;
considers, moreover, that EU measures can act as a catalyst within the IMO, as in the
23
case, for example, of the accelerated phasing-out of single-hulled tankers;

As will be seen later in this chapter, in its actions on places of refuge it has explicitly
stated in Directive 2009/17/EC that member States must work with the IMO
Guidelines.24
European Union Approach to Places of Refuge
The sinking of the Erika in 1999 and the subsequent discovery of the failure of the
safety net of flag State and port State control and classification society certification to
prevent substandard ships like the Erika from entering European waters, indicated a
serious deficiency in the regulation of shipping. It resulted in growing impatience with
the processes at the IMO and the international system of regulation.25 This prompted the
European Commission to look closely at the shipping industry and to propose a series of
measures to improve the standard of shipping entering European waters,26 although still
under the aegis of the IMO.27 These are known as the Erika I,28 II and III packages.29
The urgency increased with the Prestige sinking.30
22
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23
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on improving safety at sea P5_TA(2004)0350 dated 21 April 2004’
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The issue of places of refuge was first addressed in the Erika II package in the European
Traffic Monitoring Directive (Directive 2002/59).31 Under Article 20 of the Directive:
Member States…shall draw up, taking into account relevant guidelines by IMO, plans
to accommodate, in the waters under their jurisdiction, ships in distress. Such plans
shall contain the necessary arrangements and procedures taking into account operational
and environmental constraints, to ensure that ships in distress may immediately go to a
32
place of refuge subject to authorisation by the competent authority.

This provision was inserted in light of the warning in Recital 16 that ‘non-availability of
a place of refuge may have serious consequences in the event of an accident at sea’.33
There are a number of pertinent points in Article 20. First, it is clear that the Directive is
designed to be consistent with relevant IMO guidelines although the words ‘taking into
account’ would indicate that such plans need not be identical with them. Second, as the
Directive was issued prior to the IMO Guidelines, the words ‘ships in distress’ were
used which are narrower than the term ‘ships in need of assistance’ which was
ultimately used in the IMO Guidelines. Third, there is no compulsion for coastal States
or ports to actually accommodate ships in distress since such an action is subject to
‘operational and environmental constraints’ and is ‘subject to authorisation of the
competent authority’. The constraints are supplemented by Article 18.1(b) under which
port authorities may take any action, including refusal of entry or exit from a port, in
times of exceptionally bad weather conditions if it would endanger life or the
environment.34
The second paragraph of Article 20 requires member States to make their plans
available on demand and to inform the Commission of its measures by 5 February 2004.
This timetable was reduced to 1 July 2003 after the Prestige sinking. While this
paragraph created a requirement that places of refuge be listed and communicated to the
Commission by this time there was no specific requirement that such a list be
published.35 Such a move has been strongly resisted by most member States with only
31

Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and repealing Council Directive
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33
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35
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Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia doing so36 and the requirement does not appear
to have yet been enforced against other member States.37
The Erika III package contained Directive 2009/1738 which amended Directive 2002/59.
This new Directive repealed Article 20 and replaced it with a more detailed provision.
One of the main objectives for the repeal and replacement was to
make it possible to guarantee that the authorities responsible for designating places of
refuge are clearly identified and have the necessary information on the basis of which
they can take their decisions, including a precise inventory of potential places of refuge
39
along the coast.

The recitals contain a substantial number of policy statements. These include the
expansion of the term ‘ships in distress’ to ‘ships in need of assistance’ to be consistent
with the IMO Guidelines;40 expert competent authorities are to be designated to make
decisions on requests for refuge;41 that when a ship in need of assistance needs a place
of refuge, particularly in situations where there may be loss of life or of the ship or
environmental damage, those competent authorities (which should be permanent) can
make independent decisions and actions;42 that there needs to be a clear process43 based
on the IMO Guidelines;

that individual case variation is allowed44 to ensure the

harmonious and effective implementation of the IMO Guidelines with the work of
European Maritime Safety Authority (EMSA) and the Commission;45 that there needs to
of Refuge’ Reports of 5th International Conference on Maritime Law, Piraeus 29 September - 2 October
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be a system devised so that prompt compensation for any damage caused by granting
refuge;46 that, while the competent authority may request evidence of insurance, this
should not delay the decision making process and the absence of such insurance should
not automatically preclude a ship from gaining refuge;47 that member States should
identify possible places of refuge;48 that member States should publish contact details of
the competent authority and may permit relevant information on places of refuge to be
given to parties involved in the maritime assistance operation;49 and, finally, that, in the
event of a maritime accident, seafarers are to be treated fairly and their human rights
and dignity preserved at all times and all investigations conducted fairly and
expeditiously.50
In line with the policy statements in the Recitals, a new Article 20 was inserted together
with four new Sub-Articles 20a-20d. The new Article 20 deals with the designation of
competent authorities by member States. The article makes clear that the authority is to
have the required expertise to make decisions and that such decisions are to be
independent and on their own initiative.51 The decisions that such a competent authority
can make are set out in Annex IV of Directive 2002/59, which are non exclusive, but
include the power to instruct a master to put into a place of refuge or to be piloted or
towed into such a place.52 Otherwise Directive 2002/59 makes no reference to any
obligation on ports to accept a ship in distress.
The appointment of an authority capable of taking independent decisions was one of the
major improvements identified as arising out of the Prestige sinking. The actions of
Spain were criticised53 and the appointment in each State of an equivalent of the
SOSREP in the United Kingdom was strongly advocated.54 The European Parliament
included in its resolution on improving safety at sea:
12.
Calls on each coastal Member State to establish a clear decision-making and
command structure for dealing with maritime emergencies and an independent authority
46
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having the powers and expertise to take the necessary decisions which are to be binding
on all parties concerned, in particular as regards the selection and mandatory
55
assignment of an emergency mooring or port;

The Transport Council at its meeting in June 2007 rejected this provision and the
amended Article 20 was withdrawn due to fears of some members that such a provision
would involve financial risks.56 However when the resolution was finally presented to
the European Parliament in March 2009, Article 20 was reinserted and passed in
Directive 2009/17.
The introduction of the independent decision maker has been generally supported by
European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO) but it has also pointed out that the result could
be a decision that is forced on port authorities with resultant potentially significant
damage which must be addressed in a compensation package. ESPO also urges that
compensation be made available promptly and that any compensation not readily
available should be paid by the independent competent authority.57
The new Sub-Article 20a requires member States to draw up plans for accommodation
ships in need of assistance, with the participation of the competent authorities identified
in Article 20. These plans are to be based on the IMO Guidelines and the contents can
be communicated to other member States on a confidential basis.
The new Sub-Article 20b confirms that the competent authority is to make the decision
on a request for a place of refuge based on the plans. This article comes close to
establishing an obligation to accept a ship in need of assistance by stating:
The authority or authorities shall ensure that ships are admitted to a place of refuge if
they consider such an accommodation to be the best course of action for the purposes of
58
protection of human life or the environment.

Directive 2009/17/EC addressed the question of compensation in the new Sub-Articles
20c and 20d. Under the first, the member State can seek a certificate of insurance but
55
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such request must not delay consideration of the request and absence of such certificate
will not of itself justify a refusal of accommodation. Under the second, the Commission
is to examine existing compensation mechanisms in member States and to report back
to the European Parliament by 31 December 2011 with different policy options.
3.

Other Regional Agreements

Within the European Union there are agreements between various member States
located in specific regions which address not only coordinated polices on the practical
elements of pollution control but also coordinated polices on places of refuge. Two of
these that will now be examined are the Bonn Agreement covering the North Sea and
the HELCOM Agreement covering the Baltic Sea.
Bonn Agreement
Prior to the current activity by the European Union and, indeed, prior to many current
member States joining the Union, agreements had been concluded between States
bordering specific geographical bodies of water for various purposes but especially for
the protection of both the marine environment and the environment of the land
bordering such waters.
The North Atlantic is one body of water that has since the late 1960s been the subject of
a number of agreements between the littoral States. In 1969 as a result of the Torrey
Canyon sinking, a number of countries surrounding the North Sea59 entered into the
Bonn Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea.60 The
main objective of this regional agreement was to combat the effects of oil spills in the
North Atlantic.61 This was soon followed by the Oslo Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft62 and the Paris Convention for

59
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the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources.63 In 1983 the current
version of the Bonn Agreement was entered into and now deals with spills of hazardous
substances as well as oil.64
Other subregional plans within the Bonn Agreement also are in force. These include the
Manche Plan between France and the United Kingdom for incidents in the English
Channel,65 which was invoked in the MSC Napoli incident, the DEGERNETH Plan
between Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands covering their joint area of
responsibility66 and the quadripartite agreement between the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Belgium and France covering the southern part of the North Sea.67
The primary objectives of the 1969 Bonn Agreement and the sub regional plans under it
were reactive in that the objectives were mainly surveillance, reporting and combating
of oil spills and the provision of mutual support between signatory countries.68 The
current 1983 Bonn Agreement as well as including harmful substances other than oil,69
also envisages assistance in preventative measures in addition to clean-up measures.70
The 1983 Bonn Agreement has also been implemented in a more proactive way.71 As
well as assisting in prevention and clean up of oil spills, the 1983 Bonn Agreement,
63
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through its aerial surveillance programme,72 established in 1986 under Article 6A of the
1983 Bonn Agreement, can monitor compliance with international, European Union
and national regulations on marine pollution. It can also provide evidence in any
subsequent criminal actions.73
Places of Refuge under the Bonn Agreement
One measure that is envisaged by the 1983 Bonn Agreement is the provision of a place
of refuge to a ship in need of assistance. In the Bonn Agreement Counter Pollution
Manual, Chapter 27 specifically deals with places of refuge.74 The objective of Chapter
27 is to provide a consistency of approach by the signatory states where a place of
refuge is made by a ship in need of assistance to any of the signatory States.75
Signatories to the 1983 Bonn Agreement are obligated to apply the risk assessment
approach set out in Chapter 27.76 The main criteria to be used in assessing any request
for a place of refuge are consistent with those laid down in the IMO Guidelines.77 The
close linkage between Chapter 27 of the Bonn Agreement and the IMO Guidelines and,
where appropriate, European Union Directives on places of refuge clearly indicate that
the Bonn Agreement is intended to be part of the global regime under the aegis of the
IMO and not an independent rule making authority.
Helsinki Convention
While the Bonn Agreement and other agreements covering the North Atlantic dealt with
specific aspects of pollution, the Helsinki Convention for the Protection of the
Environment of the Baltic Sea took a more comprehensive view of protection of the
marine environment.78
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The first Helsinki Convention was negotiated in 1974 as the Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area.79 This convention covered
pollution from land, ships, dumping and exploitation of the seabed.80 There were 6
Annexes dealing with various types of pollution, with pollution from ships being Annex
IV. Hazardous substances were to be eliminated or strictly controlled according to their
harmfulness.81 The Convention was to be administered by the Helsinki Commission
(HELCOM). The Convention was found to be inadequate82 and was replaced by the
1992 Convention.83 This expanded and updated the 1974 Convention including the 6
Annexes in light of advances in environmental law and policy since 1974.84
Places of Refuge under the Helsinki Convention
As with the Bonn Agreement, the obligations concerning pollution from ships, contained
in Annex IV to the Convention, are expressly to be applied in light of rules adopted by
the IMO. Regulation 1 of Annex IV provides:

The Contracting Parties shall, in matters concerning the protection of the Baltic Sea
Area from pollution by ships, co-operate:
(a)
within the International Maritime Organisation, in particular in
promoting the development of international rules…
(b)
in the effective and harmonised implementation of rules adopted by the
85
International Maritime Organisation.
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The development of the pollution from ships measures taken by HELCOM has been
heavily influenced by LOSC, IMO activities and European Union actions.86 From a
practical point of view, the member States of HELCOM can only effectively enforce
regulations against their flag ships. For anything more, the States must cooperate with
the IMO.87
After a major oil spill resulting from the collision of the Baltic Carrier and the Tern in
the Baltic in March 2001, HELCOM held an extraordinary meeting in Copenhagen in
September 2001.88 The end result was a Declaration89 which addressed a number of
aspects of marine safety and pollution prevention in the Baltic Sea area. One of these
aspects concerned places of refuge.90 In paragraph XII of the Declaration the member
States committed themselves to working towards the development of criteria for the
granting of a place of refuge to a ship in distress in light of the work of the IMO and the
European Union. Annex IV of the Convention was amended to reflect this.91
On 15 November 2007 at a HELCOM Ministerial Meeting in Krakow the HELCOM
Baltic Sea Action Plan was adopted.92 Two of the matters agreed on were:
WE RECOGNISE the great importance of an efficient use of places of refuge and for
that reason DECIDE to develop by 2009 and implement by 2010 a mutual plan for
places of refuge in the Baltic Sea…
WE AGREE to further investigate issues of liability and compensation related to a
93
mutual plan on places of refuge…
86
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A Draft HELCOM Recommendation on Mutual Plan for Places of Refuge in the Baltic
Sea Area was submitted to the 31st Meeting of the Helsinki Commission on 4 March
2010.94 The Plan was adopted by HELCOM on 20 May 2010.95 The object of the plan is
to provide for mutual assistance by member States where a request for a place of refuge
is made to one of them. The plan recommends that the member States co-operate with
other member States in a place of refuge situation to reduce risk to the ship and the
environment; for each State to appoint a competent authority with the power to make
independent decisions of requests for places of refuge and to communicate this to other
member States; for member States to deal with the request for a place of refuge within
their own territory first and only if the most appropriate place of refuge is in another
member State should the latter State be requested to assist and in such a case full
reasons for the decision is to be given; that appropriate financial compensation between
the requesting and the accommodating State be agreed. Although not explicitly stated,
requests for refuge are to be handled and information provided within the provisions of
IMO Guidelines which are acknowledged in the Preamble.96
4.

Assessment of the Role of Regional Arrangements

Regional arrangements can be most beneficial in the implementation of international
policies. This is particularly so in cases of pollution where regional cooperation is vital
in preventing and combating marine oil spills which can extend into more than one
jurisdiction.97 In countries like Australia, Canada and the United States where
contiguous national boundaries are either absent or far apart, there is less need for
regional arrangements with neighbouring States. In contrast, in geographical regions
like the Baltic Sea and North Sea, the close physical proximity of national boundaries
makes it appropriate and necessary for close co-operation between States when
responding to a request for a place of refuge made to one of them.98
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A further benefit of regional approaches is to act as a catalyst to IMO action.99 Indeed
the European Parliament specifically admitted to this in its resolution on improving
safety at sea.100 This appears to be based on the premise that international agreements
must be loosely worded to accommodate the differing views of the various States and
accordingly end up being the ‘lowest common denominator’.101
Problems can arise where gaps appear in such international instruments which
individual States or regional arrangements try to fill. Provided such moves are still
within LOSC framework, the results can provide the IMO with valuable precedents.
One example in relation to the IMO Guidelines is the question of liability and
compensation for damage caused by admitting a ship in need of assistance into a place
of refuge. This was identified as one of the main deficiencies of the IMO Guidelines
both during negotiations and subsequently. The IMO have adopted a ‘wait and see’
attitude, a position that has been criticised by both commentators102 and European
institutions.103 The European Parliament and Council in Directive 2002/59 called on the
European Commission to ‘examine the possibilities for introducing an adequate system
of compensation for ports in the Community accommodating a ship in distress and the
feasibility of requiring a ship coming into a Community port to be adequately
insured’.104 In the Erika III package, Directive 2009/17, which replaced Directive
2002/59, member States were encouraged to put in place a system of compensation for
damage caused by ships in need of assistance and the Commission was requested to
examine existing compensation mechanisms and put forward alternate proposals.105
This latter point formed the new Article 20d under which the Commission was required
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to report back on the results of the examination.106 The need for provisions covering
compensation for damage from ships in need of assistance is also referred to in the draft
HELCOM Recommendation on Mutual Plan for Places of Refuge in the Baltic Sea
Area.

Clearly, the European Union is moving ahead of the IMO in relation to

compensation and when the report under Article 20d is produced, it may be that the
European Parliament will legislate for this gap in the IMO Guidelines causing an
unwanted threat to the international regime.107
One other benefit of the regional approach, specifically applying to the European Union,
is the enforceability of the use of the IMO Guidelines. The IMO Guidelines themselves
are not mandatory but the European Union through its Directives has the ability to
compel its member States to apply them.108 The enforced use of the IMO Guidelines
throughout the member States of the European Union would have a positive effect on
their use.109
The unique nature of the European Union in both its political cohesiveness and its
ability to enforce international rules is not indicative of all regional arrangements. In
most of the rest of the world, such cohesiveness is absent and regional treatment of such
things as places of refuge still relies entirely on the attitude of the coastal States. Also,
European arrangements tend to work because of the tight geographical nature of the
States. Regions that lack this geographical unity would be less successful.110
In the absence of strong regional arrangements like the European Union, the regional
approach to dealing with places of refuge is less effective and better enforcement of
international standards through the IMO is the better approach.111 The main reason for
this is the obverse of tight European enforcement – substandard ships will move to and
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trade in waters that are less stringently governed.112 This fact highlights the need for
much stronger controls at the international rather than the regional level.
CONCLUSION
Regional arrangements can be a very effective way of enforcing the use of international
policies such as the IMO Guidelines. Provided that the actions of regional organisations
are not in conflict with the objectives of LOSC, that is they do not deviate from IMO
policies, they can be of great benefit. Where gaps exist in IMO policies, the actions of
regional organisations can be useful both as a catalyst to IMO action and as precedents
for use by the IMO. In this regard the actions of the European Union, the Bonn
Agreement and HELCOM Agreement have proved to be of great value in the acceptance
and use of the IMO Guidelines on places of refuge.
Nevertheless the use of regional arrangements is not a complete answer to problem of
places of refuge. Regional arrangements vary widely between closely knit geographical
regions such as the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and political units like the European
Union to less regulated ones in the rest of the world. While European waters are greatly
improved both in ship safety and pollution control, the price has been the transplanting
of the problems elsewhere in the world. If all regional arrangements were as effective as
the European Union, then it could be argued that the regional approach to dealing with
the problem of places of refuge could be the most effective way to do so. It is doubtful
that this would ever happen.
In view of the inability of the regional arrangement to provide an effective answer to the
problem of places of refuge, it is necessary to deal with the issue internationally either
through voluntary cooperation such as the IMO Guidelines or more formally through
international conventions. The first of these options was dealt with in chapter four of
this thesis. The question of whether a new international convention dealing solely with
places of refuge is needed will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
A CONVENTION ON PLACES OF REFUGE AS A SOLUTION ?
INTRODUCTION
One of the major deficiencies identified with the IMO Guidelines1 is its lack of
enforceability. The primary way of providing this enforceability is by way of an
international convention. This chapter will examine the possibility of a separate
convention that deals solely with places of refuge, a move which has been described as
the most far reaching solution that has been proposed.2
The task of drafting a new convention was undertaken by the Comite Maritime
International (CMI) as a result of the Castor and Prestige incidents. Negotiations within
the membership of CMI took place over a number of years from 2003 to 2008. In
October 2008, CMI concluded its negotiations on drafting an instrument that is intended
to provide an answer to the problem of places of refuge and to form the basis of a new
international convention. The IMO received the draft Instrument in January 2009 but
decided that at present there was no need for a new convention. Despite the reluctance
of the IMO to consider a new convention this attitude may change in the future.
This chapter will first briefly examine the potential of a discrete convention, of which
the CMI draft Instrument is but one possibility, to provide an answer to the problem of
places of refuge. It will then examine and analyse the CMI draft Instrument as an
example of a discrete convention.

1.

Potential of a Discrete Convention

The idea of dealing with ‘international lepers’ and problem of places of refuge by way
of a convention is not new. Suggestions that existing conventions could be amended for
such purposes were raised as far back as 1991 in relation to the International
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Assistance adopted on 5 December 2 (IMO Guidelines).
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Compensation, With Particular Reference to the EU’ CMI Yearbook Durban I (Comite Maritime
International, 2004) 208, 222.
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Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention).3 Suggestions for a separate convention
on places of refuge were made at least ten years ago.4
The clear benefit of a convention would be to resolve and clarify the rights and
obligations of all parties in a place of refuge situation.5 By placing such rights into a
convention, all signatories to the convention would be bound to comply with the
provisions of the convention.
One other benefit of a convention is that it would emphasise that the problem is an
international one that requires an international solution.6 In view of the current
developments particularly in the United States and the European Union, there is a risk
that, by failing to address the issues internationally, there will develop a fragmented and
inconsistent approach to resolving the problem.7 However, the benefit of enforceability
is limited by the fact that it would be binding only on signatories. The convention would
therefore have to be drafted in such a way as to encourage States, or at least those
coastal States on whom the successful implementation of the convention would depend,
to become parties to the convention.8 This in turn would require a balance to be created
between the competing interests of the shipping industry and the interests of the coastal
States. The risk is that to achieve this balance the convention would need to be reduced
to the lowest common denominator. This risk has been succinctly summarised by a
former President of CMI:
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It would be easy to create a Convention (possibly by way of a Protocol to the OPRC
Convention) which would place an obligation on States to find a place of refuge for any
ship in distress. However, such a Convention would never be ratified unless that
obligation to grant access had clearly defined reservations. The danger is that those
reservations will almost certainly take away the right of access which the masters of
ships require in an emergency. Where there are reservations there will arise the need for
assessments and decision making which will take time. In the most recent distress cases,
time has been of the essence. It follows that anything which makes the decision making
9
process more difficult and time consuming needs to be avoided.

The same commentator later stated in relation to the proposed CMI draft Instrument:
It seems unrealistic to me to contemplate the creation of an instrument which imposes
an absolute obligation to grant access without according state parties a discretion to
refuse such access. Frankly, no state will sign up to an instrument which obliges it to
accept a ship in distress regardless of the circumstances or the risk involved. The danger
is that by qualifying the obligation to grant access we weaken the instrument to the
10
point of it being useless.

The danger of proceeding with a draft convention and failing to attract sufficient
signatories for its timely implementation could result in diminishing the credibility of
the current international regime and reinforce the intent of the United States and the
European Union to proceed with their own legislation to deal with the problem.11
On a practical level, any convention on places of refuge would need to be developed
within the IMO. In this regard the Assembly of the IMO has recommended ‘that the
Council and the Committees entertain proposals for new conventions or amendments to
existing conventions only on the basis of clear and well-documented demonstration of
compelling need…’.12 This need was reinforced in the 2008-2009 High Level Action
Plan of the IMO which stated that ‘… due attention should be given to the requirement
that a well-documented compelling need must be demonstrated for the development and

9

Address by Patrick Griggs to the Propeller Club, April 2003, quoted in Stuart Hetherington, ‘Report of
the International Sub-Committee on Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2004 (Comite Maritime
International, 2004) 380, 384.
10
Patrick Griggs, ‘Places of Refuge: the International Perspective’ paper delivered to International
Workshop on Places of Refuge, University of Antwerp 11 December 2003 6 <www.espo.be/news/
proceedings_11-12-2003.asp>; Rosa Roman, ‘Port Perspectives and Environmental Management
Considerations’ in Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 119, 139
11
Andrew Bardot, ‘Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime
International, 2009) 196, 199-200.
12
IMO Assembly, 12th Session, Resolution A 500 (XII) Resolution A 500 (XII) Objectives of the
Organisation in the 1980’s adopted on 20 November 1981.

285

adoption of new or revised standards…’.13 The IMO Legal Committee took the view in
2005 that there was no current need for a new convention and, as will be seen, this view
was reinforced in 2009 on receipt of the CMI draft Instrument.14 It is therefore clear that
there still does not exist a ‘clear and well documented compelling need’.15
While there is no compelling need for a new convention, a conclusion which CMI
acknowledges,16 the draft Instrument developed by CMI is worthy of examination and
assessment in the event that such a compelling need arises in the future.17
2.

CMI Draft Instrument

After initial discussions at a colloquium in Bordeaux in 2003, CMI concluded at its
2004 Conference that there was no one convention that currently dealt with places of
refuge and those that did, particularly the compensation and limitation conventions,
contained exclusions and limitation provisions that could ultimately leave coastal States
exposed to liability.18 This would be so even should all the existing unratified
conventions be put in force.19 Furthermore, the absence of a right to access a place of
refuge and the trend to introduce prohibitive financial conditions on ships that are
permitted access indicated that the current IMO Guidelines were not sufficient.20
Three alternate recommendations were made at the 2004 Conference: a separate
convention be drawn up to deal with places of refuge; the existing compensation and
limitation conventions be amended to deal with the issues raised by ships in distress; the
IMO Guidelines be amended to deal with compensation and liability issues.21 The point
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was also made that some of these issues are being addressed on a unilateral basis,
particularly by the European Union, which could lead to a lack of uniformity.22
When provided with the report of the 2004 Conference, the IMO Legal Committee
maintained its position that a new convention was not warranted and that member States
should be encouraged to ratify existing conventions.23 Despite this attitude, CMI took
the view that work on the topic should continue.24 In doing so it had to address two
questions that had previously been canvassed: first, should CMI be engaged in drafting
a convention or some other instrument and second, what such a convention or
instrument should contain.25 These two questions were to engage CMI for the next 3
years, culminating in a draft Instrument in 2008.
Work on the CMI draft continued and a draft Instrument was provided for comment at
the 2006 Conference. There was a mixed response with some interests, such as the ship
interests and port authorities,26 preferring to follow the IMO Guidelines model while
salvors and cargo owners27 were in favour of a new convention.28 At the conclusion of
the meeting, CMI resolved to finalise the work on a draft Instrument since ‘there
remains a probability that ultimately there will be a need for such a Convention; …and
it has noted the further work being done by the EU in this area, which could create a
lack of uniformity in International law.’29
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A final draft of the Instrument was presented to the CMI Conference in October 2008.30
It was not accepted unanimously and the level of acceptance reflected the existing
coastal State/shipping interest divide. It was not supported by the International
Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH),31 which continued to adopt the IMO position
that the idea of a new convention should only be considered once the current
conventions were in force.32 The IAPH position was supported by the P&I Clubs.33 On
the other hand the Instrument was supported by International Salvage Union (ISU)34
and International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI).35 There was also a mixed reception
from member delegations. These varied from outright rejection by some delegations to
limited acceptance by others. Ultimately a resolution in support of the draft Instrument
was passed by 16 votes to 10 with 2 abstentions.36 This draft was adopted by the
Conference and was submitted to the Legal Committee stating the reasons why it has
been completed and why it is important:
The CMI commends the draft instrument to the Legal Committee, and remains of the
view that there is till a long way to go before existing liability conventions have
worldwide acceptance. Even if all the liability conventions…achieve wide international
acceptance, there is no international convention which expressly requires States…to act
reasonably in carrying out assessments of the condition of vessels which are in need of
assistance and seek that assistance….The CMI fears that a repeat of events which took
place in 2001 and 2002, in relation to the vessels Castor and Prestige, may take place
again in the future…The CMI is also conscious of legislation being contemplated within
the European Union and believes that the IMO is a more appropriate body to introduce
37
legislation which requires States to act responsibly in these situations.

The Legal Committee dealt with the CMI Report at the 95th Session on 23 January
2009. While thanking CMI for its work, it did not alter its position that a new
30
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convention was not required. It considered that the current convention regime together
with the IMO Guidelines provide a sufficient framework for places of refuge and
decided not to develop a binding instrument on places of refuge.38

Contents of CMI Draft Instrument
The CMI draft Instrument was deliberately not called a ‘draft convention’ so as to
permit the IMO to deal with in whatever form it thought best.39 Nevertheless it is
drafted in the form of a convention. After stating the objectives of the Instrument in the
Preamble, the document proceeds to enumerate the following specific provisions:
definitions (Article 1); object and purpose (Article 2); legal obligation to grant access to
a place of refuge (Article 3); immunity from liability where access is granted reasonably
(Article 4); liability to another State, a third party, the ship owner or salvor where
refusal of access is unreasonable (Article 5); reasonable conduct (Article 6); guarantees
(Article 7); plans to accommodate ships seeking assistance (Article 8); identification of
competent authority (Article 9)
Preamble
The object, purpose and reasons for a new Instrument are addressed in the Preamble.40
The recitals acknowledge that the right of access to a ship in need of assistance under
international law has been questioned41 and that the existing international conventions
do not adequately deal with the questions of liability and compensation in the event that
a ship requiring a place of refuge causes damage, whether or not the request is
granted.42 The instrument is designed to complement the procedure in the IMO
Guidelines but also to seek to deal with their perceived shortcomings43 and stresses the
need for a framework of legal obligations in addition to the IMO Guidelines44 which
takes into account the interests of all concerned parties.45 It is also acknowledged that
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the provision of a place of refuge minimises the hazards to human life, navigation, ships
cargoes and the environment while also increasing the efficiency of salvage
operations.46 The overall aim of the Instrument is summed up in the final recital –
INTENDING that this Instrument shall govern the actions of States, competent
authorities, shipowners, salvors and others involved, where a ship seeks assistance;
encourage adherence to international Conventions relating to the preservation of human
life, property and the environment, and balance those interests in a fair and reasonable
47
way; and shall be construed accordingly.

Definitions
The definitions in the Instrument generally reflect the definitions in either the IMO
Guidelines or the current international liability conventions.
The definition of ‘ship’ is wider than in most of the conventions in that it is not limited
to seagoing ships and also includes floating platforms.48 The definition was originally
based on the wording in the International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (Wreck
Removal Convention)49 and Article 3 of the Salvage Convention. The original definition
in the draft Instrument was limited to sea-going ships,50 similar to the definition in the
Wreck Removal Convention. Also ‘floating platform’ was limited by excepting
platforms when they were ‘on location engaged in exploration, exploitation or
production of sea-be mineral resources’.51 During discussions at the 2008 CMI
Conference it was decided to delete these limitations. This means that it is possible for
non seagoing ships to be covered by this Instrument and the Instrument could also cover
ships on inland waters.52 It would also cover all floating platforms regardless of where
they are or what they are being used for.
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Ibid.
52
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
158, 158.
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The definitions of ‘ship in need of assistance’53 and ‘place of refuge’54 reflect the
definitions in the IMO Guidelines but the wording of ‘place of refuge’ is expanded to
include not only actions to minimise hazards to navigation and protecting of human life
and the environment but also to protect ships and cargoes. Although ships and cargoes
do not form part of the definition of ‘place of refuge’ in the IMO Guidelines one of the
items of analysis by an inspection team under the IMO Guidelines is ‘due regard…to
the preservation of the hull, machinery and cargo of the ship in need of assistance’.55 As
noted in chapter four, this was inserted into the IMO Guidelines at the request of IUMI
on the basis that, as hull and cargo underwriters cover most of the costs associated with
salvaging ships and cargo, there should be serious consideration given to seeking to
preserve the ship and cargo, otherwise the insurers may not be in a position to continue
to cover these expenses. The inclusion of ship and cargo into the definition of ‘place of
refuge’ in the draft Instrument highlights this concern.
The close connection between the CMI draft Instrument and the IMO Guidelines is
reinforced in the definition of ‘assessment’56 which requires any assessment of a request
for a place of refuge is to be made in accordance with applicable IMO Guidelines. It
also incorporates applicable regional agreements or standards. This could include
European Union Directives and such agreements as the Bonn Agreement and the
Helsinki Convention.
‘Registered shipowner’57 is the same as the definition in the Wreck Removal
Convention,58 as well as the definition of ‘owner’ in the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC 92)59 and other liability conventions.

53

‘ship in need of assistance’ means a ship in circumstances that could give rise to loss of the ship or its
cargo or to an environmental or navigational hazard.
54
‘place of refuge’ means a place where action can be taken in order to stabilise the condition of a ship in
need of assistance, to minimize the hazards to navigation, or to protect human life, ships, cargoes or the
environment.
55
IMO Guidelines Article 3.11.
56
‘assessment’ means an objective analysis in relation to a ship in need of assistance requiring a place of
refuge carried out in accordance with any applicable IMO guidelines or any other applicable regional
agreements or standards.
57
‘registered owner’ means the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of
registration, the person or persons owning the ship; however, in the case of a ship owned by a State and
operated by a company, which in that State is registered as the operator of the ship, ‘registered owner’
shall mean such company.
58
Wreck Removal Convention Article 1.8.
59
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 27
November 1992, 1953 UNTS 255 (entered into force 3 May 1996) Article 1.3 (CLC 92).
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The definition of ‘ship owner’60 is identical with ‘operator of the ship’ under the Wreck
Removal Convention but is not included in any other of the conventions. It widens
considerably the scope of the term by including managers and bareboat charterers who
assume responsibility under the International Security Management Code (ISM Code).
While not included in the definition of CLC 92 and other liability conventions, these
additional parties are included in the channelling provisions.61
Finally ‘competent authority’62 was amended to include ‘State’ as well as other parties
and organisations which can grant or refuse access to a place of refuge. ‘State’ was
inserted in anticipation of the instrument becoming converted into a Convention.63
Object and Purpose
Article 2 of the draft Instrument reinforces the wording in the Recitals and states:
The object and purpose of this Instrument is to establish:
(a)
a legal framework for the efficient management of situations involving
ships in need of assistance requiring a place of refuge and
(b)
the responsibilities and obligations concerning the granting or refusing of
64
access to a place of refuge.

The use of the word ‘legal’ is significant. It differs from the IMO Guidelines which in
paragraph 1.12 states that the purpose is to simply ‘provide a framework’. Clearly the
objective is to eliminate the major drawback of the IMO Guidelines namely, the fact
that they are unenforceable. The use of the word ‘legal’ implies not only the ability to
enforce the provisions of the draft instrument but also brings with it consequences for
doing so or failing to do so. This latter point is emphasised in the wording of
subparagraph (b).
Also the use of the words ‘object and purpose’ is deliberately meant to reflect the

60

‘ship owner’ includes the registered owner or any other organization or person such as the manager or
the bareboat charterer who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the owner of the
ship and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibilities
established under the International Safety Management Code, as amended.
61
CLC 92 Article III.4(c).
62
‘competent authority’ means a State and any organisations or persons which have the power to permit
or refuse entry of a ship in need of assistance to a place of refuge.
63
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
158, 159.
64
CMI Draft Instrument Article 2.

292

language of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969.65 Under Articles 18 and
31(1) of this Convention, States are to look to the object and purpose of a treaty when
interpreting it66 or to ensure that no action is taken to defeat the object and purpose of
the treaty.67 In the event of the translation of the draft Instrument into a convention,
Article 2 of the draft Instrument will provide the object and purpose. Also a clear
statement of object and purpose is preferred by European Union legislators.68
Legal obligation to grant access to a place of refuge
Article 3 is the main operative provision69 and the one that could prove most
controversial.70 Under Article 3(a) any competent authority (which includes a State) is
required to grant access to a ship in need of assistance when it is requested unless it can,
on reasonable grounds, refuse.71
This reverses the current trend in State practice of coastal States having the right to
refuse access to ship in need of assistance on reasonable grounds, to the position that a
ship in need of assistance has a presumptive right of access and coastal States have a
duty to grant access unless there are reasonable grounds to refuse.
The significance of this provision is that this would be the first time an international
convention dealt with the granting of access to a place of refuge in any substantial way.
Earlier chapters of this thesis have shown that no other convention, other than the
reference in Article 11 of the Salvage Convention, refer to places of refuge and that the
situation under customary international law has changed to the extent that any right to
access a place of refuge arguably no longer exists. These points are also made in the
Preamble to the draft instrument. The duty to provide a place of refuge cuts through all

65

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331
(entered into force 27 January 1980); Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ CMI
Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 208, 209.
66
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(1).
67
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 18.
68
Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2009) 208, 209.
69
Ibid.
70
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
158, 159; Frans van Zoelen, ‘An Instrument on Places of Refuge from a Ports’ Perspective’ CMI
Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 181, 187.
71
‘Except as provided in Article 3 (b) any competent authority shall permit access to a place of refuge by
a ship in need of assistance when requested’.
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these doubts and firmly states that coastal States have a rebuttable duty to grant access
when requested.
The imposition of a duty to grant access is a substantial limitation on the sovereignty of
coastal States and goes much further than the IMO Guidelines which state in paragraph
3.12 that ‘coastal States should…give shelter where reasonably possible’.72 However, it
does reflect the current policy of the SOSREP in the United Kingdom under which
access is granted unless there are reasonable grounds to refuse it.73 In light of the
conduct in relation to the Erika, Castor and Prestige and numerous other incidents, the
same argument cannot be made for other coastal States where policy totally lacks
uniformity and varies from outright rejection to the imposition of punitive guarantees to
outright acceptance.74 It was for this reason and to avoid a repeat of the Prestige disaster
that CMI75 and other organisations such as IUMI76 proposed in 2003 an instrument to
require a grant of access.77
The right of access granted under Article 3(a) is not absolute and coastal States do retain
a right to refuse access in certain circumstances. The obligation to grant access is
rebuttable if the grounds set out in Articles 3(b) or (c) are met. After considerable
debate, CMI was unable to reach agreement on the grounds available to competent
authorities to refuse access, so it provided three options for Articles 3(b) and 3(c).78
The common factor in the three options is that access can be denied if, after an
assessment, there are reasonable grounds for finding that the condition of the ship or its

72

IMO Guidelines paragraph 3.12; Andrew Bardot, ‘Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress’ CMI
Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 196, 199; Frans van Zoelen, ‘An
Instrument on Places of Refuge from a Ports’ Perspective’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime
International, 2009) 181, 187.
73
Robin Middleton, ‘Places of Refuge – the UK Experience’ paper presented to International Places of
Refuge Workshop, University of Antwerp 11 December 2003 <www.espo.be/downloads/miscellaneous/
12424/news/2003/events/middletonpdf>.
74
Eric van Hooydonk, ‘Some Remarks on Financial Securities Imposed by Public Authorities on
Casualty Ships as a Condition for Entry into Ports’ in Mark Huybrechts (ed) and Eric van Hooydonk and
Christian Dieryck (co-eds), Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Century Volume 2 (Intersentia, 2000)
117, 135.
75
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2007-2008 (Comite Maritime International, 2008)
126, 126.
76
See IUMI Paper to the Maritime Safety Committee, MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted
by the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) MSC 77/8/2 dated 14 February 2003.
77
Stuart Hetherington, ‘International Sub-Committee Discussion Paper’ CMI Yearbook 2003 (Comite
Maritime International, 2003) 380, 383-386.
78
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
157, 159-160.
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cargo is such that it would pose a greater risk to grant access than to deny it. This is the
sole basis in Option 1.79 Option 2 expands slightly on this by stating that the grounds
for denying access must be reasonable and must ‘have regard to’ the condition of the
ship.80 This is wider in that the condition of the ship is only one of the grounds for
potential denial of entry, all of which must be reasonable. Option 3 is the same in
wording, but not form, as Option 1.81
The major difference between the three options is the relationship between the provision
of security and the denying of access. Under Option 1, the mere absence of an insurance
certificate, guarantee or financial security is not grounds for refusal of access.82 Under
Option 2, the existence or availability of security is a factor when assessing whether
access is to be denied and is not a reason for not performing the assessment. Further the
absence of security by itself cannot be used as a reason for refusing access or delaying a
decision.83 Under Option 3, the failure to provide security for an amount that reasonably
reflects the potential liability, as determined in the assessment, is a ground for refusal by
itself.84

79

Option 1 states: ‘(b)The competent authority may deny access to a place of refuge by a ship in need of
assistance when requested, following an assessment which on reasonable grounds establishes that the
condition of the ship is such that it and/or its cargo is likely to pose a greater risk if permission to enter a
place of refuge is granted than if such a request is refused.’
80
Option 2 states ‘(b) Notwithstanding Article 3 (a) a competent authority may, on reasonable grounds,
deny access to a place of refuge by a ship in need of assistance when requested, following an assessment
and having regard to the following factors: (i) the issue of whether the condition of the ship is such that it
and/or its cargo is likely to pose a greater risk if permission to enter a place of refuge is granted than if
such a request is refused…’
81
Option 3 states: ‘(b) Notwithstanding Article 3 (a) the competent authority may deny access to a place
of refuge by a ship in need of assistance when requested : (i) following an assessment which on
reasonable grounds establishes that the condition of the ship is such that it and/or its cargo is likely to
pose a greater risk if permission to enter a place of refuge is granted than if such a request is refused’
82
‘(c) The competent authority shall not deny access to a place of refuge by a ship in need of assistance
when requested on the grounds that the shipowner fails to provide an insurance certificate, letter of
guarantee or other financial security’; Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II
(Comite Maritime International, 2009) 158, 159.
83
‘(ii) the existence or availability of an insurance certificate, letter of guarantee or other financial
security but the absence of an insurance certificate, letter of guarantee or other financial security, as
referred to in Article 7, shall not relieve the competent authority from the obligation to carry out the
assessment, and is not itself sufficient reason for a competent authority to refuse to grant access to a place
of refuge by a ship in distress, and the requesting of such certificate, or letter of guarantee or other
financial security shall not lead to a delay in accommodating a ship in need of assistance’; Stuart
Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 157,
159-160.
84
‘(ii) on the grounds that the shipowner fails to provide an insurance certificate, or a letter of guarantee or
other financial security in respect of such reasonably anticipated liabilities that it has identified in its
assessment, but limited in accordance with Article 7.’; Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook
2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 157, 160.
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If a request for access to a place of refuge is refused, the competent authority must use
‘best endeavours’ to identify an alternative course of action that is practical or lower
risk that permitting access.85 The only guidance on the scope of this requirement is that
it is based on the US Coast Guard approach.86
Finally in relation to the obligations in this article, the obligation to grant access does
not preclude a claim for salvage which a competent authority could make. The idea of a
port being able to make a claim for salvage as an incentive for granting access has been
raised by a number of commentators.87 Although such a concept has not yet found
widespread favour, this provision would be necessary should the concept of a port being
able to claim salvage be accepted, since one of the bases for a successful claim for
salvage is that the action taken must be voluntary and not under legal compulsion.88
Guarantees
The effect of the requirement to provide security is closely tied to Article 7 which deals
with requirements for guarantees. This also created a great deal of debate and again
three options were provided to cover the variance of opinion.89
Under Option 1,90 the ship requesting a place of refuge must provide evidence of
insurance, a letter of guarantee from the International Group of P&I Clubs or other
security from up to the applicable limit of liability under the Convention on Limitation
85

‘(d) If access is denied the competent authority shall use its best endeavours to identify a practical or
lower risk alternative to granting access’.
86
Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2009) 208, 209; Lizabeth Burrell, ‘Places of Refuge Policies of the United States
Coast Guard and National Response Team” CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International,
2009) 163, 165.
87
Eric van Hooydonk, ‘The Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge to a Ship In Distress’ CMI Yearbook
2003Part II, (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 403, 444; Archie Bishop, ‘Places of Refuge’ CMI
Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 201, 203.
88
Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (Law Book, 3rd ed, 2004) 610; Stuart Hetherington,
‘Civil Liability and Monetary Incentives for Accepting Ships In Distress’ CMI Yearbook 2003 (Comite
Maritime International, 2003) 457, 463.
89
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
157, 160-161.
90
‘(a) When agreeing to grant access to a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance, the competent
authority may request the ship owner to provide evidence of an insurance certificate, or a letter of
guarantee by a member of the International Group of P&I Clubs, or other financial security from a
recognised insurer, bank or financial institution in a reasonable amount in respect of such reasonably
anticipated liabilities that it has identified from its assessment. Subject to the following paragraph of this
Article, such letter of guarantee or other financial security shall not be required to exceed an amount
calculated in accordance with the most recent version of Article 6(1)(b) of the Convention on Limitation
of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 or the corresponding provision on limitation for claims other than
passenger, loss of life or personal injury claims of any other international convention replacing the
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of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 (LLMC).91 Option 2 includes the wording of
Option 1 but adds a provision that where LLMC does not apply, that the amount should
be sufficient to cover anticipated liabilities.92 Option 3 contains no reference to
limitation under LLMC but simply requires a guarantee covering the anticipated
liabilities.93 In all three options, there is a provision that nothing in the instrument
precludes competent authorities from requiring guarantees provided for in any other
Conventions.94
The right to limit liability and the consequent right to limit guarantees to this amount is
a point of contention with the port interests. IAPH argues that ports should be permitted
to require that ships requesting access waive the global right to limit under LLMC and
for any security to be open-ended in relation to amount.95 While the basis for this
argument is that the Instrument must balance the interests of the shipping interests and
coastal State interests,96 the suggestion arguably tilts the balance too far in favour of the
coastal States. The difficulty and cost of obtaining unlimited guarantees from P&I Clubs
or other financial institutions could clearly disadvantage ships in need of assistance.97
Immunity from Liability for Granting Access and Liability for Refusing Access
As these articles jointly deal with the consequences of the decision on a request for
previously mentioned convention, in force on the date when the insurance certificate, or letter of
guarantee or other financial security is first requested, whether or not the State in question is a party to
that convention’
91
Convention of 19 November 1976 on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, opened for signature
19 November 1976, 1456 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 December 1986) as amended by Protocol of 2
May 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, opened for signature
2 May 1996, RMC I.2.340 II.2.340 (entered into force 13 May 2004).
92
‘(b) In cases where claims described in Article 2 paragraphs 1 (d) or (e) of the Convention on
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims are not subject to limitation the reasonable amount shall be
calculated in accordance with Article 7 (a), with the addition of such amount as is likely in total to
compensate the competent authority in respect of such liabilities.’
93
‘(a) When agreeing to grant access to a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance, the competent
authority may request the ship owner to provide evidence of an insurance certificate, or a letter of
guarantee by a member of the International Group of P&I Clubs, or other financial security from a
recognised insurer, bank or financial institution in a reasonable amount in respect of such reasonably
anticipated liabilities that it has identified from its assessment’
94
‘Nothing in this Article shall prevent a competent authority from requiring the shipowner to provide a
certificate or letter of guarantee under any other applicable International Convention other than this
Instrument’
95
Frans van Zoelen, ‘An Instrument on Places of Refuge from a Ports’ Perspective’ CMI Yearbook 2009
Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 181, 188.
96
Ibid.
97
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Civil liability and monetary incentives or accepting ships in distress’ in CMI
Yearbook 2003 : Vancouver I : Documents for the Conference. (Comite Maritime International, 2003)
457, 463.
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access to a place of refuge they can be conveniently examined together. Under Article 4,
if a competent authority assesses the request for a place of refuge and concludes that
access under Article 3 can be granted and that assessment was made reasonably then the
competent authority has immunity from liability for any damage that ensues.98 Under
Article 5, where a competent authority assesses the request and refuses access it will
have no liability if the competent authority can establish that the decision was made on
reasonable grounds.99
The wording of Article 4 is confusing because immunity from liability is available only
‘if a competent authority reasonably grants access to a place of refuge’. Under Article 3,
there is a clear duty to grant access. A refusal to grant access can only be excused if, on
the grounds laid out in Articles 3(b) or (c), it is reasonable to do so. The way Article 4 is
worded seems to imply that it is this explicit duty to grant access and not the application
of the exceptions to this duty that is subject to a test of reasonableness. Furthermore the
way Article 4 is written implies that the onus of proof for establishing the
reasonableness of the decision to not apply the exceptions is on the party suffering the
consequent damage.
The consequences of a refusal of access is dealt with in Article 5 in a different way to
the consequences of a grant of access. Under Article 5 it is the competent authority
which must establish the reasonableness of the decision to apply the application of the
exceptions to the duty and refuse access.
It has been stated that the immunity granted in Article 4 should logically also apply to a
decision to refuse access under Article 5.100 On the current wording of the two articles
this argument seems to be valid since there is no practical difference between
‘immunity’ to liability and the right to claim a defence to liability where the decision is
98

‘Subject to the terms of this Instrument, if a competent authority reasonably grants access to a place of
refuge to a ship in need of assistance and loss or damage is caused to the ship, its cargo or other third
parties or their property, the competent authority shall have no liability arising from its decision to grant
access.’
99
‘If a competent authority refuses to grant access to a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance and
another State, the ship owner, the salvor, the cargo owner or any other party prove that it or they suffered
loss or damage (including, in so far as the salvor is concerned, but not limited to, the salvors inability to
complete the salvage operations) by reason of such refusal such competent authority shall be liable to
compensate the other State, ship owner, salvor, cargo owner , or any other party, for the loss or damage
occasioned to it or them, unless such competent authority is able to establish that it acted reasonably in
refusing access pursuant to Article 3(b)’
100
Frans van Zoelen, ‘An Instrument on Places of Refuge from a Ports’ Perspective’ CMI Yearbook 2009
Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 181, 188.
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based on an objective assessment of the same circumstances. Where the basis for the
granting of immunity to liability is subject to a test of reasonableness, it is no different
to saying that the party that is being sued is entitled to a claim a defence to liability if
the basis of the decision was reasonable.
However, there is a fundamental distinction that can and should be drawn between a
decision to grant access and a decision to refuse access. It is generally accepted that it is
better in most instances for a ship in need of assistance to be given access to a place of
refuge. This is reflected not only in the Preamble to the draft Instrument noted above,101
but also in the objectives of the IMO Guidelines which state that ‘the best way of
preventing damage or pollution would be to lighten its cargo and bunkers; and to repair
the damage. Such an operation is best carried out in a place of refuge’102 and also note
that ‘it is rarely possible to deal satisfactorily and effectively with a marine casualty in
open sea conditions’.103 The problems that have arisen with places of refuge have
largely resulted from decisions to refuse access on questionable grounds and when
granting of access would have been more beneficial such as with the Castor and
Prestige.104 This reality is admitted in the IMO Guidelines where it is stated in the
Objectives ‘granting a place of refuge could involve a political decision’.105 There is a
greater need for justification for a decision to refuse access than to grant it and for this
reason, they should be treated differently.
To clarify the distinction necessary between the two types of decisions, it is submitted
that the current use of the word ‘immunity’ in Article 4 is misleading and needs
revision. It has been stated that the aim of the immunity in Article 4 is to encourage
coastal States to agree to the obligation in Article 3 to grant access to ships in need of
assistance and also to encourage the ratification of any convention which may evolve
from the draft Instrument.106 The only practical way that immunity from liability would
fulfil these objectives, it is submitted, is where such immunity is absolute. The actual
101

CMI Draft Instrument Recital 1.
IMO Guidelines paragraph 1.2.
103
IMO Guidelines paragraph 1.5.
104
Archie Bishop, ‘Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
201, 201; exceptions that have been noted in earlier Chapters include the Sea Empress in the United
Kingdom and the Kowloon Bridge in Ireland where the grant of access resulted in serious damage to the
environment in Milford Haven and Bantry Bay respectively, although in neither case was refusal of
access found to have been a better option.
105
IMO Guidelines paragraph 1.7.
106
Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ in CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2009) 208, 209.
102
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decision should not be subject to challenge and the immunity should not be limited by a
test of reasonableness. In some jurisdictions there is scope through administrative
review for such a decision to be questioned on process but not merit and it should be to
this purpose only that any test of reasonableness should apply. Any damage that could
flow from a decision to grant access would likely affect coastal State interests and so it
is unlikely that the decision to grant access would not be given proper attention. Any
person or group that suffers damage due to access being granted have rights in the
national courts of the coastal State against the shipowner and, in some instances, other
parties under international liability conventions.
Another major failing of these two articles is that there is no attempt to define what
damages are recoverable should the test of reasonableness fail. As will be more fully
discussed in the next chapter, the inconsistency of approach to issues such as pure
economic loss and environmental damage can have serious consequences. Should a
competent authority, in good faith, wrongly assess the risk under Article 3 the
compensation for which those parties suffering damage could sue the competent
authority are just as unclear under this draft Instrument as under the existing
international liability regime.
Reasonable conduct
In Articles 3, 4 and 5 there are references to reasonableness. What is meant by this term
is critical to the application of the whole Instrument. Article 6 attempts to provide some
guidance.107 However, the actual wording of Article 6 provides scant assistance save
that it emphasises that the test is objective and refers back to the definition of
‘assessment’ in Article 1. This in turn imports the IMO Guidelines and other regional
agreements or standards in determining what is reasonable conduct for the purposes of
the competent authority making decisions on a request for a place of refuge.108

107

‘For the purposes of ascertaining under Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Instrument whether a State or
competent authority has acted reasonably courts shall take into account all the circumstances which were
known (or ought to have been known) to the competent authority at the relevant time, having regard, inter
alia, to the assessment by the competent authority’.
108
Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group’, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ in CMI Yearbook
2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 208, 209.
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Plans to accommodate ships seeking assistance
Under Article 8, coastal States are to draw up plans to accommodate ships in need of
assistance to which access has been granted under Article 3.109 This reflects what
currently exists in the IMO Guidelines.110 Also, the requirement for provision of
adequate means and facilities for assistance, salvage and pollution response currently
exists in the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation (OPRC Convention)111 but is identified by the ISU as being a major
problem with the current arrangement.112 It should be noted that the article does not
require the publication of the places of refuge, contrary to the position adopted by the
European Union.
Identification of competent authority
Under Article 9, States must identify the competent authority. Although the word
‘identification’ is used it appears that the intention is that the States designate a
competent authority that can make decisions on admission of a ship to a place of refuge
and the identification of an appropriate place of refuge for that particular ship.113 This
corresponds to the SOSREP system in the United Kingdom and the requirement for the
identification of authorities responsible for designating places of refuge under the Erika
III package of the European Union.114
109

“States shall draw up plans to accommodate ships in need of assistance in appropriate places under
their jurisdiction around their coasts and such plans shall contain the necessary arrangements and
procedures to take into account operational and environmental constraints to ensure that ships in need of
assistance may immediately go to a place of refuge, subject to authorisation by the competent authority,
granted in accordance with Article 3. Such plans shall also contain arrangements for the provision of
adequate means and facilities for assistance, salvage and pollution response”.
110
Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ in CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2009) 208, 210.
111
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, opened for
signature 30 November 1990, 30 ILM 733 (entered into force 13 May 1995); Stuart Hetherington, ‘Civil
liability and monetary incentives or accepting ships in distress’ in CMI Yearbook 2003 : Vancouver I :
Documents for the Conference. (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 457, 463; Stuart Hetherington,
‘Introduction’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 157, 161.
112
Archie Bishop, ‘Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
201, 203.
113
‘States shall designate the competent authority to whom a request from a ship in need of assistance for
admission to a place of refuge appropriate to the size and condition of the ship in question should be
made, and use all practicable means, including the good offices of States and organisations, to inform
mariners of the identity and contact details of such competent authority.’; Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working
Group on Places of Refuge’ in CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 208,
210.
114
Directive 2009/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending
Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system Official
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3.

Assessment of the CMI Draft Instrument

As with the IMO Guidelines, an assessment of whether or not the CMI draft Instrument
provides a solution can be made by an examination of their benefits and disadvantages.
Benefits
The CMI draft Instrument goes some way to providing a clearer answer to the problem
of places of refuge. It has at least five advantages, which are analysed below:
First, the major benefit of the draft Instrument, should it be converted to a convention, is
that it is binding and enforceable as compared to the IMO Guidelines which are neither
binding nor enforceable. In providing for a binding duty on coastal States to accept
ships in need of assistance, with limited exceptions, it attempts to eliminate the
possibility of another Castor or Prestige and in return seeks to deal with the effects of
such duty.
Second, for the first time, there is a clear obligation on coastal States to grant a place of
refuge to a ship in need of assistance. The delicate balance between shipping interests
and coastal State interests that has bedevilled the whole issue of places of refuge is
shifted away from the coastal States towards the shipping interests. By requiring a
surrender of a coastal State’s sovereignty over control of access to its ports and other
internal waters, the draft Instrument reverses the trend of customary international law
and the objectives of the IMO Guidelines.
Third, by including in the definitions reference to the use of the IMO Guidelines, the
IMO Guidelines are given a greater significance. While still not enforceable per se, the
requirement that in performing an assessment relevant IMO Guidelines are to be taken
into account provides a sounder basis for their acceptance than they would have by
themselves.

Journal of the European Union [2009] L131/101. It was on this provision that this Article was modelled Richard Shaw, ‘CMI Working Group on Places of Refuge’ in CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2009) 208, 210.
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Fourth, coastal States are, to a limited degree, protected against liability in situations
where access is either granted or refused but only to the extent that the decisions are
made reasonably.115
Fifth, the requirement for coastal States to identify a competent authority with the
powers to assess the request for access and to allocate the ship to a specific place of
refuge would help to remove the risk of political interference and would also ensure that
the person appointed to be the competent authority has the requisite skills and
knowledge to make proper decisions.116
Disadvantages
Despite the obvious advantages set out above, there are a number of disadvantages. The
five main disadvantages are analysed below.
First, the draft Instrument significantly affects the balance between shipping interests
and coastal State interests. The obligation to grant access to a place of refuge, while it
could be a clear advantage to shipping interests undermines state sovereignty and gives
very little to the coastal State in return.117 It is, as one commentator has described it, ‘all
stick and no carrot’.118
Second, as liability for damage flowing from decisions on access are subject to a test of
reasonableness, no legal certainty is given to coastal States granting access as to liability
for damage flowing from that decision. The ‘immunity’ granted under Article 4 is not
absolute and still relies on an assessment of the reasonableness of the action to permit
access. If the objective of the draft Instrument is to encourage coastal States to permit
access to ships in need of assistance, the immunity for doing so should not be subject to
challenge.119

115

Eric van Hooydonk, ‘The Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge to a Ship In Distress’ CMI Yearbook
2003Part II, (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 403, 444.
116
Ibid.
117
Frans van Zoelen, ‘An Instrument on Places of Refuge from a Ports’ Perspective’ CMI Yearbook 2009
Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 181, 186-187; Andrew Bardot, ‘Places of Refuge for Ships
in Distress’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009) 196, 199
118
Archie Bishop, ‘Places of Refuge’ CMI Yearbook 2009 Part II (Comite Maritime International, 2009)
201, 203
119
Eric van Hooydonk, ‘The Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge to a Ship In Distress’ CMI Yearbook
2003Part II, (Comite Maritime International, 2003) 403, 437
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Third, the draft Instrument does not deal with such issues of liability and compensation
as pure economic loss and environmental damage so that the current lack of consistency
of approach is not remedied. The restrictions placed on the competent authority to
refuse access accentuate the potential risk that coastal States will be left with damage
for which the shipowner is not liable. Issues of liability which might have helped to
convince coastal States to accept the duty to grant access are either inadequate or
absent. Just as important as clarification of liability of the various parties are the
questions of limitation of that liability and the content of guarantees. These issues will
need to be addressed if there is any chance of acceptance by coastal States on whom
successful implementation of the Instrument depends.
Fourth, the guarantees that competent authorities are able to require shipowners to
provide are, in two of the three options in Article 7, limited to liability calculated in
accordance with LLMC, although they can still require guarantees under other liability
conventions. This could seriously impact on coastal States in cases like the Prestige
where the damage inflicted is greatly in excess of the funds available as a result of the
shipowner’s right to limit.
Fifth, the CMI draft Instrument is clearly a compromise document and lacks widespread
support. This is shown by the fact that in two of its main provisions no unanimity could
be found on the wording and three options had to be provided for each.
CONCLUSION
In view of the confused state of the law in relation to many aspects of the places of
refuge problem and the uncertainties surrounding the rights and obligations of all
parties, the idea of a separate convention to deal with all matters pertaining to the
problem is, in theory at least, a good solution.
However, on a practical level, there is little point in devising such a convention if it
does not receive the necessary support not only of the coastal States directly affected,
but also the IMO. There is little indication from the IMO debates or the discussions on
the CMI draft Instrument that coastal States would be prepared in the current
circumstances to agree to limit their sovereignty over admitting or refusing access to
ships in need of assistance. Furthermore the stated unwillingness of the body that would
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be tasked with bringing the new convention into existence, the IMO, means in practical
terms that there is no present likelihood of such a new convention being developed.
Nevertheless, the work of CMI has not been wasted since, should the need arise for a
new convention in the future, the draft Instrument would form a significant basis for
developing such a convention.
The CMI draft Instrument attempts to provide certainty into the rights and obligations of
all parties and in doing so significantly alters the current balance between these
interests. However, in attempting to provide greater certainty the draft sows further
confusion. The duty to permit access is not absolute, which the shipping interests would
require, but qualified by the need to perform assessments on the potential to affect
coastal State interests. As such the draft goes little further than the current application of
the IMO Guidelines. Similarly, the benefits that would accrue to a coastal State for the
surrender of sovereignty are insufficiently dealt with.
In summary, while the idea behind the draft Instrument and its objectives are to be
encouraged, more work will be needed on the vital issues before it would be acceptable
to all parties. The time has not yet come for a new convention. The reality is that, as
with the origin of many maritime safety and liability conventions, it may take another
Prestige disaster for a ‘clear and well-documented compelling need’ to arise.
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CHAPTER 8

FACTORS AFFECTING A RESPONSE TO PLACES OF REFUGE
PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
One of the central themes running through this thesis is that any remedies which address
the problem of places of refuge must seek an acceptable balance between the interests of
the coastal States and the shipping interests. The answer to the places of refuge problem
depends heavily on coastal States being willing to grant access to ships in need of
assistance and they must have confidence that their interests will not be unreasonably
put at risk by granting a place of refuge to such a ship. Equally, a shipowner, master or
salvor must be confident that when a place of refuge is needed that such a request will
receive prompt and proper attention.
Both of the solutions presently proposed, namely, the current IMO Guidelines and a
discrete new convention on places of refuge could potentially provide an appropriate
answer to the places of refuge problem. In the case of the IMO Guidelines, they have
already been put into practice in various States and the European Union in varying
ways. Nevertheless, this acceptance is not universal. As for the CMI draft Instrument,
this is yet to be accepted by the IMO as necessary let alone put into effect. The result is
that, while both have potential to provide an answer, there is still great scope for either
or both solutions to fail to receive sufficient support from coastal States and the
shipping industry. The reasons for this fall outside the actual wording and intent of the
instruments themselves. Other factors can and do influence the willingness of coastal
States to subject their waters, national territory, environment and populations to the
risks associated with granting access to a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance.
This chapter will examine factors outside the current potential solutions and assess the
effect that a failure to address these factors could have on the implementation of either
or both the IMO Guidelines and CMI draft Instrument on places of refuge. The issues
addressed in this chapter are: the need for the shipping industry to play a role in finding
an answer to the problem by improving the standard of its ships and equipment used for
the transportation of oil and other hazardous cargoes; the need for flag States to improve
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their regulatory role over ships flying their flags; the need for coastal States to improve
their performance of Port State Control; the need for classification societies to improve
their performance in providing surveys and other regulatory services. In examining
these elements, the chapter will describe and assess steps that have been taken to
address these factors. Next, the chapter will examine the need for either or both the IMO
Guidelines and international conventions dealing with compensation and liability for
pollution damage to be amended to provide assurances to coastal States that any grant
of access to a place of refuge will not result in the coastal State being financially
disadvantaged through shipowners being able to either escape liability or limit any
liability to a level that is not commensurate with the actual or potential damage to the
coastal State or its interests. Finally, on the opposite side of the argument, there are
factors which could influence the way coastal States reach decisions on providing a
place of refuge which actually provide incentives for the coastal State to adopt and
enforce the IMO Guidelines. These factors relate mainly to the use to which the IMO
Guidelines could be put to defeat claims by third parties against the coastal State for
damage caused to those third parties by a refusal of access to a place of refuge.

1.

IMPROVED INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE

Improvements to age and design may not be the complete answer to the problem of
substandard shipping which can result in the need for places of refuge, but they must
form part of the solution.1 Age of ships is a risk factor. So also is whether a ship has a
single or a double hull.2 The significance of the age of the tanker fleet and the lack of
proper supervision is exemplified by the Erika and the Prestige which were both over
25 years old when they sank and because of their age were used to carry ‘black
product’.3 Integral to any solution to the places of refuge problem is an improvement in
the quality of ships carrying dangerous cargo, particularly petroleum products.4
1

Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law’ (2005)
20/1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 63.
2
Elizabeth Galiano, ‘In the Wake of the Prestige Disaster: Is an Earlier Phase-Out of Single-Hulled Oil
Tankers the Answer?’ (2003-2004) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 113, 132.
3
Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Accidents at Sea (CPEM), Report of the Enquiry into the
Sinking of the Erika off the Coasts of Brittany on 12 December 1999 10 <www.beamer-france.org/
BanqueDocument/pdf_87.pdf>.
4
Elizabeth Galiano, ‘In the Wake of the Prestige Disaster: Is an Earlier Phase-Out of Single-Hulled Oil
Tankers the Answer?’ (2003-2004) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 113, 133; this was also reflected in
the view of the Spanish delegation to the IMO after the Prestige sinking, as set out above in chapter four
of this thesis, which suggested that the way to avoid the places of refuge problem was to only permit
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In 2009, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued
the Review of Maritime Transport 2009.5 The statistics in this Review, discussed below,
disclose the potential risk of serious pollution incidents and the need for a solution to
the places of refuge problem. They also show the scope for ship owners and shipping
regulators to make improvements in the safety and quality of their ships so that the
potential for pollution incidents is reduced.
The world fleet as at 1 January 2009 reached 1.19 billion dwt of which oil tankers
constituted 35%. While the average age of all shipping was 23 years, the average age of
oil tankers was 17.55 years. Of more significance, 39.7 % of oil tankers were in excess
of 20 years old with those registered in developing countries accounting for 46.5%, 20%
in developed countries and 67.1% of those registered in transition economy States.
There is a significant upward trend in oil tankers less than 10 years old which now
account for 36.9% overall with 31.8% in developing countries, 47.1% in developed
countries but only 20.5 % in transition economies.6
Although these statistics suggest that the tanker fleet is still significantly old, older
tankers are gradually being replaced, at least in developed and developing countries,
through measures taken by the IMO and other States. In particular, the IMO, the United
States and the European Union have taken steps to require the phase out of older tankers
by the requirement that before tankers can be given access to ports, they must be fitted
with double hulls either when built or retrofitted in accordance with a schedule.
Double Hull and Ship Replacement
A substantial number of tankers have a single hull which means that only a single side
plate and bottom separate the oil cargo from the sea. Any damage to the single plate by
way of grounding could result in oil escaping from the damaged hull.7 Since the 1990s
steps have been taken to require that these single hulled ships be replaced by ships with

access to ships in distress that fully complied with all international conventions see MSC, 77th Session,
Places of Refuge – Guidelines for the evaluation of risks associated with the provision of places of
refuge- Submitted by Spain MSC 77/8/5 dated 31 March 2003 paragraph 2; ‘Cynical or Stupid?’ Fairplay
May 15, 2003, 3.
5
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport
2009 (United Nations, 2009).
6
Ibid 40-2, Table 11. The countries in each category are listed in Annex 1 to the Report.
7
Tammy Alcock, ‘‘Ecology Tankers’ and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to Require
Double Hulls on Oil Tankers’ (1992) Ecology Law Quarterly 97, 107.
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double hulls and all newly built tankers be built with double hulls. Double hulls provide
a space between the cargo tank and the outside hull that in many cases should prevent
oil from escaping after damage to the outer hull.8
The United States Initiatives
The first regulatory measure in this regard occurred in the United States. As a
consequence of the sinking of the Exxon Valdez in 1989, the United States took
unilateral action by introducing the Oil Pollution Act 1990(OPA).9 Pursuant to s 4115 of
OPA, all single hulled tankers over 5,000 gross tons were to be phased out by 1 January
2010, and ships fitted with double sides or a double bottom by 1 January 2015.10 All
new tankers built after 1990 were to be built with a double hull.11 The phase out
depended on age, tonnage and whether or not it was fitted with double sides or a double
bottom prior to 1990.12 Tankers less than 5,000 gross tons can continue to operate until
2015.13 After 2015 any tanker seeking entry into United States waters will be refused
entry unless it has a double hull.14 No changes to the OPA schedule have been made as
a result of the Erika and Prestige sinkings.
International Maritime Organisation Initiatives
The unilateral action by the United States was followed by an international approach by
the IMO to provide for a similar phase out of single hulled tankers operating under the
flags of member states. Regulations 13F and 13G, covering new-builds and existing

8

Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Comparison of Single and Double Hulled Tankers <www.
amsa.gov.au/Publications?Comparison_of_single_and_double_hull_tankers.pdf>; Elizabeth Galiano, ‘In
the Wake of the Prestige Disaster: Is an Earlier Phase-Out of Single-Hulled Oil Tankers the Answer?’
(2003-2004) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 113, 131.
9
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 USC 2701(2009).
10
Ibid s 4115 amended 46 USC 3703 (2009) by adding s 3703a requiring the Secretary to prescribe
regulations for, inter alia, the prevention and mitigation of damages to the environment. 33 CFR
157.10(d) (2008) Double hulls on tank vessels, made provision for the introduction of double hulls on
tank ships in accordance with a timetable. The timetable was set out in 33 CFR 157 Appendix G (2008).
Guidelines for the implementation of the introduction of double hulls is set out in US Coast Guard
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No 10-94 (NVIC 10-94) <www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/pdf/
1994/n10-94ch2.pdf>.
11
NVIC 10-94 Part 1 p 2.
12
Ibid Part 4 Tables; 33 CFR 157 Appendix G.
13
33 CFR 157 Appendix G paragraph 2(b).
14
Ibid Appendix G paragraph 2(d).
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tankers were introduced into Annex 1 of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)15 in March 1992.
Under regulation 13F, all new tankers over 600 dwt contracted to be built after 6 July
1992 were to be fitted with double hulls or other acceptable design providing the same
protection.16
Under the current regulation 13G, which came into force on 5 April 2005, no single
hulled oil tankers above 5,000 dwt will be permitted to carry oil after 2010. In addition,
the IMO introduced a new regulation 13H which prohibits, with limited exceptions,17
the carriage of heavy crude oil in single hulled ships above 5,000dwt from 5 April 2005
and in ships 600 dwt to 5,000 dwt by the ship’s anniversary date in 2008.18
The European Union Initiatives
After the Erika sinking, the European Commission proposed a phase out of single
hulled tankers in the same way as the United States.19 This was largely prompted by the
fact that the then original IMO phase out and the OPA phase out were not aligned and
the Commission was concerned that tankers banned from United States waters would be
used in European waters.20 In 2002, the European Union adopted Regulation 417/2002
on February 18, 200221 which is similar in most respects to regulation 13G of
15

International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, opened for signature 2
November 1973, 12 ILM 1319 (not yet in force) as amended by Protocol Relating to the Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, opened for signature 17 February 1978, 17 ILM 546
(entered into force 2 October 1983) (MARPOL); in October 2004, regulations 13F, 13 G and 13H were
renumbered regulations 19, 20 and 21 - Revised MARPOL Annex 1 (oil) adopted on 15 October 2004 and
in force from 1 January 2007.
16
MARPOL Annex 1 (oil) - regulation 13F (2). Oil Tankers between 600dwt and 5000 dwt also were
required by regulation 13F (6) to be fitted with double bottom tanks to a lesser depth than larger tankers.
17
Exceptions to this ban include category 2 and 3 ships that comply with the 1978 MARPOL Protocol
provided the condition assessment shows that the ship is fit to continue such operation and ships of 600
dwt to 5000 dwt that are fit to continue, but only until the 25th anniversary of delivery. Also permitted are
single hulled ships over 600 dwt provided that they operate exclusively within the waters of a party to the
convention. A coastal state can refuse entry into its waters by any ship excepted under regulation 13H.
18
MARPOL regulation 13H (4).
19
Oya Ozcayir, ‘The Erika and its Aftermath’ (2000) 7 International Maritime Law 230, 237; Caroline
Stenman, The Development of the MARPOL and EU Regulations to Phase Out Single Hulled Tankers 24
(LLM Thesis, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Goteborg University, 2005) <http://www.
gupea.ub.gu.se/ bitstream/2007/1941/1/200556.pdf> .
20
Justine Wene, ‘European and International Regulatory Initiatives Due to the Erika and Prestige
Incidents’ (2005) 19 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 56, 62; ‘Maritime
safety: accelerating phasing-in of double-hull oil tankers’ <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
transport/waterborne_transport/124231_en.htm>.
21
Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on
the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent requirements for single hulled tankers and
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94 [2002] OJ L 64/1; Justine Wene, ‘European and
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MARPOL. In particular it has the same phase out schedule.22 After the sinking of the
Prestige, the European Commission, in Regulation 1726/2003, brought forward the
phase out of category 1 ships to 2005 and category 2 and 3 ships to 2010.23 This
schedule aligned the European Union with the United States.24 Regulation 1726/2003
also provided for the banning of transportation of heavy grades of oil in all single hulled
ships over 600 dwt with immediate effect.25 This was to be repeated in amendments to
regulation 13H of MARPOL. One exemption in Regulation 1726/2003, that has not been
repeated in regulation 13G of MARPOL, is in Article 8. This permits a single hull tanker
that is in difficulty and in search of a place of refuge to enter a European port even if it
is otherwise banned from doing so.
Unilateral Action by other Coastal States
The Prestige sinking prompted unilateral action by a number of coastal States in Europe
that had been affected by it. Spain,26 France and Portugal all took unilateral action soon
after the incident to ban single hulled oil tankers carrying heavy grades of oil from their
ports and internal waters.27 Additionally, France and Spain agreed at a conference in
Malaga in November 2002 to ban all single hull tankers over 15 years old from not only
their territorial waters but also their EEZs, regardless of their actual condition. This has
been rigorously enforced by both countries.28

International Regulatory Initiatives Due to the Erika and Prestige Incidents’ (2005) 19 Maritime Law
Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 56, 62.
22
Oya Ozcayir, ‘The Erika and its Aftermath’ (2000) 7 International Maritime Law 230, 237.
23
Regulation (EC) No 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 OJ
L249/1 dated 22 July 2003 (Regulation 1726/2003) Article 3(a).
24
Caroline Stenman, The Development of the MARPOL and EU Regulations to Phase Out Single Hulled
Tankers 27 (LLM Thesis, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Goteborg University, 2005)
<http://www.gupea.ub.gu.se/ bitstream/2007/1941/1/200556.pdf>.
25
Regulation (EC) No 1726/2003 Article 3(d).
26
Royal Decree-Law 9/2002 of 13th December whereby measures are adopted for tankers carrying
dangerous or contaminated cargoes Boletín Oficial del Estado 14 December 2002, entered into force on
1 January 2003 see MEPC/Circ.402 Prohibition of Entry into Spanish Ports, Terminals or Anchorage
Areas of Single-Hull Oil Tankers carrying Heavy Oils dated 15 January 2003 and <www.intertanko.
com/templates/Page.aspx?id=35992>.
27
Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law’ (2005)
20/1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 9; in December 2002, Morocco announced to
the MSC that it supported the actions of France and Spain (MSC, 76th Session, Report of the Maritime
Safety Committee on its Seventy-sixth Session MSC 76/23 dated 16 December 2002, paragraph 1.27) and
was proposing to take the same action (MSC, 76th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on
its Seventy-sixth Session MSC 76/23 dated 16 December 2002 Add.1, Annex 20, 236-237) but to date has
not acted on this.
28
Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law’ (2005)
20/1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 9; Benedicte Sage, ‘Identification of ‘High Risk
Vessels’ in coastal waters’ (2005) 29 Marine Policy 349, 355; Portugal immediately joined the
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The banning of ships from the EEZ solely on the basis of age and irrespective of their
compliance with IMO standards has been criticised by the shipping industry and legal
commentators as being contrary to international law.29 It would also mean that ships in
need of refuge would be severely disadvantaged since they would be unable to enter and
traverse not only territorial waters but also the EEZ of coastal States when seeking
access to a place of refuge.30
Ship Design
As a result of a proposal by Greece and the Bahamas to the IMO Council at its 89th
session in November 2002,31 the IMO Assembly in 2003 added the development of
‘Goal-based new ship construction standards’ to the IMO Strategic Plan for 2004-2010
and the long term working plan to 2010.32 The objective is for the IMO to adopt, in a
more systematic way than before, a greater role in the future design of ships by setting
standards for design and construction.33

Declaration – see Maria Gavounelli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff,
2007) 83; Veronica Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection in the
International Law of the Sea – Implementing Global Obligations at the Regional Level (Martinus Nijhoff,
2007) 202. In the first six months of the ban over 80 ships were escorted out of the EEZ of both countries
see Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law’ (2005)
20/1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 9; for example, in December 2003, the Spanish
Government prevented the Geroi Sevastapol, 24 year old single hulled tanker carrying heavy crude from
Estonia to Singapore from sailing through the Strait of Gibraltar, forcing it to sail around the Cape of
Good Hope see Veronica Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International
Law’ (2005) 20/1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 9 (footnote 45). It has also meant
that such ships coming from the Baltic cannot transit the English Channel and must proceed through the
Irish Sea see Report of the European Parliament on Improving Safety at Sea in Response to the Prestige
Accident(2003/2066(INI) ( Sterckx Report)- Rapporteur’s proposals paragraph 2.4 <www.europapl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=Report&reference= A5-2003-0278>.
29
Letter from the Round Table of International Shipping Organisations to the President of the European
Union dated 12 December 2002 <www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=36005>; Elizabeth
Galiano, ‘In the Wake of the Prestige Disaster: Is an Earlier Phase-Out of Single-Hulled Oil Tankers the
Answer?’ (2003-2004) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 113, 123; Welmoed van der Velde, ‘The
Position of Coastal States and Casualty Ships in International Law’ CMI Yearbook 2003 Part II (Comite
Maritime International, 2003) 479, 497.
30
Sterckx Report paragraph 2.4.
31
Council, 89th session, Consideration of the Strategy and Policy of the Organization including the
Report of the Working Group - IMO Strategic Plan - Submitted by Bahamas and Greece C 89/12/1 dated
8 October 2002.
32
IMO Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 943(23) Long-Term Work Plan of the Organization (Up to
2010) adopted on 5 December 2003; development of the system is still in progress and is part of the work
of the MSC.
33
In an unorganised manner the IMO had been doing this for some time including the revised Chapter II2 of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184
UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1976) (SOLAS) concerning construction for fire protection, detection
and extinction and for the safety of passenger ships see Heike Hoppe,‘Goal-Based Standards – A New
Approach to the International Regulation of Ship Construction’ (2005) 4/2 World Maritime University
Journal of Maritime Affairs 169, 170-171.
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The plan set out a five tier system setting out the goals, the functional requirements, the
verification of compliance criteria, the technical procedures and guidelines,
classification rules ands industry standards all leading to the formulation of codes of
practice and quality systems covering such things as shipbuilding, ship operation,
maintenance, training and manning.34 The system is not designed to be prescriptive but
to provide an overarching set of standards that are required to be met during the lifetime
of the ships.35 Ships are to be designed and constructed for a life of not less than 25
years and capable of withstanding North Atlantic environmental conditions.36 There is
to be a transparent and credible verification system auditable by classification societies
whose rules must meet the goal based standards.37
Effect of Double Hulls Replacement and Ship Design on Places of Refuge
The Erika and the Prestige were old, single hulled tankers. The reaction to the sinkings
was to phase out such ships to lessen the risk of ships either needing a place of refuge
or, if so, to reduce the risks of damage to the place of refuge by the granting of access to
them. While there would appear to be some substance to the argument that older ships
present higher risks38 and their phase out would improve the safety of shipping overall,
this belies the fact that some older ships are more reliable than younger ships based on
the way they have been maintained over their life.39 One commentator has remarked:
It is ridiculous to suggest that old ships are automatically worse than newer vessels and
that a charterer should be castigated as environmentally irresponsible for the high
average age of the ships he is working….Quality is nothing whatever to do with the age
40
of the ship.

34

Nicolai Lagoni, The Liability of Classification Societies (Springer, 2007) 38.
MSC, 80th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-seventh Session MSC 80/24
dated 24 May 2005 paragraph 6.38.
36
H Hoppe, ‘Goal-Based Standards – A New Approach to the International Regulation of Ship
Construction’ (2005) 4/2 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 169, 176.
37
Ibid 179.
38
Fairplay Editorial 20 October 1994 states ‘Age and safety are intertwined….There are conscientious
operators of well maintained old tonnage with outstanding loss records But they are not the rule.’ quoted
in John Hare, ‘Flag, Coastal & Port State Control – Closing the Net on Unseaworthy Ships and their
Unscrupulous Owners’ <www.uctshiplaw.com/portstate.htm>.
39
Harilaos Psaraftis, ‘Maritime Safety in the Post-Prestige Era’ (2006) 43 Marine Technology 85, 89;
European Parliament Resolution on improving safety at sea P5_TA(2004)0350 dated 21 April 2004
[2004] OJ C 104 E/730, paragraph 2 states ‘that far more attention ought to be devoted to the maintenance
and condition of ships, as a poorly maintained double-hulled tanker represents a greater potential hazard
than a well maintained single-hulled tanker’.
40
Lloyds List Editorial August 18, 1994 quoted in John Hare, ‘Flag, Coastal & Port State Control –
Closing the Net on Unseaworthy Ships and their Unscrupulous Owners’ <www.uctshiplaw.com/
portstate.htm>.
35
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It has also been argued that to single out the age of ships is more a political reaction
than a reasoned one with little economic studies done to justify the conclusion that
single hulled ships of a certain age are a danger and must be eliminated.41 This was
recognised by Lord Donaldson in his 1993 report42 where he stated:
The UK Government should resist any attempt to introduce arbitrary age limits, as they
could encourage owners to curtail maintenance as the specified age approaches. Age
43
limits will induce a race to build the cheapest, short-life ships.

That age cannot be the sole determining factor of ship safety was exemplified in the
case of the Amoco Cadiz which was a 3 year old tanker properly maintained and crewed
which sank in 1978 causing major pollution in the English Channel. The loss was due to
steering gear failure and the absence of a proper system of emergency response.44 More
recently the MV Rocknes ran aground and sank off Bergen in Norway on 19 January
2004.45 It had been built in 2000 and converted in 2003. It had a double hull and was
properly crewed.46 The evidence given at the subsequent court hearing was that the
cause of the loss was faulty charting and improper loading.47
Similar arguments have been made concerning the preference of double hulled tankers
over single hulled tankers. Studies have shown that while double hulled tankers would
help to prevent small oil spills and minimise major ones,48 they are not a complete

41

Ibid; Timothy Hughes, ‘ERIKA - European Oil Shipping’s Defining Moment?’ (Paper presented at
SPILLCON 2000 Conference, Darwin, 15-17 August 2000) 5 <www.aip.com.au/amosc/papers/hughest.
doc>.
42
Lord Donaldson of Lymington, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas Report of Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry into the
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protection against major disasters.49 It has also been argued that double hulls would not
have prevented the Erika disaster since the sinking and the subsequent pollution were
the result, not of the fact that it had a single hull, but the fact that the ship broke in two
in heavy weather. While the Erika was over 25 years old, the lack of proper
maintenance and the force of weather were more relevant factors than age or the fact it
was single hulled.50 Similar arguments have been made about the Prestige.51
Other arguments against double hulls have been raised by various commentators and
States in relation to economics, design and operation. While economic factors
predominate, there are also arguments that double hulls also have inherent dangers. In
relation to design, doubled hull tankers have no protection against corrosion in the inner
and outer hulls contrary to single hulled tankers where such protection is given by the
oil cargo. This leaves the cargo tanks exposed and requiring more maintenance which is
unlikely to be done.52 Double hulls also create a greater risk of gas build up and
explosion risks between the hulls.53 Operationally, double hulls are less stable and also
run the risk of oil leakage and sediment build up between the hulls.54
Regardless of the benefits and disadvantages of double hull tankers, the actions of the
IMO, the European Union and the United States will ensure that at least in United States
and European waters, single hulled tankers will be banned from 2015. This raises the
question of what happens in the rest of the world. There is a serious risk that single
hulled tankers that are denied entry into European and United States waters will seek to
continue to trade in other areas of the world where enforcement of standards is not as
49
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strong.55 There is no prospect of a quick solution to the use of older single hulled
tankers since they still constitute a major part of the world’s tanker fleet and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The United States and European Union
initiatives will have the effect of limiting their use in their respective waters but they
will not simply disappear – they will simply move to less regulated waters. What
happens relies essentially on the attitude of the flag states and the port states on the
implementation of regulations 20 and 21 of Annex I of MARPOL. It is yet another
indication of the need for better flag State control of its flagged ships and of increased
surveillance of ships by port State control and classification societies.
Of much greater importance than age and design, is the quality of maintenance a ship
receives over its life.56 This also requires a proper level of inspection and enforcement.
This is the province of the shipping industry regulators.

2.

IMPROVED INDUSTRY REGULATION

The Erika and the Prestige show the heavy reliance that coastal states place and their
port authorities place on industry regulators and the Erika is a good example of what
happens when a substandard ship slips through all the safety nets provided by the
industry.57 To convince coastal States that they should risk accepting a ship in need of
assistance into a place of refuge they would need to be assured that the shipping
regulators have properly performed their role in ensuring that any ship seeking a place
of refuge is sufficiently seaworthy and cargo-worthy and in such good repair that it will
not cause serious damage to the coastal State or its interests should a pollution incident
occur in the place of refuge. Also the coastal State when assessing whether or not to
grant access needs to have assurance that any survey or certificate of compliance
granted by a classification society can be relied on.
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Flag State Control
As well as the age and condition of ships seeking a place of refuge, the performance of
the flag State under which the ship is registered can have an effect on the willingness of
coastal States to accept ships in distress.
Regulation of the shipping industry, particularly in relation to design, maintenance,
safety and operations is the domain of the state under whose flag a ship sails58 and
heavy responsibility is placed on the flag state under various international
conventions.59 Traditionally ships sailed under the national flag of its owner,60 but more
recently, there have arisen open registries or ‘flags of convenience’ where the ship
obtains registration with little connection with the flag state.61 An important aspect of
tanker safety and the resultant reluctance of ports to accept tankers is the failure of some
flag states to properly enforce their obligations to ships flying their flag.62 This problem
occurs in national registries as well as open registries.63 The ages of ships registered
vary widely between registries. Some open registries have significantly older fleets than
others, the majority being based in the developing world where almost half of the oil
tankers are over 20 years old.64
While some ‘flags of convenience’ have been identified as substandard indicating either
an inability or disinclination to fulfil their responsibilities,65 some are better performers
than others.66 For example, as a result of international and economic pressures, some
flag States such as Malta, which registered the Erika, and Panama both now have
58
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stricter inspection regimes and have improved their performance,67 but some national
are worse than some open registers.68
There are few existing remedies available to counter this lack of implementation by flag
States.69 One commentator has stated that:
The general consensus is that there are sufficient regulations to do the job, the
problem is their lack of implementation. Major reasons stated for failure to
implement the necessary measures were the lack of competent personnel and
financial resources, and a lack of political will in many cases.70
The performance by flag States in complying with international conventions needs to be
improved and steps need to be taken to address these issues to ensure better compliance
by flag States with their responsibilities.71
It was also realised that a more universal method of reviewing enforcement of
international conventions was needed.72

As a result, the IMO has introduced the

Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS).73 The objective of the audits is
to objectively assess the implementation by the member State of IMO instruments. The
assessments are to be conducted to ascertain compliance with the Code for
Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments74 as well as to ensure that member
States have either enacted laws or have the ability to do so and have the administrative
capacity to implement all mandatory IMO instruments.75

67

Oya Ozcayir, Port State Control (Informa, 1st ed, 2001) 29.
Ibid; John Mansell, Flag State Responsibility (Springer, 2009) 140-141; Shipping Industry Guidelines
on Flag State Performance, (Maritime International Secretariat Services Limited, 2nd ed, 2006) which
analyses flag state performance in accordance with 19 set criteria. The 2009 Update identified 13 States
that fail 12 or more of the criteria while only 8 meet all criteria. Of the latter category, only 2, Hong Kong
and the Marshall Islands, operate an open registry <www.marisec.org/ flag-performance>.
69
Henrik Ringbom, ‘Preventing Pollution from Ships-Reflections on the ‘Adequacy’ of Existing Rules’
(1999) 8 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 21, 24.
70
International Commission on Shipping, Ship, Slaves and Competition (International Commission on
Shipping, 2000) 32.
71
Oya Ozcayir, ‘Flags of Convenience and the Need for International Co-operation’ (2000) 7
International Maritime Law 111, 117; Oya Ozcayir, Port State Control (Informa, 1st ed, 2001) 33.
72
L Barchue, ‘Making a Case for the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme’ 2 <www.imo.
org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/Data_id%3D17981/voluntary.pdf>.
73
International Maritime Organisation, ‘Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme’ <www.imo.org/
Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=841>; Carmen Casado, ‘Vessels on the High Seas: Using a Model Flag
State Compliance Agreement to Control Marine Pollution’ (2004-2005) 35 California Western
International Law Journal 203, 222.
74
The current Code is 2007 which was adopted by IMO Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 996(25)
Code for the Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments, 2007 adopted on 29 November 2007.
75
Code for the Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments, 2007 paragraph 7.
68

318

There have also been industry initiatives to improve flag State performance. The Round
Table of Shipping Industry Organisations76 has introduced Shipping Industry Guidelines
on Flag State Performance77which sets out flag State responsibilities and assesses
performance according to certain set criteria. It is designed to complement VIMSAS78
and to encourage shipowners to put pressure on flag States to improve performance.79
This is done by providing guidance to shipowners to enable them to make considered
decisions on whether or not to use the flag State.80
Other organisations providing input into the problem of flag States include Protection
and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs). Part of the Rules of most P&I Clubs include
complying with statutory requirements including the ISM Code and being classed by an
IACS Classification Society81 and a poor safety record of a ship could result in a ship
being refused entry or being excluded from membership,82 or, possibly, of being
allowed entry but at a higher premium.83 Since the International Group of P&I Clubs
cover over 90% of the world’s shipping84 including 95% of the world’s tanker fleet,85
they are in a strong position to pressure flag States for better performance.86

Effect on Places of Refuge of Actions to Improve Flag State Control
For a coastal State to be willing to grant access to a place of refuge, it needs to be
satisfied that the ship is seaworthy. Improvements to flag State performance could go
some way to providing this assurance since, while advances have been made in
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identifying ways to improve flag State performance, such as VIMSAS and the Round
Table flag State performance surveys, the essential problem remains that, under
international law, flag States are responsible for ‘effectively exercising jurisdiction and
controlling administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’.87
Because of the pervasive nature of the concept of state sovereignty,88 neither the IMO
nor any other body currently have the power or capability to force the flag State to
properly implement international conventions89 or to impose sanctions if they fail to do
so.90 Although the continuation of this system has been questioned,91 unless legitimate
ways can be found to force flag States to fulfil their responsibilities the situation will
continue.92 In this regard, it has been suggested that for VIMSAS to be fully effective it
must be made mandatory and that standards of compliance be set.93 The success or
otherwise of such moves would depend on the support or the acquiescence of member
States to the inclusion of such standards in current or new conventions such as SOLAS.94
Ultimately, the most effective sanction against lax flag State control is through market
forces. If substandard ships that are permitted by flag States to continue to operate under
their flag, the only effective way to stop their operation is to refuse such ships from
accessing ports absolutely, as with the phase out of single hulled tankers in European
and United States waters, or to permit access subject to conditions.95 By refusing access
to substandard ships in as many ports as possible, the result should be that such ships
have nowhere to go and will eventually either be improved or scrapped. To achieve this,
the system of port State control must be more widely applied and enforced.
87
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Port State Control
Just as important to a coastal State in deciding whether or not to admit a ship in need of
assistance to a place of refuge is the inspection and detention record of the ship under
the system of Port State Control. This concern is real since, in the case of the Prestige,
there was strong evidence that the ship, prior to its last voyage had been used as a
floating storage at St Petersburg but had not been inspected as required under the rules
of the Paris MoU.96 Also, in the case of the Erika, the ship had been inspected many
times by port State inspectors and had been detained and cleared by port inspectors five
times but cleared each time and yet still broke up and sank within twenty four hours.97
The system of Port State Control was introduced to permit States in whose waters a ship
sails to inspect and if necessary detain a ship to ensure that it complies with
requirements of international conventions.98 Studies have shown a close correlation
between the age of a ship and detention rates under Port State Control for failure to
comply with the required international standards.99 While the role of ports has been
expanded, the primacy of the flag State in relation to its flagged ships has not
diminished.100 Port State Control is an aid to the flag State in its role101 and is part of the
‘safety net’ to protect ports should the flag State fail to properly carry out its role.102
In practice, Port State Control is not applied individually by each port State. Various
regional arrangements have been established under Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs) which currently cover most regions of the world.103 The objective is not only to
harmonise the inspections by ports in the regions but also to create a contractual
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obligation on the port States to achieve certain consistent outcomes.104 The results of the
inspections are publicised and the flag States are tabulated into ‘black’, ‘grey’ and
‘white’ lists depending on the number of deficiencies and previous detentions. Presence
on the black and grey lists results in increased inspections for all ships of the flag
State.105 One exception of relevance to places of refuge, is Article 3.12.3 of the Paris
MoU under which otherwise banned ships may be permitted access to a port in the
event of force majeure or safety considerations or to minimise the risk of pollution
provided that any conditions of the port authority are complied with.106 A New
Inspection Regime will be introduced in 2011 under which the target of 25% by each
member State will be replaced by a commitment by all member States to jointly inspect
all ships visiting MoU ports and anchorages.107
Effect on Places of Refuge of Actions to Improve Port State Control
Port State Control forms part of the safety net of procedures designed to alleviate
failures by flag States to properly enforce international obligations on ships flying their
flags. It does not in any way replace the responsibility of flag States and the various
MoUs clearly state that responsibility for monitoring compliance with international
conventions lies on the flag State.108
The development of regional arrangements has the potential to significantly improve the
standard of shipping by port States detaining or banning substandard ships from their
ports.109 However for this to succeed there must be consistency of application and
approach by all port States. While there has been a movement to harmonise the
activities of the various MoUs, there is still little consistency between them.110
Furthermore, there has there not been universality of coverage by the regional

104

Oya Ozcayir , Port State Control (Informa, 1st ed, 2001) 116.
Elizabeth deSombre, ‘Globalisation and Environmental Protection on the High Seas’ (Paper presented
at 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 27 August 2003) 16
<www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation0/6/2/5/3/pages62530/ p62530-1.php>.
106
Paris MOU Article 3.12.3.
107
<www.parismou.org/upload/pdf/TEC21%20-%203.6%20Annex%201%20Popular%20version%20
NIR pdf>.
108
Ibid Preamble paragraph 6; Paris MOU Recital 4.
109
Moritaka Hayashi, ‘Toward the Elimination of Substandard Shipping: The Report of the International
Commission on Shipping’ (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 501, 509.
110
Elli Louka, International Environmental Law – Fairness, Effectiveness and World Order (Cambridge
University Press, 2006) 161.
105

322

arrangements.111 This creates a danger of the creation of ‘ports of convenience’ for
substandard ships that would otherwise be detained or refused entry to ports covered by
one of the MoU arrangements.112 It shifts the substandard shipping from one area that is
efficiently controlled to another area where port authorities are not as diligent.113 The
rise of regionalism through the MoU system and the actions of the European Union risk
exacerbating the problem of substandard shipping which is in essence an international
one.114 Unless the regional arrangements are fully coordinated and made truly universal
both in application and geography there remains the risk that the ‘port shopping’ will
continue to subvert the system.115
Despite the shortcomings of Port State Control, most commentators agree that it has
substantially improved the situation since the 1980s.116 Nevertheless there is still room
for improvement, a point that has been summed up as –
The port state control needs to become more effective in order to make it more difficult
for sub-standard ships to find some where to hide, to prevent them from plying its
waters. The flag state control and port state control are bound with each other. There is
117
a need for increased flag state and tighter port state control.

Despite significant success in ridding ports of the worst of the substandard ships,118 the
experiences of the Erika and the Prestige indicates that Port State Control still needs
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improvement before coastal States would be willing to trust the inspection records of
port States.
As well as improvements in flag State and Port State Control, improvement is also
needed in the other element of the safety net – classification societies.
Classification Societies
The final element of the safety net for shipping regulation is classification
societies.119Again, the Erika and Prestige sinkings exemplify problems that coastal
States have with the surveys and certification by classification societies since in both
cases significant doubts were raised about the competence and reliability of the surveys
for both ships. In the case of the Erika, RINA was found liable in the French courts120
and, in the case of the Prestige, action has been taken against ABS in the United States
courts.121
Classification societies perform two main functions. First, they regularly survey ships
entered with them to ensure that they are seaworthy. Secondly, many flag states have
delegated to them the flag State role of ensuring that the ships comply with international
requirements.122 The performance of classification societies varies widely between the
individual societies and whether or not they are members of the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS).123 In view of the heavy reliance placed
on classification society surveys,124 the standard of inspection and consistency of
reporting of classification societies it is important that the standards of classification
societies are maintained to the highest standard.
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One major problem with the classification system is the number of classification
societies.125 There are currently over 60 societies and their performance varies
widely.126 The problem lies not with the number per se but the fact that it promotes
unhealthy competition resulting in unsatisfactory performance.127 It also has the effect
of promoting ‘class hopping’ between Societies by substandard ships.128 In the case of
the Erika, the ship had been entered in four different classification societies during its
life. Since the 1990s a number of actions have been taken to improve the classification
system. These have been on industry, IMO and European Union levels.
At the industry level, IACS has taken steps to improve the services provided by its
members. In 1991 it introduced a Quality Management System Certification Scheme
(QSCS) against which the members are audited. The audit covers the Society’s Rules
and Regulations for classification services, the Society’s products and the
implementation of flag State requirements and aims to establish a degree of consistency
between all members.129 IACS has eliminated ‘class hopping’ by means of the Transfer
of Class Agreement. Under this process a transfer can only be granted where the ship
being transferred has met all the requirements of its current society. Also, ships over 15
years old require a special survey.130
The Comite Maritime International (CMI) has also attempted to improve the
classification system. In 1996 it produced two documents – Principles of Conduct for
Classification Societies and Model Clauses.131 In both documents an attempt was made
125

Juan Begines, ‘The EU Law on Classification Societies: Scope and Liability Issues’ (2005) 36 Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce 487, 492.
126
Anthony Antapassis, ‘Liability of Classification Societies’ (2007) 11/3 Electronic Journal of
Comparative Law 1, 5; See for example Paris MOU, Annual Report, 2008 42 <www.parismou/upload/
annrep/Annual%20 Report %20 2008.pdf>, which lists the performance of 27 Recognised Organisations.
127
Juan Begines, ‘The EU Law on Classification Societies: Scope and Liability Issues’ (2005) 36 Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce 487, 492-493.
128
Ibid 493; Philippe Boisson, ‘Classification Societies and Safety at Sea – Back to Basics to Prepare for
the Future’ (1994) 18/5 Marine Policy 363, 373; John Mansell, Flag State Responsibility (Springer, 2009)
132.
129
Hisayasu Jin, ‘The IACS Quality Management System Certification Scheme (QCSC) – In Progress’ 67<www.jterc.org.jp/english/kokusai/Hisayasu%20Jin.pdf>; this formed the basis for Council Directive
94/57/EC of 22 November 1994 on Common Rules and Standards for Ship Inspection and Survey
Organisations and the Relevant Activities of Maritime Administrations [1994] OJ L319/20 (Repealed by
Directive 2009/15/EC).
130
Juan Begines, ‘The EU Law on Classification Societies: Scope and Liability Issues’ (2005) 36 Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce 487, 500; John Mansell, Flag State Responsibility (Springer, 2009) 133.
131
The first sought to establish a duty of care for classification societies by, among other things,
publishing their rules, employing appropriately trained personnel and engage in technical research and
development. It also sought to establish standards of practice and performance in technical, administrative
and managerial matters, reporting and confidentiality. The Model Clauses which were to be used in

325

to deal with liability and compensation but no agreement could be reached.132
The IMO has also addressed the issue of standards of quality of classification societies
and the monitoring of these standards. First, in November 1993 it issued Guidelines for
the Authorization of Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration.133 The
Guidelines were designed to establish uniform procedures for delegation of functions to
recognised organisations, particularly the elements to be included in an agreement
between the flag State and the organisation, and to set minimum standards for
recognised organisations.134 Second, the IMO issued in November 2007, a Code for the
Implementation of Mandatory Instruments, 2007135and addresses delegation of authority
by flag States to classification societies.136
In response to the crisis of class, the European Union has also developed regulations for
the classification societies operating within the Union. In 2009 it issued Directive
2009/15/EC137 and Regulation (EC) No 391/2009.138 The Directive specifically refers
and is tied closely to the relevant IMO resolutions and requires that member States
comply with them.139 It permits member States to use only recognised organisations that
comply with Regulation 391/2009,140 enter into a written agreement with them that sets
out specific duties and functions including at least those set out in IMO Resolution
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A 739(18),141 and to audit their functions at least biennially.142 Regulation 391/2009
establishes the method of recognition of recognised organisations and sets out in Annex
1 the minimum criteria for the recognition and continued recognition of organisations.
Effect on Places of Refuge of Actions to Improve Classification Societies
The role of classification societies is integral to the functioning of maritime transport. In
both its roles heavy reliance is placed on the societies. The issuing of class certification
is indispensible for charterers and insurers and the proper and efficient conduct of flag
State responsibilities is essential to the safety of shipping and protection of the
environment as well as providing assurances to coastal States that ships are seaworthy
and cargo-worthy when deciding on requests for access to a place of refuge. The crisis
of class in the late 20th century resulted in much activity in the industry, at the IMO and
in the European Union. However, the failure of the classification system in the Erika
and the Prestige sinkings clearly indicates that there is still room for improvement. The
vital requirement is that the efficiency and reliability of the classification system must
be maintained and improved.143 The activities of all participants have the potential to
achieve this. However, more needs to be done to improve the accountability of
classification societies.144

3.

ISSUES OF LIABILITY, COMPENSATION AND LIMITATION

The IMO has stated that implementation of the IMO Guidelines for places of refuge is
the appropriate response to the places of refuge problem and that before any further step
is taken to address the problem, particularly the suggestion of a new convention, all
existing conventions dealing with liability and compensation should be ratified and
implemented. While the IMO Guidelines are a good first step in dealing with the
problem of places of refuge they do, nevertheless, have serious deficiencies. One of
these is that they fail to adequately address issues of liability and compensation and that
this failure could affect widespread adoption and implementation of them. One of the
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conclusions of the assessment of the IMO Guidelines in chapter four of this thesis was
that, ultimately, these issues would need to be addressed by the IMO either in
amendments to the IMO Guidelines or the current international conventions on liability
and compensation or in a new convention dealing solely with places of refuge. This is
also the view taken by CMI and other industry organisations.
The current international liability and compensation conventions are deficient in a
number of ways – subject coverage, the liabilities that are covered, the defences that are
available to shipowners and the ability of shipowners to limit that liability. All these
factors can result in a coastal State that has been requested to provide a place of refuge
being faced with the possibility of significant shortfalls in compensation for any damage
caused by the ship in need of assistance being granted access. Failure to address the
possibility of unfunded damage to a coastal State could influence the implementation of
any solution to the place of refuge problem, either the proper application of the IMO
Guidelines or the acceptance of the CMI draft Instrument.
Subject Coverage
In the event of all member States actually ratifying all the current international treaties,
the first question to be answered is whether this would mean that all possible
contaminants that could cause damage to a coastal state in the event of a ship in distress
being granted or refused a place of refuge, would then be covered. The subject matter of
the risks addressed by the international conventions does appear to cover most of the
possible contaminants that could give rise to liability and compensation. This is
particularly so with all forms of oil. However there are some gaps in the coverage of the
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Liquid Substances by Sea (HNS
Convention),145 such as coal and other bulk ships. Other ships such as container ships,
RoRo ships and car carriers are also not covered.146 While the gaps would mostly be
covered by the International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of
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Owners of Seagoing Ships (LLMC),147 the levels of limitation under this convention are
very low. This could have an effect on the funds available to meet claims for
compensation by coastal States where damage is caused by a ship which does not fall
within the parameters of the HNS Convention. These gaps, while not large, detract from
the claim that the implementation of the current international convention regime would
provide the answer to the problem of places of refuge. To include all possible sources of
pollution the international conventions would need to be amended to include these ships
carrying these products. However most of these products are low risk.148 In the absence
of a major incident, the low risk of such cargoes would provide little incentive for
including them in the liability regime.149 An alternative to amending the coverage in the
specific liability conventions could be to increase the limits under LLMC which covers
most damage caused by these ships.
Liability for Damage
The damage that can be caused by ship in need of assistance, whether granted access to
a place of refuge or not, can be extensive and can include: damage to the environment,
such as physical damage to beaches, ecosystems and animal life; economic damage,
such as fisheries, mariculture, port operations, water-based industries and tourist
operations; damage to personal or public property, such as wharves and other ships;
personal injury or loss of life to both the crew of the ship in need of assistance or to
salvors, port operations personnel and the inhabitants of the place of refuge; monetary
damages, such as the cost of clean up of an oil spill and salvage expenses.
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Liability for damage can attach to a number of parties which can vary according to
whether a place of refuge is denied or granted. However, not all damage creates a
liability under the current international conventions and strict liability only attaches to
the owner. Furthermore, even if the damage falls within the appropriate definition in the
conventions, it can be defeated if liability for such damage falls within any of the
defences available under the conventions. Liability for any damage not covered by such
definitions falls to be determined by the national law of the State in whose waters the
damage has occurred. In common law jurisdictions this generally150 requires the
claimant to take action in torts such as negligence, public nuisance or trespass151 and has
proved to be of limited benefit in places of refuge situations or cases of environmental
damage in general.152 The absence of a single adjudicating forum to determine damage
claims and the consequent reliance on national courts has been identified as a major
weakness not only of international regime but also the United States national system.
The potential conflict of national laws could lead to such problems as forum shopping
and other enforcement related issues.153
There are two major areas of contention in relation to what claims are compensable
under the liability and compensation conventions - claims for ‘pure economic loss’ and
claims for environmental damage per se. Each of these has the potential to create
significant gaps in the international compensation scheme. Also the defences available
under these conventions can have the result of exempting parties from liability for the
damage caused either wholly or partially.

Compensation for ‘Pure Economic Loss’
In relation to claims for ‘pure economic loss’,154 there is a lack of uniformity and
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consistency of approach between various legal systems and even between the legal
systems of neighbouring countries in relation to claims for pure economic loss. In the
common law jurisdictions, claims for ‘pure economic loss’ are either rejected totally, as
in England,155 the United States156

and Malaysia157 or permitted under certain

circumstances, as in Australia,158 New Zealand,159 Singapore160 and Canada.161 In civil
law jurisdictions, claims are permitted in France,162 Netherlands,163 Belgium, Spain,
Greece, Estonia, Latvia, Quebec and Japan, rejected in Sweden and Finland and
permitted under certain conditions in other countries such as Germany,164 Portugal,
Poland and Romania.165 For potential claimants for such losses this situation presents
serious implications. It also presents serious implications for countries whose
economies depend significantly on tourism as it is on this industry that oil spills have
potentially the most deleterious effects.
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The position is complicated further by the decisions of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund (IOPCF) set up to deal with claims under the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (Funds Convention).166 Claims made to and paid by the IOPCF have
disclosed a more liberal approach to pure economic loss than national laws.167 For
example in the loss of the Haven off Italy in April 1991, the IOPCF not only paid for
claims for loss of income by beach facilities such as shops, hotels, restaurants on the
waterfront but also businesses in the same town or area inland from the water and
regardless of whether they were located in France, Italy or Monaco.168 However where
the IOPCF decisions are appealed to national courts, the national law on pure economic
loss is generally applied.169 The rejection by not only the IOPCF but also the national
courts of most countries to which claims are made of claims by tourism operations,
hotels, restaurants, and other industries dependent on these operations such as food
suppliers and tour operators without proof of direct connection with the oil pollution is
not conducive to convincing coastal states to voluntarily risk damage to their tourism
income by permitting access to ships in need of assistance that could cause severe
pollution.
From the point of view of places of refuge, not only is there a problem of coastal states
taking the risk to their economies in accepting ships in need of assistance, there is an
element of risk that masters of such ships will seek to try to reach the waters of
countries where they are likely to receive better treatment. Even in small geographical
areas like the Baltic Sea, the existence of legal systems like Sweden and Finland which
reject claims for pure economic loss, Estonia and Latvia which take a liberal view of
such claims and Germany and Poland which take a restricted view creates a situation
166
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where simply by requesting a place of refuge in one country as opposed to another the
effects of the granting of such access could have very different results should there be
pollution damage. Similarly, along the coast of Western Europe, the legal systems of
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Spain are different from the United Kingdom, Ireland
and Portugal.
The lack of consistency in dealing with claims for ‘pure economic loss’ could seriously
hamper the implementation of a consistent places of refuge regime. The treatment of
claims for pure economic loss need to be clearly enunciated and set out in either the
IMO Guidelines or the international conventions need to be amended so that the
national courts are given sufficiently clear guidance on the meaning of the wording
thereby avoiding the necessity to import divergent national interpretations.
Compensation for Damage to the Environment per se
The second major concern with the international conventions is the extent to which
damage to the environment per se can be compensated.170 The risk of environmental
damage by oil spills is often cited as a reason why coastal States are reluctant to grant a
place of refuge to ships in need of assistance.171 A lack of clarity on liability for
environmental damage would only increase the reluctance of coastal States to offer as
place of refuge. The international conventions fail to provide this clarity.
Protection and preservation of the marine environment is an obligation placed on all
States under Article 192 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC)

172

and under Article 194.1 they are to take all necessary measures to prevent,

reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. The inability of the
international liability and compensation conventions to compensate for all
environmental damage that could be potentially caused by a ship seeking a place of
refuge could affect the ability of coastal States to comply with these obligations.
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As with ‘pure economic loss’ claims, the failure to adequately limit the potential width
of the definition in the liability and compensation conventions meant that it fell to
national laws to identify and quantify the loss. While liability for damage to persons and
to physical assets and, to some degree, damage to the economic interests of coastal
States and their inhabitants is reasonably settled, it is damage to the environment
necessitating rehabilitation and restoration that is not fully addressed in the international
conventions.173
The IOPCF has always refused to pay claims for damage to the environment that is not
quantifiable.174Attempts have been made in the United States and the European Union
to address compensation for damage to the environment. In Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico et al v The SS Zoe Colocotroni175 attempts were made to expand environmental
rehabilitation claims following an oil spill and found that the appropriate standard for
calculating damages was the cost of rehabilitation to its pre spill condition without
disproportionate expenditure.176 It is also addressed in the Oil Pollution Act 1990
(OPA)177 and Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).178 Under both Acts the emphasis is not on payment of damages per se but
more to ensure that there is restoration of the environment.179 Since the decision of the
Zoe Colocotroni, restorative measures must be reasonable.180 Compensation is also
payable under OPA for loss of public amenity such as loss of use of beaches and
recreational fisheries and what are termed ‘interim losses’, being the loss of use of the
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resources pending restoration,181 none of which would be recoverable under
international conventions but which could be significant in when a coastal State is
considering granting access to a place of refuge.
In the European Union, the Directive on Environmental Liability182 is based largely on
the United States legislation and the overall objective of compensation is to return the
damaged areas, species and resources to their pre pollution state.183 The application of
the Directive is only to the member States of the European Union and so is limited in its
effect. However, by excluding the application of the Directive to environmental damage
under other liability conventions, the European Union is attempting to influence the
IOPCF into expanding the scope of payment of claims for environmental damage to
include the matters covered by the Directive. It is also attempting to influence the IMO
into improving the international regime with an implied threat to introduce its own
liability regime if the IMO fails to do so.184
The reluctance of the IOPCF to pay for damage to the environment per se could
constitute a major difficulty for coastal States considering the granting of a place of
refuge to a ship which has the potential to cause serious damage to their environment.
The fact that damage to the environment per se may not be compensated for, with the
State being left to repair the damage at its own cost, would be a serious disincentive to
the granting of access in some cases. The conventions themselves restrict environmental
damage to the ‘costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to
be undertaken’,185 although the IOPCF does adopt a liberal attitude to the interpretation.
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As with claims for pure economic loss, to address the situation the international
conventions on liability and compensation would need to be expanded to incorporate
elements of environmental damage not currently covered. The IOPCF has made a start
by the 2002 revision of its Claims Manual but it is the conventions that need to be
amended as it is only by doing this will coastal States be given some assurance that they
will not be ultimately liable for rehabilitating the damaged environment.
Currently the scope of liability for environmental damage is limited to ‘costs of
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken’ and ‘the
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive
measures.’ What is lacking in the international conventions

are those elements

addressed in the European Union’s Directive on Environmental Liability and the United
States legislation on rehabilitation and restoration of the environment and loss of public
amenity which are more difficult to quantify by way of monetary damages. To expand
the scope of environmental damage to include these elements the definitions of
‘pollution damage’ and ‘damage’ could be amended to reflect more closely the
changing attitude to environmental damage in the European Union and the United
States.186 However, this approach is not supported by oil industry organisations such as
the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF)187 which argues
that not all environmental damage can be appropriately remedied by human intervention
and in some instances natural recovery is more appropriate. This opinion is reflected in
the IOPCF Claims Manual which confirms that it will only pay for measures actually
undertaken or to be undertaken.188
An alternative to amending the conventions on this point is the establishment of national
or industry funds which would provide for expenditure not otherwise likely to be
recovered under the conventions.189 In Canada such a damages fund was established in
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1995.190 The Environmental Damages Fund was established to provide funds to repair
the damage done to the environment by assessing and restoring the environment after
pollution damage has occurred and for education purposes. All fines awarded by
Federal and Provincial Courts for pollution offences is paid into the Fund and allocated
to projects in the area of the incident. It is allocated to local organisations including
government and non government organisations, aboriginal groups and universities who
must conduct the activities in a feasible, sound and cost effective way.191 Tanker owners
have also established two funds - the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification
Agreement (STOPIA 2006) and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
(TOPIA 2006).192
On a practical level, failure to address such issues could also threaten the international
approach to dealing with pollution damage in general, and in consequence the problem
of places of refuge, as the European Union has already taken steps to address the issues
and has threatened to create its own liability regime if the IMO fails to do so. With the
United States already adopting a separate liability model, a separate European model
would have serious effects on the ability of the IMO to continue to address the issue in
an international manner.
Defences Available under International Conventions
Under the international conventions, a shipowner is not absolutely liable for the damage
caused in a pollution incident and is entitled to the benefit of defences.
In the context of places of refuge, the defence which is most likely to affect a coastal
State’s deliberations on granting a place of refuge is the contributory negligence
defence, which is expressed as in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC 92):
If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially either
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who
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suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may be
exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such person.193
A ‘person’ in all the conventions includes ‘any public or private body, whether
corporate or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions’.194 Therefore,
the actions of a State and anyone representing the State in a place of refuge situation
would need to be examined to ascertain if the response to the request for a place of
refuge was negligent thereby exonerating the shipowner or IOPCF from some or all
liability. If the coastal State is found to have been negligent, not only will it be unable to
recover damages to its property and interests, it will expose it to third party claims by
salvors, insurers, charterers, shipowners and any other person affected by the damage.
It is unlikely that a claimant would be able to prove intent to cause damage and proof of
negligence would be more likely. In common law jurisdictions, to rebut a claim of
negligence a defendant would need to show that its decisions in dealing with a request
for a place of refuge were reasonable. These decisions would include not only the initial
decision to grant or refuse access but also the choice of place of refuge.195 The test for
reasonableness is objective and, in practice, would be answered most commonly by
reference to a sound system of evaluation that is fairly and transparently applied.196 The
use of processes such as the IMO Guidelines would assist in establishing the
reasonableness of the decisions involved.197 Proper application of the established
procedures, such as the IMO Guidelines, proper assessment of the risks involved in the
individual cases and seeking and following appropriate expert evidence where it would
be reasonable to do so would all assist in establishing that what the coastal State and its
port authorities did in the situation was not negligent.198 The same argument would
apply to the selection of a place of refuge that was appropriate for the particular ship
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and had appropriate facilities.199 Again the processes of selection set out in the IMO
Guidelines could be employed to ensure this.

The defences that are granted to shipowners under the international regime could
potentially result in the coastal State being liable fully or partially for the pollution
damage caused by the ship requesting the place of refuge. This risk to the coastal State
exists whether or not access is granted.200 The risk to the coastal State is more than
simply being unable to recover its own costs. Potentially it could be liable for third
party costs depending on how it acted in the situation.201
Under the existing international conventions on liability, coastal States are exposed to
liability from ships requesting places of refuge in many cases simply by their
geographical position by ships traversing their territorial seas and exercising their right
of innocent passage. As a result of the liability provisions of international conventions, a
request for a place of refuge by a ship in distress places coastal States in a position of
potential liability depending on the way such a request is handled. The risk of damage
to the coastal State with the added risk that the polluters may be able to escape liability
through defences in international conventions means that, unless they are assured that
the risk to their environment in accepting such ships is minimised or eliminated, there
could result a reluctance for coastal States to accept ships in need of assistance.
Limitation of Liability
The international conventions permit the shipowner to limit any liability which may
accrue following a pollution incident. The right to limit liability compounds the
problems facing coastal States under the international liability conventions. Already
faced with the possibility that the costs that can be recovered from the polluter will not
cover all damage that occurs, particularly for pure economic loss and damage to the
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environment, the costs they do recover can be reduced further by the ability of the
shipowner to limit its liability.
While the right to limit has been criticised on the basis that the whole purpose of the
international regime was to compensate the victim and not the shipowner202 and that
limitation conflicts with the ‘polluter pays’ principle and is therefore in breach of the
Rio Declaration,203 limitation of liability is so firmly entrenched in maritime law that it
is unlikely to disappear.204
Two ways that the system can be made more favourable to the coastal States and make
the risks of granting places of refuge more acceptable to them are by increasing the
possibility of limitation rights being lost and by continually increasing the liability
limits so that in all but the largest spills there are adequate funds to at least cover the
liabilities permitted under the international conventions.
To date the IMO has followed the second method and moved to increase the level of
limitation to cover most situations without removing the cap on claims. The increases
have been disaster driven.205 The increase in limits proposed in the 1984 Protocol to
CLC arose out of the fact that it was recognised that the level of limitation was too low
following the Amoco Cadiz spill.206 The same limits were set in CLC 92 since there was
an urgency for IMO action after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 of the United
States and also the IMO did not want to upset the consensus reached in the 1984
negotiations.207 Limitation levels were again raised in 2000 after the sinking of the
Erika. In 2003 after the sinking of the Prestige the IMO introduced the Protocol of
2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
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Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (Supplementary Fund Convention).208
Both moves were warranted as the claims history of the IOPCF for both sinkings have
disclosed that the total funds allowed under the 1992 Protocols may be just sufficient to
cover the Erika claims209 but totally inadequate for the Prestige.210
In the United States under the Oil Pollution Act 1990 and in the European Union under
the Directive on Environmental Liability, compensation for damage to the environment
has expanded out to include damage other than actual restoration costs. In the United
States the right to limit that liability, as well as all other liability, has been made more
easily breakable. This is one approach that could be taken if there is any suggestion of
changing limitation rights,211 another being the imposition of a system of unlimited
liability. The notion of unlimited liability is not totally unknown.212 Pollution legislation
in a number of American States contains no right to limit,213 although OPA does. So
does the legislation of all signatories to LLMC and other liability conventions. The right
to limit has widespread support but its continued justification has been questioned.214 It
has been argued that it detracts from the ‘polluter pays’ principle215 and also that the
availability of the right to limit results in under-deterrence as the polluter is not fully
exposed to the consequences of its actions.216
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There have also been suggestions that compensation for environmental damage can be
subdivided from the general right to limit liability. It is argued that damage to the
natural environment is different to damage to the economic interests of third parties or
coastal States. Just as limitation of liability could result in under-deterrence for the
polluter, so, unlimited liability could mean that third parties fail to take proper
precautions for their rights if they knew all liability would attach to the polluter. The
argument proceeds that because it is not possible to take precautions to prevent damage
to the natural environment the polluter should be fully liable for damage to the natural
environment and natural resources. The one exception to this distinction is fishermen
and others dependent for their livelihood on the natural environment should be entitled
to unlimited compensation.217
Despite these arguments it is clear that the system of limitation of liability will not
disappear218 despite the view of one commentator that ‘It is hoped that the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 turns out to be the statute which sounded the death-knell of maritime
limitation of liability’.219 All that may happen is that limitation levels will continue to
increase to take account of most pollution spills and that the breadth of the definition of
‘pollution damage’ may increase. If these or other changes are to be made they can only
be made in the international sphere by amending the liability and limitation
conventions.
Amending IMO Guidelines
An alternative to amending the international conventions could be changes to the IMO
Guidelines. Despite the obvious benefits of compulsion and enforceability of the
international convention approach to improving the response to the places of refuge
problem, there is still a place for improved IMO Guidelines. However, in practical
terms, there is a limit as to what changes can be brought about. Where international
conventions deal clearly and in detail with issues then the IMO Guidelines would be
unable under normal circumstances to effectively cover the same ground in a different
way. However there are substantial gaps in liability coverage particularly in relation to
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pure economic loss and damage to the environment per se in which IMO Guidelines
could be employed to aid interpretation.
The IMO Guidelines as currently written are essentially a risk management tool.220 They
do not attempt to address legal considerations of the granting or refusing of a place of
refuge.221 To be more responsive to the needs of coastal States and shipping interests,
the IMO Guidelines would need to be expanded to deal with these legal considerations.
One amendment to the IMO Guidelines which could be considered is the inclusion of a
document similar to the IOPCF Claims Manual either into the body of the IMO
Guidelines or as an Annex. In relation to issues of liability, particularly for pure
economic loss and damage to the environment per se, guidance needs to be given to the
shipowner’s insurers and national courts for claims that international liability and
compensation conventions give specific jurisdiction to national courts as opposed to the
IOPCF.222 As described earlier in this chapter, the IOPCF tends to be more liberal in its
interpretation of ‘pollution damage’ than national courts.223 The IOPCF Claims
Manual224 sets out in detail the scope of compensation and evidence needed for clean up
and pollution prevention measures, claims for property damage, claims for economic
loss in the fisheries, mariculture and fish processing sectors, claims for economic loss in
the tourism sector, claims for measures to prevent pure economic loss and
environmental damage and post spill studies. Claims in all these areas are permitted
subject to the claimant satisfying specific criteria.225 This differs from the approach
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taken by courts in many common law jurisdictions where claims for pure economic loss
and damage to the environment unrelated to property damage are rejected in accordance
with established national legal principles.
The inclusion into the IMO Guidelines of detailed criteria for claims that could
potentially flow from the granting or refusing of a place of refuge would have a number
of potential advantages.
First, such a document would align treatment of claims by national courts with those
made against the IOPCF for claims arising out of a place of refuge situation. This would
have the benefit of creating a fairer balance between the liability of the shipowner, and
therefore their insurers, under the CLC 92 and other non-Fund conventions226 and the
receivers of oil carried by sea who finance the Fund Conventions.227 This balance would
be achieved by the reduction of claims on the IOPCF since initial claims would be met
by the shipowners and insurers under the non-Fund conventions. It would also have the
effect of reinforcing the ‘polluter pays’ principle228 since a more liberal interpretation of
‘pollution damage’ under non-Fund conventions would result in more liability attaching
to the actual polluter rather than to the importer of oil.
Second, the inclusion of detailed criteria into the IMO Guidelines could provide national
courts with a basis for permitting exceptional treatment when considering claims
relating to damage flowing from the grant or refusal of a place of refuge. In common
law jurisdictions, judicial decisions can be distinguished from other decisions where a
good and sufficient reason exists. For example, take the case of a claim by a hotel owner
whose business is indirectly affected by a loss of trade flowing from an oil spill. Under
established legal precedent this would probably be rejected as ‘pure economic loss’.229
If, however, in a place of refuge situation where the IMO Guidelines provide for
payment of such a claim in appropriate circumstances and this possibility was known to
all parties prior to access being granted or refused through its inclusion in the IMO
Guidelines, the courts might by exception permit such a claim. While there is no
guarantee this would result particularly in light of the fairly strict rule in the United
226
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Kingdom,230 the High Court of Australia has shown a willingness to allow claims for
pure economic loss in appropriate circumstances231 as have the courts of Canada232 and
New Zealand.233 In civil law jurisdictions, the willingness of the French Courts to
support the decisions of the IOPCF and to take note of the criteria in the Claims Manual
provides a precedent for judicial treatment of such documentation.234
Finally, in the case of claims for environmental damage, the inclusion in the IMO
Guidelines of a clear enunciation of the criteria used by the IOPCF in assessing such
claims would be beneficial. Claims for damage to the environment are different to
claims for pure economic loss. The scope of claims for environmental damage is
specifically limited in Fund Convention and the Supplementary Fund Convention to
reasonable costs of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken. Any
compensation for damage to the environment per se along the lines of the United States
Oil Pollution Act or the European Directive on Environmental Liability would require
this provision of the Fund Convention to be amended. This is one example where
amendments to the IMO Guidelines without concurrent amendments to the liability
conventions could not assist in expanding liability. Nevertheless, clear guidance along
the lines set out in the IOPCF Claims Manual on environmental damage and post spill
studies could help in delineating the scope of claims that could be made under the nonFund conventions.
On the question of compensation, a major point of contention between the ship-owing
interests and the coastal States is the provision of security in the form of guarantees
before a ship can be granted access to a place of refuge. The main problem for coastal
State interests is the right of shipowners to limit whatever liability they may owe for
damage done to facilities, economy and environment of the coastal State.235 Currently
under the international liability conventions, shipowners are required to take out and
maintain insurance up to the limit of liability under the convention.236 In legal terms, the
only way of formally changing the insurance requirements, the right to limit or the
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limitation amounts is through amendment to the liability conventions.237 However, on a
practical level, the IMO Guidelines could be amended to provide more fully than
present for ad hoc situations where the shipowner and its insurers may agree to provide
security for all forms of losses flowing from the decision to grant access, including
waiving the right to limit.238
In relation to security of payment, the IMO Guidelines currently refer to the provision of
guarantees in favour of a port in two instances. First, the IMO Guidelines recommend,
as a general rule, that security be provided for port costs involved in providing a place
of refuge such as port dues, pilotage and measures to safeguard the port.239 Second, as
one of the risk factors in Appendix 2, is a consideration of whether a bank guarantee or
other financial security acceptable to the coastal State is imposed before access is
granted. It is not clear what this guarantee would cover but as it is listed under
‘operational conditions, particularly in the case of a port’ and in the same context as the
availability of tugs and pilotage,240 it is arguable that this guarantee is limited to the
security for operational expenses recommended in paragraph 3.14 of the IMO
Guidelines. This would need to be clarified. The provision of guarantees to cover
liabilities other than operational expenses could be provided for in the IMO Guidelines
by including a requirement that the shipowner provide some form of guarantee for the
liabilities of the coastal State at least up to the limit of liability as soon as possible after
the incident to avoid any delay in assessing the request for access. In this regard the
International Group of P&I Clubs have provided the Legal Committee of IMO with a
draft letter covering all liabilities of its member to the coastal State for wreck removal
and pollution clean-up and prevention measures up to $10 million, although it was later
stated that this amount would be increased depending on the circumstances and was not
a total amount for all cases.241 It is unlikely that the P&I Clubs would agree to such a
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letter being expanded to cover unlimited liability,242 even though the limit of liability
for pollution damage provided by P&I Clubs to its members in most cases far exceeds
the liability amounts available under the liability conventions.243 This cover would need
to be limited solely to damage suffered by the coastal State leaving other third parties
who suffer damage to claim under the liability conventions. The use of P&I Club cover
in this way could have the advantage of increasing the amount available under the
liability conventions. Alternatively the P& I Club cover could be used in instances
where the IOPCF cover is inadequate or if for any reason the IOPCF cover is denied.244
The issue of limitation of liability would also need to be addressed. While unlimited
liability would be difficult to achieve in a practical sense under the current insurance
arrangements, the relative freedom of coastal States under international law to impose
conditions on access to ports could result in coastal States unilaterally imposing a
condition requiring the waiving of liability rights.245 In this regard Spain introduced on
6 February 2004 by Royal Decree 210/2004,246 among other things, a requirement that
all ships requesting a place of refuge pay a financial guarantee based on tonnage of the
ship and that the shipowner waive the benefit of limitation.247 However, this approach
has been criticised even by Spain’s shipowners association as being self defeating248
and amounting to a virtual refusal of access if the shipowner is unable or unwilling to
comply with these requirements.249
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The risk of such legislation is that all other considerations of granting access to a place
of refuge could made subject to compliance with financial guarantee requirements. A
better approach has been taken in Belgium under the Marine Environment Protection
Act 1999 which requires a bond or guarantee, albeit not on an unlimited basis, to be
provided by a shipowner involved in an incident which may threaten the environment.
Failure to provide such a security does not prevent access but merely subjects the ship
to the risk of arrest.250
If a provision is placed in the IMO Guidelines permitting guarantees in excess of
liability limits as a condition of access, it is important that it be made clear that failure
to agree on such a guarantee must not preclude access where other indicators clearly
show that access should be granted.251 Further, any bond should be based on clear
criteria and should cover only those measures or expenses that are available under
current State legislation. Anything more could have the effect of undermining the
liability conventions under which the coastal State would have to establish
compensability.252
4.

Incentives for Coastal States to Use the IMO Guidelines

Although it has been argued that failure to address the issues of liability and
compensation could have the effect of some coastal States refusing to adopt and apply
the IMO Guidelines,253 there are other reasons why coastal States should adopt and
implement the IMO Guidelines, whether they are expanded or not.
Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out that under the liability conventions, coastal
States could be liable for not only their own pollution costs but for the costs incurred by
third parties if the actions of the coastal States or their agents and employees amount to
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negligence which partially or wholly causes the resultant pollution damage. Any
allegation of negligence could be rebutted by evidence that the actions of the coastal
State were reasonable and it was argued that the proper use application of the IMO
Guidelines could provide this evidence.254
There are other ways under which coastal States could be found liable in damages in a
place of refuge situation and for which proper use of the IMO Guidelines could assist in
rebutting liability.
Where third parties are unable to obtain compensation under the international liability
regime for any reason or the compensation is inadequate, there is a possibility of taking
action against the State which either negligently refused access to a place of refuge or
having granted access negligently fails to take reasonable steps to ensure such action
does not result in pollution damage.255 The channelling provisions of CLC 92 and the
HNS Convention do not include the actions of a State or public authorities or their
employees, and the Bunkers Convention has no channelling provisions at all.256
Therefore it is open to third parties under these conventions to take action against a
State or States involved in the granting or refusal of a place of refuge. This is so even
though there would be serious questions of causation since the claims would not have
the benefit of the strict liability provisions of the conventions.257
Also, under the Fund Convention and the Supplementary Fund Convention, the IOPCF
is subrogated to the rights of the claimants and can take action against the person
responsible for the pollution damage, including the coastal State, for recovery of the
payments made.258 In this regard, the IOPCF took action against the Milford Haven Port
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Authority for losses arising out of the Sea Empress incident in February 1996. The
IOPCF paid out in excess of thirty six million pounds and sued to recover its losses on
the basis that the port authority had negligently failed to assess that the entry of the Sea
Empress into port was safe and for allowing the ship into port without such an
assessment.259 The case settled with the port authority reimbursing the IOPCF twenty
million pounds.260 In the Erika case, the IOPCF originally considered taking action
against the French State for the alleged negligence of the local authorities and the
French Navy. Criminal charges failed against these defendants and no further recovery
action by the Fund has been taken.261 The attitude of the IOPCF to recovery actions is
exemplified by the deliberations on the case of the Al Jaziah I. Although this was a
recovery action against the negligence of the shipowner, most delegations considered
that the IOPCF should play a part in discouraging the operation of substandard ships and enforcing the
‘polluter pays principle’. In recommending that the IOPC Funds should pursue a
recourse action those delegations recognised that the prospects of enforcing a
favourable judgement were limited, but that it was in their view nevertheless important
262
for the Funds to take a stand.

If this attitude is also taken against negligent actions of port authorities or other State
authorities, there is a likelihood that recovery actions against coastal States, as in the
Sea Empress case, will increase in number and size.
Finally, even where a claimant has a right against the IOPCF there is nothing to prevent
action being taken directly against the coastal State instead.263
Other than potential liability under the liability conventions, the possible bases for
liability of coastal States in a place of refuge situation include the liability of States for
cross boundary environmental damage and breach of international obligations to protect
the environment under LOSC. For these areas of potential liability, the adoption and
implementation of rules such as the IMO Guidelines could assist in rebutting liability.
259
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Liability for Cross Boundary Environmental Harm.
It has long been recognised under both customary international law and international
convention that a State is not totally free to do whatever it wants within its own territory
if such actions affect other States.264 This is sometimes referred to as the principle of
‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’.265 Where harm is done to a State by the actions of
another State, action may be taken either by way of arbitration or in the International
Court of Justice.266
In the Trail Smelter Arbitration267 the United States took action against Canada for air
pollution in Washington State emanating from a zinc smelter in British Columbia. In
finding for the United States and awarding damages for pollution damage the arbitral
tribunal held:
Under the principles of international law…no state has the right to use or permit the use
of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
of the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
268
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.

Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972269 reinforces the obligation of States
to protect the environment and not cause damage to other States-
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
270
national jurisdiction.

In applying these findings to the case of pollution damage affecting another State
flowing from a decision to grant or refuse a place of refuge, liability can attach to the
first State if it is breach of the obligation to prevent cross boundary environmental harm.
This is, of course, in addition to any damage which flows from a breach of an
international convention.
Although there is some doubt as to whether liability is strict or not, the better view is
that the breach is based on fault in an objective sense.271 Whether or not the conduct of a
coastal State in a place of refuge situation gives rise to liability where damage flows to
another State depends on the facts of each case.
However, if the State can show it made its decision in a clear, systematic and reasonable
manner, such as following the processes set out in the IMO Guidelines, arguably it may
be able to rebut any claim for compensation.272
International Obligations to Protect the Environment
States have obligations under LOSC as well as principles of international environmental
law to protect the environment, including the marine environment. The need for a ship
in need of assistance to be granted access to a place of refuge can pose serious threats to
the marine environment and the coastal States in such instances are obliged to take steps
to protect the marine environment.273 While it was established in chapter four of this
thesis that this does not oblige coastal States to grant access to a place of refuge, to
270
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prove compliance with international obligations it would be advantageous for coastal
States to be able to show that a decision to grant or refuse access was properly made.274
Specific measures are to be taken by States under Article 194(1) to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from all sources. Specifically on ship
sourced pollution, Article 194(3)(b) of LOSC requires that these measures include
measures for ‘preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the
design, construction, equipment, operation and management of ships.’ While some of
these obligations, particularly the last category, fall mainly on flag States, the
obligations to take measures to prevent pollution could equally fall on coastal States.275
Trans-boundary pollution that could arise from a place of refuge situation is also dealt
with by subsequent provisions. Under Article 194(2) these measures are to be conducted
so as ‘not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not
spread beyond areas where they exercise sovereign rights…’. Article 195 adds ‘[i]n
taking measures to prevent and control pollution of the marine environment States shall
act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to
another or transform one type of pollution into another.’ These provisions effectively
codify the second part of Article 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.276
The Rio Declaration of 1992 introduced the notion of sustainable development. One of
the major principles expounded in the Rio Declaration is that of the precautionary
principle.277 In the context of places of refuge, the precautionary principle can be
adopted even where the extent of possible damage is unknown. It should also be used
by policy makers when determining contingency planning, location of places of refuge
and risk management plans.
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In the event that a State fails to comply with the duties imposed under Part XII of
LOSC, there are two articles which could impose liability. Under Article 235(1) ‘States
are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in
accordance with international law’. More specifically under Article 232, in enforcing
obligations under Articles 213-231 of LOSC ‘States shall be liable for damage or loss
attributable to them arising from measures taken … when such measures are unlawful
or exceed those reasonably required in the light of the available information.’278
In all these areas adoption and implementation of the IMO Guidelines would assist the
coastal State when drawing up plans and making decisions on requests for a place of
refuge.279
CONCLUSION
The IMO Guidelines make it clear that decisions concerning the granting of a place of
refuge to ship in need of assistance can be the subject of outside influences.280 This
chapter has sought to examine the factors that could possibly influence a coastal State in
making such decisions. In a broader sense, these factors could also affect the decisions
of a coastal State to adopt and apply the IMO Guidelines at all and even more the
decisions of a coastal State to ratify the CMI draft Instrument should it ever become an
international convention.
This chapter has highlighted a number of possible factors which, unless properly
addressed, could result in the coastal States exercising their sovereign power to refuse
access to its internal waters to any ship whether in need of assistance or not.
The coastal State must be satisfied that the ship requesting access is unlikely to cause
serious damage to the coastal State’s territory, environment or population. This involves
the coastal State being satisfied that the ship is properly maintained and certified. In this
278
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regard it is important that the necessary improvement in ship design and improved
industry regulation currently being made by the IMO, the European Union and other
States such as the United States be maintained and continued.
Even if the coastal State can be satisfied that any ship seeking access is likely to be
properly maintained and certified, there is also a need for attention to be give to the
current IMO Guidelines and international conventions with respect to issues of liability
compensation and limitation. This chapter has established that the current international
liability conventions are inadequate in many areas and therefore are not in themselves
an appropriate response to the places of refuge problem. They do not cover all possible
pollutants nor do they cover important areas of liability such as pure economic loss and
environmental damage. Also the system of limitation and the levels at which the
limitation is set do nothing to induce a coastal State to take the risk of granting access to
a ship in need of assistance that, in many cases, is simply transiting its territorial waters.
Not only does the coastal State run the risk of damage to its economic interests and
environment which are not covered by the international liability conventions but also,
potentially, the decision on the request for a place of refuge and the way it is handled
could mean that it loses all rights of recourse against the shipowner and could also
expose itself to liability to third parties.
From the point of the shipowner, the international liability conventions and also the
existence of national legislation outside the international conventions create serious
uncertainties. The current state of provisions governing civil liability for pollution
damage is confused and precarious. The lack of consistency between adjoining
countries and even within countries on such issues as compensable damage and levels
of limitation does not create a situation where a master of a ship in need of assistance
can simply request the closest State for a place of refuge. The differences on vital issues
could result in the master seeking to proceed on a voyage until such time as the ship can
access a place of refuge in a country which is most likely to grant access and on the
most favourable terms should the ship cause pollution damage, thereby putting the ship
at risk of disaster.
The answer to the places of refuge problem depends heavily on coastal States being
willing to grant access to ships in need of assistance. To encourage coastal States to
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readily grant such access and avoid incidents like the Erika and Prestige, the
international liability conventions will need to be improved to create a more equitable
balance between the interests of coastal States to protect its economy and environment
and the interests of shipowners in seeking and being granted a place of refuge when it is
required.
The current unsatisfactory state of international law has been summed up:
The saga of the Prestige epitomizes in many respects why reform is needed in this area
of international law. Current international law shelters flags of convenience, single
hulled tankers, sham corporations, marginal operators, shadowy owners and totally
inadequate caps on liability for the actual damages suffered from a catastrophic oil
spill….The net result is that lip service is paid to owner ‘responsibility’ that, in reality,
amounts to monetary liability caps meeting 10 or 15 per cent of the actual damages
from a massive spill. Meanwhile, others who profit greatly from the transport of oil on
the world’s oceans escape not only paying for any damages but also even public
disclosure of their role and potential responsibility. In major oil spills, it is a myth that
the polluter pays. In the case of the Prestige, those who suffered the greatest damage
from the marine pollution were coastal café owners, small boat fishermen and other
bystanders having nothing to do with the business of the passing tanker. The victim or
281
his fellow taxpayers paid. International law must do better.

The current situation has too many uncertainties to provide shipowners with assurance
that requests for a place of refuge will be granted and to provide coastal States with any
degree of confidence that it can provide access when requested without running the risk
of being left with a massive ecological and economic disaster from a ship that may be
substandard and carrying dangerous cargo. More needs to be done to reduce these risks
so that either the IMO Guidelines or, if necessary, the CMI draft Instrument on places of
refuge can be properly and effectively implemented.
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CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

The proposition that has been put forward in this thesis is that the two current solutions
to the problems of places of refuge, namely the IMO Guidelines and the CMI draft
Instrument, are inadequate and that a new approach is required. It is now eleven years
since the sinking of the Erika and eight years since the Prestige incident. Although there
has been a substantial amount of work at the international, regional and national levels
to find a workable solution to the problem of places of refuge, the question must be
asked whether the actions of the IMO, the CMI and other States and regional
organisations to date would be sufficient to eliminate the possibility of such events
reoccurring. The answer to this question, based on the evidence presented in the thesis,
is that the current solutions would be insufficient to prevent the next, inevitable,
disaster. This concluding chapter will synthesise the evidence presented in this thesis to
substantiate this answer and will then comment on ways that the current solutions can
be improved to better balance the interests of all parties to the places of refuge problem.
The evidence to substantiate the conclusion reached in this thesis, has been examined
and assessed by the achievement of four objectives – to establish that the problem is a
current problem; to establish that international law currently does not have the answer to
the problem; an examination of the activities of the IMO and other international
organisations as well as States and regional institutions to see if they can provide an
answer; an analysis of the two current proposals, the IMO Guidelines and CMI draft
Instrument to see if they provide an adequate answer as well as an examination of
external factors which could affect the effective implementation of either or both
proposals.
The first objective of the thesis was to establish that the problems concerning places of
refuge are significant and current. This was achieved in chapter one. By examining the
cases of the Erika, Castor and the Prestige, it was demonstrated that the problem of
places of refuge clearly flows from a substantial change being made to what was
considered to be an unwritten custom of the sea that ships in distress were always
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granted a place of refuge. The rights that flowed from the granting of a place of refuge
were significant and reflected the needs of distressed ships both of the crew and the
shipowner and cargo owners. This change in attitude has resulted in a conflict between
those interests concerned with the successful completion of the voyage and those
interests concerned with the preservation of the marine and coastal environment. A
solution to this conflict has proved elusive particularly since the industry safety net that
should have, to a large degree, prevented the cause of the problem has failed. The
problem is still current since the IMO Guidelines are deficient in many respects and the
proposed solution of an international convention would rely greatly on coastal States
being willing to compromise their sovereignty over their internal and territorial waters.
The attitude of States such as Spain and France in expelling all single hulled tankers
from their waters gives little hope for any compromise.
The second objective of the thesis was to review the places of refuge problem in the
context of international law to ascertain whether or not there is a basis for arguing that
there exists in international law a right for ships to access the ports of coastal States
either in general or for ships in distress in particular. This was done in chapters two and
three. The conclusion of chapter two was that neither conventional international law nor
customary international law impose a general right of access for ships to access ports.
The only basis for allowing access is based on bilateral treaty obligations, but this right
is limited to ships of the treaty parties and is not of a general nature. The conclusions
reached in chapter three were that there is no specific right under any multilateral treaty
compelling a coastal State to grant access to ships in distress but that there has existed
and there continues to exist under customary international law an obligation on a coastal
State to grant access to ships in distress, although the scope of the custom has changed
over time. The analysis shows that, today, the extent of the obligation to grant access to
a place of refuge to ships in distress under customary international law has been greatly
circumscribed to be one of humanitarian assistance only and that, outside the
requirement to protect human life, a request by a ship in distress for access to a port or a
place of refuge is now to be treated in the same way as any general request for access.
As a result of the current inability of international law to provide the answer to the
problem, it was necessary to examine other alternative solutions.
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The third objective of the thesis was to examine and evaluate current international,
national and regional methods of dealing with the issues associated with the grant of
access to places of refuge. This was achieved in chapters four, five and six. The overall
conclusion of chapter four was that, while there are some beneficial elements in the
international approach to the problem through the implementation of the IMO
Guidelines, the IMO Guidelines by themselves do not provide an answer. There are
serious deficiencies in the IMO Guidelines which need to be addressed either through
amendments to them or through other means. As with the international approach to the
problem, the examination in chapter five of the way in which Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom apply the IMO Guidelines disclosed some beneficial elements,
especially the creation of an independent decision maker in Australia and the United
Kingdom. However this examination was sufficient to show that there is a general lack
of consistency of approach in the application of the IMO Guidelines even in these three
countries. Chapter six considered a regional approach and concluded that, in theory,
there is no reason why such a regional approach could not be used. However, this would
only be beneficial in a regional arrangement like the European Union where there is the
ability to apply a consistent approach in the regional member States. If this cannot be
done then the regional arrangement would not be totally satisfactory as it would still not
eliminate the inconsistency problem inherent in the national law approach but would
merely reduce it in number. A regional approach would be much inferior to an
international solution and would still suffer from the same problem of acceptability to
nation States.
The fourth objective of the thesis involved analysing the two proposals to remedy the
problems associated with the granting of a place of refuge and the external factors
which could affect the way these remedies might be put into practice. The proposals
examined were the IMO Guidelines and the CMI draft Instrument. The IMO Guidelines
were examined and assessed in chapter four and the CMI draft Instrument in chapter
seven. The external factors were investigated in chapter eight.
The conclusion reached in relation to the IMO Guidelines was that they are a good first
step to dealing with the problem and at the very least are better than nothing. However,
in the short term, the IMO Guidelines suffer from significant weaknesses. These
weaknesses flow essentially from the perceived need to produce a document to satisfy
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an urgent need and that the end product is the lowest common denominator sufficient to
attract support from its member States. The IMO Guidelines steer clear of impinging on
the sovereignty of coastal States at the expense of providing certainty of access to a
place of refuge to ship masters and salvors in a distress situation. The end product is a
document that is arguably biased towards the interests of coastal States while seeking to
deal with the rights of shipowners and shipping interests in an advisory and non-binding
way. Significantly, the failure to deal with issues of liability and compensation runs the
risk of severely hampering acceptance of the IMO Guidelines by coastal States and
increases the possibility that incidents like the Erika, Castor and Prestige will reoccur
due to risk based decisions being overruled on political or other extraneous grounds.
Chapter seven concluded that the CMI draft Instrument could provide more clarification
on the rights and obligations of all parties but in doing would significantly alter the
current balance between these interests to favour the shipping interests. Furthermore, in
attempting to provide greater certainty the draft creates further confusion. The duty to
permit access, which the shipping interests would require, is not absolute but qualified
by the need to perform assessments on the potential to affect coastal State interests. As
such the CMI draft Instrument goes little further than the current application of the IMO
Guidelines. Similarly, the benefits that would accrue to a coastal State for the surrender
of sovereignty are insufficiently dealt with. The final conclusion in Chapter seven was
that the time has not yet come for a new convention but that this might change should
another Prestige disaster occur and provide a ‘clear and well-documented compelling
need’ for a new convention.
Chapter eight considered the various external factors that might influence the decision
by a coastal State when a request is made for a place of refuge. Since both the IMO
Guidelines and CMI draft Instrument suffer from significant weaknesses, these factors
could be vital in the decision making process. The chapter found that the issue of ship
age and design are important but that they are being addressed by the IMO and the
European Union and other States. Of more significance is the failure of the IMO
Guidelines and the current international conventions on liability and compensation to
properly address all the potential damage to the place of refuge whether access to a
place of refuge is granted or denied. On this point, the chapter concluded that the
current international conventions are inadequate in many areas to deal with potential
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damage to a place of refuge. The international conventions do not cover all possible
pollutants nor do they cover important areas of liability such as pure economic loss and
environmental damage. Also the ability to limit liability and the levels at which the
limitation is set do nothing to induce a coastal State to take the risk of granting access to
a ships in need of assistance that in many cases are simply transiting its national waters.
The position of the coastal State is compounded by the fact that, potentially, the
decision on the request for a place of refuge and the way it is handled could mean that it
loses all rights of recourse against the shipowner and could also expose itself to liability
to third parties. The overall conclusion to the chapter is that the current situation has too
many uncertainties to provide shipowners with assurance that requests for a place of
refuge will be granted and to provide coastal States with any degree of confidence that it
can provide access when requested without running the risk of being left with a massive
ecological and economic disaster from a ship that may be substandard and carrying
dangerous cargo. More needs to be done to reduce these risks so that either the IMO
Guidelines or, if necessary, the CMI draft Instrument can be properly and effectively
implemented.
The sinking of the Erika and the Prestige and the treatment afforded the Castor exposed
significant problems in the way in which requests for access by ships in distress and in
need of a place of refuge are handled by coastal States. Despite the significant work
done by the IMO, CMI and other international bodies as well as States and the
European Union, there still is no satisfactory answer to the problem of places of refuge.
The two current solutions go some way to addressing the concerns of all interests but
neither is able, as currently drafted and implemented, to properly balance these interests.
In the absence of a satisfactory balance between shipping interests and coastal States,
external factors threaten the proper implementation of the IMO Guidelines and could
seriously affect the future acceptability of the CMI draft Instrument.
The introduction to this thesis began with a quote from the Secretary General of the
IMO stating that ‘we cannot continue to permit a situation to unfold in which salvors
dealing with a damaged ship containing a potentially hazardous cargo have nowhere to
go’. On present evidence, this is still the situation and will be for the foreseeable future.
The necessary balancing of interests of shipowners and coastal States has not been
satisfactorily achieved. The obvious benefits to shipowners of a place of refuge in times
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of distress cannot be achieved without the coastal State being satisfied that it should
surrender its ability to refuse entry to such ships. This cannot be achieved without a
clear and reliable improvement to not only the ships themselves but also the way in
which the evidence of the seaworthiness of such ships are provided by the industry
regulators. The goodwill of coastal States cannot be assumed without the shipping
industry playing its part. The shipping industry and the industry regulators must
improve their performance to give coastal States this comfort. By the same measure,
coastal States must understand that the very fact that they have coastlines and ports
gives them significant economic advantages from such activities as tourism, fishing,
mariculture as well as the payment of port dues and the ability to freely export their own
goods and produce. These benefits should not come without a price. This price may
include the taking of reasonable risks to their economy and environment of permitting
ships in need of assistance to access places of refuge.
Any proposal to deal with the problem of places of refuge must be an international one.
The role of the IMO must be supported and reinforced by its member States so that
there is no fragmentation of efforts to find a solution. From the viewpoint of the
shipowner, master and salvor of a ship in need of assistance, there should be no reason
why the location of the ship should in any way affect the treatment it receives. While
the IMO Guidelines have the potential to provide an international approach to dealing
with the problem, they cannot be allowed to stagnate. The IMO must continue to
develop them and to encourage coastal States to adopt and apply them. In doing so the
IMO must address the issues that it avoided because of the need to provide a urgent
response to the Prestige sinking, namely, liability and compensation for damage done
by ships in a place of refuge. The risk of failing to continue with the development of the
IMO Guidelines is that States will, out of frustration, develop their own methods of
dealing with the issues. For example, the United States, while it applies the IMO
Guidelines, has already developed ways of dealing with the issues of liability and
compensation through the Oil Pollution Act 1990 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act that are at variance with the
policies of the IOPCF and other States. Similarly, the European Union requires its
member States to apply the IMO Guidelines but has also begun to examine the issues of
liability and compensation in Directive 2009/17/EC. Not only does the Directive seek
to adapt the IMO Guidelines to European requirements, but also requires the European
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Commission to prepare a report on liability and compensation issues for presentation to
the European Parliament in 2011. Unless the IMO ceases its ‘wait and see’ attitude to
any further development of the IMO Guidelines, the actions of the European Union
could potentially fragment the international approach to the problem.
While the approach to the problem of granting access to places of refuge needs to be an
international one, the success of any proposal to remedy the places of refuge problem
relies and will always rely on the goodwill of coastal States to adopt and properly apply
the IMO Guidelines or ratify any convention which may eventually flow from the CMI
draft Instrument. In this regard, the policies of coastal States vary widely. Some coastal
States, such as the United Kingdom, have a stated policy of granting access to all ships
in need of assistance. On the other hand, Spain, France and Portugal have acted
differently. The post-Prestige actions of these three States of banning all single hulled
tankers from, not only their internal waters and territorial sea, but also their EEZs, and
the statements made by Spain during the IMO negotiations of the IMO Guidelines,
indicate that, in some instances at least, they are prepared to put their national interest
ahead of any need to grant access to places of refuge. Most other coastal States fall
within these extremes.
Some coastal States such as Australia and the United Kingdom and, potentially, the
member States of the European Union have appointed independent decision makers,
while most have not. National laws of many coastal States on vital issues of liability and
compensation vary widely not only among common law countries but also civil law
jurisdictions. The IMO Guidelines as well as the current conventions on liability and
compensation need to be amended to reduce the divergence of national laws so that
shipowners and salvors can be satisfied that they will receive consistent and predictable
treatment wherever the ship is located when a place of refuge is required and coastal
States can confidently assess the likelihood of sufficient compensation being available
should any grant of access to a place of refuge result in economic and environmental
damage.
Currently, there is no comprehensive answer to the problem of places of refuge.
Ultimately, powers of sovereign States must be respected until such time as they are
willing to forego those powers generally through multilateral international action or
specifically through bilateral action. A convention flowing from the CMI draft
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Instrument could provide such an opportunity. The best that can be done short of this is
to convince coastal States to act in a way that is consistent and beneficial to the interests
of other coastal States and the shipping industry through the medium of codes of action
such as the IMO Guidelines. The test for all interests involved in places of refuge is to
improve the IMO Guidelines either with or without improvements to existing
international conventions concerning liability and compensation so that coastal States
can be convinced that any risk involved in granting a place of refuge will not result in
an economic and environmental disaster.
Since most advances in shipping safety and pollution control are disaster driven, it may
be that a comprehensive response to the places of refuge problem must await another
Prestige disaster. In such a situation, as presaged by CMI, it may be that the CMI draft
Instrument will be the appropriate response. Until then, the present, uncertain situation
will continue. This sentiment, succinctly summarised by Aldo Chircop et al, is a
convenient point to end this thesis :
It is clear that the modern day problem of places of refuge for ships in distress,
in particular in relation to large commercial vessels carrying hazardous, noxious
and other dangerous cargos and fuel oil, offers no easy or obvious solutions and
is likely to persist for as long as maritime trade continues.1

1

Aldo Chircop, Olof Linden and Detlef Nielsen, ‘Characterising the Problem of Places of Refuge’ in
Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds), Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of
a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 1, 31.
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other Harmful Substances, opened for signature 13 September 1983, Misc 26 (1983)
9104 (entered into force 1 September 1989)
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), opened for signature 6
August 1985, 24 ILM 1422 (entered into force 11 December, 1986)
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, opened for
signature 7 February 1986, UNTS Chapter XII -7, Vol-2 (not yet in force)
Single European Act opened for signature 28 February 1986 25 ILM 506 (entered into
force 1July 1987)
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,
opened for signature 30 November 1990, 30 ILM 733 (entered into force 13 May 1995)
Treaty on European Unity, Maastricht, opened for signature 7 February 1992, 31 ILM
247 (entered into force 1 November 1993)
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, opened
for signature 9 April 1992, BNA 35:0401 (entered into force 17 January 2000)
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
opened for signature 22 September 1992, 32 ILM 1068 (entered into force 25 March
1998)
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 27 November 1992,
RMC I.7.111, II.1.7.111 (entered into force 30 May 1996)

412

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for
signature 27 November 1992, 1953 UNTS 255 (entered into force 3 May 1996)
Protocol to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, opened for signature 7 July 1995, 1969 UNTS 82 (entered
into force 1 February 1997)
Protocol of 2 May 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, opened for signature 2 May 1996, RMC I.2.340 II.2.340 (entered into
force 13 May 2004)
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Liquid Substances by Sea, opened for
signature 3 May 1996, 25 ILM 1406 (not yet in force)
Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, opened for signature 15 March 2000, 2000 HNSOPRC/CONF/11/Rev.1, entered into force 14 June 2007
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, opened
for signature 27 March 2001, 40 ILM 1493 (entered into force 21 November 2008)
Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, opened for
signature 5 October 2001, IMO Doc AFS/CONF 26 (entered into force 17 September
2008)
The Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992, opened for
signature 16 May 2003, RMC II.7.115 (entered into force 3 March 2005)
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, opened for signature 23
May 2007, LEG/CONF.16/19 (not yet in force)

2.3

Bilateral Treaties

2.3.1

United Kingdom

Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Sweden, signed 11 April
1654, ATS 1901 No 99 (entered into force 11 April 1654)
Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, signed 10 July 1654, II Hertslet 8 (entered
into force - not known)
Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Sweden, signed 17 July
1656, ATS 1901 No 100 (entered into force - not known)
Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Sweden, signed 21 October
1661, ATS 1901 No 101 (entered into force 21 October 1661)
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Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Denmark, signed 13
February 1661, ATS 1901 No 23 (entered into force - not known)
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and Spain, signed 23 May 1667,
II Hertslet 140 (entered into force - not known)
Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Denmark, signed 11 July
1670, ATS 1901 No 24 (entered into force - not known)
Convention between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland on Fisheries, Boundary and Restoration of Slaves, signed 20
October 1818, 12 Bevans 57 (entered into force 30 January 1819)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and Russia, signed 12 January 1859, ATS 1901 No 92 (entered into force 1
February 1859)
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and Colombia, signed 16 February 1866, ATS 1901 No 19 (entered
into force 17 October 1866)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and Italy, signed 15 June 1883, ATS 1901 No 65 (entered into force 1 July
1883)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and Greece, signed 10 November 1886, ATS 1901 No 54 (entered into force 21
April 1887)
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and Honduras, signed 21 January 1887, ATS 1901 No 59 (entered
into force 3 February 1900)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and Mexico, signed 27 November 1888, ATS 1901 No 71 (entered into force 11
February 1889)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and Japan, signed 15 July 1894, ATS 1901 No 66 (entered into force 17 July
1899)
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and Nicaragua, signed 28 July 1905, 1736 UNTS 252 (entered into
force 3 September 1906)
Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Great Britain,
signed January 11, 1909 36 Stat 2448, UKTS No 5481 (entered into force 5 May 1910)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Portugal, signed 12
August 1914, 1677 UNTS 236 (entered into force 23 September 1916)
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Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, signed 20
December 1951, UNTS No 1956 ( entered into force 19 May 1952)
Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation between the United Kingdom and
Japan, signed 14 November 1962, UNTS No 6934 (entered into force 14 May 1963)
2.3.2

United States

Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and France, signed 6
February 1778 <http://avalon.yale.edu/18th_century/fr1778-1.asp> (entered into force
17 September 1778)
Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of Prussia and the
United States, signed 10 September 1785, <http://avalon.yale.edu/18th_century/prus
1785.asp> (entered into force 17 May 1786)
Treaty with Morocco, signed 28 June and 15 July 1786, <http://avalon.yale.edu/18th_
century/bar1786t. asp> (entered into force 18 July 1787)
Treaty of Peace and Amity, signed at Algiers 5 September 1795,<http://avalon.yale. edu
/18th_century/bar1795t.asp> (entered into force 7 March 1796
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between His Britannick Majesty and the
United States of America, London signed 19 November 1794, <http://avalon.yale.
edu/18th_century/jay.asp> (entered into force 29 February 1796)
Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation Between Spain and the United States,
signed 27 October 1795, <http://avalon.yale.edu/18th_century/sp1795.asp> (entered
into force 2 August 1796)
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed at Tripoli 4 November 1796, <http://avalon.
yale.edu/18th_century/bar1796t.asp> (entered into force 10 June 1797)
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed at Tunis 28 August 1797, <http://avalon.
yale.edu/18th_century/bar1797t.asp> (not proclaimed)
Treaty of Peace and Amity, signed at Tripoli 4 June 1805,<http://avalon.yale.edu/19th
_century/bar1805t.asp> (entered into force 22 April 1806)
Treaty of Peace, signed at Algiers 30 June and 3 July 1815, <http://avalon.yale.edu/
19th_century/bar1815t.asp> (entered into force 26 December 1815)
Treaty of Peace, signed at Algiers 22 and 23 December 1816, <http://avalon.yale.
edu/19th_century/bar1816t.asp> (entered into force 11 February 1822)
Treaty of Amity, Settlement and, Limits and Navigation Between the United States and
His Catholic Majesty, signed 22 February 1819, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_
century/sp1819.asp> (entered into force 22 February 1821)
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Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and
His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, signed 12 February 1828, <http://avalon.yale.edu/
19th_century/brazil01.asp> (entered into force 18 March 1829)
Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and Siam signed
20 March 1833 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. xxii (1833-34), 590 (entered into
force 14 April 1836
Convention of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Chili, signed 16 May 1832, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_
century/chile01.asp> (entered into force 29 April 1834)
Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States, signed 5 April 1831, 9 Bevans 764 1968 (entered into force
– not known)
Morocco – Treaty of Peace, signed 16 September 1836, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_
century/bar1836t.asp> (entered into force 30 January 1837)
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between the United States of
America and Venezuela, signed 20 January 1836, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/
venez001.asp> (entered into force 31 May 1836)
Convention for the Adjustment of Claims by Citizens of the United States on the
Government of the Mexican Republic, signed on 11 April 1839, 9 Bevans 783 1968
(entered into force 11 April 1839)
Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
signed 1 December 1845, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/sic1845.asp> (entered
into force 24 July 1846)
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Guatemala, signed 3 March 1849, 10 Bevans 873, 461
(entered into force 13 May 1852)
Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Hawaii, signed 20
December 1849 Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics (2004) 115 (entered into force
24 August 1850)
Convention of 1853 between Great Britain and the United States, signed on 8 August
1853 <http://avalon.yale.law.edu/19th_century/br1853.asp>; 12 Bevans 1968 111
(entered into force 20 August 1853)
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Argentina and the
United States of America, signed 27 July 1853, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century
/argen02.asp> (entered into force 9 April 1855)
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Bolivia, 13 May 1858, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_
century/bolivia01.asp> (entered into force 8 January 1863)
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Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the King
of the Belgians, signed 17 June 1858, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/be1002
.asp> (entered into force 19 April 1859)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the
Ottoman Empire, signed 25 February 1862, <http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/ot
1862.asp> (entered into force 22 July 1862)
Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, signed 10 December 1898,
<http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp> (entered into force 6 February 1899)
General Claims Convention between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States, signed 8 September 1923, 9 Bevans 935 1968 (entered into force 1
March 1924)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Greece, signed 3 August 1951, 224 UNTS 279 (entered into force 13 October
1954)
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations Between the United States and Togo signed 8
February 1966 680 UNTS 159 (entered into force 5 February 1967)
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations Between the United States and the Kingdom of
Thailand signed May 29 1966 652 UNTS 253(entered into force 8 June 1968)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Korea, signed 28 November 1956, 302 UNTS 281 (entered into force 7 November
1957)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Israel, signed 23 August 1951, 219 UNTS 237 (entered into force 3 April 1954)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Italy, signed 2 April 1948, 79 UNTS 171 (entered into force 26 July 1949)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Japan, signed 2 April 1953, 206 UNTS 143 (entered into force 30 October 1953)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and China, signed 4 November 1946, 25 UNTS 69 (entered into force 30 November
1948)
Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and Germany, signed 29 October 1954, 273 UNTS 3 (entered into force 14 July 1956)
Treaty of Friendship Establishment and Navigation between the United States of
America and Belgium, signed 21 February 1961, 480 UNTS 149 (entered into force 3
October 1963)
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Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, signed 15 April, 1972, 23 UST 301 (entered into
force 15 April 1972)
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, signed 22 November 1978, 30 UST 1383
(entered into force 22 November 1978)
Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International law Governing Innocent Passage
signed between the USA and the USSR 23 September 1989 28 ILM 1444

2.3.3

Australia

Agreement on Commerce between the Commonwealth of Australia and Japan, signed 6
July 1957, ATS 1957 No 15 (entered into force 4 December 1957)
Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan, and
Protocol, signed 16 June 1976, ATS 1977 No 19 (entered into force 20 August 1977)

2.3.4 Ireland
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Irish Free State and Portugal, signed
29 October 1929, 131 LNTS 145 (entered into force 26 July 1932)
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Irish Free State and Germany 12 May
1930,131 LNTS 153 (entered into force 26 July 1932)
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Ireland and the United States
of America signed 21 January 1950 Irish Treaty Series 1950 No 7 (entered into force 14
September 1950)

2.3.5

Canada

Treaty between Canada and the United States of America for Securing the Preservation
of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean, signed 2 March, 1923, UST No 701
(entered into force 23 October 1924)
Agreement relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland and
Canada, signed 17 December 1973, UNTS 1974 No 13550 (entered into force 13
March 1974)
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of
Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, signed 26 August 1983
CTS 1983 No 19 (entered into force 26 August 1983)
Agreement between Canada and France establishing a court of arbitration for the
purpose of carrying out a delimitation of maritime areas, signed 30 March 1989, 1583
UNTS 1990 26 (entered into force 30 March 1989)
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Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Kingdom of Denmark constituting an Agreement to amend Annex B of the 1983
Agreement relating to the Marine Environment, signed 7 October 1991, CTS 1991 No
35 (entered into force 7 October 1991)

3.

NATIONAL LEGISLATION

3.1

United Kingdom

Responsibility of Shipowners Act 1733, 7 Geo 2, c 15
Act for the Registration of British Vessels of the United Kingdom 1824, 4 Geo 4, c 41
Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, 10 Vict, c 27
Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 Geo 5, c 4
Dangerous Vessels Act 1985 (UK) c 22
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK) c 21
Maritime Security Act 1997 (UK) c 28
Marine Safety Act 2003 (UK) c 16
Merchant Shipping (Port State Control) Regulation 1995 (UK) SI 1995/3128
Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1997 (UK) SI 1997/1820
The Merchant Shipping (Port State Control) (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (UK) SI
2003/1636
Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (UK)
SI 2004/303

3.2

Australia

Australian Constitution
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth)
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth)
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Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth)
Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 1981 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 (Cth)
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth)
Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990 (Cth)
Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth)
Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth)
Marine Pollution Act 1987 (NSW)
Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW)
Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW)
Marine Act 1988 (Vic)
Protection of Marine Waters (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1987 (SA)
Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act 1987 (WA)
Transport Operations (Marine Pollution) Act (Qld)
Marine Pollution Act 1999 (NT)
Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act 1987 (Tas)

3.3

United States

Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 Pub L 107-295, 116 Stat 2064
Oil Pollution Act 1990 33 USC 2701 (2009)
Port and Waterways Safety Act 1972 33 USC 1228 (2009)
Deepwater Ports Act 1974 33 USC 1501-24 (2009)
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Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33 USC 1251 (2009) (now known as the Clean
Water Act)
Intervention on the High Seas Act 33 USC 1471(2009)
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42
USC 103 (2009)
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1978 43 USC 1331 (2009)
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorisation Act 1976 43 USC 34 (2009)
Limitation of Liability Act 1851 46 USC 189 (2009)
Magnuson Act 50 USC 191 (2009)
Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act 1970 Fla Laws Ch 70-244
Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act 1973 38 MRSA 349
Natural Resource Damage Assessments 15 CFR 990 (2005)
Natural Resource Damage Assessments 43 CFR 11.80 (2005)
Double hulls on tank vessels, 33 CFR 157.10(d) (2008)

3.4

Canada

Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3
Customs Act 1927 RSC 1927 c 42
Ocean Dumping Control Act SC 1974-75-76, c 44
Canada Water Act 1985 RSC 1985, c C-11
Canada Shipping Act 1985 RSC 1985, c A-12
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1985 RSC 1985, c A-12
Marine Transportation Security Act 1994 SC 1994, c 40
Migratory Birds Convention Act, SC 1994, c 22
Oceans Act 1996 SC 1996, c 31
Canada Marine Act 1998 SC 1998, c 10
Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999 SC 1999, c 33
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Canada Shipping Act 2001 SC 2001, c 26
Confederation Bridge Area Provincial (PEI) Laws Application Regulations SOR 97375

3.5

New Zealand

The Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 (NZ)
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 (NZ)

3.6

Spain

Royal Decree 9/2002, of 13 December 2002, whereby measures are adopted for tankers
carrying dangerous or contaminated cargoes, Boletin Oficial del Estado, 14 December
2002, entered into force on 1 January 2003
Royal Decree 210/2004 on the monitoring and information of the maritime traffic
Boletin Oficial del Estado No 39, 14 February 2004, 6868-6878 entered into force on 15
February 2004

3.7

European Union

Council Directive 93/75/EEC of 13 September 1993 concerning minimum requirements
for vessels bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting
goods [1993] OJ L247/19
Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on a common policy on safe seas [1993] OJ 271/1
Council Directive 94/57/EC of 22 November 1994 on Common Rules and Standards for
Ship Inspection and Survey Organisations and the Relevant Activities of Maritime
Administrations [1994] OJ L319/20
Council Directive 95/21/EC on Port State Control of 19 June 1995 [1995] OJ L157/1
Council Directive 98/25/EC of 27 April 1998 amending Directive 95/21/EC concerning
the enforcement, in respect of shipping using Community ports and sailing in the waters
under the jurisdiction of the Member States, of international standards for ship safety,
pollution prevention and shipboard living and working conditions (port State control)
[1998] OJ L133/19
Commission Directive 98/42/EC of 19 June 1998 amending Council Directive 95/21/EC
concerning the enforcement, in respect of shipping using Community ports and sailing
in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Member States, of international standards for
ship safety, pollution prevention and shipboard living and working conditions (port
State control) [1998] OJ L184/40
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Commission Directive 1999/97/EC of 13 December 1999 amending Council Directive
95/21/EC concerning the enforcement, in respect of shipping using Community ports
and sailing in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Member States, of international
standards for ship safety, pollution prevention and shipboard living and working
conditions (port State control) [1999] OJ L331/67
Directive 2001/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December
2001 amending Council Directive 94/57/EC on common rules and standards for ship
inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime
administrations OJ L19/9 (Repealed by Directive 2009/15/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 [2009] OJ L131/47)
Directive 2001/106/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December
2001 amending Council Directive 95/21/EC concerning the enforcement, in respect of
shipping using Community ports and sailing in the waters under the jurisdiction of the
Member States, of international standards for ship safety, pollution prevention and
shipboard living and working conditions (port State control) [2001] OJ L19/17
Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002
establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and
repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC [2002] OJ L208/10
Directive 2002/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November
2002 amending the Directives on maritime safety and the prevention of pollution from
ships [2002] OJ L324/53
Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004
on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage [2004] OJ L143/56
Directive 2009/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for
the relevant activities of marine administrations Official Journal of the European Union
[2009] L131/47
Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on port state control Official Journal of the European Union [2009] L131/57
Directive 2009/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
amending Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring
and information system Official Journal of the European Union [2009] L131/101
Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
February 2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent requirements
for single hulled tankers and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94 [2002] OJ
L 64/1
Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
June 2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency Official Journal of the
European Union [2002] OJ L208/1
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Regulation (EC) No 2099/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5
November 2002 establishing a Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (COSS) and amending the Regulations on maritime safety and the
prevention of pollution from ships [2002] OJ L324/1
Regulation (EC) No 1644/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
July 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime
Safety Agency [2003] OJ L245/10
Regulation (EC) No 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
July 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of
double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers [2003] OJ
L249/1
Regulation (EC) No 724/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31
March 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European
Maritime Safety Agency [2004] OJ L 129/1
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31
March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security Official Journal of the
European Union [2004] OJ L 129/6
Regulation (EC) No 2172/2004 of 17 December 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No
417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the accelerated phasing-in
of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers [2004] OJ
L371/26
Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 December 2006 on multiannual funding for the action of the European Maritime
Safety Agency in the field of response to pollution caused by ships and amending
Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 [2006] OJ L194/1
Regulation (EC) No 457/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
April 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of
double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers [2007] OJ
L113/1
Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 2009 adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure referred to in
Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC with regard to the
regulatory procedure with scrutiny [2009] OJ L87/109
Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 of the European Parliament and Council 2009 of 23
April 2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey
organisations [2009] OJ L 131/11
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4.

CASES

4.1

Permanent Court of International Justice/ International Court of Justice

SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgement) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.
Albania) [1949] ICJ Reports 4
Asylum (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Reports 266
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Norway) (Jurisdiction) [1951] ICJ Reports
116
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Application)
[1970] ICJ Reports 3
Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 14
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua
intervening) [1992] ICJ Reports 351
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ
Reports 226
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Reports 7

4.2

International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea

M/V Saiga (No.2) (St Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) <www.itlos.org/case_
documents/2001/document_en_68.pdf>

4.3

Permanent Court of Arbitration and other International Arbitral Bodies

Portendick case (1834) reported in A de la Pradelle and N Politis Receuil des
Arbitrages Internationaux Volume 1 (Les Editions Internationales, 1957) 522
The Comet reported in John Bassett Moore A Digest of International Law, Vol 2
(Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 350
The Encomium reported in John Bassett Moore A Digest of International Law, Vol 2
(Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 350
The Creole reported in John Bassett Moore History and Digest of the International
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party Volume 4 (1898) (Government
Printing Office Washington) 4375.
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The Enterprise reported in John Bassett Moore History and Digest of the International
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party Volume 4 (1898) (Government
Printing Office Washington) 4349
The Hermosa reported in John Bassett Moore History and Digest of the International
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party Volume 4 (1898) (Government
Printing Office Washington) 4374
The Brig Ann (1839) 9 Bevans 1968 783
The Susannah reported in John Bassett Moore History and Digest of the International
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party Volume 4 (1898) (Government
Printing Office Washington) 4348.
Closure of Buenos Aires case (Great Britain v Argentina) (1870) 2 Arb Int 637
Antonio Pelletier and AH Lazare claims (1884) reported in John Bassett Moore A
Digest of International Law, Vol 2 (Government Printing Office, Washington 1906)
1749
The Crescent City reported in John Bassett Moore A Digest of International Law, Vol 2
(Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 269
Orinoco Steamship Company Case (United States v Venezuela) reported in James Scott
The Hague Reports Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 1916) 226
Poggioli case, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (1903) X Reports of International
Arbitral Awards 669
Martini case, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (1903) X Reports of International
Arbitral Awards 644
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (Great Britain v United States of America) (1910) XI
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 173
Island of Palmas Arbitration Case (United States v The Netherlands) (1928) XI Reports
of International Arbitral Awards 829
Kate A Hoff v the United Mexican States concerning the vessel Rebecca (1929) 23
American Journal of International Law 860
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) (1941) 3 Reports of International
Arbitral Awards 1907
Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v France) (1957) 24 ILR 101
Arbitration between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO (1963) 27 ILR 117
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4.4

Decisions of National Courts

4.4.1 England
Bates case (1610) 2 State Trials 371
Luke v Lyde (1759) 97 ER 614
The Eleanor (1809) Edw 135, 165 ER 1058
Dudley Canal Navigation Co v Glazebrook (1830) 1 Barnewall and Adolphus 59
Kish v Taylor (1912) AC 604
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v Lennard Carrying Co. Ltd (1914) 1 KB 419
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562
Esso Petroleum Company Limited v Southport Corporation (1956) AC 218
The Bramley More (1964) P 200
Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller Partners Limited (1964) AC 565
The Lady Gwendolen [1964] 2 Lloyd's List Law Reports 99, Court of Appeal [1965] 1
Lloyd's List Law Reports 335
Anns v Merton Borough Council (1978) AC 728
The Marion [1984] 2 Lloyds Reports 1
The Morning Watch [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 547
Murphy v Brentwood Municipal Council (1991) 1 AC 398
Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd; The Nicholas H [1995] 2 Lloyds
Reports 299
Semco Salvage and Marine Pte Ltd v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd; The Nagasaki Spirit
(1997) AC 455
Environment Agency v Milford Haven Port Authority and Andrews; The Sea Empress
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 673
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MS Merkur Sky MBH & Co KG v MS Leerort Nth Schiffarts
GmbH & Co KG; The Leerort [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 291
RJ Tilbury & Sons (Devon) Ltd et Ors v The Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and Regions et Ors [2003] EWCA Civ 65
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4.4.2 Scotland
Skerries Salmon Limited v the Braer Corporation, Assuranceforeninger Skuld and
IOPCF [1998] ScotCS 83
P&O Scottish Ferries v the Braer Corporation, Assuranceforeninger Skuld and IOPCF
[1999] ScotCS 3
Landcatch v IOPC Fund [1999] ScotSC 116

4.4.3 Ireland
ACT Shipping (Pte) Ltd v The Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney
General [1995] 2 ILRM 30

4.4.4

St Helena

Merk and Djakimah v the Queen Supreme Court of St Helena Supreme Court Case No
12, 1991

4.4.5

Australia

New South Wales v the Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337
Caltex Oil Pty Limited v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529
Robinson v The Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283
Schlederer v The Ship Red Fin [1979] 1 NSWLR 258
Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424
Dietrich v the Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292
Bryan v Murphy [1995] HCA 17
Perre v Arpand Pty Limited [1999] HCA 36
United Salvage Pty Ltd. v Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC (The La Pampa) [2006] 163
FCR 151
Qenos Pty Ltd v The Ship APL Sydney [2009] FCA 1090

4.4.6 New Zealand
Invercargill CC v Hamlin [1996]UKPC 56
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4.4.7

Singapore

RSP Architects Planners and Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd and another [1996] 1
SLR 113
Man b and W Diesel S E Asia Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR 300

4.4.8

Malaysia

Government of Malaysia v Cheah Foong Chiew and Ors [1993] 2 MLR 439

4.4.9

Canada

The Nabby reported in the Quebec Mercury #43 Tuesday October 27 1818, 340
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Canada (Attorney General) v McDonell (1883) 1 Ex CR 99
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SS May v The King (1931) 3 DLR 15.
SS Queen City v the King, SS Tillie M v the King and SS Sunrise v the King (1931) 3
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MacDonald et al v Vapor Canada Ltd [1977] 2 SCR 134
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In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor General In Council concerning property
in and legislative jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf
offshore Newfoundland and set out in Order-In-Council P.C. 1982-1509 dated the 19th
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The Attorney General of Canada v The Attorney General of British Columbia [1984] 1
SCR 388
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R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 401
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co [1992] 1 SCR 1021
Winnipeg Condominium Corp No 36 v Bird Construction Co [1995] 1SCR 85
Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v St John Shipbuilding Ltd [1997] 3 SRC 1210

4.4.10 United States
Hallet & Bowne v Jenks 7 US 210 (1805)
Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 11 US 116 (1812)
The Brig Concord 13 US 387 (1815)
The Argo 15 US 287 (1817)
The New York 21 US 261 (1818)
The Aeolus 16 US 392 (1818)
The Experiment 13 US 387 (1823)
United States v Libellants of Schooner Armistad 40 US 518 (1841)
The Diana 74 US 354 (1868)
The Nuesta Señora de Regla 84 US 29 (1872)
The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 (1900)
Cunard SS Co v Mellon 262 US 100 (1923)
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company v Flint 275 US 303 (1927)
Ultramares Corporation v Touche 255 NY 170 (1931)
Lauritzen v Larsen 345 U.S 571 (1953)
Khedivial Line SAE v Seafarers International Union 278 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir 1960)
Petition of the Kinsman Transit Company 338 F 2d 708 (2nd Cir 1964)
Burgess v M/V Tamano 370 F. Supp 247 (D Me 1973)
Askew v American Waterways Operators Inc 411 US 325 (1973)
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Portland Pipeline Corporation v Environment Improvement Commission 307 A 2d 1
(Me 1973)
Union Oil v Oppen 501 F 2d 558 (9th Cir 1974)
Venore Transportation Company v M/V Struma 583 F 2d 708 (4th Cir 1978)
The Tug Ocean Prince Inc v United States 584 F 2d 1151 (2nd Cir 1978)
Steuart Transport Co v Allied Towing Corp 596 F 2d 609 (4th Cir 1979)
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al v The SS Zoe Colocotroni 628 F 2d 652 (1st Cir
1980)
In re Bethlehem Steel Corporation 631 F 2d 441 (6th Cir 1980)
State of Louisiana v M/V Testbank 752 F 2d 1019 (5th Cir 1985)
In Re Complaint of Armatur SA 710 F Supp 390 (DPR 1988)
Sundance Cruises Corp. v Am Bureau of Shipping 7 F 3d 1077 (2nd Cir 1993)
Ballard Shipping Co. v Beach Shellfish 32 F 3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994)
Cargill Inc. v Bureau Veritas 902 F Supp 49 (SDNY 1995)
Carbotrade SpA v Bureau Veritas 99 F 3d 86 (2d Cir 1996)
Otto Candies LLC v Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp 346 F 3d 530 (5th Cir (La) 2003)
Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, Inc 528 F Supp 2d 455 (SDNY 2008)
4.4.11 Italy
Joined Cases 676/86 and 337 and Others, General Nation Maritime Transport
Company and Others v Patmos Shipping Company and Others, Court of Messina, 1st
Civil Division, 30 July 1986; Messina Appeals Court 24 December 1993
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Netherlands v Bergings en Transportbeddrijf Van den Akker and Another, Netherlands
v Dissotis Shipping Corporation (Attican Unity) Netherlands Supreme Court 7 February
1986 reproduced in Elihu Lauterpacht, Alan Oppenheimer and Christopher Greenwood
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5.

International Organisation Resolutions and Documents

5.1

United Nations

United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, Oceans and the law of the sea –
Report of the Secretary General A58/65 dated 3 March 2003
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, GA Res 58/240, UNGAOR, 58th Session, UN Doc
A/RES/58/240 (23 December 2003)
United Nations General Assembly, Contribution of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) to the Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the
Sea (Assembly Resolution A/RES/58/240) - Preliminary Considerations <www.un.
org/Depts/los/ general_assembly/contributions2004/IMO2004.pdf>

5.2

International Maritime Organisation

5.2.1

Assembly

5.2.1.1 Assembly Resolutions
Assembly, 9th Session, Resolution A 358(IX) Title and Substantive Provisions adopted
on 14 November 1975
Assembly, 10th Session, Resolution A 400(X) Institutionalisation of the Committee on
Technical Cooperation adopted on 17 November 1977
Assembly, 12th Session, Resolution A 466(XII) Procedures for the Control of Ships
adopted 20 November 1981
Assembly, 12th Session, Resolution A 500 (XII) Resolution A.500 (XII) Objectives of
the Organisation in the 1980’s adopted on 20 November 1981
Assembly, 12th Session, Resolution A 555(XII) Objectives of the Organisation in the
1980’s adopted 20 November 1981
Assembly, 18th Session, Resolution A 739(18) Guidelines for the Authorisation of
Organisations Acing on Behalf of the Administration adopted on 4 November 1993
Assembly, 18th Session, Resolution A 741(18) The International Safety Management
Code adopted on 3 November 1993
Assembly, 18th Session, Resolution A 777(18) Work Methods and Organisation of
Work in Committees and their Subsidiary Bodies adopted on 4 November 1993
Assembly, 19th Session, Resolution A 787(19) Procedures for Port State Control
adopted on 23 November 1995
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Assembly, 20th Session, Resolution A 847(20) Guidelines to Assist Flag States in the
Implementation of IMO Instruments adopted on 27 November 1997 (revoked by
Assembly Resolution A 973(24) – Code for the implementation of IMO Instruments
adopted on 1 December 2005)
Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 882(21) Amendments to the Procedures for Port
State Control (Resolution A.787(19)) adopted on 25 November 1999
Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 900(21) Objectives of the Organisation in the
2000’s adopted on 16 November 1999
Assembly, 21st Session, Resolution A 901(21) IMO and Technical Co-operation in the
2000’s adopted on 25 November 1999
Assembly, 22nd Session, Resolution A 909(22) Policy Making in IMO – Setting the
Organisation’s Policies and Objectives adopted on 29 November 2001
Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 943(23) Long-Term Work Plan of the
Organization (Up to 2010) adopted on 5 December 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 946(23) Voluntary IMO Member State Audit
Scheme adopted on 27 November 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 949(23) Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships
in Need of Assistance adopted on 5 December 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Resolution A 950(23) Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)
adopted on 5 December 2003
Assembly, 24th Session, Resolution A 974(24) Framework and Procedures for the
Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme adopted on 1 December 2005
Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 989(25) Strategic Plan for the Organisation (for
the six-year period 2008-2013) adopted on 20 November 2007
Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 990(25) High-Level Action Plan of the
Organisation and Priorities for the 2008-2009 Biennium adopted on 29 November 2007
Assembly, 25th Session, Resolution A 996(25) Code for the Implementation of
Mandatory IMO Instruments, 2007 adopted on 29 November 2007

5.2.1.2 Assembly Documents
Assembly, 21st Session, Report of the Council to the Assembly on the Work of the
Organisation Since the 20th Session of the Assembly A 21/8/1 dated 28 July 1999
Assembly, 22nd Session, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting A 22/SR 5 dated
21 November 2001
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Assembly, 23rd Session, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting A 23/SR 2
dated 7 June 2004
Assembly, 23rd Session, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting A 23/SR 4
dated 7 June 2004
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports and Recommendations of the
Maritime Safety Committee - Note by the Secretary-General A 23/17 dated 30 July 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Committees of the
Assembly – Report of the Administrative, Financial, Legal and Technical Co-operation
Committee A 23/5(b)/1 dated 4 December 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Committees of the
Assembly – Report of the Technical Committee to the Plenary A 23/5(b)/2 dated 4
December 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Long-Term Work Plan, Including the Consideration of
Guidelines for its Preparation A 23/15/1/Ad .2 dated 4 November 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports and Recommendations of the
Maritime Safety Committee – Draft Assembly resolutions finalised by NAV 49 – Note by
the Secretary-General A 23/17/Add 1 dated 23 October 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports and Recommendations of the
Maritime Safety Committee – Outcome of LEG 87 – Note by the Secretary-General A
23/17/Add 2 dated 23 October 2003
Assembly, 23rd Session, Consideration of the Reports and Recommendations of the
Legal Committee – Note by the Secretary-General A 23/18 dated 18 August 2003
Assembly, 24th Session, Consideration of the Reports and Recommendations of the
Legal Committee – Note by the Secretary-General A 24/10 dated 4 October 2005

5.2.2

Council

Council, 82nd Session, Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting C 82/SR 6 dated 16 June
1999
Council, 82nd Session, Draft Report of the Council to the Assembly on the work of the
Organisation since the twentieth regular session of the Assembly – Note by the
Secretary General C 82/26(c)/1 dated 7 May 1999
Council, 21st Extraordinary Session, Consideration of the Report of the Legal
Committee – Note by the Secretary General C/ES.21/5/Add 1 dated 29 October 2001
Council, 88th Session, Summary Record of the Second Meeting C 88/SR 2 dated 10 June
2002
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Council, 88th Session, Consideration of the Report of the Legal Committee – Note by the
Secretary General C 88/6/Add 1 dated 9 May 2002
Council, 89th session, Consideration of the Strategy and Policy of the Organization
including the Report of the Working Group - IMO Strategic Plan - Submitted by
Bahamas and Greece C 89/12/1 dated 8 October 2002
Council, 89th Session, Summary Record of the First Meeting C 89/SR 1 dated 25
November 2002
Council, 89th Session, Statement by Spain to the IMO Council on the Accident to the
Tanker Prestige – London 25 November 2002 C 89/INF 3 dated 26 November 2002
Council, 90th Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Maritime Safety Committee –
Note by the Secretary General C 90/5/Add 1 dated 11 June 2003
Council, 90th Session, Consideration of the Report of the Legal Committee – Note by the
Secretary General C 90/6/Add 1 dated 21 May 2003
Council, 90th Session, Long-Term Work Plan – Note by the Secretary General C 90/21/
Add 1 dated 19 May 2003
Council, 92nd Session, Summary Record of the Third Meeting C 92/SR 3 dated 22 June
2004
Council, 92nd Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Legal Committee – Note by
the Secretary General C 92/6/Add 1 dated 27 April 2004
Council, 22nd Extraordinary Session, Summary Record of the Second Meeting
C/ES.22/SR 2 dated 21 May 2004
Council, 22nd Extraordinary Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Legal
Committee – Note by the Secretary General C/ES 22/19/Add 1 dated 5 November 2003
Council, 93rd Session, Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting C 93/SR 8 dated 18
November 2004
Council, 94th Session, Consideration of the Reports of the Legal Committee – Note by
the Secretary General C 94/10/Add 1 dated 31 May 2005
5.2.3 Legal Committee
Legal Committee, 83rd Session, Matters arising from the seventy-fourth session of the
Maritime Safety Committee: Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 83/13/3
dated 28 August 2001
Legal Committee, 83rd Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Third Session LEG 83/14 dated 23 October 2001
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Legal Committee, 84th Session, Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 84/7
dated 20 February 2002
Legal Committee, 84th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the International
Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) LEG 84/7/1 dated 19 March 2002
Legal Committee, 84th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Fourth Session LEG 84/14 dated 7 May 2002
Legal Committee, 85th Session, Places of Refuge – Outcome of the forty-eighth session
of the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation LEG 85/10/1 dated 5 September 2002
Legal Committee, 85th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Comite Maritime
International LEG 85/10/3 dated 17 September 2002
Legal Committee, 85th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Fifth Session LEG 85/11 dated 5 November 2002
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 86/8
dated 3 February 2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 86/8/1
dated 14 March 2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Comite Maritime
International LEG 86/8/2 dated 31 March 2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines for the evaluation of risks
associated with the provision of places of refuge – Submitted by Spain LEG 86/8/3
dated 25 March 2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines for action requires of
masters and/or salvors in need of places of refuge; Guidelines for actions expected of
coastal States- Submitted by Spain LEG 86/8/4 dated 26 March 2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines on places of refuge for
ships in need of assistance – General - Submitted by Spain LEG 86/8/5 dated 26 March
2003
Legal Committee, 86th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Sixth Session LEG 86/15 dated 2 May 2003
Legal Committee, 87th Session, Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat Leg 87/7
dated 5 August 2003
Legal Committee, 87th Session, Places of Refuge – Legal Aspects – Submitted by Spain
Leg 87/7/1 dated 6 August 2003
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Legal Committee, 87th Session, Places of Refuge – Summary of responses to the CMI’s
second questionnaire – Submitted by the Comite Maritime International Leg 87/7/2
dated 16 September 2003
Legal Committee, 87th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Seventh Session LEG 87/17 dated 23 October 2003
Legal Committee, 88th Session, Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat LEG 88/6
dated 3 February 2004
Legal Committee, 88th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Eighth Session LEG 88/13 dated 18 May 2004
Legal Committee, 89th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Comite Maritime
International (CMI) LEG 89/7 dated 19 August 2004
Legal Committee, 89th Session, Places of Refuge – Provision of financial security to
authorities in relation to vessels granted a place of refuge - Submitted by the
International Group of P and I Clubs (International Group) LEG 89/7/1 dated 24
September 2004
Legal Committee, 89th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Eighty-Ninth Session LEG 89/16 dated 4 November 2004
Legal Committee, 90th Session, Places of Refuge – Supplementary Report on Places of
Refuge- Submitted by the Comite Maritime International LEG 90/8 dated 11 February
2005
Legal Committee, 90th Session, Places of Refuge - Submitted by the International
Association of Ports and Harbors LEG 90/8/1 dated 18 March 2005
Legal Committee, 90th Session, Places of Refuge – Provision of financial security to
authorities in relation to vessels granted a place of refuge – Submitted by the
International Group of P&I Clubs LEG 90/8/2 dated 17 March 2005
Legal Committee, 90th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Ninetieth Session LEG 90/15 dated 9 May 2005
Legal Committee, 91st Session, Places of Refuge – Report on places of refugeSubmitted by the Comite Maritime International LEG 91/6 dated 24 March 2006
Legal Committee, 91st Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Ninety-first Session LEG 91/12 dated 9 May 2006
Legal Committee, 92nd Session, Biennium activities within the context of the
Organisation’s strategic plan LEG 92/10 dated 11 August 2006
Legal Committee, 92nd Session, Draft Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Ninety-second Session LEG 92/WP 7 dated 19 October 2006
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Legal Committee, 95th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Comite Maritime
International LEG 95/9 dated 23 January 2009
Legal Committee, 95th Session, Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its
Ninety-fifth Session LEG 95/10 dated 22 April 2009

5.2.4

Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)

5.2.4.1 Resolutions
Resolution MEPC 95(46) Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973
(Amendments to regulation 13G of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78 and to the Supplement to
the IOPP Certificate) adopted 27 April 2001 and annexed to Report of the Marine
Environment Protection Committee on its Forty-Sixth Session MEPC 46/23 dated 16
May 2001
Resolution MEPC 111(50) Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 adopted 4
December 2003 and annexed to MEPC 50th Session Report of the Marine Environment
Protection Committee on its Fiftieth Session MEPC 50/3 dated 8 December 2003
5.2.4.2 Documents
MEPC, 44th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Forty-Fourth Session MEPC 44/20 dated 12 April 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Aftermath of the “Erika” incident – Submitted by Greece MEPC 45/7/1 dated
31 May 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Outcome of MSC 72 on matters relating to the Erika incident – Note by the
Secretariat MEPC 45/7/2 dated 8 June 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Aftermath of the “Erika” incident – Submitted by Spain MEPC 45/7/5 dated 30
June 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Outcome of the Study on the Impact of the Proposals to amend Regulation 13G
of MARPOL Annex 1- Note by the Secretariat MEPC 45/7/6/Add 1 dated 31 August
2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Alternative suggestions for the revision of regulation 13G – Submitted by the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) MEPC 45/7/12 dated 22 August 2000
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MEPC, 45th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Forty-Fifth Session MEPC 45/20 dated 16 October 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Post Erika Actions- IACS initiatives following the Erika incident – Submitted
by the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) MEPC 45/Inf 22
dated 31 July 2000
MEPC, 45th Session, Interpretation and Amendments of MARPOL 73/78 and Related
Codes – Outcome of the Study on the Impact of the Proposals to amend Regulation 13G
of MARPOL Annex 1- Note by the Secretariat MEPC 45/Inf 29 dated 1 September 2000
MEPC, 46th Session Implementation of the OPRC Convention and the OPRC-HNS
Protocol and Relevant Conference Resolutions – The Erika Incident – Submitted by
France MEPC 46/4/4 dated 26 January 2001
MEPC, 46th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Forty-Sixth Session MEPC 46/23 dated 16 May 2001
MEPC, 47th Session, Implementation of the OPRC Convention and the OPRC-HNS
Protocol and Relevant Conference Resolutions –Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress –
Outcome of MSC 74, LEG 83 and NAV 47 – Note by the Secretariat MEPC 47/5/3
MEPC, 47th Session, Implementation of the OPRC Convention and the OPRC-HNS
Protocol and Relevant Conference Resolutions –Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress –
Outcome of MSC 74, LEG 83 and NAV 47 – Submitted by the International Association
of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) MEPC 47/5/4 dated 18 December 2001
MEPC, 47th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Forty-Seventh Session MEPC 47/20 dated 18 March 2002
MEPC, 48th Session, Reports of Sub-Committees – Outcome of NAV 48 - Note by the
Secretariat MEPC 48/9/5 dated 8 August 2002
MEPC, 48th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Forty-Eighth Session MEPC 48/21 dated 24 October 2002
MEPC, 49th Session, Work of Other Bodies – Outcome of MSC 77 – Note by the
Secretariat MEPC 49/11/6 dated 18 June 2003
MEPC, 50th Session, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its
Fiftieth Session MEPC 50/3 dated 8 December 2003
MEPC, 53rd Session, Work of Other Bodies _ Outcome of LEG 90 – Note by the
Secretariat MEPC 53/11/3 dated 9 May 2005
MEPC, 55th Session, Work Programme - Review of progress made in implementing the
High-level action plan and priorities for the 2006-2007 biennium and Proposals for the
High-level action plan and priorities, including planned output, for the 2008-2009
biennium – Note by the Secretariat MEPC 55/19/7 dated 13 September 2006
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5.2.4.3 Circulars
Prohibition of Entry into Spanish Ports, Terminals or Anchorage Areas of Single-Hull
Oil Tankers carrying Heavy Oils MEPC/Circ.402 dated 15 January 2003
Communication of Information Under the Revised Regulation 13G and the new
Regulation 13H of MARPOL Annex I MEPC/Circ.429 dated 9 February 2005

5.2.5

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)

MSC, 72nd Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-second
Session MSC 72/23 dated #1 May 2000
MSC, 73rd Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-third
Session MSC 73/21 dated 12 December 2000
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies – Outcome of COMSAR 5, FP 45,
STW 32 and BLG 6 on post-Erika safety-related issues – Note by the Secretariat MSC
74/2/3 dated 21 February 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies- Post “Erika” safety-related matters
– Ports/places of refuge – Note by the Secretariat MSC 74/2/3/Add.1 dated 22 January
2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies- Outcome of FSI 9 and DE 44 on
post “Erika” safety-related issues – Note by the Secretariat MSC 74/2/3/Add.2 dated
19 March 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies-Designation by coastal States of
places of refuge for vessels in distress where there is a risk of pollution – Submitted by
Spain MSC 74/2/4 dated 11 February 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies- Emergency assistance rendered to
ships in ports of refuge on the Spanish coast – Submitted by Spain MSC 74/2/4/Add.1
dated 24 February 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies – Ports of refuge –Submitted by the
International Chamber of Shipping MSC 74/2/5 dated 23 March 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies- Ports or anchorages of refuge –
Submitted by the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(INTERTANKO) MSC 74/2/6 dated 5 April 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies-Designation by coastal States of
places of refuge for vessels in distress where there is a risk of pollution – Submitted by
Germany MSC 74/2/7 dated 6 April 2001
MSC, 74th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-fourth
Session MSC 74/24 dated 13 June 2001
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MSC, 75th Session, Decisions of other IMO Bodies-Outcome of the eighty-fourth session
of the Legal Committee – Note by the Secretariat MSC 75/2/1/Add 1 dated 26 April
2002
MSC, 75th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-fifth Session
MSC 75/24 dated 29 May 2002
MSC, 76th Session, Safety of Navigation – Places of Refuge – Note by the Secretariat
MSC 76/11/3 dated 29 October 2002
MSC, 76th Session, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-sixth
Session MSC 76/23 dated 16 December 2002
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Outcome of MSC 74/76 on Ports/Places of
refuge (Sheltered waters) – Note by the Secretariat MSC 77/8 dated 11 February 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Outcome of fifty-seventh session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and COMSAR 7 – Note by the Secretariat MSC 77/8/1
dated 11 February 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the International Union of Marine
Insurance (IUMI) MSC 77/8/2 dated 14 February 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the Commonwealth of the Bahamas
MSC 77/8/3 dated 3 March 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by France MSC 77/8/4 dated 3 March
2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines for the evaluation of risks associated
with the provision of places of refuge- Submitted by Spain MSC 77/8/5 dated 31 March
2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines for action requires of masters and/or
salvors in need of places of refuge; Guidelines for actions expected of coastal StatesSubmitted by Spain MSC 77/8/6 dated 31 March 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need
of assistance – General - Submitted by Spain MSC 77/8/7 dated 31 March 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by the BIMCO MSC 77/8/8 dated 24
March 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Submitted by INTERTANKO MSC 77/8/9 dated
25 March 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Comments on document MSC 77/8/3 (Bahamas)
– Note By Spain MSC 77/8/10 dated 4 April 2003
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MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Comments on the paper submitted by the
International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) Places of Refuge – MSC 77/8/2 –
Submitted by the United Kingdom MSC 77/8/11 dated 8 April 2003
MSC, 77th Session, Places of Refuge – Safe Havens for disabled gas carriers – Note by
the Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) MSC 77/Inf
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